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Abstract 
Governing water in Canada is in transition. Since 2000, episodes of drought, unsafe drinking 
water, and polluted watersheds have affected local and First Nations communities. In reaction to 
these crises, provincial regulators entered a new governance phase. This regulatory turn profoundly 
transforms the traditional environmental regulatory approach by introducing a collaborative new 
governance arrangement. The legal scholarship is generally supportive of this trend, however, a 
dearth of empirical research exists to understand how decisions are made under this new 
regulatory approach.  
 This dissertation presents an “eco-resiliency framework” to examine the 
responsiveness of this new governance mode to environmental change. The primary 
research question is: What lessons can be taken from resiliency theory and applied in the 
sphere of environmental regulation and governance? Three comparative case studies of local 
watershed-level committees — in Ontario, Alberta, and the Yukon — served as empirical 
evidence. The research methodology adopted a qualitative approach (i.e., participant observation 
and interviews with committee members) and a thorough review of the relevant legislation, 
administrative decisions, policy documents, and media reports. The data was analyzed in terms 
of the four eco-resiliency elements: flexibility, diversity, a broad perspective, and emergent 
change.  
Contrary to the themes of inclusivity and consensus found in the collaborative 
governance literature, the research findings exposed an insular and technocratic decision-making 
process that served the political interests of the province and the administrative needs of the 
regulatory agency. Even though, in theory, the provincial regimes under study allowed for a 
diverse number of stakeholders at the policy table, in practice, only a few experts influenced the 
decision-making. Local communities’ ecological health and environmental concerns including 
First Nations’ ways of knowing water were overlooked. The devolution of water governance to a 
local level, rather than empowering local public-interest representatives, concentrates power in 
the hands of a few participants. Surprisingly, the Yukon Water Board, an administrative tribunal 
with strict procedural requirements, offered the strongest opportunity for Aboriginal and 
conservation groups to raise their water concerns. The most important finding is the erosion of 
the environmental protection function of the state, which is obscured by this policy drift.  
 
 
	  iii	  
Dedication 
 
Lorraine Butterworth, my true mom. 
  
John Hania, my dad, who immigrated to Canada to find his way and learned to 
love his adopted country while missing his beloved homeland.  
 
Jackie Eiler (nee Hania) whose premature death inspired me  
to pursue my dream of going to law school.   
 
Chris (Donald Christopher) Holland, my dear high school friend,  
who always had my back and who I miss dearly. 
	  iv	  
Acknowledgments 
There are so many friends and family members to thank for their kind words of 
encouragement. Jac, thank you for your support and for giving me the space to 
complete this research project.  Brenda, the Diva’s and Renee, your interesting 
questions always made me think more deeply about my research. Professor Audrey 
Armour, thank you for your guidance. Professor Peer Zumbansen, I am so thankful 
that you set a high academic standard. Dayna, my Ph.D. supervisor, who always 
offered insightful comments, endless edits and today, gives me hope for the future. 
Finally, thank you, to all the individuals who participated in this research. Each 
one of you graciously offered your time to share your views on water resource 
management planning. Your contributions give voice and legitimacy to this 
research. 
	  v	  
Table of Contents 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii	  
Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... iii	  
Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................ iv	  
Dissertation Overview .................................................................................................................. 1	  
1.0 	   Introduction ....................................................................................................................1	  
2.0 	   Key Research Findings ..................................................................................................8	  
2.1	   Eco-Resiliency Factor of Flexibility ......................................................................9	  
2.2	   Eco-Resiliency Factor of Diversity ......................................................................10	  
2.3	   Eco-Resiliency Factor of Broad Perspective .......................................................12	  
2.4	   Eco-Resiliency Factor of Emergent Change ......................................................12	  
2.5	   Additional Findings .............................................................................................13	  
3.0 	   Dissertation Chapters Outlined ..................................................................................15	  
Chapter One:  Literature Review & Research Methodology ................................................. 20	  
1.0 	   The Research Problem, Question & Rationale ..........................................................20	  
1.1 	   The Research Problem: Is the Governance Experiment Suitable to Protect 
Water Sources? ....................................................................................................20	  
1.2 	   Research Question: Lessons from Resiliency Theory .......................................22	  
1.3 	   Research Rationale: Is Environmental Policy Responsive to Industry 
Pressure or Ecological Change? .........................................................................22	  
2.0 	   Literature Review: Understanding the Responsive Regulation Theme ..................30	  
2.1 	   Environmental Regulatory Practice in Canada: The Policy Drift to the 
Governance Mode ................................................................................................30	  
3.1	    A Call For Change ..............................................................................................41	  
4.0 	   An Interdisciplinary Perspective ................................................................................43	  
4.1	    Bridging Legal and Natural Resource Governance Scholarship ...................43	  
 
 
 
 
 
	  vi	  
5.0 	   Re-Centering Environmental Policy–making Towards Eco-Resiliency: Exploring 
The Gap in Gunningham and Sinclair’s “Integrative Regulatory Approach” ......44	  
5.1 	   Introduction ..........................................................................................................44	  
5.2	   A Synopsis of the Integrative Regulatory Approach (Smart Regulation) ......45	  
5.3 	   The Normative Frame of Effectiveness and Efficiency ....................................47	  
5.4 	   Integrative Regulatory Approach’s Five Principles: ........................................48	  
5.5	   Does the Smart Regulation Model Lead to Better Environmental Decision-
Making? ................................................................................................................52	  
 
6.0 	   A Synopsis Of C.S. Holling’s Resilency Theory ........................................................53	  
6.1	   Introduction ..........................................................................................................53	  
6.2	   Examples of Resiliency & A Loss of Resiliency .................................................54	  
6.3 	   Applying the Resiliency Concept to a Natural Resource Management Regime55	  
6.4 	   The Pathology of the Command-and-Control Regime – The Engineered 
Approach ..............................................................................................................56	  
 
7.0 	   Research Methodology .................................................................................................58	  
7.1 	   Introduction ..........................................................................................................58	  
7.2 	   Theoretical Perspectives ......................................................................................59	  
7.3 	   The Methodology Introduction ...........................................................................61	  
7.4 	   Literature Review and Mapping ........................................................................62	  
7.5 	   Units of Analysis ...................................................................................................64	  
7.6 	   The Case Studies ..................................................................................................64	  
7.7 	   Data Collection .....................................................................................................68	  
7.8 	   The Evaluative Criteria .......................................................................................70	  
7.9 	   Research Limitations ...........................................................................................71	  
Chapter Two:  Eco-Resiliency Indicators: The Eco-Resiliency Governance Framework ... 73	  
1.0 	   Introduction ..................................................................................................................73	  
2.0 	   Eco-Resiliency Governance Framework ....................................................................77	  
2.1 	   Flexibility ..............................................................................................................78	  
2.2 	   A Broad Perspective ............................................................................................82	  
2.3 	   Diversity ................................................................................................................85	  
2.4 	   Emergent Change and the Element of Surprise ................................................87 
	  vii	  
Chapter	  Two:	  	  Eco-­‐‑Resiliency	  Indicators:	  The	  Eco-­‐‑Resiliency	  Governance	  Framework	  	  
3.0 	   Strengthening the Governance Model ........................................................................91	  
4.0 	   Summary: The Literature Mapping Exercise & Establishing the Eco-Resiliency 
Governance Framework ..............................................................................................91	  
Chapter Three:  The Chameleon State: Signaling and Shaping of Water Governance  
through Ontario’s Source Protection Committees .................................................................. 93	  
1.0	   Overview: A Story of One Water Plan, Two Communities and Their Struggles 
Over Water ...................................................................................................................93	  
2.0 	   Introduction ..................................................................................................................95	  
3.0 	   Background ...................................................................................................................98	  
3.1	   Community Conflict & Aggregate Extraction ..................................................98	  
3.2	   The Aggregate Industry Perspective ..................................................................99	  
3.3	   The Local Communities’ Perspective ...............................................................101	  
3.4	   Presenting at the Local Water Committee ......................................................103	  
3.5	   Summary: Governance as a Process of Decision-Making – How Are Decision-
makers Responsive to Environmental Change? .............................................110	  
4.0 	   Historical Context: A Water Governance Crisis — Walkerton, Ontario. ............111	  
4.1 	   Introduction ........................................................................................................111	  
4.2 	   The Walkerton Governance Crisis – The Holiday Weekend – May 24th, 2000114	  
5.0 	   Applying The Eco-Resiliency Framework To The Legal Framework ..................117	  
5.1 	   Introduction ........................................................................................................117	  
5.2 	   Diversity ..............................................................................................................117	  
5.3 	   Flexibility ............................................................................................................122	  
5.4 	   Broad Perspective ..............................................................................................126	  
5.5 	   Emergent Change ...............................................................................................129	  
6.0 	   The Eco-Resiliency Framework In Practice: The Water Source Protection 
Committees & Localized Watershed Management Planning Process & Aggregate 
Extraction ....................................................................................................................130	  
6.1 	   Flexibility – Consensus Building ......................................................................130	  
6.2 	   Broad Perspective ..............................................................................................135	  
7.0 	   Conclusion ...................................................................................................................137	  
	  viii	  
 
Chapter Four:  The Enigma State: The Changing Form and Function of Water 
Governance through Alberta’s Soft Law Approach .............................................................. 140	  
1.0	   Overview: What is consensus? ...................................................................................140	  
2.0 	   Introduction ................................................................................................................142	  
3.0 	   Background .................................................................................................................144	  
3.1 	   A Historical Context: Alberta’s Soft-Law Approach to Water Governance144	  
4.0 	   Appyling the Eco-Resiliency Framework to Alberta’s Soft-Law Policy Approach148	  
4.1 	   Diversity ..............................................................................................................148	  
4.2 	   Flexibility ............................................................................................................151	  
4.3 	   Broad Perspective ..............................................................................................164	  
4.4 	   Emergent Change ...............................................................................................168	  
5.0 	   The Eco-Resiliency Framework in Practice – The WPAC & Consensus-Building172	  
6.0 	   Conclusion: The Puzzling State of Water Governance ...........................................174	  
Chapter Five:  The Yukon: The Mechanized State: The State’s Stable and  Routine Form 
of Water Governance Mediated through the  Yukon’s Waters Act .................................... 177	  
1.0	   Overview ......................................................................................................................177	  
2.0 	   Introduction ................................................................................................................178	  
3.0 	   Background .................................................................................................................182	  
3.1	   The Federal Level ..............................................................................................182	  
3.2	   The Provincial Level ..........................................................................................185	  
4.0 	   The Yukon’s Fragmented Legal Structure ..............................................................188	  
4.1 	   Introduction ........................................................................................................188	  
5.0 	   The Legislative Context .............................................................................................190	  
5.1 	   Introduction – The Big Picture: Environmental Protection in the Yukon ...190	  
5.2	   The Yukon Water Board (Board) & Its Water Governance Role ................191	  
5.3	   What is the connection between The Yukon Waters Act and the Umbrella 
Final Agreement and Little Salmon/Carmacks First National Final 
Agreement? .........................................................................................................191	  
 
 
 
 
	  ix	  
6.0 	   Applying the Eco-Resiliency Framework to the Legal Framework ......................195	  
6.1 	   Introduction ........................................................................................................195	  
6.2	   Diversity - The Legal Framework: The UFA Agreement and the Waters Act, 
2003......................................................................................................................196	  
6.3 	   Flexibility ............................................................................................................198	  
6.4 	   Broad Perspective ..............................................................................................201	  
6.5 	   The Accommodation of Emergent Change ......................................................205	  
7.0 	   The Eco-Resiliency Framework in Practice — The Yukon Water Board ............208	  
7.1	   Introduction: The Board’s Carmacks Decision ..............................................208	  
8.0	   Applying the Eco-Resiliency Framework to the Yukon Water Board’s Carmacks 
Copper Ltd Water Use Licence #QZ08-084 Decision of May 10 2010. .................209	  
8.1	   A Broad Perspective ..........................................................................................209	  
8.2	   Emergent Change ...............................................................................................210	  
9.0	   The Legal Sequel .........................................................................................................212	  
10.0 	  The Water Board’s July 4-6th 2012 Public Hearing - Minto Explorations Ltd’s 
Water Use Licence #QZ11-031 Amendment #8 for the Minto Mine Yukon Project213	  
10.1	   Introduction ........................................................................................................213	  
10.2	  Diversity ..............................................................................................................214	  
10.3	  Flexibility ............................................................................................................216	  
10.4	  The Accommodation of Emergent Change ......................................................219	  
11.0	   Conclusion ...................................................................................................................221	  
Chapter Six:  The Voices of the Committee Members on Eco-Resiliency ........................... 223	  
1.0 	   Introduction ................................................................................................................223	  
2.0 	   The Committee’s Responsiveness to Ecological Change ........................................223	  
3.0 	   Eco-Resiliency Framework – The Flexibility Factor ..............................................233	  
3.1 	   Introduction: Flexible Governance Regimes ...................................................233	  
3.2 	   Eco-Resiliency Framework: The Diversity Factor .........................................242	  
3.3 	   Eco-Resiliency Framework: A Broad Perspective Factor .............................264	  
3.4 	   The Emergent Change Factor ...........................................................................267	  
4.0 	   Synthesis Of Findings: The Limitations Of These Legislative Experiments ........272	  
4.1 	   Regulatory Capture ...........................................................................................272	  
4.2 	   Agency Capture ..................................................................................................274	  
4.3 	   Accountability for Environmental Protection .................................................277 
	  x	  
4.0	  	   Synthesis	  Of	  Findings:	  The	  Limitations	  Of	  These	  Legislative	  Experiments	   	  
4.4 	   Volunteer Fatigue ...............................................................................................280	  
4.5 	   Coping With Change .........................................................................................281	  
5.0 	   Concluding Comments on the Eco-Resiliency Governance Framework ..............284	  
Chapter Seven:  Conclusion – Lessons Learned  As a Participant Observer in a Water 
Committee .................................................................................................................................. 287	  
1.0 	   Introduction ................................................................................................................287	  
2.0 	   Lessons Learned From Applying the Eco-Resiliency Governance Framework ..289	  
2.1	   Eco-Resiliency Factor One: Flexibility ............................................................290	  
2.2	   Eco-Resiliency Factor Two: Diversity ...............................................................292	  
2.3	   Eco-Resiliency Factor Three: Broad Perspective .............................................296	  
2.4	   Eco-Resiliency Factor Four: Emergent Change Perspective ...........................297	  
3.0	   The Possibilities for Improvement .............................................................................297	  
3.1	   Foster Social Capital & Networking & Community Building .......................300	  
3.2	   Changing to a Social-Ecological Perspective of Water ...................................301	  
3.3	   Encouraging Surrogate Regulators ..................................................................301	  
3.4	   Thinking About Innovation & Knowledge Transfer Opportunities .............302	  
4.0 	   Recommendations to Strengthen the Governance Mode .......................................303	  
4.1	   Strengthen Transparency ..................................................................................304	  
4.2	   Test the Readiness of the Participants to Participate in a Collaborative 
Govenance Arrangement. ..................................................................................305	  
4.3	   Strengthen Diversity ..........................................................................................305	  
4.4	   Create A Regulatory Administrative Coordinating Mechanism ...................306	  
4.5	   Changing to a Social-Ecological Perspective of Water ...................................306	  
4.6	   Implement Adaptive Governance Based on Adaptive Management Principles306	  
4.7	   Encourage the Role of the Civil Society Sector as Surrogate Regulators and 
Foster Public Awareness of Water Security Issues .........................................307	  
4.8	   Conduct Further Research ................................................................................307	  
	  xi	  
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 308	  
Appendix “A” – The Interview Instrument ........................................................................... 328	  
Appendix “B” – The Four Part-Motion .................................................................................. 331	  
 
 
	  	   	  1	  
Dissertation Overview  
1.0  Introduction 
In Canada, an environmental regime change often arises from an ecological crisis that prompts 
new legislation. This dissertation examines the environmental regulatory change to a governance 
mode away from the traditional command-and-control approach. 1  In response to the water 
governance crisis in Walkerton, Ontario (May, 2000) provincial regulators across Canada moved 
quickly to introduce new water laws, without much debate. The new regulatory approach 
typically involved local, stakeholder-driven water committees. In fact, this governance mode is 
now the dominant legal model in Canada. But, is this regulatory approach suitable to protect 
water sources?  
 With the introduction of the governance mode, the environmental regulatory paradigm at 
a provincial level is now firmly repositioned towards the process of decision-making. While the 
legal literature is generally supportive of a governance arrangement that increases transparency 
and the participation of the public, a dearth of empirical research exists on these regulatory 
governance experiments. In particular, little is known as to how environmental decisions are 
made and who decides in the context of these water committees. This dissertation provides 
comparative case study research, which casts doubt on the collaborative decision-making nature 
of this governance mode.  
 The three case studies presented in this research demonstrate a situation of regulatory 
change in response to a crisis – specifically, an environmental crisis and a crisis of uncertainty. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 C. Abbott, “Environmental Command Regulation” in B.J. Richardson and S. Wood, Environmental Law for  
Sustainability: A Reader (Portland: Hart, 2006) at 61. A command-and- control regulatory style “refers to the 
prescriptive nature of regulation, the command, supported by imposition of some negative sanction, the control.”  
Some scholars argue the term “command-and-control” to describe regulation is unnecessary because typically, 
regulation is based on commands and includes different types of sanctions (controls) to modify behaviour. In this 
dissertation, the term traditional regulation refers to command-and-control regulation. This command-and-control 
phrase is also used to align to the meaning as used by Gunningham, et al., Smart Regulation, Infra note 5. The Smart 
Regulation model’s responsiveness theme is the primary regulatory model examined in this research.     
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In Ontario, the Walkerton contaminated drinking water tragedy spurred legislative change and 
the introduction of 19 localized source protection committees, enacted through a  regulation 
under the Clean Water Act, 2006 (CWA).2 In Alberta, water scarcity challenges resulted in 
the introduction of the Water Act3 and the Water for Life Strategy4 that were relied upon to 
organize local water governance through watershed planning and advisory councils. In May 
2010, when the Yukon Water Board heard the Western Copper–Carmacks application and 
denied the mining proponent’s water license, a crisis of uncertainty emerged within the mining 
industry operating in the Territories. This denial of the license resulted in the industry proponent 
appealing the Board’s decision to raise a legal question on the jurisdiction of the Water Board. 
Together, the Walkerton drinking water tragedy, the water quantity issues in Alberta and the 
Yukon administrative law proceedings prompt deeper thinking on the rationale of regulators to 
experiment with the protection of water through a strategy of “regulatory pluralism.”5   
 Generally, at a provincial level, a state-centric form of governance characterized the 
early phase of environmental protection regulation, as exhibited by the command-and-control 
implementation style. In other words, the state controlled and directed the behaviour of the 
regulated entities through prescriptive legislation. The state set out the regulatory standards, 
instruments or commands, and state-imposed sanctions or controls were incorporated into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 S.O. 2006, c. 22. See O. Reg. 288/07.  
3 R.S.A., 2000, c. W-3. 
4 Alberta Government, Water for Life Strategy: Alberta’s Strategy for Sustainability (November, 2003) and Alberta 
Government, Water for Life: A Renewal  (November, 2008), online: Alberta Environment and Parks 
<http://www.waterforlife.alberta.ca/02488.html>. 
5 P. Grabosky, “Beyond Responsive Regulation: The expanding role of non-state actors in the regulatory process” 
(2013) 7 Regulation & Governance 114 at 115. Grabosky states the concept of regulatory pluralism “derives from 
that of legal pluralism which recognizes that the law exists alongside a variety of lesser normative orderings.” And, 
locates regulatory pluralism as an extension of Galanter’s observation that “legal system is often secondary rather 
than a primary locus of regulation”; including other scholars such as Griffiths view that law is “an unsystemic 
collage of inconsistent and overlapping parts.”; N. Gunningham, P. Grabosky, D. Sinclair, Smart Regulation: 
Designing Environmental Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 89-91. Where regulatory pluralism is 
described as inclusion of a range of state and non-state actors who, for example, are charged with implementing or 
overseeing the implementation of a mix of instruments. 
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regulation. Today’s legally constituted governance experiments reorient the state’s role towards 
a shared environmental protection function. However,  when governance is a shared function,  
private actors,  in a certain respect, become regulators of the water. With the shift to a 
governance mode, I question the state’s function as the guardian of the public interest, namely as 
the upholder of environmental protection values.  
 Prior to this profound regulatory turn away from command-and-control approaches, 
global regulatory trends – in particular, the 1990s neo-liberal era of privatization and the 
“responsive regulation theme” – strengthened the “consultative” regulatory relationship 
provincial governments had established with the private sector.6 This advice-giving relationship 
has defined the participation of industry actors in Canada’s environmental regulation since the 
1970s command-and-control period and continued through the government’s adoption of the 
cost-cutting measures under the industry-oriented “new public management” platform of the 
1990s.7 This partnership between environmental regulators and the private sector reverberates 
through the recent regulatory trend towards a shared governance mode, where a plurality of state 
and non-state actors govern water at a local watershed level. Perhaps this consultative 
partnership regularized the participation of private actors in regulatory affairs and facilitated the 
easy acceptance of the governance mode by regulators.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 S. Wood, G. Tanner & B.J. Richardson, “What Ever Happened to Canadian Environmental Law” (2010) 37 
Ecology Law Quarterly 981 at 988.  
7Ibid. Also see The Honourable Dennis R. O’Connor, Walkerton Commission of Inquiry – Part One: A Summary 
Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: The Events of May 2000 and Related Issues (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 
2002) at 463. online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/walkerton/part1/WI_Summary.pdf>. [Herein Known 
as Walkerton Report One] Justice O’Connor discusses cost cutting measures under the Common Sense Revolution 
Platform. In the Inquiry Report he states: “The Red Tape Commission was established in November 1995 as a 
Cabinet-level committee. … The Commission’s primary objectives included, in part, the following objectives: i) 
Reduce the compliance costs and administrative burden to businesses and institutions, thereby improving the 
competitiveness and business climate for existing and new businesses. ii) Move toward alternative methods of 
regulation, such as the establishment of performance standards and allowing business self-regulation; move away 
from micro-managing the compliance process…..” 
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 The devolution of public responsibilities to private and civil society sectors also occurred 
during these periods of regulatory change.8 For example, in June 1995, Ontario’s Ministry of the 
Environment announced the transfer of the testing of drinking water from the Ministry of Health 
to private labs. In the Walkerton Reports, Justice O’Connor cited this privatization policy as a 
contributing factor to the Walkerton incident.9 However, in certain ways, explored in more detail 
in this dissertation, the devolving of responsibilities to private actors continues with the 
regulatory shift to a shared governance approach.  
 Taken together, the shift to the governance mode, the embeddedness of the private sector 
in the regulatory function, the influence of the neo-liberal philosophy on environmental 
regulation and its devolution effect produce a problematic result from the perspective of public 
law values (for example, environmental protection, access to public process, transparency) 
underpinning water source protection. As I embarked on this research, I anticipated that the 
industry’s dominant regulatory role in the environmental function could translate into a 
domineering voice in the localized water committee setting. I wondered, who would raise 
environmental protection values and water security issues in this multi-party forum? Moreover, 
would these decision-makers be responsive to the changing ecological conditions occurring 
within a watershed? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Wood, Tanner & Richardson, Supra note 6. 
9 O’Connor, Walkerton Report One, Supra note 7. See Chapter 10: Failure to Enact a Notification Regulation – 10.4 
The Move to Privatization in 1995–96 beginning at 374 and Chapter 13: Budget Reductions at 31-35. Justice 
O’Connor, at page 376 explains that: “A new government was elected in Ontario in June 1995. The MOE initiative 
to privatize drinking water testing that had begun shortly before the election was consistent with the policies of the 
new government. The decision to privatize became part of the budget reductions implemented through the MOE 
business plan dated January 22, 1996, and approved by Cabinet on February 28, 1996. The original MOE proposal 
for privatization, in June 1995, was based on a time line of two to three years. After the newly elected government 
assumed office, this period was reduced to six months, then to four months, then to two months. Municipalities were 
informed, in a letter dated May 15, 1996, that the MOE’s laboratories would stop providing routine drinking water 
tests on July 13, 1996. On July 17, 1996, the Ministry of Health informed municipalities that its laboratories would 
also stop routine testing, as of September 1996. This notification letter was applicable to the testing of water in 
Walkerton, “because the Walkerton PUC had historically sent its water samples to the Ministry of Health laboratory 
in Palmerston for testing.” 
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 Water security has been an ongoing governance problem for water managers across 
Canada. By 2000, watersheds in Alberta, Ontario and the Yukon were exhibiting changes 
associated with climate change (episodes of drought and flooding), oil/gas and mining activities 
(hydraulic fracturing – i.e., fracking and mineral extraction) and contaminated drinking water 
events. As I commenced my research, I expected the decision-makers in these water committees 
would debate these water security issues, especially in my three selected research sites: Alberta’s 
Bow River Basin Council (BRBC),  Ontario’s Lake Erie Source Water Protection Committee 
and the Yukon’s Water Board. Instead, I found these issues were not raised by the committee 
members, nor debated in the committee forum, nor fully explored in the committee’s reports or 
decision documents. For example, in the BRBC’s Bow River Basin State of the Watershed 
Summary Report (2010), climate change “predict[ions of] increased glacial melting” is briefly 
commented upon and, then is quickly discounted in the report.10 As an information tool for 
“water managers and users .. of the Bow River,”11 I ask: Did this watershed status report prepare 
water managers, residents and business owners of Calgary for the June 2013 flood, reportedly 
“Canada’s costliest natural disaster”?” 12  This research demonstrates how governing water 
through a management planning exercise and licensing process remained a reactive and insular 
administrative function directed at the technocratic and narrow information needs of its 
administrators. Oddly, a protective, watershed-level perspective was missing in the committees’ 
decision-making processes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Bow River Basin Council, Print Copy: Bow River Basin State of the Watershed Report Summary Booklet, 2010 
(Calgary, Bow River Basin Council, 2010) at 13. Also see BRBC, State of Watershed Summary Booklet (2010), 
online: BRBC <http://wsow.brbc.ab.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=102&Itemid=182>. 
11 Ibid. at 2.  
12 Government of Canada, “Canada’s Top Ten Weather Stories for 2013 – 1. Alberta’s Flood of Floods,” online: 
Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/meteo-weather/default.asp?lang=En&n=5BA5EAFC-
1&offset=2&toc=hide>. 
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 The three research sites also illustrate the change towards regulatory pluralism, where a 
multiplicity of public, private, civil society and First Nations representatives participate in a 
regulatory function.13 Regulatory scholars and provincial regulators anticipated that a diverse 
range of stakeholders would participate in these watershed committees. Building on K. Bakker’s 
definition of governance as “how we make decisions and who gets to decide,”14 I pursued 
this research to gather empirical data on these questions. I discovered the politicized nature of 
water governance where an agency captured by provincial authorities prevailed and where 
decision-making power was concentrated in the hands of a few actors. The civil society sector’s 
participation and the First Nations’ ways of knowing water were marginalized. The results call 
into question the theoretical participatory premise of the governance mode and point to the need 
for further research on the power and negotiation dynamics in play. 
 Change is a key feature of environmental regulatory regimes and natural ecological 
systems. Conceptually, the notion of change connects the theories of “responsive 
environmental regulation”15 and “resiliency.”16 In order to examine the responsiveness of the 
decision-makers to environmental change in watersheds, this dissertation relies on the 
governance and ecological literature by connecting the ecological theory of “resiliency”17 with 
the regulation literature’s “responsive environmental regulation” 18  theme. The ecological 
literature defines resiliency as “a measure of a system’s capacity to cope with shocks and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Grabosky & Gunningham, Supra note 5. 
14 K. Bakker, ed, Eau Canada: The Future of Canada’s Water (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) at 16. 
15 N. Gunningham and D. Sinclair, “Integrative Regulation: A Principled-Based Approach to Environmental Policy” 
(1999) Law & Society Inquiry - American Bar Foundation 853.; This article is premised on Gunningham, Grabosky 
and Sinclair’s Smart Regulation see footnote Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair, Supra 5. 
16 C.S. Holling, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems” (1973) 4 Annual Review of Ecology and 
Systematics 1 in R.K. Turner, K. Button and P. Nijkamp, Ecosystems and Nature: Economics, Science and Policy 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999). 
17 Ibid.  
18 Gunningham, Grabosky & Sinclair,  Supra note 15.   
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undergo change while retaining essentially the same structure and function.”19 In short, resiliency 
is a measurement of an ecosystem’s adaptability and stability.  
 Similar to a  natural system often characterized as adaptive, interconnected and 
responsive, I wondered whether a social-legal system such as a governance regime could be 
responsive to ecological change. 20 This academic curiosity informed the dissertation’s primary 
research question: What lessons can be taken from resiliency theory and applied to 
environmental regulation and governance? To address the question I take up Canadian ecologist 
C.S. Holling’s four features of resiliency: flexibility, diversity, a broad perspective and the 
capacity to react to emergent change. 21  These four features make up an “eco-resiliency 
framework,” which I offer as an evaluative tool to examine if a particular legal governance model 
exhibits features of an environmentally responsive regime. 22  I  found the legislation and 
policy documents exhibited features of eco-resiliency, but the practice of water governance fell 
short in supporting an eco-resilient governance mode. Perhaps organizational change scholars 
would have predicted this regulatory implementation problem, but this business management 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 B.H. Walker, N. Abel, J.M. Anderies & P. Ryan, “Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability in the Goulburn-
Broken Catchment, Australia” (2009) 14(1) Ecology and Society 12.  
20 S.A. Levin, The Princeton Guide to Ecology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). Conceptually, the 
social-ecological system recognizes ecological systems as “linked to social systems comprised of resource users and 
their governance arrangements.” 
21 Holling, Supra note 16 at 21. A description of these four resiliency features is discussed in final section of the 
1973 article under the heading: Application. The naming of these four features and characterizing these elements as 
the Eco-resiliency Framework is exclusive to this dissertation and is inspired by Holling’s thinking in his 1973 
article.  
22 The term “eco-resiliency” is coined in this research to distinguish resiliency from its use in other disciplines and to limit 
the term to an ecological context. For example, the term resilience has been used to define “personal” resilience, 
“community resiliency” and “organizational resilience.” S. Mikail, “Dimensions of Human Resilience: An 
Overview” 2014 [Unpublished] Mikail relies upon numerous authors including: J.W. Reich, A.J. Zautra (Eds.) 
Handbook of Adult Resilience (New York: Guilford Press, 2010). In this article, Mikail (Ph.D., C.Psych., ABPP.) 
offers a definition of individual resilience and community resilience: “resilience is the ability to recover from 
challenges in a manner that leaves an individual or community more flexible and better able to meet future 
challenges. Resilience involves an ability to react creatively and constructively to change while recognizing that 
change is ongoing part of life.” Community resilience is “the existence, development, and engagement of community 
resources by community members to thrive in an environment characterized by change, uncertainty, unpredictability, 
and surprise.” Mikail further introduces the concept of organizational resilience, which is defined as “the capacity of 
a system, its function and structure in the face of internal and external changes.” In sum, the term resiliency reflects 
an ability to adapt to change. 
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theory was not explored in this research. In the end, I conclude that the regulatory policy drift to 
a governance mode does not produce better environmental decision-making. I anticipate this 
particular finding will be of interest to policy-makers, legal scholars, including First Nations and 
local community groups interested in participating in a localized water committee.  
 Even though, in this research, the social-ecological context of governing a watershed is 
acknowledged as complex, the goal of this research is simple: to examine these newly 
constituted legal models in order to understand how water committee members make 
environmental decisions. The qualitative research methodology adopted in this dissertation relies 
upon participant observation and interviews with committee members, a literature review and a 
thorough analysis of legislation, jurisprudence, administrative law decision-making document of 
the Yukon Water Board, policy documents and media reports. To examine the ecological 
responsiveness of these localized decision-making processes and decision-makers, the data was 
analyzed for the four eco-resiliency elements: flexibility, diversity, a broad perspective and 
emergent change. The nine key findings from this research are presented next in this dissertation 
overview.  
2.0  Key Research Findings  
In this research, resiliency is viewed as a  concept that can be used to examine the committee’s 
responsiveness to environmental decision-making. An eco-resiliency framework was developed 
by mapping the legal governance scholarship with the ecological literature and is used as an 
analytical tool for evaluating environmental responsiveness. Building on Holling’s four 
elements, the eco-resiliency framework offers four corresponding, interrelated features 
(flexibility, diversity, a broad perspective, and emergent change) whose meanings are precisely 
specified in order to provide analytical clarity. Specifically, “flexibility” in a governance context 
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is present when the regime fosters a two-way communication process that is grounded in 
consensus and offers the participants flexibility in resolving the problem (for example by relying 
upon a mix of regulatory responses and tools) and network governance arrangements. 
“Diversity” is displayed when the decision-making process includes an array of participants, is 
open to receiving diverse viewpoints and encourages diversity in thinking. “A broad perspective” 
is depicted when the governance context considers the multi-jurisdictional frame, the polycentric 
nature of natural resource governance and when it includes a jurisdictional co-ordination 
mechanism to organize decision-makers, their water problems and solutions. Finally, a capacity 
for emergent change is present when decision-makers are able to react quickly to accept and 
respond to emergent environmental change or surprise events.  
 The application of the four eco-resiliency factors to the three case studies, the interview 
data, the observation of the water committee members and the media reports resulted in nine 
primary research findings. These research findings illustrate that governance is complicated. The 
findings are organized according to the four factors.  
2.1 Eco-Resiliency Factor of Flexibility 
1.   Contrary to the collective and consensus-based decision themes the collaborative 
governance literature predicts these findings expose a restrictive and technocratic 
decision-making process. Specifically, in the Ontario case study, the source protection 
committee’s decision-making was limited to the 21 legislatively defined drinking water 
threats – the enumerated drinking water threat list.  In Alberta, the watershed planning 
and advisory council fulfilled a regulatory information function by reporting on the 
ecological state of the watershed, with disregard to the oil and gas industry’s fracking 
activities and climate change events (such as flooding and droughts) occurring within the 
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basin. In the Yukon, the Water Board was limited to the administrative aspects of 
reviewing and amending a mining proponent’s water license proposal. This 
administrative process was restricted to considering the environmental mitigation plan of 
the proponent’s project under review and not the watershed as a whole. Overall, as is 
demonstrated in the following chapters, the legal framework restricted the committees’ 
flows of communication and their ability to be flexible in their decision-making.  
2.   In the localized water committee where the law structures the governance arrangement, 
we see the limits of the law with respect to implementing procedural mechanisms to 
ensure compliance with legal regulations. As observed, in Alberta and Ontario, the 
practice of governing exposed an application problem; the participants overlooked and 
failed to implement regulatory directives and policy instruments. For example, the legal 
requirement to work in a collaborative setting and to adopt consensus as a decision-
making principle was often overlooked and left a water plan open to criticism of 
arbitrariness. In effect, the regulatory architects missed the essence of a collaborative 
process: that is, the conditions to collaborate resided within the assembled group.  
2.2 Eco-Resiliency Factor of Diversity 
3.   Although the theoretical premise of collaborative governance is based upon a diversity of 
actors, these research findings demonstrate that a stakeholder approach may be in tension 
with environmental protection goals. In Ontario, local community groups in the cities of 
Guelph and Paris brought forward their water concerns related to aggregate extraction 
activities within their watershed, but their concerns were swept aside. As expressed by 
one of the water committee members, in order for a citizen’s concerns to be heard by the 
committee, the submission must be presented in a conventional, science-based expert 
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format. Their concerns must fall squarely within one of the 21 prescribed drinking water 
threats. As I observed, the committee members would respond to the presentation by a 
citizen’s delegation by smiling politely, noting the citizen’s concern and then promptly 
dismissing the issue (as not falling within the enumerated drinking water threat list) as the 
committee quickly moved forward to draft the water plan. 
4.   First Nation communities faced systemic barriers to participating in a water committee. 
In Alberta, local Aboriginal communities did not participate in the process. During the 
interviews, the lack of First Nations’ participation was raised as an outreach challenge for 
the Bow River Basin Council. In contrast, the Six Nations of the Grand River and 
Mississaugas of the New Credit First Nation participated regularly in Ontario’s Lake Erie 
Water Source Protection Committee. However, their accepted ways of knowing water 
were overlooked in the decision-making process. The Ontario case study revealed an 
administrative planning practice that homogenized, rather than distinguished, the 
cultural, political and identity differences between these two First Nations. In effect, the 
new governance arrangement preserved colonial knowledge and the existing 
administrative knowledge technologies embedded in the provincial government’s 
established planning functions, which together further perpetuated the silencing of 
Aboriginal voices in the committee. As part of the Yukon Water Board, First Nations 
communities (for example, the Little Salmon First Nation and Selkirk First Nation) 
have also actively participated in public hearings. However, a close reading of the 
decision documents including the observation of a hearing proceeding (Minto 
Exploration Ltd. Amendment Application QZ11-031) revealed a pragmatic 
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administrative process that incorporated the concerns of the First Nation communities 
but lacked any reference to Indigenous law, legal traditions or ways of knowing water.  
5.   In contrast to the literature’s support of empowering watershed users through the 
devolution of water governance to a local level, this research reveals that power becomes 
concentrated in this decentralized forum and creates a barrier to a resilient legal regime. 
In Ontario, the aggregate extraction conflicts (in cities of Guelph and Paris) illustrate 
agency capture where the provincial regulatory authorities (the provincial Ministry of the 
Environment and Conservation Authority) tightly held the power to control the 
administrative process and influence the committee’s decision-making process in order to 
serve provincial interests in economic development. Moreover, powerful industry 
representatives directly participating in the committee and operating within the shadows 
of the planning exercise prevailed in the decision-making. 
2.3 Eco-Resiliency Factor of Broad Perspective 
6.   Overall, in all three case studies, the challenge of jurisdictional co-ordination was 
enormous. The jurisdictional fragmentation presented in this research exposes the 
constraints (for example, constitutional) that are imposed upon these committees and that 
create a complex administrative burden, wherein the participants acquiesce to these 
constraints. The ubiquitous legal question of jurisdiction casts a shadow over governing 
water at a local level, and acts as a barrier to the implementation of inter-agency 
coordinated decisions and solutions or to a networked governance approach.   
2.4 Eco-Resiliency Factor of Emergent Change  
7.   Surprisingly, the Yukon Water Board, an administrative tribunal with strict procedural 
requirements, offered the strongest opportunity for Aboriginal and conservation groups to 
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raise their water concerns.  The Water Board, through the legal mechanism of presenting 
and questioning evidence at a public hearing, demonstrated responsiveness to new 
information, revealing an element of surprise. This responsiveness to new information 
allowed for the reconsideration and incorporation of additional water concerns into a 
decision document and a water license.  
2.5 Additional Findings 
8.   Conceptually, the governance model creates a shared governing function where 
the province no longer acts as the single commander-in-chief over environmental 
protection regimes. These case studies reveal three state identities with respect to the 
regulatory function of water governance: the Chameleon State (Ontario), the Enigma 
State (Alberta) and the Mechanized State (Yukon). Together, these identities 
demonstrate an organization in a state of flux where these government entities struggle 
to shed the traditional environmental command-and-control paradigm and move towards 
a new way of governing. 
a.   Like a chameleon’s ability to constantly change colours in order to signal 
behavioural change, Ontario’s provincial government exhibited a constantly 
shifting oversight function. Charged with the regulatory water source protection 
oversight function under the Clean Water Act, 2006, the provincial agencies 
exerted strong and weak forms of control directly and indirectly through the use 
of policy bulletins, directives, discussion papers and a non-appointed Ministry of 
Environment (MOE) liaison committee representative. Despite this chameleon-
like behaviour, the state remained, at its core, strongly aligned to the traditional 
command-and-control regulatory implementation style.  
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b.   Alberta’s Enigma State manifested as a puzzling and complex water governance 
regime. In Alberta, there exists a multi-level water governance organizational 
architecture that is woven through the Water Act23 and the plethora of soft-law 
policy instruments, with the dominant policy being Alberta’s Water for Life 
Strategy. 24  In this flexible policy- driven and partnership model (created 
between the provincial environmental government, its advisory council, the 
local water committees and the stewardship groups), the province’s role in 
localized-water management planning remains a puzzle – an enigma. 
c.   A Mechanized State emerged from observing the Yukon Water Board’s 
(Board) administrative process. The Board’s closed-door decision-making 
process created a limitation to understanding how this heterogeneous group, or 
even individual decision-makers, moved beyond a traditional administrative law 
framework. The transparency of the Board’s decision-making process was 
limited in this research to a review of the final decision documents and 
observation of the Board’s process at a public hearing. Thus, insight into how 
these diverse decision-makers shape the outcome in practice remains 
undeveloped. However, a mechanized state organism that operates through an 
efficient administrative function grounded in the legal traditions and doctrines of 
an administrative tribunal process was observed at the public hearing.    
9.   Perhaps the most important finding of this research, which is obscured by this policy drift 
towards a governance mode, is the erosion of the water-source protection function of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Supra. note 3.  
24 Alberta Government, Water for Life Strategy: Alberta’s Strategy for Sustainability (November, 2003) and Alberta 
Government, Water for Life: A Renewal  (November, 2008), online: Alberta Environment and Parks 
<http://www.waterforlife.alberta.ca/02488.html>. 
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state. The state’s function as the guardian of the public interest and namely, as the upholder 
of environmental protection values has been altered. This empirical research reveals how the 
task of consensus building –   in drafting and completing the legislatively imposed end 
product, the water plan or license – generates a pragmatic view of the agency’s policy 
function, one devoid of environmental values. During my observation of all three processes, 
the committee members never raised nor debated the environmental values underpinning the 
public interest in water. Consequently, the essence of the environmental regulatory state’s 
substantive and moral authority, with regard to environmental protection, is being eroded, 
and the state’s function, as guardian of the public interest in water source protection, is now 
open to question.  
3.0  Dissertation Chapters Outlined  
This dissertation is structured into five chapters, excluding this overview section and the 
conclusion segment. In the overview chapter, the premise of the dissertation is provided to direct 
the reader’s attention to how change shapes not only natural systems but also socio-legal 
systems, such as legally constituted water governance regimes. This summary chapter introduces 
the reader to the responsiveness concept that underpinned C.S. Holling’s resiliency theory and 
appeared in Gunningham and Sinclair’s “Smart Regulation” (Integrative Regulation Approach), 
which sets out an environmental policy framework. Together, these authorities are featured to 
introduce the reader to the theoretical basis of dissertation’s in-depth analysis of Canada’s 
recent legislative policy drift to a governance mode in Canada’s water regulatory sector. The 
analysis undertaken to understand how these legal governance constructs can be responsive to 
ecological change.  
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Chapter One: Introduction: Literature Review & Research Methodology: Given the subject 
matter of this research, collaborative governance in the water sector (water management 
planning that results in a water plan or water license), the premise of this dissertation seeks to 
understand the concept of responsiveness with respect to ecological change across changing local 
waterscapes. This lengthy chapter begins by setting out the research problem, the central 
research question and the background of environmental regulatory change, followed by an 
extensive literature review. The literature review outlines the shift away from the command-
and-control implementation style to the responsive regulatory approach. Presented next is 
Gunningham and Sinclair’s Integrative Regulation Approach, the environmental policy 
framework that informs the theoretical basis of this research. The theme of responsiveness is 
also explored from an ecological perspective by presenting a summary of C.S. Holling’s 
resiliency theory. The chapter concludes by outlining the research methodology applied in the 
dissertation. 
Chapter Two: Eco-Resiliency Framework – What does Eco-Resiliency look like in a Local 
Water Governance Model?: In this chapter, I assert that the governance literature demonstrates 
similar responsiveness features as discussed in the natural science literature’s presentation 
of the concept of resiliency. In Canada, however, the environmental governance literature has 
yet to explore fully the complementary features of resiliency and the application of this 
ecological concept to the environmental problem of how to govern a watershed. In response to 
the gap in the literature, this chapter develops the eco-resiliency framework through a mapping 
exercise where the resiliency literature is mapped onto governance literature. The eco-
resiliency evaluation criteria takes into account the four elements: i) flexibility, ii) a broad 
perspective iii) diversity, and iv) emergent change. The four-part eco-resiliency framework is 
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used to evaluate the responsiveness of the legislative water governance experiments and to 
structure the interview instrument. 
Chapter Three: Ontario Case Study – The Chameleon State: The Lake Erie Region Source 
Protection Committee (SPC) enacted under the Clean Water Act, 2006 is presented in this 
chapter. The eco-resiliency features of the committee’s decision-making process are examined 
by considering the aggregate extraction conflicts that arose in the communities of Guelph and 
Paris, Ontario. In both cases, local citizens brought forward their drinking water concerns to the 
SPC but faced numerous barriers in the local planning process. Both groups were concerned their 
drinking water was at risk of contamination as result of aggregate extraction activities. In the 
Guelph case, residents were concerned with a breach of an aquitard at a local aquifer. The 
residents of Paris were concerned with the extraction methods at a gravel pit not yet quarried. 
Through these conflicts, the chameleon-like behaviour of the state emerged as provincial 
representatives steered the committee members’ decision-making to ensure community concerns 
were marginalized in the local planning process. 
Chapter Four: Alberta Case Study – The Enigma State: In 2004, the provincial government 
named the Bow River Basin Council (BRBC) as the first watershed planning and advisory 
council (WPAC) in the province and it i s  this water committee that is examined in this 
chapter. In Alberta, water governance is a complex system of multi-level soft-law policies 
where the BRBC carries out the local water planning function within a group of over 200 
members. In 2012, the Bow River Basin faced numerous water security challenges (for example, 
climate change events such as floods and drought, First Nation drinking water concerns, 
hydraulic fracking) but the BRBC had not incorporated these concerns into its localized planning 
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process. In this research, the role and function of the provincial government at the BRBC 
meeting remained a riddle – an enigma. 
Chapter Five: Yukon Case Study – The Mechanized State: The Yukon Water Board’s May 
2010 Western Copper – Carmack’s decision and the Board’s July 4-6, 2012 public hearing 
process where the Minto Exploration Ltd’s existing Water Use Licence #QZ11-031 was 
renewed form the backdrop for examining the responsiveness of this co-management Board 
and its supporting legal framework. In the Carmack’s licensing process, the Board denied 
the water use license. In the Minto license amendment, the Board found the mining 
company had breached its existing license and had violated the Waters Act. In this chapter, 
the focus is on whether the legal framework constructs a mode of water governance that is 
inclusive of the elements of eco-resiliency. Together, these legal decisions, including the 
integrated legal water governance framework defined by the Umbrella Final Agreement (in 
particular, The Water Board (Chapter 2) and Water Management (Chapter 14)) and the Waters 
Act legislation, are reviewed to assess the eco-resiliency of the decision-making. In the end, 
the Water Board’s decision-makers operate in a new governance institutional framework and 
carry out their decisions through a mechanized state organism. The tribunal supports a form of 
command- and- control regulatory implementation style with the Board being subject to 
Ministerial directives and approval.  
Chapter Six: The Voices of the Committee Members on Eco-Resiliency: This lengthy analysis 
chapter organized into the four features of eco-resiliency, presents the findings derived from 
the interview data gathered from the water committee research participants. In the analysis, 
consideration is given to the context of the three case studies, the lessons learned of applying 
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the eco-resiliency framework to these case studies and answering the question: Do the legal 
water governance models examined exhibit any or all of the four features of eco-resiliency? 
Conclusions & Recommendations – The Lessons Learned: The primary question addressed in 
this conclusion is: How might one strengthen these legislative experiments in water governance 
in Canada? Several recommendations that support the dissertation’s findings are set out. 
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Chapter One:  
Literature Review & Research Methodology  
1.0  The Research Problem, Question & Rationale 
1.1  The Research Problem: Is the Governance Experiment Suitable to Protect Water 
Sources? 
Many of Canada’s aquatic systems are degraded. Lake Winnipeg, the St. Clair River, South 
Saskatchewan River, and the St. Lawrence River illustrate ecological change and the 
consequences of the loss of resilience.25 In a freshwater system, a loss of resilience can create a 
more fragile and vulnerable water source. The loss of resilience has been attributed to nutrient 
overloading (for example, phosphorus and nitrogen) from non-point sources of pollution (for 
example, fertilized lands, feedlots, storm run-off from urban development, leaky underground 
septic storage tanks and waste-water sources) into the receiving waters. If an aquatic system is in 
a vulnerable state, nutrient loading can lead to a degraded ecosystem and eutrophication. 
Eutrophication is a change to an aquatic system that occurs because of the addition of nutrients to 
the water. These added nutrients stimulate the growth of phytoplankton and produce a change in 
the state of the water from a clear to a greenish, turbid condition or an algae bloom. In shallow 
freshwater lakes, this regime shift can occur very quickly.26 Given this possibility of ecological 
change, in part, stimulated by continuous anthropocentric activities, the question remains: How 
can a regulatory regime be designed to be responsive to an aquatic system that functions in an 
active state of resisting disturbances and perturbations? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 D. Dempsey, J. Elder & D. Scavia, Great Lakes Restoration & The Threat of Global Warming (Great Lakes 
Organization, May 2008), online: Great Lakes Organization <www.healthylakes.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2008/05/how-global-warming-report-08.pdf>; J.P. Bruce et al., Report in Focus – The Expert Panel 
on Groundwater: The Sustainable Management of Groundwater in Canada 2009 Report (Council of Canadian 
Academies, May 2009), online: WWF-Canada. <www.scienceadvice.ca/documents/(2009-05-
11)%20Report%20in%20Focus%20-%20GW.pdf>; WWF – Canada Report entitled: 2009 Canada’s Rivers at Risk: 
Environmental Flows and Canada’s Freshwater Future, online: WWF 
<http://assets.wwf.ca/downloads/canadas_rivers_at_risk.pdf>; Cleaning up Lake Winnipeg and Lake Simcoe see: 
Online: Env. Canada < http://www.ec.gc.ca/eau-water/default.asp?lang=En&n=B1128A3D-1>. 
26 Levin, Supra. note 20. at 39. 
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A traditional environmental regulatory response to these environmental problems relied 
upon command-and-control style regulatory instruments.27  While some scholars argue these 
prescriptive instruments have been successful in protecting environmental systems, 28  others 
counter that the degraded state of many freshwater systems worldwide demonstrates the limits of 
this regulatory approach. Taken together, the contested nature of this traditional regulatory 
approach and the continued degraded environmental state of the aquatic systems across Canada 
combined with the regulatory turn to a governance mode at a provincial level raises questions for 
those interested in governance and water-source protection. Does a collaborative decision-
making process strengthen water governance regimes? Does the decision-making process allow 
decision-makers to consider the ecological health or integrity of a watershed? Has the provincial 
government’s adoption of a shared governance paradigm resulted in devolving water-source 
protection responsibilities to municipalities, industry and civil society sectors and First Nations?  
Without research on how these water committees are responsive to emerging water security 
issues, regulators are impeded in understanding how to strengthen and sustain water governance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Abbott, Supra 1 at 61. Abbot explains that “[c]ommand and control can take numerous forms. It is generally 
characterized by centrally set environmental standards or targets (for example, limits on the emission of certain 
pollutant into a watercourse) which are underpinned by the use of sanctions in the event of non-compliance. In many 
instances, these standards are implemented through an environmental licence or permit.” At page 63, Abbott further 
describes this form of regulation as a “combination of prohibitions, licences and standards represented the command 
aspect of pollution regulation. The control aspect usually took the form of the threat of criminal or quasi-criminal 
liability supported by legal regimes for monitoring, reporting, inspection, prosecution and sanctions.”  
28 R. Durant, D.J. Fiorino & R. O’Leary, “Introduction” in R. Durant, D.J. Fiorino & R. O’Leary, eds, 
Environmental Governance Reconsidered: Challenges, Choices, and Opportunities (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004). 
These scholars describe this shift away from the traditional model as a “post-modern” perspective. A perspective 
that emerged as a response to the well-documented critique of the traditional command and control model but also, a 
response to the evolving state of environmental regulation. These academics argue regulation exhibits distinct 
phases of development and explains, in part, the current regulatory change towards governance. As an 
environmental regulatory strategy, this shift from government to governance represents a fundamental change to the 
traditional regulatory: a model that relied primarily upon a prescriptive, tailored, single-instrument regulatory 
method of environmental protection.; For a critique and support of the command-and-control approach see: J.V. 
DeMarco and T. Vigod, “Smarter Regulation: The Case for Enforcement and Transparency” (March 2007) 17(2) J. 
Env. L. Prac. 85; J. Hanebury, “Smart Regulation – Rhetoric or reality?” (2006) 44(1) Alta. L. Rev. 33; M. Winfield, 
“Governance and the Environment in Canada From Regulatory Renaissance to ‘Smart Regulation’” (March 2007) 
17(2) J. Env. L. Prac.69; M.P. Vandenbergh, “The Social Meaning of Environmental Command and Control” (2001) 
20 Va. Envtl. L. J. 191.  
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regimes with an environmental protective ethos.  
1.2  Research Question: Lessons from Resiliency Theory 
The central question in this dissertation is: What lessons can be taken from resiliency theory and 
applied in the sphere of environmental regulation and governance? This question considers the 
regulatory policy drift to the governance construct as a practice of governing water in Canada. 
An examination of the legal governance construct devotes attention to the responsiveness theme 
underpinning Holling’s resiliency theory and as featured in the governance literature. While the 
governance literature is vast, Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair’s Smart Regulation 
(Integrative Regulation Approach) is examined because of the dominance of their environmental 
policy model in the literature and in regulatory practice.29 The responsiveness theme featured in 
Smart Regulation is directed at industry, is organized by an enforcement-and-compliance 
pyramid model and is underpinned by a normative frame of effectiveness and efficiency. While 
important features of a regulatory regime, these values of effectiveness and cost-efficiency are in 
sharp contrast to environmental protection values advanced by environmental law and policy. In 
the context of the shift to a shared governance mode, questions are raised on how decisions and 
decision-makers are influenced by this mariet-oriented normative frame of reference of 
effectiveness and efficiency.  
1.3  Research Rationale: Is Environmental Policy Responsive to Industry Pressure or 
Ecological Change?   
This doctoral research takes up Professor Benidickson’s provocative question: “If one takes 
conservation, ecological integrity or biodiversity as a frame of reference, what happens [to water 
law regimes]?”30 What if regulators seriously adopted responsiveness towards ecological change 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Gunningham, et. al., Supra note 5.   
30 J. Benidickson, The Culture of Flushing: A Social and Legal History of Sewage (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) 8. 
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as a regulatory theme? This dissertation explores whether environmental regulatory 
responsiveness can be achieved by taking into account the abstract ecological concept of 
resiliency. To reiterate, resilience is defined as “the capacity of an ecosystem to cope with 
change and perturbation.”31 This research brings together two distinct bodies of theory: the 
literature on environmental governance and regulation with the literature on ecologically based 
resiliency. The justification for bridging these two bodies of theory is premised on the hypothesis 
that water governance in Canada should be responsive to ecological change or “the flux of 
nature” perspective.32 Unlike the traditional view of an ecosystem in “balance”33 (or in a state of 
near equilibrium, implying a “predictable and controllable”34 ecosystem), the flux of nature 
perspective characterizes an ecosystem as non-linear, “dynamic, inherently uncertain, with 
potential multiple futures” that respond to external disturbances (for example, a fire or an intense 
rainfall).35 This contemporary perspective of a responsive or adaptive ecosystem introduces the 
element of change.  
Responsiveness is a dominant theme in regulatory theory.  In Gunningham et.al.’s Smart 
Regulation, the responsiveness theme is the key-organizing construct of their environmental 
policy model. Their idea of responsiveness is ordered through a three-sided enforcement-
compliance pyramid directed at the industry actor and advances a regulatory pluralism 
perspective based on a  “flexible and resilient” regulatory model.36 The regulatory pluralism 
approach considers “not just conventional forms of direct (“command-and-control”) regulation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 F. Moberg & V. Galaz, “Resilience: Going from Conventional to Adaptive Freshwater Management for Human 
and Ecosystem Compatibility” (2005) at 3, online: Swedish Water Policy Briefs 
<www.siwi.org/documents/Resources/Policy_Briefs/PB3_Resilience_2005.pdf>. 
32 C.F. Hutchinson and S.M. Hermann, The Future of Arid Lands: Revisited – Chapter 6: Ecosystems (UNESCO, 
2008) at 88. 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid at 83. 
35 Holling, Supra note 16 at 734. 
36 Gunningham, et al., Supra note 5 at 14.  
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but also…more flexible, imaginative, and innovative forms of social control that seek to harness 
not just governments but also business and third parties.” 37  Yet, this responsive regulatory 
pluralism idea has implications for the environmental function of the State, once the primary 
actor under a traditional environmental regulatory approach. In essence, the Smart Regulation 
(Integrative Regulation) approach reinforces the logic of enforcement and compliance while also 
devolving regulatory practice to non-state actors.38 However, it is still unclear: How does the 
regulatory pluralism approach enable decision-makers to consider environmental protection 
concerns? 39  
Gunningham, et.al.,’s present their three-side enforcement and compliance pyramid 
model to bolster the “suboptimal” nature of traditional environmental regulatory approaches.40 In 
their view, environmental regulatory approaches are suboptimal when regimes “are not effective 
in achieving their purported policy goals, not efficient in doing so at least cost, nor do they 
perform well in terms of other criteria such as equity or political acceptability.”41 These scholars 
characterize an “optimal” regulatory approach as effective (i.e., “achieving their purported policy 
goals”) and efficient (achieving the goals at the “least cost”).42 In their view, effectiveness and 
efficiency are “the primary concerns of policy makers.” 43  On its face, Gunningham and 
Sinclair’s reliance upon effectiveness and efficiency as an “optimal” evaluation criteria suggests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ibid at 4.  
38 Ibid.  
39 N. Gunningham & M.D. Young entitled: “Towards Optimal Environmental Policy: The Case of Biodiversity 
Conservation” (1997) 24 Ecology Law Quarterly 243.;  also see: Gunningham and Sinclair, Supra note 15. 
Gunningham and Sinclair caution against adopting an escalating compliance/enforcement response when the 
potential for an irreversible ecological loss such as, loss of biodiversity exists.  
40 Gunningham & Sinclair, Integrative Regulation, Supra note 15 at 854 and Gunningham et.al., Smart Regulation, 
at 25-27.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid. Integrative Regulation, at 854. 
43 Gunningham & Grabosky, Smart Regulation, Supra note 5 at 26. 
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that policy makers are primarily concerned with economic 44  issues and outcomes while 
discounting other perspectives (for example, distributive law value of “equity” 45 ). This 
dissertation takes up Gunningham and Sinclair’s contention that policy makers are primarily 
concerned with a market-oriented criterion and explores the danger of framing the 
responsiveness theme in an environmental public policy exercise by effectiveness and efficiency. 
The worry, in this research, is about how this market orientation will shape a decision-making 
process. The decision-makers might be influenced by the goals of effectiveness and achieving a 
cost-efficient administrative process with little time or regard for citizen’s environmental 
protection concerns and key ecological considerations, such as maintaining healthy aquatic 
system functions.  
 While Gunningham and Sinclair’s evaluative environmental policy framework of 
effectiveness and efficiency is important, it is directed at an outcome-based policy analysis (i.e., 
results oriented), overlooks the process and its participatory aspects. In the case of water 
governance, Gunningham and Sinclair’s outcome-based framework potentially narrows the focus 
on the effectiveness and efficiency of the end product – for example, a water plan. Overlooked in 
their framework is the dynamic nature of environmental policy-making and regulating from the 
bottom-up. The organizational design of regulatory pluralism re-orients the regulatory function 
towards the process and introduces a bottom-up organizational structure where stakeholders 
participate in the decision-making. 46  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid at 27. Gunningham, et al.,  discuss the issue of “optimality” from an economic perspective.  
45 Ibid. at 28.; Gunningham & Sinclair, Integrative Regulation, Supra note 15 at 854. 
46 F. Rauschmayer, A. Berghofer, I. Omann and D. Zikos “Examining Processes or/and Outcomes? Evaluation 
Concepts in European Governance of Natural Resources” (2009) 19 Environmental Policy and Governance 159 at 
165. My thinking considers the process rather than the outcome of the policy exercise. Evaluation of “good 
governance” has been approached by considering two approaches – outcome-oriented and process-oriented 
evaluation. These authors argue that “good processes contribute to good governance” by “improve[ing] the 
substantial quality of the output through more and better information management and learning effects with the 
process; legitimate processes stand a better chance of getting their results accepted; reinforce the normative aim of 
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In the ecological literature, Holling argues efficiency is tied to the concept of engineering 
resiliency and the equilibrium view in ecology. Engineering resilience focuses on equilibrium 
“steady states, where resistance to disturbance and speed of return to the equilibrium” are 
measured.47 An engineering approach supports “efficiency, constancy, and predictability ⎯ all 
attributes at the core of the engineer’s desires for a fail-safe design.”48 In Holling’s view, these 
attributes lead resources management activities and policies to be directed towards achieving 
stability, fixed rules and a maximum sustainable yield. Of course, a danger exists these fixed 
rules will cause a system to change into another state. Once a system has changed into an 
alternative state, restoration is often expensive, time consuming and unattainable.49 A potential 
outcome, as Holling pointed out in his 1973 article, may be that “the present concerns for 
pollution and endangered species are signals that the well-being of the world is not adequately 
described by concentrating on equilibria and conditions near them.”50 In 2015, the problems 
Holling was concerned about, including pollution, species and biodiversity loss are still pressing. 
Holling counters this engineering-oriented efficiency perspective by presenting 
ecological resiliency, which reflects the “flux of nature” perspective in ecology. 51 Ecological 
resiliency considers “the amount of disturbance that can be absorbed without undergoing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
certain characteristics of governance processes, such as openness and participation, [features of shift towards 
participatory, pluralistic and localized water governance]; J. Black “Regulatory Conversations” (March 2002) 29 (1) 
Journal of Law and Society 163 at 164. The process orientation of this dissertation also considers regulatory scholar 
J. Black’s idea that “regulation is a large part a communicative process;” a communication process that is carried out 
through decision-making methodologies that are socially constructed, in the case of water governance at a provincial 
level in Canada, as a participatory, pluralistic and localized participant driven watershed committee. Together, the 
process orientation and the focus on communication are taken up in this dissertation.  
47 C.S. Holling “Ecological Resilience versus Ecological Resilience” in L. Gunderson, C.R. Allen & C.S. Holling, 
Foundations of Ecological Resilience (Washington: Island Press, 2010) at 53. 
48 Ibid. 
49 B. Walker & D. Salt, Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a Changing World (Washington: 
Island Press, 2006). Walker and Salt discuss the problems within The Northern Highlands Lake District, Wisconsin 
at 96-110. 
50 Holling, Supra note 16 at 2.  
51 Hutchinson & Herrmann, Supra note 32.  
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shift to an alternative stable state.” 52  The resiliency perspective highlights the elements of 
“persistence, change and unpredictability.” These three elements are “embraced and celebrated 
by biologists with an evolutionary perspective and by those who search for safe-fail designs.”53 
Unlike engineering resiliency, where the analysis of resiliency is directed toward the time it takes 
the system to return from a disturbance, ecological resiliency is a measure of the system’s ability 
to absorb the perturbation.  
Holling’s thinking on ecological resiliency is taken up in this dissertation to consider 
whether decision-making and the decision-makers can be oriented towards flexibility and non-
linear thinking. Ecological resiliency requires decisions directed towards “retaining the ability” 
of the system “to get back”54 from a disturbance, to maintain the system’s ability to continue to 
behave in the same way and to offer an undisrupted flow of “ecosystem services”55 from the 
natural system to the human system. Conceptually, this “flux of nature”56 ecological perspective 
supports a flexible decision-making process responsive to the fluctuations within the system and 
changing ideas amongst decision-makers.  
 This dissertation is underpinned by the ecological resiliency and flux of nature 
perspectives to counter the market-oriented criteria of effectiveness and cost-efficiency featured 
in Smart Regulation. These values of effectiveness and efficiency are universally accepted in 
both the literature and in regulatory practice. However, these market-oriented values (for 
example, cost-efficiency) are in sharp contrast to public policy goals, such as environmental 
protection, the protective public mandate of environmental law and ecological change. These two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 C.R. Allen, L.H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling, “Commentary on Part One Articles” in L. Gunderson, C.R. Allen & 
C.S. Holling, Foundations of Ecological Resilience (Washington: Island Press, 2010) at 6.  
53 C. Folke, J. Colding & F. Berkes, “Synthesis: building resilience and adaptive capacity in social-ecological 
systems” 352 in F. Berkes, J. Colding and C. Folke, eds., Navigating Social-Ecological Systems (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Press, 2003). 
54 Walker & Salt, Supra note 49 at 64. 
55 Ranaganthan, et. al., Infra. note 149. See discussion of ecosystem services.  
56 Hutchinson and Herrmann, Supra note 32. 
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values are embedded in regulatory theory and perhaps, carried into regulatory practice without 
regard to public law values, a contemporary perspective of an ecosystem (flux of nature), a 
citizen’s water security concerns and Aboriginal peoples’ ways of knowing a watershed. The 
worry is the shift to the shared governance mode in a public law area of water governance will 
continue to perpetuate the values of effectiveness and efficiency without regard to the ecological 
nature of aquatic systems and an environmental protection ethos. 
So, before moving to Gunningham et.al.,’s important outcome-oriented environmental 
law question of whether the regulatory governance regime is effective (i.e., “achieving their 
purported policy goals”57), this dissertation takes a step back and considers the value of first 
understanding the decision-making carried out in sites of law-making. 58  Specifically, I am 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Gunningham & Sinclair, Integrative Regulation, Supra note 15 at 854.; Also see Gunningham et. al., Smart 
Regulation, Surpa note 5 at 26-27.  
58 The focus on environmental decision-making in this dissertation is informed by the following scholars:  
1. Lester M. Salamon, “Chapter 1: Introduction – The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An 
Introduction” in Lester M. Salamon (ed) The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) at 10-11. Salamon contends the enactment of new legislation should consider the 
implementation stage of the regulatory program and  in particular, “the decisions that shape which actors have 
significant roles in this stage of the process,” which points to the political nature of the regulatory design, the 
governing process and the regulatory tool choice. He states: “What is at stake in these battles is not simply the most 
efficient way to solve a public problem, but also the relative influence that various affected interests will have in 
shaping the post enactment evolution.” [Emphasis Added];    
2. N. Walker and Grainne de Burca “Reconceiving Law & New Governance” (2006-07) 13 Colum. J. Eur. L. 519. 
These authors argue a “causal analysis” of law and new governance (NG) regulatory approach is insufficient 
because it fails to reveal how NG shapes law and how law shapes NG. These scholars state: “how each is being 
shaped and reshaped though the influence of the other, and how this process of mutual influence may affect the 
balance of values and practical priorities” within modern regulatory regimes.;  
3. J. Newig & O. Fritsch, “Environmental Governance: Participatory, Multi-Level – and Effective?” (2009) 19 
Environmental Policy and Governance 197 at 198-199 & 210. These scholars contend that “environmental 
governance has become highly complex system of decision points” and research is needed to explore the 
relationship between decision-making processes (e.g., collaborative, command and control or market-based 
mechanisms) and policy outputs on environmental outcomes. Their research question: “what extent the existence of 
multiple levels of governance affects the ability of participatory decision-making to deliver high quality 
environmental output and improve implementation and compliance.” Their research findings found that face to face, 
not merely two-way communication, “positively influenced the ecological standard of decisions.” In this 
dissertation, the focus is on the complexity of the decision-making process, which exposes the relationship between 
decisions and policy outcomes, the political nature of a governance model and the normative frame underpinning the 
model. It is this idea of how law or for example, in the case of water management planning – the end-product the 
water plan is being shaped and reshaped by the decisions and decision-making process in the localized, stakeholder-
driven water committees.  
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interested in examining the environmental decision-making process in water committees.59 This 
inquiry is undertaken in order to understand if a legal water model reveals features of a 
responsive governance regime – ‘responsiveness’ in this thesis is viewed from a conceptual 
perspective of ecological resiliency. Moreover, to understand the governance process — in 
particular, who is the decision-maker? And, who has influence within the decision-making 
process?60  
 To date, the legal environmental governance literature offers limited recognition of how 
to conceptualize or evaluate decision-making in a regulatory model to be responsive to 
ecological change. The challenge remains to structure a water governance regime to be 
responsive to the complexity of the ever-changing state of freshwater aquatic systems and their 
connectivity with a social system of water users, governance regimes and ecological systems. 
This research acknowledges the connectivity of social and ecological systems by adopting a 
framework that treats ecological systems as “linked to social systems comprised of resource 
users and their governance arrangements.”61  
Given the subject matter of this dissertation, environmental regulation and specifically, 
the shift to a governance mode in water policy and law in Canada, a comparative analysis of the 
Integrative Regulatory approach (Smart Regulation) and Holling’s resiliency theory is completed 
as a mapping exercise to develop an evaluative tool. This dissertation’s eco-resiliency framework 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For example, Ontario’s localized, multi-stakeholder water committee envisioned by the Honourable Dennis R. 
O’Connor, Part Two Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: A Strategy for Safe Drinking Water Ontario. Ministry of the 
Attorney General (Toronto: Queen’s Park Printer, 2002), online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/walkerton/part2/Chapter_4.pdf>. [Herein Known as 
Walkerton Report Two]. The participatory and pluralistic aspects are outlined in Report Two. Ch 4: Participation of 
Affected Groups and the Public, at 103-109. In particular, at 103, it was expected that the MOE would consult with 
the CA authority, “municipalities, environmental groups, and other affected groups to develop a provincial 
framework for the source protection planning, including guidelines for the form, content, and the development 
process.”  
 
61 Levin, Supra note 26.  
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is based on an ecological change concept to understand how legal governance regimes and 
decision-makers are adaptable to ecological change. Presented in Chapter Six is the analysis of 
the interviews with the water committee members, which offers a “law in action” inter-
disciplinary research perspective.  In Chapter Seven, the conclusion chapter, Gunningham and 
Sinclair’s Integrative Regulatory principled-based approach, in particular, the participatory 
principle (i.e., no. 4: “A participatory approach, which empowers third parties to become quasi-
regulators”62) is expanded upon. This participatory principle triggered this research inquiry on 
the decision-making aspect of governance. This dissertation leaves the outcome question — Is 
the water plan or water license effective? — open for further study.  
Presented next is a discussion of the development of the responsive regulation theme, 
which facilitated the policy drift to a governance mode in Canada’s regulatory affairs. In the next 
sub-sections (Part 5.0), the responsive theme underpinning Gunningham and Sinclair’s 
Integrated Regulation Theory and Holling’s Resiliency Theory (Part 6.0) are explained, as both 
theories form the theoretical foundation of this research. The final section, (Part 7.0) of this 
chapter, sets out the research methodology of this dissertation.  
2.0  Literature Review: Understanding the Responsive Regulation Theme  
2.1  Environmental Regulatory Practice in Canada: The Policy Drift to the Governance 
Mode 
2.1.1  Introduction 
The last fifteen years have been a period of transition in water governance in Canada. The shift 
in the regulatory practice to a governance mode can be traced to water governance crises in 
Alberta, Ontario and Saskatchewan. During the period of 1999-2004, Albertans experienced 
extreme drought conditions. In May 2000, seven residents of Walkerton, Ontario died as result of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Gunningham et. al., Smart Regulation, Surpa note 5 at 141; Gunningham & Sinclair, Integrataive Regulation, 
Supra 15 at 874.   
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drinking E. coli contaminated tap water. In Battleford, Saskatchewan the cryptosporidium 
parasite contaminated drinking water in 2001 and caused severe illness for several thousand 
residents. Like so many Aboriginal communities across Canada, the Kashechewan First Nation 
in Northern Ontario had been on a boil-water alert for two years when E. coli was discovered in 
the reserve’s drinking water in the spring of 2005.  
 In the literature, the Walkerton incident is cited as the impetus of regulatory change 
across Canada. Provincial legislators in Ontario responded to public outcry over the incident by 
introducing several pieces of legislation, including the Clean Water Act, 2006. This piece of 
legislation is known as the gold standard for water source protection planning. In consideration 
of Justice O’Connor’s recommendations, as set out in the Walkerton Commission Inquiry 
Reports, the new legislative approach was envisioned as a “local planning process” and 
introduced the governance mode.63 In this new shared-governance model, a plurality of state and 
non-state actors would form a water committee and come together to develop a water plan for a 
local watershed. Shortly after, provincial regulators across Canada began to adopt this legal 
model of water governance. As a politically palatable response, the introduction of the 
governance mode demonstrates a government’s responsiveness to public outcry. But, does this 
model lead to better environmental decision-making than offered by the traditional command-
and-control era of environmental regulation?   
 In this chapter, the governance literature is reviewed in order to place the policy drift to 
the governance mode in context and to understand the responsiveness theme in regulatory theory. 
However, the governance literature is extensive. This review of the scholarship is selective and is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 O’Connor, Walkerton Report Two Supra note 59. Report Two, Ch. 1: An Overview at 9. Justice O’Connor sets 
out the recommendation regarding a localized process. The recommendation reads: A local planning process: To 
ensure that local considerations are fully taken into account, and to develop goodwill within and acceptance by local 
communities, source protection planning should be done as much as possible at a local (watershed) level, by those 
who will be most directly affected (municipalities and other affected local groups). …. open to public scrutiny. 
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narrowly focused on the political science and legal literatures. Particular attention is given to the 
responsiveness theme in these literatures in order to understand its meaning in Gunningham 
et.al.’s, environmental policy-making model. The collaborative or new governance scholarship is 
also featured, as both literatures explain the normative framework and offer insight into the 
implications of the shared governance in the natural resources sector.  
 Together, scholars from different yet complementary disciplines were calling for 
regulatory change in the governance of the natural resources sector. This dissertation explores 
the link between these literatures through the responsiveness theme and the push for change in 
regulatory practice. The bridging of the scholarship is explored by examining Holling’s theory, 
which informs the analytical eco-resiliency framework, presented in the next Chapter Two – 
Eco-Resiliency Indicators: The Eco-Resiliency Framework. The framework allows us to 
seriously examine the responsiveness theme in the context of ecological change, as challenged, 
by Professor Benidickson’s provocative question: “If one takes conservation, ecological integrity 
or biodiversity as a frame of reference, what happens [to water law regimes]?”64  
 Presented next is a discussion of the responsive regulatory theme as adopted in regulatory 
theory and as developed in regulatory practice at a global level and then, taken up in Canada. 
This responsiveness regulatory theme is industry-oriented, is underpinned by values of 
effectiveness and cost-efficiency and isolates the decision-makers from the social-ecological 
context of the environmental law-making exercise.  
2.1.2  Traditional Environmental Regulatory Practice in Canada  
During the 1970s to 1980s, Canada’s “compliance system” period of environmental regulation, a 
traditional regulatory strategy sought to alter business behaviour. Howlett describes this 
compliance period as one of closed negotiations between government and business interests 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Benidickson, Supra note 30. 
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directed at the implementation of, and compliance with, environmental standards.65 In Howlett’s 
view, this strategy of bi-lateral negotiation was, in part, a response to the “significance of 
industry to the Canadian economy, the historical dominance of single industry production in 
many areas of the country, and the legacy of a staples economy and economic forces that 
provided a significant constraint on regulation.”66 In this negotiation dyad industry acted as an 
information conduit for the regulatory state where the regulated industry provided the regulator 
with “base-line data, …up-to -date technical information...cost-benefit analysis of production and 
abatement costs.” 67  However, Howlett questioned, as did others, whether this approach to 
environmental policy could result in “environmental protection.”68  
 Wood, Tanner and Richardson also described Canada’s regulatory approach as  
“characterized by a consultative style.” 69  This permissive orientation reflected the close 
consultative relationship between government and industry in developing and enforcing 
environmental regulatory rules “via closed door, bilateral negotiations.” 70  Critiques of this 
approach cite the political nature of regulatory negotiations and the effective blurring of the 
public-private divide. The notion of “regulatory capture” became commonplace, describing “the 
effective control or domination of regulatory mechanisms by the interests who are the object of 
regulation.”71 In the United States, more so than in Canada, the concern with regulatory capture 
emerged as public interest group in the 1960s and 1970s demanded participation in the law-
making regimes of the state. In Canada, the dominance of the consultative implementation style 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 M. Howlett, “Chapter Two: Policy Instruments and Implementation Styles: The Evolution of Instrument Choice in 
Canadian Environmental Policy” in D.L. VanNijnatten and R. Boardman in Canadian Environmental Policy: 
Context and Cases, 2nd ed. (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
66 Ibid. at 35. 
67 Ibid  
68 Ibid at 34. 
69 Wood, Tanner & Richardson, Supra note 6 at 988. 
70 Ibid. 
71 M. Minogue, “Governance-Based Analysis of Regulation” (2002) 73 Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics 649 at 655.  
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allowed regulatory capture by industry to prevail, as this permissive bi-lateral negotiation style 
shaped regulatory affairs.  
 In the late 1980s, the foundation of the 1970s environmental public law era was 
beginning to show signs of fatigue – structural cracks were emerging in the traditional approach 
to environmental regulation as globalization, privatization and the neo-liberal ideology trends 
influenced methods of regulation.72 It was hoped that a “Third Way”73 would re-align the State’s 
role as a “steering”74 function. In an oversight role, the administrative state began to govern from 
a distance while the “rowing” activities of carrying out the State’s administrative mandate were 
left to a hybrid form of governance where state and non-state actors participated in regulatory 
activities. 75  Scholars cautioned this hybrid form of governing could obscure the bright-line 
distinction between public and private functions. Yet, in Canada, the dominance of the 
consultative style of environmental governance points to the acceptance of industry actors in 
regulatory affairs. Perhaps, this acceptance of private actors also opened the door to a mission 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 I thank Professor D. Priel (Osgoode) for this thinking on the influence of “ideas” and how ideas can be used to 
shape of regulation. For example, the idea of privatization and its impact as an organizing principle is explored in 
the following articles: Baldwin, M. Cave, M. Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice 2nd 
ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 49.; M. Derthick and P.J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation 
(Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1985).; P. Hall, “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case 
of Economic Policy-Making in Britain” (April, 1993) 25(3) Comparative Politics 275 at 279-280 and 284.; R. 
Howse, J.R.S. Prichard, & M.J. Trebilcock, “Smaller or Smarter Government” (1990) 40 U. Toronto L.J. 498 at 
509-13 and 517 to 521.; B. Mansfield, “Rules of Privatization: Contradictions in the Neo-liberal Regulation of North 
Pacific Fisheries” (2004) 94(3) Annuals of the Ass. American Geographers 565; D.J. Savoie, Thatcher, Regan, 
Mulroney (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).; Also see, “G.B. Doern, “Chapter 6: Environment Canada 
as a Networked Institution” in D.L. VanNijnatten and R. Boardman in Canadian Environmental Policy: Context 
and Cases, 2nd ed (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 108. Public administration scholar Bruce Doern at 
Carleton University, Ottawa argues that the privatization ideology in addition to the institutionalization of the idea of 
sustainable development including an innovation policy paradigm has shaped regulatory regimes in Canada. Doern 
contends that regulatory regimes created a space for “fluid and flexible forms of networked activity” at the Federal 
government level. Thus, ideas of innovation, networked agencies, sustainable development in addition to 
privatization, globalization created a change in the orientation of Environment Canada’s regulatory form to more of 
a networked institution.  
73 S. Clarkson & S. Wood, A Perilous Imbalance: The Globalization of Canadian Law and Governance (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2010) at 193.  
74 D. Osborne & T. Gaelber, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public 
Sector (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1992).  
75 Ibid. and, Clarkson & Wood, Supra note 73 at 193.  
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creep where neo-liberal values expand into a public law area, such as environmental protection 
regulatory regimes.  
2.1.3  The Influence of Global Regulatory Trends 
Suddenly, in the 1990s, a window opened and the winds of change swept over the global 
environmental regulatory space. This global wave of regulatory change brought about the 
responsive regulation movement.76 The responsive regulation trend entered the regulatory arena 
to temper the environmental regulatory regimes of the 1980s. Scholars and industry actors 
claimed these traditional environmental regulatory instruments were “[t]oo rigid, complex, 
burdensome, costly, inefficient, adversarial, and ineffective; [that stifled] entrepreneurial 
innovation, eliminate[d] jobs and hinder[ed] competitiveness, in return for diminishing 
environmental benefits; and they are prone to industry capture.”77 The idea that effective control 
is maintained by the nation-state (a centralized, bureaucratic chain of command78) through 
prescriptive regulation was viewed as a barrier to achieving an effective and efficient 
environmental regulatory regime.  
 On the global regulatory stage, Braithwaite and Ayres introduced the responsive 
regulatory theme during the 1990’s period of privatization to mitigate traditional regulatory 
approaches. 79  Braithwaite and Ayres’ state-centric enforcement and compliance pyramid 
engaged two actors – the regulator and the regulated. The State acts as the regulatory enforcer 
and is charged with escalating the enforcement mechanisms up the compliance pyramid in 
response to the behaviour of the regulated entity – the firm. The key idea is the State’s 
responsiveness to the regulatee’s actions. The enforcement pyramid is based on a risk assessment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Wood, Tanner & Richardson, Supra note 6 at 989.  
77 Ibid. at 988.  
78 Gareth Morgan, Chapter 22: Max Weber’s – Concept of Bureaucracy, in G. Morgan, Creative Organizational 
Theory: A Resource book 49 (1989) [hereinafter Max Weber’s Bureaucracy].  
79 I. Ayres & J. Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation (Oxford: Oxford Press,1992). 
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perspective where the risk of non-compliance (i.e., some regulated actors will comply but others 
will need to be coerce to comply) is acknowledged. Regulatory responsiveness is narrowly 
directed at a firm’s behaviour and the state’s role of regulatory enforcer.   
 Freeman challenged the notion that public law is restricted to state actors. In her view, 
both private and public actors participate in regulatory affairs. Together these actors negotiate, 
reform, implement and monitor regulatory regimes and establish “institutional relationships.”80 
In this regulatory space of negotiation and problem- solving, the State’s role shifts away from 
commander-in-chief of the regulatory regime to “convener and facilitator of multi-stakeholder 
negotiations.”81 In Freeman’s view, the theme of responsiveness in the administrative state is 
characterized by public and private actors who carrying out the administrative practice of 
regulatory negotiation and problem solving.82  
 Majone argues the State’s regulatory capacity is strengthened through a strategy inclusive 
of private sector actors, who act as service providers. In his view, a regulatory-based 
privatization strategy transforms the role of state from a provider of “goods and services” to 
“umpire whose function is to ensure that economic actors play by the agreed upon rules of the 
game.”83 Effectively, governance is privatized and the responsiveness of the state to the social 
welfare needs of society is clawed back. The service provider role of the state is privatized 
through private actors and the focus is inward on managing the procedural aspects of being a 
service provider.  
 Baldwin and Black countered Braithwaite and Ayres’ enforcement theory with a broader 
perspective of responsiveness that considers a firm’s organizational culture, regulatory logics, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 J. Freeman, “Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State” (1997-98) Vol 45 UCLA Law Review 17.  
81 Ibid at 22.  
82 J. Freeman, “The Private Role in Public Governance” (June 2000) 75 (3) New York University Law Review 543. 
83 G. Majone, “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe” in R. Baldwin, C. Scott and C. Hood, A Reader on 
Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).  
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tools and strategies.84 Baldwin and Black’s work engages in a more complicated scenario by 
considering whether “really responsive regulation can be developed in polycentric regulatory 
regimes, including those where the rules of policy making, information gathering and 
enforcement are distributed between a number of different organizations, particularly where they 
cross different jurisdictional boundaries.”85 These scholars expose the multi-jurisdictional nature 
of regulatory affairs where organizational behaviour and strategic management are seen as 
factors that shape the responsiveness of a firm to regulation.  
2.1.4 Canada’s Responsive Regulatory Period 
In Canada, the responsive regulatory period was one of delayering, downsizing and devolution of 
bureaucratic organizational systems. At both a provincial and federal level, the environmental 
government sector experienced budgetary cuts, contracting out of services, devolving of 
government authority and diminishing of regulatory enforcement and compliance capacity in line 
with the public management approach and a privatization agenda.86 Clarkson and Wood contend 
this retooling of the regulatory bureaucratic organizational systems resulted in an overburdening 
of the public administration and ineffective oversight:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 R. Baldwin & J. Black, “Really Responsive Regulation” (2008) 71(1) The Modern Law Review Ltd. 59. 
85 Ibid at 93.  
86 Clarkson & Wood, Supra note 73 at 195. also see Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario, Common Sense 
Revolution Platform Document, (May 1994), online: Scribd. S. Robinson, Common Sense Revolution 
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/57099326/Common-Sense-Revolution>. Also see O’Connor, Walkerton Report, Supra 
note 7. In the Report, Justice O’Connor describes the Common Sense Revolution Platform as: “The Red Tape 
Commission was established in November 1995 as a Cabinet-level committee.… The Commission’s primary 
objectives included the following objectives: i) Reduce the compliance costs and administrative burden to 
businesses and institutions, thereby improving the competitiveness and business climate for existing and new 
businesses. ii) Move toward alternative methods of regulation, such as the establishment of performance standards 
and allowing business self-regulation; move away from micro-managing the compliance process. iii) Establish an 
ongoing regulatory review process that would critically evaluate all aspects of new regulations, including the cost to 
government, the cost to the private sector to comply, and the overall benefit. iv) Change the regulatory culture of the 
government and the public. v) Ensure that the health and safety of Ontarians are not adversely affected by the 
regulatory reform process; Also See Scott Prudham, “Poisoning the Well: Neoliberalism and the Contamination of 
the Municipal Water in Walkerton Ontario” (May 2004) 35(3) Geoforum 343. online: 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718503001076>; also see J. McKenzie, “Walkerton: 
Requiem for the New Public Management in Ontario?” Int’l J of Environment and Pollution (2004) 21(4) 309. Also 
see V. Gibbons, “The Managing the Environment Report: A Review of Best Practices (2001), online: 
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/1000/10292716.pdf>. 
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“[t]he staff that remained were often stretched beyond their limits, sometimes given 
explicit or implicit messages to relax their oversight of regulated entities. In Ontario, 
decisions by government leaders to cut regulatory capacity, privatize certain government 
functions without adequate oversight, and relax enforcement of existing laws led to 
injury, illness, or – for the inhabitants of the small town of Walkerton, who became 
victims of the improperly regulated local water supply – death.”87  
 
Similar to the compliance period of environmental regulation, the drinking water contamination 
events in Walkerton, Ontario and Battleford, Saskatchewan demonstrate a reactive period of 
political responsiveness. Legislators were prompted by these environmental governance failures 
to introduce new legislation and a new model of governance.  
 In response to environmental governance failures and the political backlash to the staid 
traditional instruments, Canadian environmental regulators, at both a federal and provincial level, 
also undertook experimentation. Howlett contends first, market-and tax-based incentive forms of 
governance were introduced including self-regulatory corporate-oriented schemes. Howlett 
contends that similar to earlier environmental regulatory strategies, this “do more-with-less” idea 
“on the part of federal and provincial administrative agencies affected by budget cuts in the mid-
1990s” 88  influenced this period of experimentation. In regulatory practice, a slow 
implementation of these market-based instruments occurred and then, a sudden and unexplained 
end to their popularity and use followed.89  
2.1.5 The Policy Drift to a Governance Mode 
Nevertheless, Howlett views with optimism the recent shift to the multi-stakeholder or the 
governance mode that he contends also emerged from the experimentation regulatory period. In 
his view, the encouragement of diverse range of state and non-state actors in policy processes is, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Clarkson & Wood, Ibid. at 195. 
88 Howlett, Supra note 65 at 35. 
89 Ibid. Howlett contends that “[n]ot one of these experiments were successful. In the case of market-based financial 
instruments, declines in government fiscal capacity and the political emphasis placed on fighting the deficit led to 
their quick demise – as evidenced by failure of numerous such proposals contained in the 1990 federal Green Plan.”  
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in part, an extension of the global new public management movement (NPM).90 NPM is an 
ideology known for prescribing the delayering and downsizing of public administration 
bureaucracies. The introduction of NPM created a regulatory culture for the inclusion of the new 
governance framework in the environmental sphere.91  
 In response to changing values in the public and private spheres in the United States, 
Lobel traces the administrative state’s subtle shift towards the new governance framework.92 In 
her view, the new governance framework is a reaction to the traditional style of governing and a 
response to the neo-liberal era’s trend of deregulation and privatization that altered the 
boundaries of the public and the private spheres.93 In effect, the tenets of the new governance 
framework result in an organizational restructuring. Notionally, the organizational design 
becomes less hierarchical to take into account how to govern from the ground up. Governing 
from the ground up is a response to the upward push from interest groups, citizens, and other 
decision-makers demanding access to policy decisions. In the end, the governance function and 
the organizational design are reconfigured to account for the upward push.  
 In response to Lobel’s research, Canadian scholars assert the new governance framework 
re-shaped environmental regulation by introducing a “cluster of [new] values” into the public 
law regulatory space.94 Others highlight the transformation of the nation-state and the idea that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Ibid.  
91 C. Hood, “Public Management: The Word, the Movement, the Science” in E. Ferlie, L.E. Lynn Jr. & C. Pollitt, 
“The Oxford Handbook of Public Management” (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2007).  
92 O. Lobel, “The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought” 
(2004-2005) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 342. Lobel’s Renew Deal’s New Governance frame is succinctly explained in: O. 
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Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous 
Lumping” (Dec, 2004) 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471; and to Lobel’s Surreply to Karkkainen see: O. Lobel, “Setting the 
Agenda for New Governance Research” (2004-2005) 89 Minn. L. R. 498. 
93 Ibid. Also see: J. Pierre, Governance and Institutional Flexibility, in D. Levi-Faur ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
Governance, (Northamptonshire, Oxford University Press, 2012) at 187.  
94 Chris Tollefson, Anthony R. Zito & Fred Gale, Symposium Overview: Conceptualizing New Governance 
Arrangements, 90(1) Public Admin J 3 (2012). 
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effective control is maintained by a centralized, bureaucratic chain of command. Conceptually, 
governance as a legal model is now viewed as a deliberative, information gathering exercise 
where learning occurs, as the State is responsive to local conditions through the participation of a 
wider range of stakeholders beyond industry actors. Under the new governance framework, the 
role and function of the state as commander-in-chief evolved into an orchestrator of a localized 
governance function.95  
 Overall, the new governance framework supports the participation and creation of 
partnerships as advanced by the experimentation implementation style highlighted by Howlett. 
The language of partnerships enters the provincial policy arena, as exhibited in Alberta’s Water 
for Life Strategy. Based on this idea of partnership, governance is viewed as a shared “normative 
authority” amongst levels of authority and decision-makers with diverse expectations. 96 
Decision-making becomes a collaborative task. Collectively, decision-makers become norm 
generators, as these “individuals are involved in the process of developing the norms of 
behaviour and changing them”97 This collaborative partnership is responsive to horizontal and 
hierarchical relationships, with the effect of blurring the organizational lines of authority and 
introducing competing organizational goals and values.   
 In light of this shift to the governance mode, the political nature of regulation emerges as 
a cautionary tale. Minoque characterizes regulation as ‘weapon of political control.’98  This 
politicized description of regulation highlights the interplay of “the different political authorities 
control and sub-central governments so that regulation becomes a weapon of political control, 
and a locus of political conflict, rather than a politically neutral instrument of efficient economic 
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96 Ibid at 373.  
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organization.”99 In other words, the significant influence of political factors upon methods and 
logics of regulation create a form of political capture of the regulatory regime. 
2.1.6  Summary of the Regulatory Change to the Governance Mode 
The environmental regulatory governance project is one of “institutional change.”100 Braithwaite 
and Ayres’ responsive regulatory theme and later advanced by Gunningham, Grabosky and 
Sinclair expanded regulatory methodologies and initiated the introduction of the governance 
framework. The re-design of the environmental regulatory space based on the governance mode 
results in an organizational restructuring. This restructuring takes into account how to govern 
from the ground up where a flatter, adaptive, self-regulatory organizational structure emerges 
from the attributes of new governance and the responsive regulation movement. Underpinning 
the responsiveness theme is the notions of privatization and inclusiveness where non-state actors 
with competing values now actively participate in the environmental regulatory process. 
Conceptually, this state and non-state partnership perspective breaks down the rigid 
organizational culture of the traditional regulatory period and results in the devolution of 
decision-making. However, in Canada, a consultative style of regulation has existed since the 
inception of the environmental regulation era and raises questions about how decisions are made 
in this governance mode. Governance is now viewed as a shared activity that re-orients the 
centralized roles and functions of the regulatory state in support of a partnership governance 
approach to governing water.  
3.0	  	   Regulatory	  Change	  in	  the	  Natural	  Resource	  Literature	   
3.1  A Call For Change  
Since the early 1970s natural resources scholars have been calling for regulatory change. In his 	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100 A. J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves (Spring 2008) Journal of Law & 
Social Inquiry 33(2) 503 at 503.  
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seminal 1973 article on resilience theory, Holling presents a conception of resiliency that takes 
into account the responsiveness of ecological systems: for example, the ability of a system to 
absorb change without shifting into another ecological state, such as algae bloom in a lake 
caused by nutrient loading of nitrogen or phosphorous into the water source.101 Holling, in this 
article, outlined the institutional design elements of a responsive natural resource governance 
system. Specifically, he put forth four resiliency-based design features: flexibility, a broad 
perspective, diversity, and emergent change and an element of surprise. Conceptually, his design 
framework emphasized dynamic change and uncertainty, an attitude that presumes that some 
events are unexpected.102 Holling’s resilience governance framework calls for natural resource 
management systems to consider how change is “absorb[ed] and [can] accommodate further” 
ecological change. 103  In other words, Holling’s framework of change invites an adaptive 
governance stance that can be responsive to the socio-political and ecological changes associated 
with contemporary environmental problems.  
 Concurrently, the connectivity of social and ecological systems (SES) was developing as 
a dominant theme in the literature. A SES regime recognizes how resource users and their social 
norms are linked to ecological systems. Ostrom reflected upon the SES concept’s intersection 
with her Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) model. Ostrom’s IAD framework challenges 
the governance function of the State and brings forward the importance of local resource users in 
organizing a governance regime and protecting the natural resource. In consideration of the SES 
concept and because of her extensive IAD research, Ostrom understood that “the application of 
empirical studies to the policy world leads one to stress the importance of fitting institutional 
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to devise systems that can absorb and accommodate future events in whatever unexpected form they may take.” 
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rules to a specific social-ecological setting. In her view, ‘One size fits all’ policies are not 
effective.” 104  With her IAD framework rooted in a localized and polycentric concept of 
governance, Ostrom’s consideration of a SES perspective effectively advanced her research 
towards an adaptive governance model. A model that also considers both intangible and tactile 
elements: “innovativeness, learning, adapting, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of 
participants of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple levels.”105 These 
attributes are expected to arise in the social context supporting the regime.   
4.0  An Interdisciplinary Perspective 
4.1  Bridging Legal and Natural Resource Governance Scholarship 
Taken together, this brief overview of the governance literature and natural resources scholarship 
exposes the challenges of the static construct embedded in legal regulatory regimes. The natural 
resource literature points to a deeper conundrum – how to reorient environmental regulatory 
regimes around the “idea of the [adaptive] ecosystem, a shared mission to protect and restore its 
health,” as aptly argued by legal scholar Karkkainen.106 This dissertation takes up the challenge 
of regulatory change and considers the responsiveness theme underpinning Gunningham et.al.,’s 
Smart Regulation (also known as the Integrative Regulatory Approach) and Holling’s 
ecologically based responsiveness theme. So, the question remains: How can regulatory 
pluralism reform water law in way that continues to protect the environmental integrity of 
Canada’s ecologically-different waterscapes? This question takes on a renewed significance in 
light of the introduction of the governance mode. What are the elements that, taken together, can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 E. Ostrom, “Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems” (2010) 100(3) 
American Economic Review 641 at 643. In this article, Elinor Ostrom relies upon the collaborative research of her 
husband Vincent Ostrom and his colleagues Tiebout and Warren who together define polycentric as: “connotes 
many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each other.” 
105 Ibid at 665.  
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be seen to constitute a sound framework to evaluate a water governance model in Canada? In this 
dissertation, the mapping of governance with the natural resources literature offers the 
opportunity to consider responsiveness to ecological change. Presented next is a summary of the 
Gunningham et.al.,’s environmental policy approach, which is followed of a synopsis of 
Holling’s resiliency theory. The idea of responsiveness in both theories is examined.  
5.0  Re-Centering Environmental Policy–making Towards Eco-Resiliency: Exploring 
The Gap in Gunningham and Sinclair’s “Integrative Regulatory Approach” 
5.1  Introduction 
Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair’s principle-based Integrative or Smart Regulation model is 
viewed in the governance literature as part of the global responsive regulation trend that swept 
regulatory regimes in Australia, New Zealand, North America, Britain, and Europe over the past 
few decades. The genesis of Gunningham and Sinclair’s Integrative Regulatory Approach107 
appears in the earlier collaborative work of Gunningham and Grabosky, which culminated into 
Smart Regulation, a regulatory governance text that included Sinclair as a key contributor. 108 
Smart Regulation builds upon Braithwaite and Ayers’ earlier monograph, Responsive 
Regulation. 109  To re-iterate, Braithwaite and Ayers’ two-dimensional enforcement and 
compliance model is state-centric. The State acts as the regulatory enforcer and is charged with 
escalating the enforcement mechanisms up the compliance pyramid in response to the behaviour 
of the regulated entity. The key idea is state’s responsiveness to the regulatee’s actions.  
 Gunningham, and his contributors, Grabosky and Sinclair, expanded upon Braithwaite 
and Ayres’ two-sided enforcement-compliance pyramid by adding an additional face or third 
side to the model. Their three-dimensional model gives consideration to the role of non-state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Gunningham & Sinclair, Integrative Regulation, Supra note 15.  
108 Gunningham  et. al., Smart Regulation, Supra note 5. 
109 Ayres & J. Braithwaite, Supra note 79.  
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actors (for example, the public, environmental groups, interest groups, business associations) 
who act as surrogate regulators; the shift to self-regulatory corporate governance systems; and, 
the state’s ability to influence the behaviour of the regulated entity. Unlike Braithwaite and 
Ayres’s model, Gunningham et.al.,’s three-dimensional pyramid model broadens regulatory 
enforcement theory. Regulatory enforcement and compliance is no longer limited to the state 
regulator but is a shared activity of a diverse range of actors.  
 Gunningham et.al.’s view of responsive regulation results in a regulatory categorization 
and mapping exercise.110 This regulatory mapping strategy offers a normative framework that 
advances regulatory pluralism 111  and a dyamic, risk-based 112  approach to enforcement and 
compliance. This approach offers a “dynamic” instrument mix and matching process tailored to 
the context of the environmental problem while consideration is also given to pre-determined 
policy outcome goals and the level of risk.113 In effect, this model de-centers the State from its 
traditional role of commander-in-chief to overseer of outcomes, intervention measures for high-
risk regulated entities and surrogate regulators (e.g., ENGOs) and self-regulatory processes.  
5.2 A Synopsis of the Integrative Regulatory Approach (Smart Regulation) 
In Gunningham and Sinclair’s Integrative Regulatory Approach, a successful regulatory 
approach is premised upon five neo-liberal oriented design elements and principles. The five 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Gunningham & Grabosky, Smart Regulation, Supra note 15 at 22.  
111 Ibid.  
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track regulatory system. “[T]he essential idea is not to respond to individual enterprises by being more or less 
punitive, depending on their path (Braithwaite’s model) but rather to offer different standard regulatory paths –green 
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dialogue; oversight and transparency – responsiveness is built in in that a failure to live up to the commitments 
required of green track performers will result in demotion to the conventional track regulation.”  
113 Ibid at 403. Is the instrument dynamic and designed to facilitate responsive regulation? These authors consider 
whether “… the individual instrument … and its implementation is static rather than dynamic and cannot be tailored 
to ascend or descend depending on the behaviour of specific firms).” In order to encourage responsiveness, these 
authors offer two methods: instrument sequencing and circuit breakers.  
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regulatory institutional design elements are:  
1.   Directed at industry,  
2.   Take into account the cost of environmental regulation,  
3.   Apply a least interventionist role for government actors,  
4.   Consider the interests of third parties, who are viewed as quasi-regulators; and,  
5.   Foster win-win opportunities. 
 
The five principles are:  
1.   “A complementary multi-instrument mix rather than a single-instrument 
approach; 
2.   Less interventionist measures; 
3.   An escalating environmental enforcement pyramid with feedback 
mechanisms; 
4.   A participatory approach, which empowers third parties to become quasi-
regulators; and, 
5.   Maximizing win-win outcomes.”114 
 
Gunningham and Sinclair submit these principles will allow policy makers to achieve “efficient 
and effective environmental policy.”115 As a normative legal theory, it presents their view of 
what the law ought to be and is accordingly based on a set of market-oriented values. 116 This 
normative perspective is reinforced in Smart Regulation, when Gunningham and Grabosky ask, 
“in what circumstances and to what extent can regulation safely be left to industries themselves? 
When government intervention is necessary, what forms should it take?”117 These questions 
orient the substance of their compliance and enforcement model towards a self-directed industry 
orientation, minimal government intervention and a value system of cost-efficiency and minimal 
regulatory intervention.  
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5.3  The Normative Frame of Effectiveness and Efficiency 
Reinforcing these five principles and elements is Smart Regulation’s “pre-eminent criteria”118 of 
effectiveness and efficiency. Gunningham et al.’s define the criterion of “effectiveness” from an 
outcome-oriented perspective as “the degree to which the determined environmental objectives 
are achieved through the use of certain instruments” 119  and “contributing to improving the 
environment.”120 This forgoing thinking might reasonably lead one to surmise that Gunningham 
et al.,’s effectiveness criterion is aligned closer to a quantifiable policy outcome (i.e., is results-
based) rather than an indeterminate environmental variable or a softer, learning characteristic as 
advanced by a process-oriented environmental collaborative governance model.   
Gunningham and Sinclair’s Integrative Regulatory Approach also considers the 
evaluative criteria of “equity and political acceptability.” While only briefly mentioned by 
Gunningham and Sinclair’s in their article (Integrative Regulatory), in the book Smart 
Regulation, Gunningham and Grabosky further expand upon the meaning of the terms equity and 
political acceptability. Equity refers to fairness, that is “fairness in the burden-sharing,” which 
these authors expand to include the criteria of “political acceptability (which includes factors 
such as liberty, transparency, and accountability).” 121  Nevertheless, these authors quickly 
discount their reliance upon equity as a criterion, as they view it as a concern for environmental 
justice advocates. These scholars firmly limit environmental policy evaluation to an 
“effectiveness and efficiency” criteria because to re-iterate, in their view, the target of the 
improved environmental performance is directed at a “firm”122 (and “industry”).123  
The timing of the introduction of the Smart Regulation manuscript in the 1990s, during 	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the dawning of the responsive regulation era, raises concerns how the idea of privatization 
shaped the governance-based legal model. Given the public law nature of environmental policy 
making and the impact upon local citizens, one might consider whether a smarter environmental 
regulatory approach should take into account an ecological-based concept, inclusive of equity 
and fairness issues. Presented in the next sub-sections are the Integrative Regulatory Approach’s 
five principles, as described by Gunningham and Sinclair in their article.  
5.4  Integrative Regulatory Approach’s Five Principles: 
5.4.1 Principle 1. A complementary multi-instrument mix: Prefer policy mixes incorporating 
instrument and institutional combinations 
Gunningham and Sinclair acknowledge little empirical research has been completed on the 
interaction of different instrument mixes. However, they argue a single-instrument regulatory 
approach is neither a “flexible”124 nor a “resilient” response to “all environmental problems in all 
contexts.” 125 In their view, the focus of an effective and efficient regulatory strategy should be 
directed towards the strengths of each instrument and creating a diverse policy instrument mix 
that is context specific.   
5.4.2 Principle 2. Prefer less-interventionist measures 
Gunningham and Sinclair contend a least interventionist regulatory approach is needed to change 
industry behaviour. In their view, a broad-brush implementation strategy applied with 
prescriptive regulatory instruments unfairly treats all industries within the sector, even the good 
performers. These scholars recommend the implementation of an instrument continuum. The 
“continuum” that categorizes policy instruments “from the least to the most interventionist.”126 
The instrument continuum places the most coercively enforced and highly prescriptive 
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instruments – the command-and-control instruments –at one end of the continuum and at the 
opposite end are the least interventionist instruments, such as voluntarism, education; while in 
between these two extremes are self-regulation and economic instruments.127 Gunningham and 
Sinclair promote a case-by-case implementation strategy, where the level of instrument 
intervention needed in the situation is first understood, prior to applying the instrument. In their 
view, this principle of least intervention is presented as an escalating policy that complements 
the next principle – the escalating enforcement pyramid principle.  
5.4.3 Principle 3. An Escalating Environmental Enforcement Pyramid with Feedback 
Mechanisms 
Gunningham and Sinclair present their “three-dimensional regulatory pyramid model” with 
“escalating degrees of coercion” as being responsive to “the interaction of different but 
complementary instruments and parties.” 128  In this model, when less-coercive regulatory 
measures fail, a strategic escalation up the three faces of the pyramid should then occur. First, by 
introducing a more coercive instrument while also connecting the three parties as regulators ⎯ 
the government as regulator (first parties), business as self-regulator (second parties) and 
commercial and non-commercial (third parties) ⎯ and, then sequencing the regulatory 
response(s).  
Conceptually, the integrated escalating pyramid is structured to be responsive to a two-
track regulatory system: a “green track” and “conventional track.” Firms with a high 
environmental performance are placed in the “green track,” which is less interventionist. Firms 
with a lower environmental performance, for instance, those companies just meeting the 
regulatory standards will be streamed into the “conventional track” where a higher intervention 
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strategy is applied through the use of prescriptive, coercive and restrictive measures.129 
Gunningham and Sinclair also acknowledge the limitations of their model. A key 
limitation exists in situations where an escalating enforcement response should not be used. In 
their view, two such situations exist: First, when the environmental problem presents “a serious 
risk of irreversible loss or catastrophic damage,” such as the “extinction of endangered species or 
nuclear plant explode[s].”130 and, Second, when the regulatory interaction is limited to one-time 
transaction. This limited relationship limits the regulator’s opportunity to change behavior. Thus, 
a higher, more interventionist response may be appropriate as a first choice.131   
In sum, this regulatory pyramid is responsive to the regulatory stream (“green” or 
“conventional”) selected for the firm and results in a regulatory strategy that may include multi-
complementary instruments with stated environmental objectives agreed upon between the 
regulator and regulatee, prior to implementation. Failure of the regulatory strategy’s objectives 
would result in an agreed-upon escalation process up the enforcement pyramid that could include 
sanctions. If the environmental problem presents as an irreversible threat then, one would expect 
the application of a high interventionist instrument. In effect, the state’s role would shift from 
one of overseer to commander-in-chief of a tightly controlled compliance, monitoring and 
reporting process.  
5.4.4 Principle 4. A participatory approach: the empowerment of third parties to become 
quasi-regulators 
For Gunningham and Sinclair, a key role of government is to foster environmental improvement 
amongst the various actors (firms, commercial and non-commercial actors). Brought together 
through the enforcement pyramid, these parties interact and create the conditions to share 
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information, take on a “general educative function”132 and “share the regulatory burden.”133 
Through this participatory approach, it is hoped public accountability for the environmental 
performance of the regulated entity will be strengthened.  
These authors caution that third party involvement can be counterproductive because the 
community may remain focused on local concerns (NIMBY – not in my backyard, for example) 
“to the detriment of broader policy goals.”134To offset this participatory burden, Gunningham 
and Sinclair stress the reliance of policy goals rooted in the pre-eminent criteria of effectiveness 
and efficiency. In NIMBY situation, these scholars worry the regulator and regulatee may spend 
more time on community engagement rather than in regulatory oversight or enforcement. Thus, 
the State’s role becomes one of establishing procedural mechanisms that offer opportunities for 
the public participation and to provide for, gather and exchange information.  
5.4.5 Principle 5. Maximizing win-win outcomes 
In recognition of the criticism that the traditional command-and-control instrument approach 
lacks incentives to “nudg[e]” firms to improve environmental performance, Gunningham and 
Sinclair argue a key challenge for regulatory policy makers is creating opportunities for firms to 
continuously improve their environmental performance. 135 In their view, the government’s role 
“is to ensure that regulatory solutions optimize the opportunity for win-win outcomes and 
facilitate and reward enterprises for going beyond compliance, while maintaining a statutory 
baseline and a ratcheting up of standards.”136 Government intervention is required to foster an 
environmental performance path geared towards green regulatory track while also taking into 
account the marginal cost issue facing industry.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Gunningham & Grabosky, Smart Regulation, Supra note 5 at 95. 
133 Gunningham & Sinclair, Integrative Regulation, Supra note 15 at 877. 
134 Ibid at 878. 
135 Ibid at 893 
136 Ibid at 880. 
	  	   	  52	  
5.4.6  Summary of the Integrative Principled Regulatory Approach 
To summarize, in response to the perceived failure of the traditional single-instrument regulatory 
approach, Gunningham and Sinclair’s Integrated Regulatory Approach (in their earlier, Smart 
Regulation) introduces an environmental regulatory method responsive to the industry’s 
regulatory behavior and is structured in a pluralistic and participatory manner. In their view, a 
regulatory strategy can be adapted to a specific situation by first considering the five principles 
and adopting a regulatory pluralism perspective. The responsiveness of Smart Regulation 
appears in the three-dimensional escalating enforcement-compliance pyramid, whereby 
regulators, regulatees and third parties can respond to the instrument mix’s outcomes by 
increasing or decreasing the levels of intervention, interaction and the type of regulatory 
instrument. In Gunningham and Sinclair’s view, the evaluation of an environmental governance 
outcome should be limited to the two elements of effectiveness and efficiency. They deem these 
elements as paramount in assessing the regulatory outcome. Yet, these scholars limit the use of 
an escalating enforcement pyramid in situations where the environmental problem may lead to 
the risk of an irreversible loss, such as loss of biodiversity. In this case, the first response by the 
regulator should be a high coercive interventionist instrument. In this regulatory pluralism 
model, the State’s role is fluid and changes between chief commander-in-controller, overseer, 
regulatory strategist, negotiator and facilitator of an undefined multi-stakeholder process.  
5.5 Does the Smart Regulation Model Lead to Better Environmental Decision-Making?  
The degraded state of many of Canada’s aquatic systems raises concerns whether the dominance 
of the responsive regulatory theme as set out in Smart Regulation and Gunningham and 
Sinclair’s Integrated Regulatory Approach is responsive to ecological change and is an 
appropriate regulatory model given Canada’s policy drift to the water governance
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experiments.137 Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair argue the escalating enforcement pyramid 
approach is an inappropriate regulatory response to a serious environmental problem. Given the 
fragile state of many of Canada’s watersheds, it is timely to examine the Integrative Regulatory 
Approach (Smart Regulation) to determine its relevance for governing aquatic systems and to 
consider responsiveness from an ecological change perspective. This dissertation argues a 
shortfall of this integrated regulatory model’s evaluation criteria is the lack of an ecologically-
based concept. Applying an eco-resiliency framework offers an alternative perspective to 
evaluate how to govern based on an ecological concept. In view of the goal of this dissertation to 
examine the decision-making within legal water governance regimes, one wonders if the 
Integrative Regulatory Approach (Smart Regulation) can be expanded to incorporate the lessons 
that can be learned by applying Holling’s resiliency theory, as found in the ecological literature.   
6.0  A Synopsis Of C.S. Holling’s Resilency Theory 
6.1 Introduction 
Resiliency in the ecological literature is describes the capacity of an ecosystem to absorb 
change.138 The concept is used to assess “how to sustain and enhance adaptive capacity” of a 
complex and constantly changing ecosystem.139 An ecosystem is resilient when it exhibits the 
capacity “to absorb recurrent disturbances.”140 A disturbance may include: a flood, a drought, 
and a sudden and intense rainfall or pest infestation. A resilient ecosystem maintains structures, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 WWF-Canada, WWF – Canada Report entitled: 2009 Canada’s Rivers at Risk: Environmental Flows and 
Canada’s Freshwater Future, online: WWF<http://assets.wwf.ca/downloads/canadas_rivers_at_risk.pdf > 
Environment Canada, Comprehensive Approach to Clean Water, see: Cleaning up Lake Winnipeg and Lake Simcoe 
Tabs, online: Environment Canada <http://www.ec.gc.ca/paae-apcw/default.asp?lang=En&n=61284017-1>; 
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/eau-water/default.asp?lang=En&n=4E8DF48A-1>and, <http://www.ec.gc.ca/paae-
apcw/default.asp?lang=En&n=63494C3C-1>,respectively. 
138 C. Folke, S. Carpeneter, T. Elmqvist, L. Gunderson, C.S. Holling & B. Walker, “Resilience and Sustainable 
Development: Building Adaptive Capacity in a World of Transformations” (2002) 31(5) AMBIO 437.  
139 Ibid. 
140 F. Berkes, “Understanding uncertainty and reducing vulnerability: lessons from resilience thinking” (2007) 41 
Natural Hazard 283-295 at 283. 
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processes and feedbacks inherent in the ecosystem without shifting into another state (that is, 
triggering the system into “a regime shift or flip”141). The resilience concept considers both the 
vulnerability of an ecosystem and disruptions to an ecosystem and ways the system can “sustain 
and enhance adaptive capacity in a complex world of rapid transformations.”142  
 With the concept’s consideration of an ecosystem’s adaptive capacity, stability, 
vulnerability, “surprises and unknowable risks,”143 resiliency offers a conceptual framework to 
organize thinking on how a legal regulatory system should be structured to respond to changing 
conditions of aquatic systems. Holling defines resilience as both the persistence of the 
relationships within a system and the system’s ability to absorb change. Resilience is “the ability 
of the system to absorb change and variation without flipping into a different state where the 
variables and processes controlling structure and behaviour suddenly change. Resilience, 
therefore, represents the property that sustains the ecosystem”144 and can be explained by a loss 
in resiliency, when an ecosystem losses resilience that loss in resilience could trigger a change in 
the state of the ecosystem. 145  
6.2 Examples of Resiliency & A Loss of Resiliency 
In his seminal article on resilience theory, Holling offers the Great Lakes as an example of an 
evolving ecosystem.146 The Great Lakes together are considered a self-contained ecosystem, 
where the properties of the water have been altered by human activities. The human activities of 
nutrient loading of both domestic and industrial wastes into the lakes as well as commercial 
fishing have resulted in well-documented ecosystem changes. For example, the presence of algae 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Ibid at 285. Berkes states: “The shift from one stable state to another is a regime shift of a flip.” 
142 Holling, Supra note 16. 
143 C.S. Holling “Surprise For Science, Resilience For Ecosystems, and Incentives For People” (1996) 6(3) 
Ecological Applications 733 at 734-735. 
144 Ibid. at 735. 
145 Ibid.  
146 Holling, Supra note 16. 
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blooms in the lakes is attributed to the practice of domestic and industrial nutrient loading and 
sewage diversion. Holling contends that the effect of the nutrient loading “triggers periodic algal 
blooms,”147 which reflect a condition of low oxygen coupled with “the sudden disappearance of 
some plankton species, and the appearance of others,” which in turn, caused “nutrient changes in 
the lake.”148 As result, the Great Lakes ecosystem experienced a loss of resiliency.  
 Holling’s discussion of the nutrient loading event in the Great Lakes illustrates the loss of 
resiliency and an ecological regime shift. An ecosystem change (also, called a flip) can occur as 
result of an external event or, what Holling would call “a disturbance.” The external force (a 
disturbance) exposes vulnerability in the system. For example, an increase in water temperature, 
as result of climate change, might reduce the population of water temperature sensitive fish 
species and may leave the remaining fish population(s) vulnerable to a predatory response. The 
ecosystem’s response to the disturbance might be either to absorb the change or, if the ecosystem 
is already vulnerable and has reached a threshold, could flip into another state. Holling’s 
discussion of disruptions within the Great Lakes ecosystem demonstrates that the non-
equilibrium model of nature (flux of nature) more closely resembles the behaviour of ecosystem. 
But also allows exposes the vulnerability and the potential for a regime shift or, surprise, which 
changes the system as result of resiliency loss caused by human-induced disturbances.  
6.3  Applying the Resiliency Concept to a Natural Resource Management Regime 
Holling considered how resilience theory could inform the development of a resource 
governance system. Specifically, Holling outlined four governance principles:  
 1) flexibility - ensures that future options are considered and left open to respond 
to changing ecological conditions;   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Ibid at 7. 
148 Ibid.  
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 2) a broad perspective - requires events to be viewed from both a regional and a 
local context;  
 3) diversity - supports the heterogeneity of the functions that species provide 
within an ecosystem and reinforces the perspective of “ecosystem services,” 149  and the 
redundancy function that species offer an ecosystem; and,  
 4) emergent change and an element of surprise – provides for dynamic change 
and an attitude that presumes that some events can be unexpected.150  
However, Holling cautions a governance framework “does not require the precise 
capacity to predict the future, but only the qualitative capacity to devise [governance] systems 
that can absorb and accommodate future events in whatever unexpected form they may take.”151 
Holling invites an adaptive governance stance that can be responsive to the socio-ecological 
system changes associated with contemporary environmental problems.  
6.4  The Pathology of the Command-and-Control Regime – The Engineered Approach  
Together, Holling and Meffe contend an ecosystem’s loss of resiliency can be attributed to the 
application of an engineering-oriented solution to a natural resources problem.152 Holling and 
Meffe argue the typical institutional response to a resource management crisis exposes the real 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 J. Ranaganthan, M. Munasinghe & F. Irwin, Policies for Sustainable Governance of Global Ecosystem Services 
World Resources Institute (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2008) at 9. These authors use the concept ecosystem 
services of nature to re-orient thinking on the degraded state of ecosystems globally and “how human alterations to 
natural systems affect their supply and distribution over time.” These authors characterize ecosystem services into 
four categories: 1) provisioning services (food, fresh water, fiber and fuel); 2) regulating services (biophysical 
processes that control climate, flood, diseases, air and water quality, pollination and erosion); 3) cultural services 
(recreational, aesthetic or spiritual places); and 4) supporting services (underlying ecosystem processes such as soil, 
photosynthesis and nutrient cycling). At page 19, these authors state that “the way forward requires rewiring of 
governance – making new connections to understand and find solutions to solve the complex interlinked challenges 
of ecosystem degradation. One thing is abundantly clear: “business as usual” is no longer the option. The time has 
come to stop operating Planet Earth Ltd solely for the purpose of making a few shareholders rich in the short term, 
and instead to manage it as a family trust fund, set up for the benefit of today’s and tomorrow’s children.” 
150 Holling, Supra note 16 at 21. 
151 Ibid.  
152 C.S. Holling & G.K. Meffe, “Command and Control and the Pathology of Natural Resource Management” (April 
1996) 10(2) Conservation Biology 328-337. 
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problem; that is, the pathology of the resource management system is the command-and-control 
theme embedded in the institutional culture of resource management.153 In their view, the goal of 
resource management planning is to create predictable, stable and reliable ecosystems for human 
needs. This orientation reinforced by an engineering-oriented adaptive response can bring about 
a loss of ecosystem resiliency.154 Holling and Meffe point out the managed command-and-
control institutional response is premised upon a linear management approach of first identifying 
the problem and then, engineering a solution and, later, implementing the solution.155 These 
scholars offer the following management examples as typical institutional responses: “we control 
agricultural pests through herbicides and pesticides; we convert natural, multi-species, variable-
aged forests into monoculture, single-aged plantations[.]”156  In their view, this technocratic 
management approach reflects an institutional response that does not reinforce an adaptive 
response. Rather, this management approach of control “can lead to short-term economic returns, 
but it also increases the vulnerability of ecosystems to perturbations that otherwise could be 
absorbed.”157 In short, this management approach exposes an institutional response failure ⎯ in 
particular, the failure to consider the natural functioning behaviour of natural ecosystems.  
In essence, Holling and Meffe call for change in natural resource management 
institutional systems reflects the golden rule of: “Natural resource management should strive to 
retain critical types and ranges of natural variation in ecosystems. That is, management should 
facilitate existing processes and variables rather than changing or controlling them.”158 Rather 
than controlling the ecosystem’s variables, processes and structures, the resource management’s 
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155 Ibid at 329.  
156 Ibid.  
157 Ibid at 335. 
158 Ibid at 334.  
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purpose should be building resilience so that the ecosystem can continue to function with the 
goal of “serving not only the natural functions and species diversity of those systems but also the 
long-term interests of humanity.”159 These scholars conclude with an appeal for a reflective 
review of institutions. In their view, the institutionalization of the control ethos embedded in 
management systems and organizational cultures should be examined.  
In sum, as argued in this chapter, a call for regulatory change has been a consistent plea 
from natural resource and governance scholars. The concept of change is also a key feature of 
the responsiveness theme in regulatory theory. However, this regulatory responsiveness theme is 
industry-oriented, directed at effective and cost-efficient outcomes and overlooks the 
responsiveness to ecological change. To re-orient environmental law and policy towards an 
ecological perspective, the responsiveness theme as theorized by Holling’s resiliency theory is 
featured to bring forward ecological change. In light of the current shift toward experimental 
legislative governance mode and, in a reflective mode, one might ask: Do the new governance 
experiments in the water sector perpetuate Holling’s pathology critique of an embedded control 
ethos? What lessons can be taken from resiliency theory and applied in the sphere of 
environmental regulation and governance to nudge decision makers to consider ecological 
change? In order to understand how these questions are explored in this dissertation the research 
methodology is outlined next.  
7.0  Research Methodology 
7.1  Introduction 
This dissertation is grounded in a socio-legal, interdisciplinary stance. Prior to describing the 
methodological approach below, a brief discussion of the three primary theoretical perspectives 
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is offered to position the underlying organizing principles of this research and to provide support 
for the research methodology.160 The methodology presented in this section outlines the various 
supporting phases of the research. Namely, the completion of a literature review of both primary 
and secondary sources, which informed the literature mapping exercise; the development of the 
eco-resiliency framework, the construction as well as the application of an interview instrument 
that was applied to the three case studies (see Appendix A) and structured the final stage and the 
performance of a data analysis matrix. 
7.2  Theoretical Perspectives 
7.2.1  The Socio-ecological Resiliency Perspective 
A socio-ecological resiliency construct recognizes the diverse, broad, flexible, emergent change 
and polycentric dimensions of natural and human systems.161 This social-ecological resiliency 
perspective pushes the boundaries of the dominant governance discourse by including insights 
from ecology concerning triggers of change. Generally, the term governance is defined across 
academic boundaries as “the study of politics, economics, and society.”162 Applying a socio-
ecological resiliency perspective to a water governance system illuminates the dynamic, 
interconnected, human and adaptive nuances of governance and allows us to imagine how a legal 
regime can be responsive to change. 
7.2.2  The Law-Making Process Perspective 
Given the recent regulatory turn to an experimental governance mode, the methodology’s lens of 
inquiry focuses upon the decision-making in these legislatively constituted water committees. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 G.B. Davis & C.A. Parker, Writing the Doctoral Dissertation: A Systematic Approach, 2nd ed (Hauppauge: 
Barron’s, 1997), J.E. Mauch & J.W. Birch, Guide to the Successful Thesis and Dissertation: A Handbook for 
Students and Faculty, 3rd ed (New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1993).  
161 E. Ostrom “A General Framework for Analyzing Sustainability of Sociol-Ecological Systems” (July 2009) 325 
Science 419. 
162 D. Levi-Faur, “‘Big Government’ to ‘Big Governance’” in D. Levi-Faur, ed, Oxford Handbook of Governance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 9.  
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This attention on law-making through a decision process subtly shifts the inquiry away from a 
traditional research investigation into the “legal effectiveness” of a regulatory instrument.163 In 
other words, this dissertation examines the water committee’s collective decision-making 
processes in action.164 With the movement away from the question of legal effectiveness, the 
decision-making remains open to discovery: How does a regulatory pluralism model shape 
social-ecological concepts of change? How does a legal framework construct these legislative 
experiments in local decision-making? Who is the decision maker and why? Specifically, my 
task is to imagine how a legal governance regime can be responsive to ecological change and 
ideas. Consideration can also be given to the hidden aspects of the decision-making process. For 
example, such elements as the norms underpinning the governance arrangement and selection of 
policy instruments (for example, market based instruments) or of the substantive issues to be 
examined (for example, surface and ground water protection) or scale of the issue (local, regional 
global effects of climate change) or inclusion of a participant (for example, First Nation). 
Together, these variables can be brought to the forefront to help us understand how these 
elements might influence the construction of knowledge and law-making at a local committee 
level. Perhaps, we can ask, how these features can influence learning, knowledge creation, 
choices, and final decisions that become embedded in the production of the final product? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 D.M. Trubek & J. Esser, “‘Critical Empiricism’ and American Critical Legal Studies: Paradox, Program, or 
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164 Salamon, Supra note 58.  
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7.2.3 The Critical Legal Studies Perspective 
The critical legal studies165 approach applied in this dissertation places an emphasis upon the 
deconstruction of the knowledge creation and law-making that occurred within these local water 
committees in order to gain an understanding of the “law in action”.166 The critique of local 
committee’s knowledge construction is targeted at what (i.e., the values, substantive issues and 
perspectives) and who (i.e., committee participants) is included or excluded in these governance 
arrangements. In short, the process of decision-making by committee members is critically 
examined in these administrative law settings in order to understand, for example:  
i.   how the governance arrangement affects the decision-making process;  
ii.   how decision-makers craft their decisions;  
iii.   how the nuances of the decision-making process (for example, the hidden values 
and perspectives, the resiliency features in decision-making, the power relations, 
the role of the state, hegemonic forms of decision-making) shape and re-shape 
decisions; and,  
iv.   how a socio-ecological resiliency perspective animates the decision-making 
process. 
7.3  The Methodology Introduction 
Consideration of a social-ecological resiliency perspective informs the research methodology by 
exposing the basis of the responsiveness of the governance regime. 167  Social-ecological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 Trubek & J. Esser, Supra. note 163.; also see J.L. Kincheloe and P. McLaren, “Rethinking Critical Theory and 
Qualitative Research” in N.K. Dezin & Y.S. Lincoln, The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research 3rd Edition, 
(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2005).  
166 S. Macaulay, “The New versus the Old Legal Realism: Things Ain’t What They Used to Be”, (2005) Wisconsin 
Law Review 366. At page 390, Professor Macaulay stated: “[W]e must study law from the bottom up if we want to 
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167 Research on ecological resiliency or social-ecological resiliency is limited. A literature review on ProQuest 
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resiliency recognizes the interconnection between nature and humans. The proposition that 
environmental governance regimes should be responsive to industry is a dominant theme in the 
governance literature; yet, it is unclear how the governance regime (i.e., decision-making) is 
responsive to ecological change. In particular, how do these legal governance experiments 
respond to social-ecological change? In order to understand how this shift to a governance model 
and whether the eco-resiliency features are present in these local water committee experiments, a 
law in action approach informed the participant observation and the semi-structured interview 
processes used in this research plan. The research design unfolded in five stages: i) literature 
review and a literature mapping exercise ii) research question and propositions iii) units of 
analysis iv) the case studies iv) data collection and v) criterion for analysis. These four stages are 
presented next.  
7.4  Literature Review and Mapping 
The first stage of the research methodology relied upon the completion of an extensive literature 
review. To fully explore the meaning of the term governance, the literature review commenced 
with a broad range of disciplines: geography, political science, economics and law, including the 
natural resource and science disciplines. Then the review was narrowed to undercover the 
responsiveness theme as discussed in legal, political science and ecological literatures. This 
literature review forms the theoretical foundation of the mapping exercise that brought together 
the legal governance scholarship and the natural science literature discussing the ecological 
resiliency ideology.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Dissertations using the terms: resiliency, social, ecological resulted in a few monographs: J.P. Wargo, Ecosystem 
Preservation Policy (Regulation, Land Use, Public Land) (D. Jur. Thesis) Yale University, 1984; A. Dale, 
Sustainable development: A Framework for Governance (D. Jur. Thesis) McGill University, 1999; B.S. Perla, The 
Differential Impact of Protection on Social-Ecological Resilience of Mountain and Lowland Communities in the 
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Resiliency: Lessons from Cuban Experience (Masters, Tufts University) 2011. 
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 The purpose of the mapping exercise was to bring together these two distinct literatures, 
that is, the legal governance literature and natural science literature, in order to generate the eco-
resiliency framework. Currently, the environmental governance literature promotes the 
implementation of responsive mode of governance based on regulatory pluralism.168 But, there is 
need to understand the success and failures of this “new” governance approach in the water 
sector. This dissertation will contribute to the legal environmental governance literature by 
considering ways these legal regimes might be resilient to socio-ecological change.  
The dominance of the responsiveness theme in both the governance and natural science 
literatures led to the research question: what lessons can be taken from eco-resiliency theory and 
applied to environmental and regulatory governance? These lessons are based upon the 
proposition that, in order to understand the responsiveness orientation of the legally constituted 
governance mode and its practice, one must not only examine the legal framework for the 
presence of eco-resiliency features but also understand how decision-makers construct decisions 
in a water committee. Taking this initial first step in researching these legislative governance 
experiments allows for an understanding of the decisions undertaken to create the final water 
plan, that then can be examined in the future to understand the plan’s effectiveness.  
However, this research is limited to understanding the practice of the new governance as 
captured in these legislative new governance experiments. Under Ontario’s Clean Water Act, 
2006 the legislative purpose is: “to protect existing and future sources of drinking water.” The 
question of effectiveness of the water plan, whether the plan was effective in protecting existing 
and future drinking water sources, is considered a distinct and a future research project.  
In the next research stage, and in order to gain an appreciation of the responsiveness of 
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eco-resiliency framework, which is set out in Chapter Two. The eco-resiliency framework is 
premised upon C.S. Holling’s four features of a resilient resource management system 
(flexibility, broad perspective, diversity and emergent change).169 This framework is used as an 
analytical tool to examine the legal governance regimes in the case studies. The four features of 
the framework also informed the development of the structured interview instrument used in the 
participant interview process, which is set out in Appendix A. 
7.5  Units of Analysis 
The localized, watershed-based (or river basin-based) stakeholder-driven committees, which 
have been assigned the regulatory steering task of governing a water resource either through 
legislative fiat or policy, were selected as the unit of analysis. This mode of governance is 
predominant in the literature, and in practice at provincial and territorial levels in Canada. The 
assertion adopted in this dissertation, the lack of empirical research on these legal experiments, 
calls for an examination of these committees, and their collective form of governance, in action. 
This unit of analysis ⎯ the localized water committee ⎯ was selected to not only understand 
how decision-makers in these committees form their decisions but also to gain an appreciation of 
how these participants conceive law-making in this governance arrangement. The research 
protocol included both the observation of water committee members in action and the 
consideration of the research dilemma: What elements of the ecological resiliency framework 
might emerge in these committees? 
7.6  The Case Studies 
The case study approach is adopted to investigate the shift to, and the practice of, the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Holling, Supra note 16.  
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governance mode of governance. The comparative “collective” 170  case study approach 
undertaken, is focused on the qualitative data generated through both participant observation and 
semi-structured interviews. 171  The case selection resulted in three case studies: a Source 
Protection Committee (SPC) in Ontario, a Watershed Planning and Advisory Committee 
(WPAC) in Alberta and the Yukon Water Board. In Ontario, 19 SPCs were created under O.Reg 
288/07, 172  and in Alberta, 11 WPACs were established under Alberta’s Water for Life 
Strategy.173 
7.6.1  The Rationale for the Case Study Selection 
While all the Canadian provinces and territories were under consideration as potential case 
studies, after a review of the water-related legislation and policies to determine the extent to 
which jurisdictions organized water governance on the premise of a participatory mode of 
governance, two provinces (Alberta and Ontario) and the Yukon Territory were selected. Water 
committees from these jurisdictions were selected because each case exhibits the features of a 
localized, participant-driven, pluralistic mode of governance, set out either in legislation174 or a 
policy document,175 and each committee includes First Nation representation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 R.E. Stake, “Chapter 17: Qualitative Case Studies” in N.K. and Y.S. Lincoln (eds) Handbook of Qualitative 
Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994). 
171Ibid. Also refer to S. Jones, “Depth Interviewing” in C. Seale, Social Research Methods: A Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 2004); J. Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (New York: Cambridge Press, 2007) at 
20. Gerring uses the term – “multiple case studies”; J.A. Maxwell, “Designing a Qualitative Study” in L. Bickman 
and D.J. Rog, The Sage Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2009).  
172 Clean Water Act, 2006, Supra note 2.  
173Alberta, Water for Life Strategy, Supra, note 4.   
174 Clean Water Act, 2006, Supra note 2. Section 7(2) CWA directs that the composition of the committee is to be set 
out in a regulation. The committee member appointment process is set out in O.Reg 288/07. Section 2. (1.) to (2.) 
states: “1. One-third of the members to be appointed”…“must”…“reflect the interests of municipalities”; 2. “One-
third of the members to be appointed”…“must”…“reflect the interests of the agricultural, commercial or industrial 
sectors”…“including small business interests.” 3. “One-third of the members to be appointed”…“must”…“reflect 
the interests other than the interests referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, including, in particular, environmental, health, 
and other interests of the general public.” Section 6 sets out the appointment of First Nation representatives. The 
number of representatives correlates to the size of the overall committee.  
175 Supra, note 4. Since 2003, Alberta’s Water for Life: Alberta’s Strategy for Sustainability is the policy tool that 
sets out the Watershed Planning and Advisory Council as the mechanism to manage the province’s water resources. 
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 A review of the legislative purpose of the water governance instruments in each 
jurisdiction also factored into the case study selection criterion, as it was expected the legislative 
purpose would guide the water committee’s decision-making. Under Ontario’s Clean Water Act, 
2006, for example, the legislative purpose is restricted to the protection of existing and future 
sources of drinking water.176 In contrast to the narrow scope of the Ontario legislation, the 
legislative purpose in Alberta’s case is broad and includes both ecological and “new” governance 
features such as a participatory mode of governance, responsiveness, and flexibility. In 
particular, in Section 2 the comprehensive legislativepurpose includes such statements of a 
“healthy environment” including “the need for an integrated approach and comprehensive, 
flexible administration and management systems based on sound planning, regulatory actions 
and market forces” as well participatory role of “all residents of Alberta” in “their role in 
providing advice with respect to water management planning and decision-making” and 
“important role of comprehensive and responsive action in administering this Act.” 177  It was 
hoped that the comparison between Ontario’s narrowly-drafted legislative purpose and Alberta’s 
environmental, market and new governance-oriented legislative purpose might explain how the 
legal framework shapes a decision-making criteria for a water committee.  
 Given the infancy of the Alberta178 and Ontario179 legislation, this research also relied 
upon a historically established co-management organizational structure featured in the water 
boards of the Territories and Nunavut. Presently, nine co-management water boards exist in 
Northern Canada. After conducting a content analysis of the website of each water board, it was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Alberta’s Water For Life Policy is premised upon a partnership model. Principle 5 states in part that the Water for 
Life strategy “is a shared responsibility that involves a network of partnerships, outcome-based approaches, and 
collaboration in delivery of services” and is includes the establishment of watershed planning and advisory councils.  
176 Ontario, Clean Water Act, Supra note 2.  
177 Alberta, Water Act, Supra note 3.  
178 Ibid.  
179 Clean Water Act, 2006, Supra note 2.   
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determined that the Yukon Water Board was the most accessible and established water board of 
a resilient resource management system. Even though a participatory mode of governance exists 
that includes First Nation representation, a key difference between a water board and Alberta and 
Ontario’s water committees is the quasi-judicial nature of the water board. Yet, all the entities 
under examination in this dissertation operate under the auspices of administrative law. It is 
hoped that a learning opportunity would emerge by including an established participatory-based 
water committee. Also the inclusion of an established water board might offer a better 
understanding of the similarities and differences between these two organizational designs, 
which are both premised upon a participatory mode of governance.  
 Once the jurisdictions were chosen, the choice of the specific water committee(s) to study 
was based upon additional selection factors such as diversity of participants and their interests, a 
mix of urban and rural land uses, institutional history and organizational attributes, and the 
inclusion of First Nations. These factors resulted in the selection of Ontario’s Lake Erie Region 
Source Protection Committee (Lake Erie SPC) and Alberta’s Bow River Basin Council (Bow 
River WPAC) and the Yukon Water Board (Yukon Board). These choices were also based on 
logistical considerations, such as ease of access to the research site from Toronto and the 
transparency of policy documents and records. The remaining Canadian provinces were 
eliminated for various reasons. For example, a language barrier existed in Quebec (the principle 
researcher’s inability to conduct the interviews in French). In Manitoba, the legislative model 
premised upon public consultation not a shared governance mode. At the time of the case study 
selection, the participatory mode of governance was still under consideration by some provinces 
(e.g., British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Saskatchewan) or the legislative mandate of the committee 
was too broad (Prince Edward Island – the environmental advisory council’s work is not specific 
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to water issues). 
7.7  Data Collection 
The data collection phase was premised upon participant observation and 15 semi-structured key 
informant interviews. Given the close proximity to Toronto of the Ontario research site in 
Cambridge, Ontario, the monthly meetings at Lake Erie SPC research site in Cambridge Ontario 
were attended for 22 months over a 24-month period ending in December 2012. The committee 
participants were observed and detailed field notes were recorded, which were cross-referenced 
with the Lake Erie SPC’s published meeting minutes. Twelve out of the 25 Lake Erie SPC 
members were scheduled to be interviewed, however, one member, at the last minute, declined to 
participate. Due to limited funding, the Alberta and Yukon research sites were visited for a week 
each. In the Yukon, I observed a public water hearing. I interviewed a senior official of the 
Yukon Water Board. I was unable to interview more members of the Board because the senior 
official who agreed to be interviewed instructed me not to approach other Board members, and 
without that official's support it would have been difficult or impossible to conduct the research. 
I also reviewed the Board’s policy and decision documents, along with related jurisprudence and 
media reports. So although the results of a single interview should be interpreted with caution, 
the case study was also based on other information. In Alberta, I observed a watershed protection 
advisory committee meeting (June 2012 and I conducted interviews with selected participants. 
The participants interviewed were selected prior to the site visit based upon their involvement on 
the WPAC and by relying upon the reputational sampling (i.e., snowball) technique. I had 
arranged six interviews with key WPAC members but three individuals were not interviewed 
because a family death and another member cancelled because of a last minute professional 
commitment and another individual failed to attend the WPAC meeting and was not available for 
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a follow-up interview during my site visit.  
 An interview instrument was drafted prior to the site visit and is set out in Appendix A. 
The interview instrument was constructed based on the four features of the eco-resiliency 
framework derived from the literature review and the governance literature mapping exercise and 
the analysis goal of completing “pattern-matching”180  of the four features of eco-resiliency 
theory to the interview data collected. The interviews were digitally recorded and interview notes 
were taken and transcribed. The notes are on file in safekeeping according to York University’s 
ethics approval requirements. 
7.7.1  Data Analysis 
Finally, the last step was the data analysis. The data was analyzed based upon a close reading 
and coding of the field notes (that is, the participant observation data, the minute meeting 
documents, site field notes). The coding process reflected the four features (diverse, broad, 
flexible, emergent change) set out in the eco-resiliency framework. These findings were set out 
in a matrix format using the four features of the framework as the matrix variables and recording 
the interview data under each category.181 This sorting of the text and narratives into the columns 
of the matrix allowed for a comparative analysis of the narratives and the text, which further 
allowed for a sorting of the data into a specific group, based upon the identity characteristics of 
the participants. So for example, responses from similarly-situated participants (First Nations, 
public interest groups, etc) could be compared.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 R.K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Newbury Park, Sage Publications: 1989) at 33. Pattern 
matching is: “whereby several pieces of information from the same case may be related to some theoretical 
proposition.” The goal is describe a pattern and then demonstrate whether the data matches the pattern. In my 
research, the pattern is eco-resiliency framework. The interview data will be matched against the pattern to relate the 
data to the framework.  
181 Ibid. at 106. 
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7.8  The Evaluative Criteria 
Briefly, eco-resiliency theory orients governance towards an adaptive form. In order to evaluate 
whether localized modes of water governance demonstrate resiliency features, the evaluation 
criteria below is organized into the features of the eco-resiliency framework, premised upon a 
synthesis of the literature. These four features were used to develop the interview protocol for the 
structured interviews. Described next is the eco-resiliency evaluation criteria that outlines four 
interrelated but defined factors for analytical purposes:  
1.   Diversity is directed at understanding the composition and inclusiveness of the committee 
decision-making process. Who is a participant? Who is a decision-maker? For example, 
does the decision-making process incorporate local indigenous knowledge? It is expected 
a heterogeneous water committee will share knowledge and different perspectives, create 
the conditions for learning and the development of trusting relationships, social capital, 
knowledge networks. In short, diversity exists when the decision-making process 
includes an array of participants and the decision-making is shared amongst these 
decision-makers. 
2.   Flexibility is premised upon the idea of being responsive to two-way communication 
flows and decision-making process grounded in consensus that offers the participants 
flexibility in resolving the problem (for example by relying upon a mix of regulatory 
responses and legislative tools) and in establishing network governance arrangements. A 
consensus-based decision-making principle is promoted to allow for open 
communication, fluid participation and a collaborative deliberative process between the 
state and non-actors.  
3.   A broad perspective is directed at the scale of governance (i.e., local, regional, national 
and transnational) regime with consideration given to the presence of polycentric 
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governance. Polycentric governance takes into account the center of power of the 
decision-makers. A broad perspective considers the multiple jurisdictional scales beyond 
the local watershed and includes a jurisdictional co-ordination mechanism to organize 
decision-makers, their water problems and solutions. 
4.   Emergent change as an eco-resiliency feature considers how the governance system takes 
into account change. The capacity to respond to emergent change is present if decision-
makers can be open to uncertainty and surprising events. In short, emergent change is the 
capacity of the regime and its decision-makers to accept and respond to emergent 
environmental change.  
Together these foregoing four eco-resiliency features form the evaluation criteria and formed the 
theoretical basis for the interview instrument, which is set out at the end of this chapter in 
Appendix “A”. 
7.9  Research Limitations 
The limited sample size may restrict the generalization of these empirical findings to other 
research. For example, in Ontario, 19 source protection committees (SPC) exist and only one 
was under examination in this research. A similar problem with generalizing the research results 
exists with regards to the findings from the WPAC in Alberta and the Water Board in the Yukon. 
Accordingly, these research findings should be applied with caution. Caution must be applied to 
the interview instrument and the responses to the survey questions. Given the resilience concept 
was new to a majority of the study participants and some participants might have needed more 
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time to reflect upon their answer then was provided in the interview. The responses may also be 
biased by a participant or the interviewer’s interpretation of the concept.182  
  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Professor Holling kindly reviewed the eco-resiliency framework chapter in this dissertation to ensure the 
accuracy of the interpretation of the resiliency concept. I also met with Professor Gunningham over lunch, and he 
kindly offered comments on the governance and resiliency theories.   
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Chapter Two:  
Eco-Resiliency Indicators: The Eco-Resiliency Governance Framework 
1.0  Introduction 
The concept of change is the thread that ties this dissertation together. In the ecological literature, 
resiliency 183  is defined as “the capacity of an ecosystem to cope with change and 
perturbation.”184 However, even within the discipline of ecology, the meaning and means for 
measuring resiliency are contested.185 Nevertheless, the core idea of the capacity to cope with 
change or responsiveness is the key organizing principle of resiliency and in this research.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 I thank Professor C.S. Holling for reviewing, recommending changes to, and for taking the time to ensure this 
chapter embodies the essence of his concept of resiliency. In this chapter and throughout the dissertation, the 
meaning of the terms “resiliency” and “eco-resiliency” are similar; thus, these terms are used interchangeably.  
184 Holling, Supra, note 16. Also see: M. Scheffer, Critical Transitions in Nature and Science (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2009). At page 101 Scheffer explains Holling’s perspective of resiliency as follows: “In a general 
sense most would agree on definition 1: the capacity of a system to recover upon disturbance… Probably the most 
widely used specific indicator is definition 2: the speed with which the system recovers upon disturbance. However, 
this does not capture the aspect of robustness against being tipped into an alternative basin of attraction. To deal 
better with this issue definition 3 uses Holling’s view of resilience: the magnitude of disturbance that a system can 
tolerate before it shifts into a different state (stability domain) with different control structure and function. This 
corresponds to interpreting resilience as the width of the basin of attraction. Holling coined the term “ecological 
resilience” for definition 3, to distinguish it from the recovery-rate definition 2, which is he calls “engineering 
resilience.” Numerous scholars have engaged in Holling’s resiliency theory.; Also see C.R. Allen & C.S. Holling, 
Discontinuities in Ecosystems and Other Complex Systems (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).; F. 
Berkes, J. Colding & C. Folke, Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and 
Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).; F. Berkes, “Understanding Uncertainty and Reducing 
Vulnerability: Lesson From Resilience Thinking” (2007) 41 Nat. Hazards 283.; F. Berkes & C.S. Seixas, “Building 
Resilience in Lagoon Social-Ecosystems: A Local-Level Perspective” (2005) 8 Ecosystems 967.; L.H. Gunderson, 
& C.S. Holling, Panarchy: Understanding Transformations in Human and Natural Systems (Washington: Island 
Press, 2002).; L. H., Gunderson & S.L. Light, “Adaptive management and adaptive governance in everglades 
ecosystem” (2006) 39 Policy Sci. 323.; L. H. Gunderson, C.S. Holling & B. Walker, “Resilience and Sustainable 
Development: Building Adaptive Capacity in a World of Transformations” (2002) 31(5) Journal of Human 
Environment 437.; L. Gunderson, C.S. Holling & S. Light, Barriers and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and 
Institutions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).; F. Moberg & V. Galaz, “Resilience: Going from 
Conventional to Adaptive Freshwater Management for Human and Ecosystem Compatibility” (2005), online: 
Swedish Water Policy Briefs <www.siwi.org>.; G. Peterson, C.R. Allen & C.S. Holling, “Ecological Resilience, 
Biodiversity, and Scale” (1998, Spring) 1 Ecosystems 6. 
185 W.N. Adger, “Social and Ecological Resilience: Are They Related? (2000) 24(3) Progress in Human Geography 
347 at 349. Adger highlights the contested nature of the resiliency by highlighting the obscure nature of the concept. 
He states: Resilience in ecology is “not easily observed, and there seems at present to be no agreed relationship, for 
example, between the diversity of ecosystems and their resilience.” He continues to state that “[r]esilience can be 
defined in many ways. It is the buffer capacity or the ability of a system to absorb perturbations or the magnitude of 
disturbance that can be absorbed before a system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that 
control behaviour. Other definitions of resilience emphasize the speed of recovery from a disturbance, highlighting 
the difference between resilience and resistance…. It is argued by many ecologists that resilience is the key to 
biodiversity conservation and that diversity itself enhances resilience, stability and ecosystem functioning.” 
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 In a seminal article, Holling introduced the concept of resiliency by describing three 
elements of an ecosystem’s ability to absorb change over time.186 First, resiliency is a property of 
the system and persistence is an outcome. Second, the system is characterized by the existence of 
multiple states rather than a static equilibrium state. Third, unexpected events (for example, 
collapse of fish stock or a sudden change in the state of a freshwater lake from clear to a turbid 
state) and disturbances (for example, a climate change disturbance such as floods, droughts or a 
sudden and intense rainfall) can occur. 187  In other words, surprises should be expected. 188 
Together, these three aspects describe the behaviour of an ecosystem over time. This view of the 
behaviour of a system is centered in the non-equilibrium or “flux of nature” perspective of an 
ecosystem, a contemporary rather than traditional viewpoint.189 Thus, a resilient complex system 
is non-linear, operates at multi-scales and is in constant flux.  
 Consideration of the social aspects of resiliency led to the broadening of the ecological 
resiliency concept to recognize the integrated human-nature dimension of natural systems.190 
Social-ecological resiliency is thus defined as “linked systems of people and nature. The term 
emphasizes that humans must be seen as a part of, not apart from, nature – the delineation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Holling, Supra note 16 at 17. 
187 Ibid. Also see L. H. Gunderson and C. Allen, “Introduction: Why Resilience? Why Now?” in L. Gunderson, C.R. 
Allen and C.S. Holling, Foundations of Ecological Resilience (Washington: Island Press, 2010) at p. xv. 
188 Ibid, Also see C.S. Holling, “Surprise For Science, Resilience For Ecosystems, and Incentives For People” 
(1996) 6(3) Ecological Applications 733. 
189 Hutchinson & Herrmann, Surpa, note 32 at 82-88. The traditional “balance of nature” perspective of an 
ecosystem suggests that a natural system operates near a state of equilibrium. Unlike the traditional view, these 
authors support the contemporary “flux of nature” perspective (at 88). This point of view presents the non-
equilibrium model of an ecosystem where the system’s behaviour is seen as being in flux and where ecological 
change is characterized as discontinuous, uncertain and perhaps, sudden.; C.S. Holling, “Surprise For Science, 
Resilience For Ecosystems, and Incentives For People” (1996) 6(3) Ecological Applications 733-34 at 734. In this 
article, Holling argues that ecosystems “do not have a single equilibrium with functions controlled to remain near 
it.” Rather, ecological processes operate “at different spatial and temporal scales, and are subject to the influence of 
outside processes” (at 733). This perspective of an evolving system characterizes an ecosystem as non-linear, 
“dynamic, inherently uncertain, with potential multiple futures,” (at 734) that respond to external disturbances (for 
example, a fire, an intense rainfall). These foregoing properties present an integrated ecosystem while also 
recognizing that knowledge is incomplete ⎯ that is, knowledge of the system and the effect of human activities 
upon the system. In other words, “[s]urprise is inevitable.” (at 734). 
190 Adger, Supra. note 185. 
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between social and ecological systems is artificial and arbitrary.”191 An important feature of the 
human dimension of social-ecological resiliency is the governance system. Attributing 
governance systems, those that deal with “how we make decisions and who gets to decide,” with 
social-ecological resiliency characteristics means that we can imagine regimes of rule-making 
and norm creation that are adaptable, multi-level and respond easily to surprises.192  
 The theme of social-ecological change orients this interdisciplinary research toward 
examining responsive forms of governance and norm creation. The governance literature reveals 
a trend toward localized, watershed-focused, stakeholder-driven committees with little 
discussion on how decisions are carried out in these committees. 193 These localized modes of 
governance have gained prominence and legitimacy in both the academic literature and in 
regulatory practice across Canada. In this chapter, I assert that the environmental governance 
literature demonstrates similar features as discussed in the natural science literature’s 
presentation of the concept of resiliency. In Canada, however, the environmental governance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 Ibid.  
192 Bakker, Supra, note 14.  
193 S. Burris, M. Kempa & C. Shearing, “Changes in governance: a cross-disciplinary review of current scholarship.” 
(2008) 41 Akron. L. Rev. 1; R. de Loё & G. Simms, (April 2009) An introduction to source water protection: 
briefing note#1. Polis Project on Ecological Governance. online: Polis 
<http://poliswaterproject.org/sites/default/files/deloe_brief.pdf>; R.D. Fish, A.A.R. Loris & N.M. Watson, 
“Integrating water and agricultural management: Collaborative governance for a complex policy problem.” (2010) 
480 Science of the Total Environment, 5623.; S.M. Graben, Co-Management: The Legal Impact of Participatory 
Governance on Administrative Decision-making in the Mackenzie Valley (2010) Doctoral Dissertation, Osgoode 
Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.; N. Gunningham, “The New Collaborative 
Environmental Governance: The Localization of Regulation.” (March 2009) 36(1) Journal of Law and Society, 145.; 
S. Hodgson, Modern water rights: theory and practice (2006) FOA Legislative Study 92. Online: Water 
Development and Management Unit – Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
<http://www.fao.org/nr/wman/abst/wman_071101_en.htm>.; R. Lee and E. Stokes, “Environmental Governance: 
Reconnecting the Global and Local” (March 2009) 36(1) Journal of Law and Society, 1.; M.C. Lemos and A. 
Agrawal, “Environmental Governance” (2006) 31 Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour. 31., 297; J. Newig and O. Fritsch, 
“Environmental governance: participatory, multi-level and effective?” (2009) 19 Environmental Policy and 
Governance, 197.; P. Rogers and A.W. Hall, “Effective water governance” (2003) online: Global Water 
Partnership: Technical Committee 
<http://www.orangesenqurak.org/UserFiles/File/GWP/GWP%20TEC%20Paper%207_English.pdf>.; B.H. Walker, 
N. Abel, J.M. Anderies & P. Ryan, “Resilience, adaptability, and transformability in the Goulburn-Broken 
Catchment, Australia (2009) 14(1) Ecology and Society, 12.; S. Zeller and L. Gunderson, “Why resilience may not 
always be a good thing: lesson in ecosystem restoration from glen canyon and the everglades.” (2008-09) 87 Neb. L. 
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  76	  
literature has yet to explore fully the complementary features of resiliency and the application of 
this ecological concept to the environmental problem of how to govern a watershed.  
 Perhaps the concept of resiliency can orient the governance activity of decision-making 
to consider the context of the problem – that is, how an aquatic system functions and ecological 
change (for example, ecological change as result of water contamination, water withdrawals and 
the impact of surrounding land use activities). I consider whether relying upon an ecological 
concept dis-embeds the decision-making from a battle of competing stakeholder interests. Re-
orienting attention to the ecological resiliency concept may allow committee members to 
consider the uncertain and changing nature of an aquatic system as an alternative frame of 
reference to the dominant efficiency and effectiveness market oriented perspective.    
 The purpose of this chapter is to develop a set of criteria in which to judge the 
governance experiments that form the case studies of this dissertation, namely a Source 
Protection Committee (SPC) in Ontario, a Water Protection Advisory Committee (WPAC) in 
Alberta and a Water Board in Yukon. The eco-resiliency framework is based on Holling’s 
resiliency theory. In his 1973 article Holling set out four features of an governance system 
adaptive to future events: i) flexibility, ii) broad perspective iii) diversity, and iv) emergent 
change.194 This four-part framework is applied to a water committee to test for the presence of 
eco-resiliency features in the legal framework in order to understand the uptake of theory and 
practice of the new governance mode. Similarly, in the governance literature, several authors 
speak to the need for flexible, responsive, and adaptive forms.195 In other words, the aims of 
adaptability and flexibility animate both the ecological and contemporary governance literatures. 
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 Several authors, however, argue that the abstract nature of the concept of resiliency,196 
combined with the lack of agreement on its meaning and its underpinning factors,197 leads to 
problems in “operationalizing” the concept. 198  While the contested nature of the resiliency 
concept is acknowledged in this research, conceptually, Holling’s framework invites an adaptive 
governance stance. This adaptive governance perspective is responsive to the socio-ecological 
changes associated with contemporary environmental problems.  
In the next section, the four elements of Holling’s governance structure are expanded to 
reflect their meaning in the ecological and governance literature. Holling’s four elements are 
adopted as the guiding principles of analysis. For the three case studies examined in this 
research, the eco-resiliency analysis framework is applied in order to understand how decisions 
are made in these legislative governance experiments. Or as K. Bakker would ask: Who gets to 
decide and, why? 
2.0  Eco-Resiliency Governance Framework 
In this section, Holling’s four resource management design features of flexibility, broad 
perspective, diversity and emergent change are outlined. Holling’s conception of each element is 	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explained and supplemented by additional resiliency theorists. The meaning of each feature is 
then explored from a governance literature perspective. Presented at the end of the chapter are 
the definitions of the four features, as derived from the mapping exercise and, to be applied in 
the eco-resiliency framework.   
2.1  Flexibility  
In Holling’s view, the uncertain and unpredictable nature of ecosystems requires flexible and 
nimble policies rather than fixed rules targeted at establishing “stable maximum sustained yield 
of renewable resources.”199 Examples of such fixed rules may be found in constant harvest yields 
for fish stock, water quality and timber. In his view, policy options should be left open and 
responsive to changing ecological conditions.   
 Some resource management scholars attribute the loss of flexibility to the efficiency 
orientation of resource management policies that are geared toward achieving optimal yields and 
are underpinned by market-based economic theory. Gibbs argues that economic rationalism 
seeks to achieve efficient forms of resource allocation based upon linear mathematical 
calculations. However, an efficient resource allocation scheme fails to consider the non-linear 
complex nature of natural systems.200 In his view, the outcome of economic rationalism is a loss 
of resilience and a system more vulnerable to disturbances.  
 The push toward efficiency in natural resource management has led resiliency scholars 
Walker and Salt to coin the phrase the “paradox of efficiency and optimization.”201 Creating an 
efficient system means redundancies are eliminated and standardized policies are often applied 
that eliminate the unique features of the natural system. Ecological systems, however, require 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Holling, Supra note 16 at 21.  
200 Gibbs, Supra note 197 at 326. 
201 Walker & Salt, Supra note 49 at 7. 
	  	   	  79	  
redundant structures and functions.202 Optimization results in maximizing efficiency by creating 
tight controls over a system and eliminating natural redundancies. In Walker and Salt’s view, 
herein lies the paradox: A dynamic, non-linear, complex adaptive system cannot achieve an 
optimal state. Why? Because a dynamic system is always in a state of change, shifting to 
maintain resiliency and to absorb disturbances. 203  In contrast, optimization eliminates the 
flexibility and ecological variability within the system. The outcome is a less resilient system. 
 Cosens relies upon the concept of resiliency to examine administrative law actions that 
take into account the uncertain and changing nature of a river system and the ability of the 
system to sustain a full range of ecosystem services. 204 Cosens puts forth flexibility, in the form 
of adaptive governance, as a perspective for understanding the complexity of the combined 
social and ecological system within the Columbia River Basin. 205  A resilient governance 
framework is premised upon a flexible decision-making process that allows for responsiveness to 
local conditions and the necessary authority to respond to the changes.206  
Lobel discusses the recent shift away from regulation to a governance model in terms of 
regulatory flexibility and fluid environmental policies. In her view, a flexible policy approach 	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can be achieved through forms of soft-law (for example, social labeling, voluntary codes of 
conduct, private accreditation). Lobel contends these soft forms of law promote “open 
communication, fluid participation, and consensus-based deliberation”207 between state and non-
state actors. Lobel argues this governance model moves law away from a prescriptive, command 
and control approach.  
 Freeman and Farber present a “modular” conception of governance premised upon 
“flexibility and coordination.”208 Modularity requires flexible institutional structures that can 
adjust in form, to new and changing information as directed by the environmental problem and 
the institutional information needs of each agency.209 In their governance model, a key feature is 
flexibility or “adaptation.”210 Their view of governance recognizes institutional relationships and 
the existing network of interconnected agencies where negotiation and traditional formal forms 
of interaction prevail. The goal of a modular conception of governance is first to identify the 
problem and second to create solutions that match the institution’s ability to implement the 
solution.211 Responsiveness, in their view, requires being open to new information and requires a 
transparent process that ensures the appropriate use of administrative discretion.212  
Flexibility, from the perspective of natural resource managers Garmestani, Allen and 
Caezas is presented as a form of adaptive management approach. In their view, flexibility is 
achieved by aligning management systems to “evolve to changing environmental conditions.”213 
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Policy development is oriented toward a “reflective front-end flexible”214  process, in which 
attention is paid to monitoring and the continuous improvement through all stages of policy 
development. Responsiveness requires an adaptive form of governance that allows adaptation of 
policies to monitoring findings.  
Garmestani, Allen and Caezas view the use of a mix of regulatory tools as supporting an 
adaptive approach that can be “both flexible and enforceable under the law and associated 
regulations.”215 To preserve the social-ecological system, a mix of both “finance (e.g. taxes, fees, 
surcharges, bonds) and compliance mechanisms (regulatory and market based incentives, 
reporting and information requirements, planning requirements, voluntary actions)” can be 
introduced to achieve flexibility. 216  Other scholars also view responsiveness through the 
application of a mix of regulatory tools and flexible decision-making governance regime.217 
Gunningham and Sinclair also promote flexibility by incorporating a mix of regulatory 
instruments.218 In their view, this mix of regulatory instruments should also take into account a 
diverse range of regulatory perspectives: the instrument’s purpose, the legislative goal, the 
environmental orientation of the regulatee, the current and desired condition of the watershed.219  
Huitema et al., discuss flexibility in the context of experiments. 220 While these scholars 
support the use of experiments to understand the status of the aquatic system, they caution that 
experiments should be limited to small-scale experiments that take into account the costs and 
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risks. 221 In their view, in light of the participatory and localized nature of water governance 
models and the use of experiments, the results from the experiments should be reviewed and 
tested for relevance by local participants. 222  However, these scholars caution the use of 
experiments may be more appropriate for technical issues.223 Consideration of these concerns 
points to a technocratic governance approach premised upon experiments and is dependent upon 
a dialogue and negotiation between experts and laypersons. This view of governance is 
suggestive of an adaptive management regime responsive in form to allow for the time to 
conduct experiments, monitor results, change policies, negotiate between stakeholders, and to 
create the knowledge capacity amongst the stakeholders to negotiate and evaluate outcomes.  
Collectively, these natural resource and governance scholars promote a flexible and 
adaptive governance structure. Flexibility, as envisioned by both literatures, recognizes the 
changing, non-linear unpredictable nature of both natural and human systems. Decision makers 
are charged with developing a fluid governance system, which provides for a participatary and 
consensus-based decision-making process. An adaptive management approach inclusive of a mix 
of regulatory tools and a networked governance arrangement are encouraged.   
2.2  A Broad Perspective 
In Holling’s view, a broad perspective is required to view “events in a regional rather than a local 
context.”224 An ecosystem is a series of complex adaptive nested cycles that respond to an array 
of internal and external disturbances occuring at different scales. In this complex adaptive 
system, Holling explains how a disturbance can trigger a series of physiological, behavioral, 
ecological and/or genetic changes to a population. The variability in response is dispersed over 	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space and time in a manner that creates variability in the numbers of the population as some 
species may remain in low numbers with other species moving into predator mode and taking up 
the opportunity to increase their population numbers.225  
Canada’s constitutional arrangement creates a broad yet fragmented context for water 
governance. In Canada, the legal jurisdiction for water is shared amongst federal and provincial 
constitutional powers. As creatures of the provinces, local municipal governments also 
participate in the governance of water resources. This fragmented legal regime results in multiple 
“centers of power.” 226  Huitema et al., define this “center of power” as a situation of 
“polycentric” governance in which “political authority is dispersed to separately constituted 
bodies with overlapping jurisdictions that do not stand in hierarchical relationship to each 
other.”227 A polycentric form of governance fosters a broad perspective of governance that brings 
to the forefront issues of co-ordination between the distinct yet interconnected levels of legal and 
socio-political centers of decision-making power. In a localized form of water governance, a 
polycentric form of governance requires decision-makers to take into account issues of co-
ordination across a range of legal jurisdictions, such as domestic, regional, national, and 
transnational. In addition, consideration may also be given to crafting the decision-making 
regime to represent a broad view of the waterscape. A view of the regional and local 
environmental conditions but also the social, geographic and political scope of the problem.  
In a similar vein, some resource managers frame governance as a “multiple, nested, 	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institutional” 228  “wide basin” 229  approach that adopts a broad viewpoint of institutional 
arrangements, problems and processes. Garmestani et al., present a broad institutional view 
premised upon the participation of stakeholders and the “bridging” 230  of organizations to 
improve communication channels and to create opportunities for joint-problem solving, 
collaboration and the development of “trust.”231 In their view, a broad polycentric aspect is a key 
feature of an adaptive governance system.232  
Similarly, environmental scholars Dovers and Connors promote the reliance upon the 
subsidiarity principle. In their view, the subsidiarity principle directs that a decision should be 
taken at the most effective level. A level that considers the political, administrative and 
substantive aspects of the problem yet, is broadly scoped to take into account the influence of 
policy directions stemming from complex institutional and policy systems.233 
In Ostrom’s view, a local level is the appropriate governance scale. In her view, the 
design of the governance system’s collective choice rules should be supportive of local 
conditions.234 Her research supports the use of governance rules that match the local attributes of 
resource, the resource unit itself and the users.235 
For decision-makers in a local water governance regime, the foregoing scholarship raises 
questions that define the jurisdictional landscape and consider the power brokers and distribution 	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of power and coordinating mechanisms to facilitate co-operation. A broad perspective brings 
forward the scale of governance. This perspective considers a wideview of institutional 
arrangements, environmental problems and processes and is premised on a polycentric form of 
governance that includes an institutional coordinating mechanism.  
2.3  Diversity 
Holling’s discussion of the diversity feature recognizes the heterogeneity of the functions that 
species provide within an ecosystem. The diversity element reinforces the concept of ecosystem 
services and the redundancy function species offer an ecosystem. This redundancy function 
contributes to the ecosystem’s characteristic of “persistence of relationships.” 236  In his 
examination of the complexity of social-ecological systems, Holling argues the complexity of the 
system is tied to the interaction of a small number of controlling processes within a self-
organizing system. He states that self-organization is key to “the development of complex 
adaptive systems, in which multiple outcomes typically are possible depending on accidents of 
history.” 237  Ecological characteristics of a self-organizing complex adaptive system include 
“diversity and individuality of components, localized interactions among components, and an 
autonomous process that uses the outcomes of those local interactions to select a subset of those 
components for enhancement.”238 
Resiliency scholars Folke et al.239 expanded Holling’s diversity element by tying into the 
human dimension of a social-ecological system. In their view, fostering diversity allows for 
reorganization and renewal of a social-ecological system. Diversity nurtures ecological memory 	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and change within institutions and builds trust amongst stakeholders. Consideration of diversity 
also led these scholars to consider the different types of learning that evolve from a decision-
making process as well as the need for organizational mechanisms to share knowledge and 
inspire creativity.  
Berkes extended Holling’s theory by considering the link between adaptive capacity and 
learning. In his view, within a social-ecological system, resilience is exhibited by three 
properties: 1) “[t]he amount of change the system can undergo and still retain the same controls 
on function and structure; 2) the degree to which the system is capable of self-organization; 3) 
the ability to build and increase the capacity for learning and adaption.”240 In an interconnected 
human and natural (social-ecological) system where learning, both institutional and group 
learning, occurs and the actors and their institutional systems are viewed as responsive to 
changing information and learning.241  Berkes’ conception of resilience thinking accepts that 
organizations can learn through doing.  
 Janssen and Osnas view diversity through a “shared organizational mind.” 242  The 
diversity in participation and organizational redundancy encourages learning, institutional 
connections, a shared mindset and the continuation of functions so that when a component 
disappears, the redundant function takes over and the system continues. These scholars consider 
the lobster-harvesting regime in Maine where the redundancy in function is illustrated by the use 
of both formal and informal local rules. The community of diverse stakeholders “create[s] 
different functional groups” that share knowledge, learn and establish institutional memory and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Ibid.  
241 Ibid. at 286-287. 
242 M.A. Janssen & E.E. Osnas, “Adaptive Capacity of Social-Ecological Systems: Lessons from Immune Systems” 
(2005) 2 Ecohealth 93 at 95.  
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together “stimulate…the adaptive capacity of the community”243 while fostering redundancy in 
roles, functions and tasks.  
 Freeman and Farber’s conception of “modular” governance promotes diversity by 
establishing connections among and across organizational domains.244 In their view, modularity 
recognizes and allows for the component parts of the regulatory system to be united by 
deploying the diverse actors within the system without necessarily replacing existing 
organizational structures.  
Together these foregoing scholars highlight the diversity of the institutional arrangements 
and actors that are brought together through the problem-solving exercise and the legal, social 
and political context. Diversity of ideas, stakeholder participation, learning and self-organizing 
units is brought forward by the diversity factor.  
2.4  Emergent Change and the Element of Surprise 
Holling viewed the element of change as recognizing a social-ecological system’s ability to 
accommodate dynamic change and the need to adopt an attitude that recognizes knowledge is 
incomplete and presumes events can be unexpected.245   
Walker and Salt consider change from a systems perspective and how systems function 
as complex adaptive systems.246 This systems perspective allows for an understanding of how 
change in one aspect of a system can create a feedback response within the overall complex 
adaptive social-ecological system.247 The unpredictable nature and emergent behaviour of the 
system can also suggest that changes to one aspect of the system can lead to the reconfiguration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Ibid at 97. 
244 Freeman & Farber, Modular, Supra note 208.  
245 Holling, Supra note 16.  
246 Walker & Salt, Resilience Thinking, Supra note 49 at 27 
247 Ibid. at 32. 
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of another stable state.248 Combing resiliency thinking and a systems perspective reinforces the 
idea of adaptation and raises the question: How is change taken into account in the governance 
system? Yet, questions remain open as to change of what and to what? 
 To assess a system’s resiliency and ability to change, Carpenter et al., address the 
questions: “Resilience of what, and, to what?” 249 Even though the system’s resiliency can be 
understood at one time period and at one scale, the concept of change highlights the need to 
consider the future state of resiliency. A system’s resiliency may be different at a later period. 
This perspective highlights the decision-making process and the importance of first identifying 
which system state is being considered (for example, a clear or turbid lake), the need to consider 
the “entire social-ecological system not just the ecological subsystem” and the variables that 
support the system’s “capacity to provide ecosystem services.”250 For example, the question: the 
resilience of what? The “what” might be a fresh water lake and this question considers the 
condition – whether the water state is clear or turbid. The answer defines the scope of the 
decision-making process. In asking the question, “the resilience to what?” the decision-makers 
are oriented to identify the context of the disturbance(s) of interest. In other words, is the 
disturbance a result of a biophysical factor, such as the nutrient loading (i.e., phosphorous and 
nitrogen) into the water source; or is a social-economic factor causing a barrier to establishing 
flexibility in the governance system. For example, do the committee members hold the power to 
negotiate and resolve environmental problems with local solutions; or is government approval 
required to implement the local solution?251  
Cosens’ consideration of resiliency theory within the context of administrative law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Ibid at 34.  
249 S. Carpenter, B. Walker, J.M. Anderies & N. Abel, “From Metaphor to Measurement: Resilience of What to 
What?” (2001) Ecosystems 4 765.  
250 Ibid at 777. 
251 Ibid. 
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reveals the competitive tension between the need to establish certainty in the law and the 
inherent uncertainty of resiliency theory and aquatic systems. To satisfy the tension created by 
this uncertainty, she discusses the need to change administrative law to be responsive to different 
circumstances. By way of an example, Cosens describes an existing Native American water 
rights governance system. Under this administrative law system, a legislated agency or 
commission is created with the authority to develop decision-making forums that consist of a 
mix of public and private participants. Such a local decision-making forum is charged with 
developing an adaptive response and final settlement of the stakeholders’ interests. The 
settlement should take into account changing local conditions, the diversity of positions and two-
way flows of communication. The final settlement is then directed to the legislature for 
approval.252  
Baldwin and Black also rely upon the concept of change to frame the role of a “really 
responsive regulator” in carrying out regulatory enforcement and compliance duties.253 In their 
view, enforcement and compliance are components of a negotiated process amongst different 
regulatory actors. The normative basis of enforcement will include various goals – punitive, 
restorative or restitutive ⎯ that are complemented by a range of legal tools, such as continuation 
of business licenses, fines, and voluntary agreements. The role of the really responsive regulator 
is to consider a range of goals of enforcement while negotiating an appropriate response – for 
example, a fine. This regulatory approach is responsive to the organizational culture of the 
regulatee, the institutional context of the regulator, the range of regulatory tools, the performance 
of the regulatory regime, and the need to change continually each of the foregoing elements.  
The resiliency element of emergent change introduces a systems perspective where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Cosens, Supra note 204 at 263-65.  
253 Baldwin & Black, Supra note 84.  
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dynamic change occurs. A systems perspective exposes expected and unexpected events, which 
frames the system by uncertainty. Managers are required to accept that knowledge is often 
incomplete and uncertainty frames the environmental problem as well as overshadows the 
solution. This consideration of emergent change raises the thorny issue of building resiliency in a 
system, which can present with alternative states and rates of change. This emergent change 
raises the questions of: resilience of what, to what? These questions redirect the orientation of a 
governance framework to be responsive to the unique and different ecological features of each 
watershed while considering the end goal, which might include maintaining the condition of the 
aquatic system, restoring a lake to a clear state or accepting the turbid stable state. An emergent 
change oriented governance system should take into account not only local and regional 
watershed features but also customary, indigenous and legal features that together foster an 
“adaptive governance framework.”254 Compliance and enforcement mechanisms must also be 
considered within the governance system in order to promote accountability for the protection of 
the environment and to foster “really responsive regulators.”255  
Lastly, consideration must also be given to emerging environmental issues such as, 
climate change. Climate change is a threat to the quality and quantity of local and global water 
sources and is a transnational global governance issue that affects both international and 
domestic legal regimes. The effects of climate change upon water sources should direct decision-
makers to take into account climatic factors, international obligations and be open to 
incorporating emerging environmental issues that might present in the future .256  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Cosens, Supra note 204.  
255 Baldwin & Black, Supra note 84.  
256 Great Lakes Water Quality Board, “Climate Change and Water Quality in the Great Lakes Basin (August, 2003), 
online: IJC <http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/climate/part1/index.htm>.; Also refer to D. Dempsey, J. Elder 
& D. Scavia, “Great Lakes Restoration & the Threat of Global Warming” (May 2008), online: Healthy Lakes Org. 
<http://www.healthylakes.org/wordpress/wp-con-tent/uploads/2008/05/how-global-warming-report-081.pdf>.; 
IPCC, “Technical Paper VI: Climate Change and Water,” (June 2008) at 104, online: Intergovernmental Panel on 
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Emergent change, as considered by the foregoing scholars directs an environmental 
governance system to consider the likelihood of uncertainty being embedded in the problem. In a 
social-ecological system based on emergent change, the governance structure must be prepared 
for unexpected results – that is, the element of surprise.  
3.0  Strengthening the Governance Model 
These dissertation’s research findings prompt re-thinking of the implementation and implications 
of the shared governance mode in the water sector. The environmental decision-making capacity 
of these water committee members and the ability of these decision-makers to be responsive to 
the water security challenges facing Canada are in doubt. These findings not only offer insight 
into the potential ways to improve this legal model but also highlight areas for further research 
for scholars interested in the strengthening the participation of citizens and First Nations in 
localized forms of governance. The recommendations generated through this research are 
discussed in detail in Chapter Seven: Conclusion — Lessons Learned.  
4.0  Summary: The Literature Mapping Exercise & Establishing the Eco-Resiliency 
Governance Framework  
Taken together, the mapping of the ecological concept of resiliency with the governance 
literature exposes a complementary pattern of characteristics that in this dissertation is referred to 
as the “Eco-Resiliency Governance Framework.” This framework is organized by four 
interrelated attributes that are bounded for analytical purposes. The four elements are: flexibility, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Climate Change/UNEP <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical- papers/climate-change-water-en.pdf>. Refer to Section 
1.3.2 Projected changes 1.3.2.2 Water resources.; Natural Resources Canada, “Climate Change Impacts and 
Adaptation: A Canadian Perspective Impacts on Water Supply Report,” online: 
NRC<http://adaptation.nrcan.gc.ca/perspective/water_3_e.php>; Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Climate 
Ready : Ontario’s Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan 2011-2014 Report (Ontario Environmental Registry, 
Information Notice #011-3299, April 29, 2011.), online: EBR Registry 
<http://www.ebr.gov.on.ca/ERSWEBExternal/displaynoticecontent.do?noticeId=MTEzMDAx&statusId=MTY5ND
Q2&language=en>.; R. de Loë & A. Berg, “Mainstreaming Climate Change in Drinking Water Source Protection 
Planning in Ontario” Prepared for Pollution Probe and Canadian Water Resources Association (March 2006), 
online: Pollution Probe <http://www.pollutionprobe.org/Reports/mainstreaming_climate_change_swp.pdf>. 
	  	   	  92	  
broad perspective, diversity and emergent change, and are defined as follows:  
1.   Flexibility - In a governance context, flexibility is present when the regime fosters a two-
way communication process that is grounded in consensus and offers the participants 
open communication and flexibility in resolving the problem (for example by relying 
upon a mix of regulatory responses and tools).  
2.   A Broad Perspective - The scale of the governance regime is broad when it represents a 
multi-jurisdictional framework, which includes a coordinating mechanims and recognizes 
polycentric governance.  
3.   Diversity – A diverse governance arrangement exists when the composition of the 
committee is inclusive of a range of participants and a shared decision-making process 
exists that facilitates learning.  
4.   Emergent Change – The goverance regime exhibits emergent change if the decision-
makers operate in an institutional arrangement where the participants are able to be open 
to uncertainty and responsive to surprises that may emerge in the decision-making 
process.   
These four features emerge from the synthesis of the literature, are used to organize the 
presentation and analysis of the legal governance regimes in each case study chapter, and to 
categorize the evaluative criteria and the analysis of the interviews with the water committee 
members, which is presented in Chapter Six: The Voices of the Committee Members on Eco-
Resiliency.  
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Chapter Three:  
The Chameleon State: Signaling and Shaping of Water Governance  
through Ontario’s Source Protection Committees 
1.0 Overview: A Story of One Water Plan, Two Communities and Their Struggles Over 
Water 
As early as 2009, city officials and citizens from the city of Guelph began to publically express 
their concerns about aggregate extraction activities at a local Dolime quarry.257 They claimed the 
protective aquitard layer (a layer of non-porous rock) of the Gasport aquifer had been breached 
and their drinking water was at risk of becoming contaminated. In their view, the aquitard breach 
“will allow surface water from the quarry pond, contaminated with bacteria and other pathogens, 
to leak into the groundwater and thereby contaminate the water supply aquifer” and potentially, 
harm the “municipal drinking water sources.” 258  Together, the Wellington Water Watchers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Ground water is a key water resource for the City of Guelph. The city draws approximately 95% of its municipal 
drinking water from the Gasport aquifer. Grand River SPA – Draft Amended Assessment Report. Dated April 26, 
2012 at 8-1. online: Lake Erie Source Protection Region (Herein Known as LESPR) 
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_watersheds_grand/2012_GR_AmendedAR_Ch8.pdf>. The Assessment Report 
states: “The City of Guelph has 115,000 residents (GSP Group Inc., 2010), and it is one of the largest cities in 
Canada to rely almost exclusively on groundwater for its potable water supply.”; For the Dolime quarry 
ownership/operator structure, refer to the The City of Guelph, Committee Agenda, Planning & Building and 
Environment Committee Report (September 19, 2011) City of Guelph, online: 
<http://guelph.ca/uploads/Council_and_Committees/PEES/PBEE_agenda_091911.pdf>;. Also: The quarry is owned 
by River Valley Development, a subsidiary of Carson Reid Homes and is operated by James Dick Construction Ltd. 
Carson Reid Homes is a well-established homebuilder in the Guelph. Also see online: Carson Reid Homes 
<http://www.carsonreidhomes.com/aboutus.htm>. 
258 The water conflict in the City of Guelph is being advanced by the citizen’s group called “Wellington Water 
Watchers” The group is concerned with the quarry extraction activities and the proposed increase in extraction 
activities at the Guelph Dolime Quarry, located in Guelph-Eramosa Township. online: Wellington Water Watchers 
<http://www.wellingtonwaterwatchers.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/page0040.jpg>; and, see City of Guelph, 
Planning & Building and Environment Committee Report (September 19, 2011) at 40 to 55, City of Guelph, online: 
<http://guelph.ca/uploads/Council_and_Committees/PEES/PBEE_agenda_091911.pdf>; The proposed expansion of 
the quarry and water quality concerns were discussed in a September 19, 2011 City of Guelph Committee Report as 
follows: “Guelph has eight water supply wells within 2 km of the Dolime Quarry and these wells are able to produce 
up to 25% of [City’s] water supply capacity.”…“On June 22, 2011 the City received a letter from James Dick 
Construction indicating that it is proposing to proceed to amend its aggregate license to expand the annual extraction 
rate from 500,000 tonnes a year to 1,000,000 tonnes a year.” Earlier in 2007, both River Valley Development and 
James Dick Construction applied for an expansion of the quarry. The Wellington Water Watchers and the City 
officials have continuously raised concerns to the Ministry of the Environment and Ministry of Natural Resources 
and to the Lake Eric Water Source Protection Committee (LEWSPC). They claim: that “the protective layer of 
aquitard that protects the City’s water supply aquifers (especially the Goat Island and Gasport Formations) will not 
be protected” under the proposed license amendment. In the view of this citizen’s group and City officials, a danger 
exists that the city’s water source(s) will or are being contaminated by the breach. As documented in the Committee 
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citizen group and city officials brought these concerns to the local water water committee (i.e, 
the Lake Erie Water Source Protection Committee.  
 In Novermber 2012, the Lake Erie Water Source Protection Committee (LEWSPC or 
SPC) heard from the Concerned Citzens of Brantford group worried their drinking water was at 
risk of contamination because of aggregate extraction activities.259 Both groups demand that the 
SPC add aggregate extraction to the drinking water threat list under the Clean Water Act, 
2006.260 Nevertheless, after numerous presentations to the committee and an advocacy campaign 
by a general public representative on the committee, these community groups found themselves 
unable to influence the SPC’s decision-making process. A decision-making process tightly 
controlled by the province.  
 Justice O’Connor, author of the Walkerton Commission of Inquiry Reports and 
considered the chief architect of the new water regulatory regime in Ontario, envisioned a 
localized watershed-planning process responsive to local citizen concerns. 261  Under the 
legislation, a water source protection committee can request permission to add an additional 
drinking water threat beyond the 21 drinking threats prescribed under the Act’s regulation.262 
Yet, in the breach of an aquitard situation, the water committee was barred from adding 
aggregate extraction to the drinking water threat list for the Lake Erie WaterSource Protection 
Region. The committee, however, was successful in adding underground pipelines to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
report, “this breach [of the aquitard] will allow surface water from the quarry pond, contaminated with bacteria and 
other pathogens, to leak into the groundwater and thereby contaminated the water supply aquifer” and potentially, 
harm the municipal drinking water sources.  
259 Citizens representing the Paris community group brought forward their concerns to the LEWSPC regarding a 
proposed gravel pit to be opened in Paris Ontario on Watts Pond Road. Please refer to: online: Concerned Citizens 
of Brantford website, <http://ccob.ca/> and <http://ccob.ca/source-water-protection-plan-comments-submitted-by-
ccob/>. 
260 Supra note 2. In particular, Ontario Regulation 287/07 sets out the 21 prescribed threats.  
261 O’Connor, Report Two, Supra note 59 and note 63. Re: Localized planning process.   
262 CWA, Supra. note 2. s. 2. “drinking water threat” means an activity or condition that adversely affects or has the 
potential to adversely affect the quality or quantity of any water that is or may be used as a source of drinking water, 
and includes an activity or condition that is prescribed by the regulations as a drinking water threat.; also see: (i.e., 
Technical Rule 119. 
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region’s threat list. Why characterize oil piplines but not aggregate extraction as a drinking water 
threat? 
 In fact, during this aggregate extraction controversy, the Lake Erie Water Source 
Protection Committee (LEWSPC), with approval from the Director of the Ministry of 
Environment, added underground oil pipelines as a new drinking water threat for the entire Lake 
Erie Water Source Protection Region. In response to fears stemming from Michigan’s 
Kalamazoo River oil pipeline spill of 2010, the LEWSPC put forward a request to the Director to 
add underground oil transmission pipelines as a drinking water threat. Within the committee’s 
geographically vast jurisdiction — only one pipeline location located in the City of Paris was 
deemed a significant threat to a drinking water source. Despite the limited impact of pipelines 
within the Lake Erie region, the director’s decision to add an oil pipeline to the threat list applied 
to the entire Region.263 These two decisions left some residents asking: Why add underground oil 
pipelines as a local drinking water threat but not aggregate extraction? – an activity currently 
transforming the landscape in the Lake Erie Water Source Region and according to the citizens 
of Guelph the local waterscape. How did the SPC arrive at these decisions? Who is the decision-
maker?  
2.0  Introduction 
In a farming community in southwestern Ontario, the E. coli drinking water contamination event 
known as the ‘Walkerton tragedy’ transformed the state-centric form of environmental regulation 
with the introduction of the Clean Water Act, 2006. The traditional regulatory command-and-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 For threats relating to oil pipelines, the Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee applied to the Director of 
the Source Protection Programs Branch to consider a request to add this as local theat. The application was made in 
February 2011 and the Director approved the conveyance of oil by way of underground pipeline on June 13, 2011. A 
review of the significant drinking water threats identified in the Assessment Reports (Section 1) indicates that the 
threat of the conveyance of oil by way of an underground pipeline is only significant within the County of Brant 
(Paris). Infra. note 362.  
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control approaches of environmental regulation gave way to a governance mode where a water-
source protection committee (SPC) comprised of state and non-state actors are charged with 
governing a watershed. 
 Concurrently with the introduction of the new governance framework, scholars traced a 
regulatory change away from a government to the governance approach. Specifically, the 
governance literature points to the introduction of a responsive form of regulation, as advanced 
by Gunningham et. al.,’s Smart Regulation, an environmental policy approach. Smart Regulation 
promotes regulatory pluralism, whereby private, civil society and state actors actively govern 
together. Together, the emphasis in the theory upon the responsiveness theme combined with the 
shift in regulatory practice to a water committee arrangement and the past water governance 
crises raises several questions: Within these water committees, what concerns are the SPC 
decision-makers responsive to: economic development, legislative requirements, community 
concerns or ecological change in a watershed? How does the committee balance these competing 
interests? What legislative barriers exist to consider ecological change at a local watershed level?  
 As the introductory vignette demonstrates and will be explored more fully in this chapter, 
the decision makers taking part in the local water committee are faced with competing interests, 
norms and complex social-ecological relations. Based upon my observation of the SPC, these 
decision-makers side step these competing interests by relying upon the administrative tasks set 
out in the Clean Water Act, 2006 and are captured by the state’s chameleon-like control over 
their governance function.  
 Similar to a chameleon, the province’s ability to change its oversight behaviour is 
complicated. The province’s governance role presents as strong and weak forms of 
communication. The water committee views its’ administrative actions as responsive to 
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community concerns. Yet, it is also defensive as the province shields the committee’s 
administrative actions by relying upon the legislation, as a defensive back-stop. The province’s 
strong control function was displayed through several mechanisms: the direction provided by 
MOE liaison representative at committee meetings; the committee’s reliance upon the prescribed 
drinking water threat list; and, the Ministry of Environment’s policy directives, technical rules 
and other similar instruments. Together these instruments, regulations, policies controlled the 
decision-making process and created a decision-making criteria for the water committee 
participants.  
 The province was also instrumental in presenting a weak style of communication. This 
weak communication presence subtly played out when community pressure exposed the 
competing interests of economic development and environmental protection underpinning the 
SPC’s decision-making process. The province’s response to the water-source protection 
committee’s (SPC) request to add aggregate extraction as a local drinking water threat was one 
of delay. During four years of the water planning process, two community groups plead for the 
protection of their local water source. However, it was not until the draft plan was in place and 
presented at the December of 2012 that the Ministry announced its decision. Aggregate 
extraction would not be added to the drinking water threat list.  
 While the provincial government was responsive to the public outcry concerning a 
drinking water tragedy – Walkerton, Ontario (2000) and introduced the Clean Water Act, 2006, it 
was difficult for the public and First Nation communities to be heard at the water committee. 
Within the committee setting, citizens raised concerns regarding the protection of their local 
water source. Yet, their environmental protection concerns were strategically managed by 
government officials and appear to be marred by political interests playing out beyond the 
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committee. This latent conflict points to the presence of a power imbalance between industry and 
community interests at the planning-policy table. This aggregate extraction conflict raises the 
question: Under this mode of governance, how do water committee participants make decisions 
amongst competing interests? What actually drives the decision-making process in practice? 
3.0  Background 
3.1 Community Conflict & Aggregate Extraction  
Predictably, the Guelph and Paris community conflicts became entrapped in the classic economic 
development versus environmental protection debate. These community conflicts play out at the 
local water committee level and are responsive to the province’s interest in economic 
development and the economics of supply and demand. 264  In Ontario, consumption and 
aggregate demand continues to increase in direct response to the province’s growing population 
pressures and the subsequent building of construction and transportation works. 265  Current 
demand and consumption266 for aggregates is projected to rise beyond historical levels.267 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Mr. Ray Pichette, Director of Natural Heritage, Lands and Protected Spaces, in the Policy Division of the 
Ministry of Natural Resources submission on Monday, May 7, 2012 to the – Aggregate Resources Act Review” 
online: Ontario Legislature <http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-
proceedings/committee_transcripts_details.do?locale=en&Date=2012-05-
07&ParlCommID=8958&BillID=&Business=Aggregate+Resources+Act+review&DocumentID=26292#P338_9490
2>. In his submission, Mr. Pichette comments on the supply side: “We all know that aggregates are a major 
component to the province’s infrastructure. …For example, the United States produces three billion tonnes of 
aggregate per year. Ontario, at this point in time, is around 166 million tonnes to 170 million tonnes a year. …in 
fact, if you go to southern Ontario, and southern Ontario alone, we’re in the 130-million-tonne to 135-million-tonne 
range. That is actually 35% of all of Canada…the larger percentage of aggregate is produced in southern Ontario. 
We have the top 10 there, representing about 50 million tonnes in 2010, predominantly to satisfy the greater Toronto 
area and the 905 region.…” 
265 Altus Group Economic Consulting, State of the Aggregate Resource in Ontario Study (SAROS): Paper 1 – 
Aggregate Consumption and Demand, Prepared for Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, December 18, 2009, 
online: Ministry of Natural Resources, 
<http://www.mnr.gov.on.ca/stdprodconsume/groups/lr/@mnr/@aggregates/documents/document/stdprod_067712.p
df>.at 27. Section: 4.2  Which uses are more important in relative terms? …During the 2000s, an estimated 81% of 
the total aggregate consumed in Ontario was used in various construction applications.” 
266Ms. Moreen Miller, Chief Executive Officer of the Ontario Stone, Sand and Gravel Association – “Committee 
Transcripts: Standing Committee on General Government – May 9, 2012 – Aggregate Resources Act Review”, 
online: Ontario Legislature <http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-
proceedings/committee_transcripts_details.do?locale=en&Date=2012-
0509&ParlCommID=8958&BillID=&Business=Aggregate+Resources+Act+review&DocumentID=26320>. In her 
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increased consumption of sand, stone and gravel (i.e., aggregates) is perpetuated by a domino 
extractive effect that places greater pressure on upstream and downstream aggregate industry 
providers to extract and deliver aggregates to meet market demands. Today these consumption 
and demand patterns combined with population and construction pressures are blurring the 
artificial boundaries of the urban and rural landscape. Intensive housing development projects 
are now encroaching upon aggregate development locations previously sited in remote rural 
areas. In the end, these economic driven factors spur community conflicts and leave citizens 
seeking an outlet to express their concerns. The chief concern for these local communities is 
water source protection.  
3.2 The Aggregate Industry Perspective 
The polemics surrounding this type of community conflict typically places industry proponents 
in direct opposition to community environmental protection interests. 268  Within southwestern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
statement to the Committee, Ms. Miller explained: “In 2010, 166 million tonnes of aggregate were produced in the 
province, and 60% of that was consumed by public authorities, the majority of which was used to build public 
infrastructure. We consume approximately 13.5 tonnes per person in Ontario each year… It is safe to assume that 
even with conservation practices, consumption will increase as population increases. If, by 2031, the population of 
Ontario increases by 3.7 million people, as set out in the growth plan, by then we will need 50 million more tonnes 
each year.” 
267 SAROS, Surpa.note 265. In the Executive Summary of Report: “…Given expected levels of economic and 
population growth, Ontario’s consumption of aggregates is projected to average about 186 million tonnes per year 
on average over the next 20 years, 13% higher than in the past 20 years. Most of the 8 geographic areas within 
Ontario considered in this study are expected to consume more aggregate over the next 20 years than past 20 years. 
Also see Section 6.1.1 Ontario’s aggregate consumption patterns.  
268 Mr. John Moroz, Vice-President and General Manager of St Marys CBM Aggregates, “Committee Transcripts: 
Standing Committee on General Government – May 9, 2012 – Aggregate Resources Act Review”, online: Ontario 
Legislature <http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-
proceedings/committee_transcripts_details.do?locale=en&Date=2012-05-
09&ParlCommID=8958&BillID=&Business=Aggregate+Resources+Act+review&DocumentID=26320#P182_4054
7>; To understand the nature and scope of this type community conflict from an industry perspective refer to Mr. 
John Moroz, Vice-President and General Manager of St Marys CBM Aggregates, statement to the Standing 
Committee regarding the company’s proposed quarry in Flamborough, north of the city of Hamilton: “...We 
recognize that quarrying is not without controversy, and we typically run into some local opposition by special-
interest groups, which may include political, environmental or even competitive interests who do not want a quarry 
in their backyard. Flamborough is no exception.”; and, For another industry perspective also see: Miller, Supra note 
266. In her statement to the Standing Committee on May 9, 2012, Ms. Moreen Miller, Chief Executive Officer of 
the Ontario Stone, Sand and Gravel Association, she did not acknowledge the “community” as an affected 
stakeholder, however, she did reference the competing economic and social interests. Specifically, she stated: “Not 
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Ontario, industry proponents are drawn to the high quality aggregate deposits located within the 
central portion of the Grand River watershed, specifically in vicinity of the cities of Guelph, 
Kitchener, Waterloo, Cambridge and Brantford.269 Both industry and provincial officials view 
these aggregate deposits as key economic commodities.270 Ms. Moreen Miller, Chief Executive 
Officer of the Ontario Stone, Sand and Gravel Association stressed in her submission to the 
Provincial government’s Standing Committee on General Government (i.e., the Committee that 
was charged with reviewing the Aggregate Resources Act 271 ) the economic importance of 
aggregate extraction to the province. She stated:  
“The aggregate industry is a primary engine for economic growth and prosperity in the 
province. Nothing gets built without aggregate: safe roads, power stations, municipal 
water supply systems, homes, schools, churches and hospitals. High-quality aggregate 
products are the very foundation of the provincial economy. Stone, sand and gravel are 
non-renewable resources. Once depleted or sterilized, they are lost forever…The 
provincial interest in aggregate resources is based on long-standing principles that have 
served Ontario well.”272 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
all areas of the province have aggregate deposits. They are only found in certain geologic formations and certain 
locations. Many of the geological formations that provide our aggregate resources also provide our agricultural 
resources, our recreation lands, our forests and our tourism destinations. The challenge is to strike the appropriate 
balance between these competing resource interests.” [Emphasis Added]. …  
269 Ms. Nancy Davy, Director of Resource Management with the Grand River Conservation Authority, “Committee 
Transcripts: Standing Committee on General Government – Monday, July 09, 2012 – Aggregate Resources Act 
Review” at 1530 online: Ontario Legislature <http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-
proceedings/committee_transcripts_details.do?Date=2012-07-
<09&ParlCommID=8958&BillID=&Business=Aggregate+Resources+Act+review&locale=en&DocumentID=2649
2#P462_125608>. Ms. Davy, in her statement to the Standing Committee, described the Grand River watershed as 
“located west of Toronto and is similar in size to Prince Edward Island.” …. “The central portion of the watershed 
has high-quality gravel and sand deposits. That’s generally the area of Guelph, Kitchener, Waterloo, Cambridge and 
Brantford and the surrounding townships.” 
270 Ministry of Natural Resources, News Release, online: MNR <http://news.ontario.ca/mnr/en/2012/03/all-party-
committee-review-of-aggregate-resources-act.html>. The Government’s position is expressed by the Minister of 
Natural Resources in a News Release Statement: “Aggregate resources such as sand and gravel are vital to Ontario's 
economy – they are used to build roads, subway tunnels, hospitals and schools.” 
271 RSO 1990, c. A.8. 
272 Miller, Supra note 266.  
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For the industry, this aggregate resource rich region offers a unique business opportunity. For the 
government, the aggregate industry is a key sector advancing the province’s economic 
development and security.   
3.3 The Local Communities’ Perspective 
In contradiction to the industry perspective, is the view of local residents. Citizen group argue 
the inter-connected hydrological functions and features of a watershed require regulatory 
protection against potential harm from extractive industry activities. Nancy Davy, Director of 
Natural Resources with the Grand River Conservation Authority explained, in her submission to 
Provincial government’s Standing Committee on General Government, the interconnected 
function of particular water features such as moraines that deliver aggregate resources. She 
stated: “the moraines and outwash deposits that provide aggregate resources also function as 
important groundwater resource areas and recharge and discharge zones.”273 In fact, in Lake Erie 
Region watershed, key aggregate deposits exist and provide critical groundwater features such as 
recharge and discharge zones.  
 Publically, both the industry274 and provincial government appear to have overlooked the 
connection between aggregate extraction and watersheds including the legal framework for water 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Ms. Davy, Supra note 269. Also, see David Suzuki Foundation and Ontario, Biodiversity in Ontario’s Greenbelt 
Report, November, 2011: Section – Growth Plan For The Greater Golden Horseshoe at p. 38, online: David Suzuki 
Foundation <http://www.davidsuzuki.org/publications/downloads/2011/REPORT-GB_Habitat-Dec2011.pdf>. In 
the Suzuki Foundation’s report, the interconnected waterscape and ecosystem is described as experiencing an impact 
from aggregate extraction activities: “The Paris and Galt moraines cover more than 560 square kilometers from 
Caledon to Norfolk – approximately one-third of the moraines are currently in the Greenbelt Plan. Like the Oak 
ridges Moraine, this area stores and filters a large amount of groundwater, thereby supporting a huge network of 
coldwater streams and wetlands throughout the Grand River watershed. …The moraines, already under significant 
pressure from high levels of aggregate extraction, may not be able to withstand the increased demand that expanding 
communities will certainly place upon its hydrology. A recent report completed by the Ministry of the Environment 
failed to examine these potential cumulative environmental effects and their implications for species with nearby 
populations in the Greenbelt, like the Jefferson salamander and Blanding’s turtle that rely on the water flow of the 
moraines for their habitat.” 
274 Miller, Supra note 266. Ms. Miller, in her statement to the Committee, characterizes the industry’s position as 
“water handlers” [not water users]. The industry offers “innovative water management” initiatives, advances a 
partnership (industry, MNR and CA) approach to the study of cumulative effects and the development of self-
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source protection.275 In their submissions to the provincial Standing Committee, neither the 
provincial government officials nor industry representatives, referenced the Clean Water Act, 
2006 (CWA), its’ custodian, the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) and the committee’s water 
source protection planning process. Rather, the presentations to the standing committee expose 
the economic partnership between the Ministry of Natural Resources and Conservation Authority 
(but not the Ministry of the Environment) and the aggregate industry. One might wonder whether 
this oversight points to a lack of awareness or possibly an isolation of the MOE’s water source 
planning activity within the larger government administrative framework and within the broader 
political power structure? When in fact, the MNR and CA’s administrative activities are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
regulatory industry certification standards suggesting the industry, as a water handler, holds a mere usufruct right. A 
right delineated from its ecological impact and is offset by the industry’s sustainable water management activities 
and self-regulation of adaptive management plans. Miller states: “OSSGA also promotes innovative and sustainable 
water management. Aggregate producers are water handlers, not water consumers. Where appropriate, adaptive 
management plans are being implemented by OSSGA members…”  
275 Pichette, Supra, note 264. Mr. Ray Pichette, Director of Natural Heritage, Lands and Protected Spaces, in the 
Policy Division of the Ministry of Natural Resources submission on Monday, May 7, 2012 to the – Aggregate 
Resources Act Review” online: Ontario Legislature <http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-
proceedings/committee_transcripts_details.do?locale=en&Date=2012-05-
07&ParlCommID=8958&BillID=&Business=Aggregate+Resources+Act+review&DocumentID=26292#P338_9490
2>. In his submission to the Standing Committee, Mr. Pichette outlines the regulatory process for aggregate 
extraction and briefly comments on water source protection. Remarkably, while the Policy Director ends his 
statement by offering his opinion on the well-integrated nature of the aggregate regulatory system, he fails to 
reference the Clean Water Act, 2006, c. 22 (CWA). He overlooks an important regulatory connection – a final water- 
source protection plan is binding on all Provincial and Municipal authorities that make decisions that affect the 
safety of drinking water. Mr. Pichette fails to reference the CWA and the legal significance of water source 
protection plan upon a municipality in his statement to the Standing Committee. He states: “The policy framework 
for aggregates is fundamentally under two pieces of provincial legislation: firstly, the Planning Act, which is under 
the municipal affairs ministry; and the Aggregate Resources Act, which is with MNR. These are the overarching 
legislative frameworks for managing aggregates in the province. There are a host of other pieces of legislation: the 
Water Resources Act, the Environmental Protection Act, the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, 
the Endangered Species Act and, actually, the federal Fisheries Act, at least at this point in time. …” [Emphasis 
Added]. In particular, Mr. Pichette fails to reference, s.s. 38-44. And s. 105(1) of the CWA. When read together, the 
wording in s.39(4) and s.105(1) suggests a test for a regulatory conflict: “the provision that provides the greatest 
protection to the quality and quantity of any water that is or may be used as a source of drinking water prevails.” 
Also see: O’Conner, Walkerton Report Two, Supra note 59. At page 106, in Ch. 4: The Protection of Drinking 
Water Sources, Justice O’Connor strengthen the water source protection plan with a trump card – in that, in his view 
“the plan would govern municipal land use and zoning activities.” Thus, one might ask: does Director Pichette’s 
oversight reflect an organizational culture at the provincial level where the MNR’s aggregate extraction sector is the 
dominant natural resource governance regime over water source protection. Perhaps the answer can be found in the 
“partnership” between the industry, Ministry of Natural Resources and Conservation Authority where oddly, the 
Ministry of the Environment (the regulatory custodian of the CWA, 2006) is a missing partner. Also See: Miller, 
Supra note 274.  Miller comments on the partnership.  
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potentially implicated by the CWA’s overriding provision for water plans. A final plan is 
considered binding on all Provincial and Municipal authorities making decisions affecting the 
safety of drinking water. 276   
3.4 Presenting at the Local Water Committee 
As I observed, in both the Guelph and Paris aggregate extraction community conflicts, the issue 
in dispute is water source protection.277 In reaction to aggregate development activities occurring 
in their communities, local citizens concerned with the protection of aquifers, below-water-table 
extraction and the prevention of contaminates entering their drinking water sources, raised these 
concerns to the Lake Erie Water Source Protection Committee (LEWSPC) — the gatekeeper of 
“local considerations” pertaining to their “local watershed” – i.e., the Lake Erie Region.278  
 However, the water-source protection committee’s governance function is directed at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 O. Reg. 288/07 Ibid, ss.38-44. And s. 105(1) CWA, s. 39. In particular, together the wording in s. 39(4) and s. 
105(1) suggests the test for conflict is: “the provision that provides the greatest protection to the quality and quantity 
of any water that is or may be used as a source of drinking water prevails.”  
277 Mr. Ken Seiling, the Regional Chair for the Region of Waterloo and Mr. Rob Horne, the Regional Planning 
Commissioner for the Waterloo Regional Government, “Committee Transcripts: Standing Committee on General 
Government – Monday, July 09, 2012 – Aggregate Resources Act Review” online: Ontario Legislature 
<http://www.ontla.on.ca/web/committee-proceedings/committee_transcripts_details.do?locale=en&Date=2012-07-
09&ParlCommID=8958&BillID=&Business=Aggregate+Resources+Act+review&DocumentID=26492#P857_2466
73>. In their joint submission, these municipal government officials emphasized the importance of water source 
protection to their groundwater thirsty community, the need to clarify the inter-relationship between CWA’s water 
protection planning process and aggregate extraction regime, which also brings attention to the escalating public 
conflict over water and aggregate extraction activities within their community. These presenters stated: “Given the 
groundwater dependence of the Waterloo region and the expansive regulatory framework emerging from the 
Walkerton tragedy, it is inconsistent that aggregate extraction can so frequently occur very near or below the water 
table. Even the relationship between aggregate extraction and emerging source protection plans has yet to be 
established and is currently problematic.” [Emphasis Added].  
278 O’Connor – Walkerton Report Two, Supra note 59. Also see: Ministry of the Environment, Clean Water Act 
description, online: MOE 
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/environment/en/legislation/clean_water_act/STD01_078394.html>. Ontario's Clean 
Water Act: 
•   requires that local communities – through local Source Protection Committees – assess existing 
and potential threats to their water, and that they set out and implement the actions needed to 
reduce or eliminate these threats 
•   empowers communities to take action to prevent threats from becoming significant 
•   requires public participation on every local source protection plan – the planning process for 
source protection is open to anyone in the community 
•   requires that all plans and actions are based on sound science. [Emphasis Added].  
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human health – that is, the safety of the public drinking water system. Justice O’Connor, in the 
Inquiry, viewed the exercise as a “local planning process” contingent upon adopting a local 
watershed perspective. 279 “[E]cological impacts” or environmental protection of the watershed 
were considered beyond the mandate of the Walkerton Commission Inquiry.280 This local scale 
of planning was expected to bring forth the public’s concerns during the process, which would 
further foster “goodwill” as well as agreement on the source protection plan within the 
community. 281  For the citizens of Guelph and Paris presenting to the committee the 
environmental protection of a water source is closely tied to the safety of their drinking water.  
 During a site visit to the Lake Erie Water Source Protection Committee, I observed one 
of the general public representatives bring forward the aggregate extraction issue. The matter 
was brought forward to the Committee, in the form of correspondence, in which the public 
interest representative identified the precarious state of the aquitard at the Guelph dolime quarry. 
At the committee, these types of local water issues can be raised in numerous ways; for example, 
through a committee member (for example, one of the public interest representatives) or a 
citizen-based delegation can make a presentation or a send letter to the Committee. 
 On November 3, 2011, the same public interest representative again brought forward his 
concern to the committee regarding the breach of the aquitard at the Dolime quarry. In his view, 
the breach is a serious drinking water threat.282 However, the MOE still had not responded to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 O’Connor, Ibid. Report Two, Ch. 1: An Overview at 9. 
280 Ibid. Justice O’Connor interpreted the Inquiry’s mandate as two-fold: 1) to establish a record of the events. 
(These events are set out in Part One of the Report.) And, 2) to consider other matters that were relevant to the issue 
of: “ensur[ing] the safety of Ontario’s drinking water.” These matters are set out in Part Two of the Report. Justice 
O’Connor’s interpretation of his mandate narrowed the issues to be heard and considered by the Inquiry to matters 
relating to the safety of drinking water. Ecological impacts to the watershed such as climate change or water 
conservation issues were considered outside the scope of the Inquiry. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Lake Erie Source Protection Region SPC Meeting “Source Protection Meeting Minutes – November 3, 2011”, 
online: LESPR- SPC Meetings <http://www.sourcewater.ca/index/document.cfm?Sec=5&Sub1=2&Sub2=45>. 
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SPC’s earlier February 4, 2010 formal motion.283 In the motion, the committee had requested this 
local aggregate extraction activity be characterized as a local drinking threat.284 But, at this 
November meeting the MOE liaison representative attending this meeting was unable to advise 
on the Ministry’s position on the motion. With no direction from the MOE, the committee was 
unable to response to the member’s request on the drinking water threat. In their view, the 
committee was still awaiting a formal response from the MOE. So, the public interest 
representatives’ concern was set-aside.  
 Yet, at the time of this November 2011 SPC meeting, correspondence did exist 
demonstrating provincial officials were aware of the breach as early as 2009. Correspondence 
between the Municipal entity (City of Guelph285), the Provincial (MOE, MNR) officials, and an 
aggregate company employee (River Valley Developments Inc.286) indicates communication 
took place between these parties on this issue as early as November of 2009. The date of the 
correspondence suggests the MOE was well aware of the breach and the municipalities’ 
concerns.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 See Appendix B for a detailed a four-part motion illustrating the Committee’s style of communication and the 
motion put forward on the aggregate extraction issue.  
284 CWA. Under the O. Reg 287/07, s.1.1(1), 21 prescribed threats are identified. A policy directive supports each 
prescribed threat. Although this issue was discussed at the December 3, 2009 SPC meeting it was decided that 
further information was required from the provincial staff. At the subsequent February 10th meeting, a number of 
recommendations were accepted that related to gathering more information on the Ministry’s position on the quarry. 
Online: Refer to: Report NO. SPC-10-02-01 – Subject: Background on Quarrying as a Drinking Water Threat 
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/020410_spc_minutes.pdf> and see the Lake Erie Region Source 
Protection Committee Meeting Minutes Thursday, February 4, 2010, SPC online: 
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/SPC021001.pdf>.  
285 Letter from the Mayor City of Guelph to the MOE, Guelph District Office (dated July 26, 2011) regarding an 
upcoming meeting between the City and the MOE to discuss the quarry. online: City of Guelph 
<http://guelph.ca/uploads/Council_and_Committees/Information/info_items_080411.pdf>. In the letter, Mayor 
Farbridge outlines the City’s objection to the quarry management plan changes, as the increase in the extraction rate, 
in the City’s view is deemed a change in the terms of permit.  
286 Letter from R. Baxter, General Manager to both the Ministers of the Environment and Natural Resources 
Correspondence (dated November 12, 2009). online: <http://ward2guelph.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/letter-from-
river-valley-developments-to-minister-of-natural-resources-and-minister-of-environment-nov-12-2009.pdf>. In a 
nutshell, the General Manager’s position is that the company is well within its provincial licence requirements. The 
city is responsible for ensuring adequate water treatment and has limited access to well infrastructure data. The 
problem lies with the City as the quarry is a legal land use.  
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 At this SPC meeting, the MOE liaison representative was presented an opportunity to de-
escalate the community conflict by introducing an August 2, 2011 letter from the local MOE 
District Guelph Office to Mayor of City of Guelph. In the letter, the MOE Guelph District 
Manager conceded the aquitard is “exposed.” In the opinion of the Manager, even though the 
“exposed or nearly exposed areas of the Gasport Formation” exist, the aggregate company’s 
management plan offers a mitigation plan that addresses the breach of the Gasport Formation.287 
However, the MOE liaison representative chose to remain silient on this issue and not introduce 
the letter. The MOE’s District Manager’s admission of a breach at the Dolime quarry casts a 
long dark shadow of doubt over the MOE liaison representative’s response of silience on the 
issue.  
 At this meeting, the MOE liaison representative further failed to de-escalate the conflict 
brewing in the City of Guelph by not raising two key provincial documents. These two key 
documents shed light on the MOE’s position on below-water-table extraction at a quarry. The 
first document was referenced by Ms. Davy, Director of Natural Resources with the Grand River 
Conservation Authority, in her submission to the Standing Committee on General Government. 
Ms. Davy stated that the MOE participated in the development of September 2010 document 
entitled: Cumulative Effects Assessment (Water Quality and Quantity) Best Practices Paper for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Letter from Jane Glassco, District Manager, Ministry of the Enviroment, Guelph District Office to Karen 
Farbridge, Mayor of Guelph file # SI WE GU C5 100 (dated August 2, 2011). For a copy of the letter, Supra note 
257 refer to pages 54 to 55 of the online version of the Planning & Building and Environment Committee Report 
(September 19, 2011). In the letter, the MOE District Manager states: “[t]he detailed technical hydrological reviews 
indicate the ground water has not been adversely affected however the ministry has taken a cautionary approach to 
this issue and asked the company to prepare a management plan to remediate the area where the Gasport formation 
is exposed. Following thorough Ministry technical review of the company’s draft management plan, the Ministry 
has advised both the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) and the company that the plan was acceptable to MOE… 
Our technical review included assessing the feasibility of the “fines layer” and the Ministry concluded that the 
management plan is a reasonable approach for mitigating exposed or nearly exposed areas of the Gasport Formation. 
The City of Guelph was provided with a copy of the finalized management plan on April 1, 2011 by the company. It 
is our understanding the plan addresses the City’s concerns first raised in 2007.” 
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Below-Water Sand and Gravel Extraction Operations in Priority Subwatersheds in the Grand 
River Watershed Report.288  
 The next document, the “Source Protection Planning Bulletin – Aggregate Resources Act 
Instruments” (MOE, March 2011) could have been raised by either the MOE liaison 
representative or the Conservation Authority representative acting as the facilitor of the 
meeting.289 Under the CWA, 2006, the CA is considered the Source Protection Authority and 
coordinates the SPC functions with the MOE. However, both government officials failed to raise 
the document and left the public representative’s concerns unanswered. This oversight by the 
government officials leaves the administrative process open to questions concerning 
transparency. From a participant observation perspective looking in at the SPC meeting process, 
it appeared the MOE liaison respresentative’s was stone walling the committee’s process and 
deliberately disregarding the public interest representative’s concerns.    
 A year later at the November 1, 2012 SPC meeting, the water committee was confronted 
with another aggregate extraction issue. A delegation from the group called the Concerned 
Citizens of Brantford made a presentation to the committee regarding a planned gravel pit 
located on Watt Pitts Road in Paris, Ontario.290 Dufferin Aggregates, the gravel proponent, has 
held the aggregate licence since 1974 on land that has been farmed for the last 38 years. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Davy, Supra note 269 at 1539-40. In her presentation to the Standing Committee on General Government 
regarding the Aggregate Resources Act Review, Ms. Davy, Director of Resource Management with the Grand River 
Conservation Authority referenced  the Best Practice Paper and indicates that the cumculative effects paper was 
developed with the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of the Environment and Ontario Stone, Sand & 
Gravel Association.  
289 Ontario Ministry of the Environment “Source Protection Planning Bulletin – Aggregate Resources Act 
Instrument (March, 2011). online: MOE 
<http://www.sourcewaterprotection.on.ca/downloads/notices_minutes/notices/2011_Apr_8/8a_20110305%20Aggre
gates%20Bulletin%20FINAL.pdf>. 
290 Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee Meeting Minutes Thursday, November 1, 2012; online: LESPR-
SPC <http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/110112_spc_minutes.pdf>. 
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company plans to commence extractive activities as soon as the various approvals are received. 
These citizens were worried their drinking water source could become contaminated.  
 At the SPC, the Brantford delegation argued the source protection plan (SPP) should take 
into account the planned aggregate activities. In their view, the SPP should take into account 
both the above and below water table extraction activities, aggregate washing facilities, washing 
wastewater pond(s), with water which may also be used to recharge the aquifer, and ponding 
effects. The close proximity of the extractive activities to the wellhead protection zone is a 
particular concern for this group. The group argues the wellhead protection areas surrounding the 
municipal wells (i.e., the Telfer and the Gilbert Well heads) are at risk of being adversely 
impacted by the activities at proposed gravel pit. Specifically, these residents contend the sandy 
composition of the soil creates contaminate pathways that easily and quickly transports 
contaminates to the area’s shallow water table. These citizens are also concerned with the 
presence of legacy agricultural chemicals historically used by the local farmers (i.e., nitrate, 
phosphate/atrazine) on the site. In effect, these citizens fear the aggregate activities will 
transform the region’s natural waterscape and its hydrological functions; thus, placing the quality 
and quantity of their drinking water at risk.291  
 After the delegation had completed their presentation and departed the meeting room, the 
committee members began to deliberate whether the SPC’s mandate allowed for the 
consideration of a local aggregate license. The heated exchange that ensued led the aggregate 
industry representative to strongly state to the Chair that the role of SPC is not to consider a local 
aggregate license dispute. In his comments, the representative reminded the Chair the committee 
had agreed in an earlier SPC meeting where the aggregate issue in Guelph was raised that it was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 Concerned Citizens of Brantford website, online: CCOB<http://ccob.ca/>. Refer to the CCOB presentation by 
Ron Norris that is set out as: “Source Water Protection Committee – Speaker Notes November 1, 2012”; Concerned 
Citizens of Brant online: <http://ccob.ca/source-water-protection-committee-speaker-notes-nov1-2012/>. 
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“not within the Committee’s jurisdiction to comment on site-specific development activities.”292 
Other committee members also agreed with the representative’s position. In end, the committee 
members passed a resolution to accept four questions from the citizens group and to request the 
CA staff to respond to the questions at the next meeting in December. 293  
 Finally, at the December 6th 2012 SPC meeting, the CA staff reported to the Committee 
on the aggregate extraction threat request. The CA responded with a resounding no to three of 
the four questions posed a month earlier by the Concerned Citizens of Brantford delegation. 294 
In short, aggregate extraction is not a drinking water threat. A CA staff explained, in memo form, 
to the Committee that the SPC does not have the “authority to examine site specific risks to the 
Paris drinking water supply.”295  Under the CWA technical rules and Ont. Reg. 287/07, the 
mandate of the SPC is limited to addressing prescribed drinking water threats and aggregate 
extraction is not one of the prescribed threats. The legal authority of the “Source Protection 
Authority” (SPA- i.e., CA) is limited to these fore mentioned legal instruments, which means the 
SPA “cannot assess risks to drinking water outside” the Act and its regulations.296 Aggregate 
extraction activities associated with transport pathways might be considered as an activity set out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Lake Erie Source Protection Region SPC Meeting “Source Protection Meeting Minutes - Thursday, November 1, 
2012,” online:  LESPR-SPC <http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/110112_spc_minutes.pdf>.R. Haggart felt 
that the issues being put forward by the CCOB are a County-wide concern and requested that these questions be 
reviewed and discussed at an upcoming SPC meeting. T. Schmidt felt that it is not the mandate of the SPC to 
comment or make decisions regarding site-specific development or operations (i.e. the proposed gravel pit in Paris). 
W. Wright- Cascaden agreed and added that although CCOB is particularly concerned about events in Paris, the 
questions being brought forth to the SPC by the CCOB could be answered in a general manner. [Emphasis Added]. 
293 Ibid. The four questions put forward: 1) Does the Source Protection Committee have the authority to examine the 
risk as a site specific issue for the Paris wells before the permit to take water will be grants? 2) Will the Source 
Protection Committee have input to the Ministry of the Environment when Dufferin Aggregates applies for their 
permit to take water, as it relates to the issues outlined in the presentation? 3) Can a study be requested/required, 
specifying the lab and field methodology to detect levels of chemistry, to determine if CCOB’s [Concerned Citizens 
of Brant’s] concerns about the wash pond have been made? 4) Will the Source Protection Committee be pursuing 
the issue any further with the Ministry of the Environment? And is there anything CCOB can do to support the 
Committee in this pursuit?  
294 Ibid.  
295 Ibid. Also see online: Lake Erie Source Protection Region SPC Meeting “Source Protection Meeting Minutes – 
December 6, 2012 … “Report 12-12-01: Response to Questions from Concerned Citizens of Brant – Delegation 
November 1, 2012”, online: LESPR-SPC <http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/SPC_121201.pdf>. 
296 Ibid.  
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in CWA policies and the technical rules and could be considered as protective measures.297 The 
CA staff also reported that the water studies completed in the Paris, Brant County area did not 
reveal any water stress.298 As a participant observer of the meeting, I watched as the Chair 
requested a comment on the presentation from the MOE liaison representative, who responded in 
brief, that the MOE and MNR are continuing to examine the issue. The Chair, responded light-
heartily to the MOE representative, “is that all you have to say on the issue!” She politely, 
responded – yes!  
3.5 Summary: Governance as a Process of Decision-Making – How Are Decision-
makers Responsive to Environmental Change? 
Together, in this chapter, the Guelph and Paris aggregate community conflicts serve as a 
backdrop to understand the presence of eco-resiliency features in a legally constituted 
governance function. This idea of a governance mode emerged from the Walkerton Inquiry 
Commission’s Reports, is now embedded in Clean Water Act (CWA) and its supporting 
regulations.299 Governance, as a function of decision-making, is focused on what the participants 
are charged to do – in this dissertation, make decisions regarding water resources. In this case 
study of a SPC and its role in drafting the water-source protection plan (SPP), decisions are made 
concerning “drinking water threats”300 within the watershed.301 To gain insight into the decision-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Ibid. Report 12-12-01: In the memo. it is further explained: “A transport pathway is a condition of land resulting 
from human activity that increases the vulnerability of a raw water supply of drinking water system. Pits and 
quarries are considered transport pathways, and vulnerability assessment can be adjusted (i.e., increased) for areas 
where transport pathways exist.  
298 Ibid. Report 12-02-01: According to the Report and the status of the water quality studies, it was noted that the 
subwatershed wide based Tier 2 Water Quality Studies that were completed across the Lake Erie Region showed 
low potential for water quantity stress in the area around Paris in Brant County. As a result, no detailed (Tier 3) 
water quantity study was recommended for the drinking water supply system in Paris under the Source Protection 
Program.  
299 Supra note 2. O.Reg. 288/07 (Source Protection Committees), O. Reg. 287/07(General) and O. Reg. 284/07 
(Source Protection Areas and Regions). 
300 CWA, Supra note 7, s. 2(1) “drinking water threat” means an activity or condition that adversely affects or has the 
potential to adversely affect the quality or quantity of any water that is or may be used as a source of drinking water, 
and includes an activity or condition that is prescribed by the regulations as a drinking water threat. 
301 O’Connor, Report Two Supra note 59. Ch 4. at 94. A watershed is defined as: “A watershed consists of all of the 
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making of these water committees, first, Justice O’Connor’s vision of a local planning process, 
as practiced within the SPC, including the legislative architecture as set out in the CWA, are 
described in this chapter. The chapter commences with a brief description of the historical 
account of the Walkerton incident to honour the seven lives lost. Then, the analysis of the eco-
resiliency features of the legal framework regime is presented, which is followed by the 
governance practice, as observed, at the SPC.  
4.0  Historical Context: A Water Governance Crisis — Walkerton, Ontario. 
4.1  Introduction 
While the genesis of Ontario’s legal water governance regime is well documented in the 
Walkerton Reports, media accounts and the academic literature, the events prior to the enactment 
of the CWA point to socio-economic changes that culminated in a water governance crisis. 
Indeed, the provincial government’s push toward privatization, the government’s downsizing 
program, the devolution of powers to municipal levels, the cost cutting efforts including the lack 
of training of municipal water personnel are known factors that contributed to the now infamous 
drinking water tragedy in Walkerton, Ontario.302  In reaction to the Walkerton incident, the 
provincial government authorized a public inquiry led by the Honourable Dennis O’Connor. In 
response to recommendations set out in the Walkerton Inquiry Commission Reports, legislation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
lands that drain into a particular body of water. …Watersheds may be nested: for example, the Grand River 
watershed is within the Lake Erie watershed. In fact, nearly every watershed is contained within some other 
watershed. …Watersheds are an ecologically practical unit for managing water. This is the level at which impacts to 
water resources are integrated, and individual impacts that might not be significant in and of themselves combine to 
create cumulative stresses that may become evident on a watershed level… Managing water on a watershed basis 
requires decision makers to recognize the impacts that upstream activities have on downstream water sources and 
helps ensure that decision makers take all impacts into account.” Also see: CWA, 2006, O.Reg 284/07 Source 
Protection Areas and Regions. This regulation sets out the source protection areas aligned to a conservation 
authority. There are 36 source protection areas that have been established under s. 4 of the CWA, 2006.  
302 O’Connor, Walkerton Report One, Supra note 7. Specifically, for a discussion of the impact of privatization refer 
to Report One: Specifically, for a discussion of the impact of privatization refer to Chapter 10: Failure to Enact a 
Notification Regulation – 10.4 The Move to Privatization in 1995–96 beginning at 374 and Ch. 13: Budget 
Reductions at 31-35.      
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was enacted, namely, the Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002303 and the Clean Water Act, 2006 
(CWA). The CWA is the primary legislative framework for water source protection planning in 
Ontario.  
 Collectively, the Walkerton incident, the Walkerton Reports, the expert panels 304 
including the legislative debates,305 the enactment of the CWA and the Provincial government’s 
administrative organizational structure each influenced the normative framework of Ontario’s 
water-source planning process. Yet, each distinct activity did so in different ways. The 
Walkerton tragedy narrowed the policy lens towards the safety of drinking water not the 
ecological health of the watershed. 306  Justice O’Connor envisioned a regulatory pluralism 
approach whereby a plurality of state and non-state actors govern the safety of drinking water.307 
As enacted, and interpreted by the Ministry of Environment (MOE), the CWA offers “local 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 S.O. 2002, c. 32. 
304 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard) 38th parliament, SP-25 second session, 
online: Ontario Legislature <www.ontla.on.ca>. Soon after Justice O’Connor’s Walkerton Reports were received by 
the Provincial government, the Environment Minister (then, Leona Dombrowsky) announced the creation of two 
formal committees: a technical committee and an implementation committee. These two committees would build 
upon the earlier work of the Advisory Committee on Watershed-based Source Protection Planning that commenced 
their committee work in April 2003. The inter-ministerial technical committee brought together senior officials from 
the conservation authority and environment ministry as co-chairs. This technical committee was charged with 
drafting the framework for threat-based risk management approach to water source protection. In contrast, the 
heterogeneous implementation committee (comprising of municipal, conservation authority, First Nation, 
agricultural, environmental and health interest group representatives) were charged the task of setting out an 
implementation plan to create the institutional architecture and identify the parties, roles and responsibilities to draft 
the water source protection plans, which would also include funding and incentive mechanisms. Together, the ideas, 
normative framework and recommendations set out by three committees informed the basis for water source 
protection and together these issues were further debated by the government’s Standing committee on social policy 
that was conferred the task of examining “Bill 43, An Act to protect existing and future water sources.” Advisory 
Committee, “Final Report: Protecting Ontario’s Drinking Water: Toward a Watershed-Based Source Protection 
Planning Framework”, April 2003, online: MOE 
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/stdprodconsume/groups/lr/@ene/@resources/documents/resource/std01_079703.pdf>. 
Technical Committee For an example of their work, online: 
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/SWP_Resources/swp_background_technical.pdf>.<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/stdprodc
onsume/groups/lr/@ene/@resources/documents/resource/std01_079703.pdf>. 
Technical Committee For an example of their work, online: 
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/SWP_Resources/swp_background_technical.pdf>. 
305 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard) 38th parliament, SP-25 second session, 
online: <www.ontla.on.ca>. 
306 O’Connor, Walkerton Report One, Supra note 7. See footnote 280 for a discussion of the mandate of the Inquiry.  
307 O’Connor, Walkerton Report Two. Supra note 59. The participatory and pluralistic aspects are outlined in Report 
Two. Ch 4: Participation of Affected Groups and the Public, at 103-109.  
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communities” a means through which to examine local drinking water threats308 and to take 
preventive action through a source water protection planning process.309 The idea of drinking 
water threats was first raised by Justice O’Connor, 310  then elaborated upon by the expert 
panels, 311  then, re-shaped, and prescribed in the legislation, 312  and then enunciated in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 CWA, Supra note 2 – s. 2(1). Under ss. 22(2) 1. to 5., the contents of the SPP must incorporate policies that relate 
to “significant drinking water threats”, “drinking water threats” and a “drinking water issue.”  
309 Ministry of Environment “The Clean Water Act – Fact Sheet” PIBS 5971e02 (Toronto, Queens Park: November 
2008), online: MOE 
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/stdprodconsume/groups/lr/@ene/@resources/documents/resource/stdprod_081235.pdf>. 
310 O’Connor, Walkerton Report Two, Supra note 59. Report Two – Chapter Four: The Protection of Drinking 
Water Sources at Section 4.4 at pages 121 to 145. Justice O’Connor identifies the following activities as potential 
threats that may affect of the safety of drinking water: 1. Human waste and municipal sewage treatment plants, 2. 
Septic systems 3. In rural agricultural areas, the practice of using biosolids (treated solid waste) and septage 
(untreated waste from septic systems) as fertilizer. 4. Additional agricultural activities, such as: manure 
management, chemical fertilizer use, stormwater run-off, pesticide use and fuel management. 5. And, other activities 
and industries that pose a threat to the safety of drinking water include: the spreading of road salt, forestry, mining, 
urban development; and industrial plants.  
311 Expert Panels, Supra, note 304.  
312 CWA, Supra note 2. And, O.Reg. 287/07 General. The 21 prescribed drinking water threats are set out in s.1.1(1) 
of the regulations and includes the following threat activities: Section 1.1(1) states: Prescribed drinking water threats 
1.1 (1) The following activities are prescribed as drinking water threats for the purpose of the definition of “drinking 
water threat” in subsection 2 (1) of the Act: 
1. The establishment, operation or maintenance of a waste disposal site within the meaning of Part V of the 
Environmental Protection Act. 
2. The establishment, operation or maintenance of a system that collects, stores, transmits, treats or 
disposes of sewage. 
3. The application of agricultural source material to land. 
4. The storage of agricultural source material. 
5. The management of agricultural source material. 
6. The application of non-agricultural source material to land. 
7. The handling and storage of non-agricultural source material. 
8. The application of commercial fertilizer to land. 
9. The handling and storage of commercial fertilizer. 
10. The application of pesticide to land. 
11. The handling and storage of pesticide. 
12. The application of road salt. 
13. The handling and storage of road salt. 
14. The storage of snow. 
15. The handling and storage of fuel. 
16. The handling and storage of a dense non-aqueous phase liquid. 
17. The handling and storage of an organic solvent. 
18. The management of runoff that contains chemicals used in the de-icing of aircraft. 
19. An activity that takes water from an aquifer or a surface water body without returning the water taken 
to the same aquifer or surface water body. 
20. An activity that reduces the recharge of an aquifer. 
21. The use of land as livestock grazing or pasturing land, an outdoor confinement area or a farm-animal 
yard. 
O. Reg.385/08, s. 3. 
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Ministry of Environment directives.313  Thus, this regulatory change is undeniably in part a 
reaction to the Walkerton drinking water incident and to Justice O’Connor’s recommendations as 
set out in the Walkerton Reports. Importantly, this regulatory reorientation toward a risk-oriented 
governance mode points to an ideological turn in the provincial government’s environmental 
regulatory strategy away from a command-and-control regulatory approach, and towards a soft 
law approach based on Ministry policy directives.   
 The CWA, 2006 legislative architecture is also perhaps influenced by the design of 
governance regimes found in other jurisdictions, as Justice O’Connor acknowledged the 
legislative practices in comparative jurisdictions. 314 Reinforcing O’Connor comparative analysis 
of governance practices is the recognition and acceptance of the governance mode in the 
scholarship. The literature, as discussed earlier in Chapter One confirms the spread of the 
paradigm shift to a governance mode across the industrialized world.  
 However, little empirical evidence exists to support this regulatory turn. To provide 
insight into the legal foundation of water source protection in Ontario, presented next is a brief 
historical account of the Walkerton crisis, the Walkerton Inquiry Reports. Presented in the final 
section of the chapter is a discussion of the relevant sections of the CWA that exhibit features of 
eco-resiliency in order to understand the water committee’s responsiveness to ecological change.   
4.2  The Walkerton Governance Crisis – The Holiday Weekend – May 24th, 2000 
The Walkerton Inquiry Commission Reports tell the story of complacency in governance. Prior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Numerous documents have been published with respect to specific drinking water threats. For example, Ministry 
of Environment, Drinking Water Threats, Clean Water Act, 2006 – PIBS-751eO2. (Toronto: Queen’s Park, 
November 2009), online: MOE 
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/stdprodconsume/groups/lr/@ene/@resources/documents/resource/std01_079851.pdf>; 
And, Technical Bulletin: Threats Assessments and Issues, March 2010, online: MOE 
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/stdprodconsume/groups/lr/@ene/@resources/documents/resource/std01_079532.pdf>. 
314 O’Connor, Walkerton Report Two, Supra note 59. For example, Justice O’Connor in Report Two – Ch 4 at page 
101 provides a brief reference to the review of practices in other jurisdictions (Australia & the EU).  
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to the spring of 2000, when residents of Ontario turned on their drinking water taps to fill a glass 
with water, they generally did not think about the quality of their drinking water. A glass of 
water would automatically be gulped down without any thought as to whether the water from 
their drinking water tap was contaminated. Sadly, the residents of Walkerton paid the ultimate 
price for not questioning the quality of their drinking water. After drinking tap water 
contaminated with the deadly bacteria, Escherichia coli O157:H7 (E Coli), seven residents died, 
and an additional 2,300 members of the community members became seriously ill. This was in a 
town with a population of less than 5000.315  
 It was the Victoria Day holiday weekend, in May of 2000, when the drinking water 
tragedy struck the close-knit, tranquil farming community of Walkerton, Ontario. After a cold 
winter and a wet spring, the Victoria Day holiday weekend had finally arrived and was 
welcomed. Even though the summer solstice was still a month away, the “May Two Four” long 
weekend, as it is colloquially known, was considered by the locals to be the unofficial 
celebration of the coming of summer. 316 In anticipation of that holiday weekend, local residents 
were preparing to participate in their typically long weekend activities: Opening summer 
cottages, sharing time with friends and families, taking part in picnics, and attending local town 
events, like fireworks celebrations, and taking the kids to a soccer game. For most residents, all 
these activities were being carried out without a thought to the quality and trustworthiness of 
their drinking water. Many of the town’s residents contentedly prepared refreshments for the 
weekend activities, including filling their water bottles for the local sporting events.  
 The Adams’ family, for instance, was unaware of the contamination of the town’s 
drinking water system that long weekend. None of the family members had heard the boil water 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 O’Connor, Walkerton Report One, Supra note 7. Summary of the Report at 2. 
316 In 2000, the statutory Victoria Day holiday, which is officially recognized as Monday, occurred on Monday, May 
22nd.  
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advisory alert that had been announced on the local radio stations that Saturday or Sunday 
morning. Diana Adams was too busy preparing for the arrival of family members from Toronto, 
including her 79-year old mother. During her son’s soccer practice, Diana’s husband, the team’s 
coach, had encouraged all the kids to drink lots of water because the weather was hot. At the 
soccer practice, their son obediently consumed two big bottles of the town’s water. By month’s 
end, all three of the Adamses’ children had contracted E Coli.317 
 The first warning for public officials that something was terribly wrong in the town of 
Walkerton was the increase in incidents of illness as exhibited by the sudden rise in telephone 
calls to public authorities, hospital emergency visits, and fatalities of vulnerable residents – that 
is, the young and the elderly. By Wednesday, May 24th, four people had died including a 66-
year-old woman, who died on May 22nd and a two-year-old child, who died on May 23rd.318 
These warning signs of a serious problem with the town’s drinking water system were discussed 
in Justice O’Connor’s Walkerton Commission Inquiry Reports, where he recounted the socio-
economic and health impacts.319 
 Tragically, on this supposedly idyllic May long weekend, the community of Walkerton 
experienced a drinking water crisis. As expected, the crisis resulted in the establishment of an 
expert-based public inquiry – Justice Dennis O’Connor’s Walkerton Inquiry. This moment in 
time eventually triggered sweeping regulatory changes, not only in Ontario, but also served as an 
impetus of change in the governance of water across Canada.320 This historical perspective and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317 O’Connor, Walkerton Report One, Supra. note 7. Ch 3 at 81. 
318 Ibid at 98. 
319 Ibid at 102. 
320 Almost a year later, in the spring of 2001, the City of North Battleford, Saskatchewan, experienced a drinking 
water contamination incident that was attributed to an outbreak of cryptosporidiosis. In reaction to this drinking 
water crisis, the province of Saskatchewan ordered a public inquiry (via an Order-in-Council dated May 10, 2001) 
into the safety of the public drinking water system. The Inquiry primarily examined the issues of operations and 
human resources (operator competency and training). Together, the Walkerton and North Battleford drinking water 
incidents identified a need for regulatory change.  
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summary demonstrates how the water sector in Ontario became highly politicized. In reaction 
and in a crisis mode, the Walkerton incident prompted the Provincial government to commence a 
Public Inquiry and to then, introduce a legislative change – Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002321 and 
the Clean Water Act, 2006 (CWA), without much debate. Presented next is an explanation of the 
legal framework of the CWA, which is organized to examine and evaluate the regime on the 
basis of features of eco-resiliency: flexibility, diversity, a broad perspective, and the ability to 
accommodate emergent change. 
5.0  Applying The Eco-Resiliency Framework To The Legal Framework 
5.1  Introduction 
Legal governance includes the statutory regime, policies, norms, and actors who interact, 
interpret, and carry out a decision-making activity. The governance regime set out in the Clean 
Water Act, 2006 (CWA) wherein the single legislative purpose of “to protect existing and future 
sources of drinking water” is complicated by the MOE’s technocratic planning process and an 
array of decision-makers charged with governing the watershed. 322  Presented next, is an 
explanation of how the four features of eco-resiliency (diversity, flexibility, a broad perspective 
and an ability to accommodate emergent change) are provided for in the legislative regime. 
5.2  Diversity 
Diversity under the eco-resiliency framework exists when the composition of the committee is 
inclusive of a range of participants and the decision-making process is shared and includes a 
diverse range of interests that facilitates forms of learning. The water laws, the CWA, 2006 and 
the regulations set out the water-source protection committee. Specifically, O. Reg. 288/07 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Supra. note 303.  
322 CWA, Supra note 2.  
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explicitly provides for the participation of municipal, industrial, agricultural, environmental, 
health, general public representatives and First Nation representatives.323 Together with the chair, 
the Lake Erie SPC is comprised of 25 seats, with seven of whom are municipal representatives, 
seven have business interests, seven are “general public” representatives and three are First 
Nation representatives. In essence, a shared governance model exists through which Provincial 
conservation and environmental authorities share decision-making within non-state actors in a 
localized watershed committee called: “Source Protection Committees” (SPC).324 
 The Source Protection Authority325 (SPA – that is, Conservation Authority) selects the 
committee members.326 The municipalities are included on the committee because of their role as 
urban water service providers. The agriculture and aggregate industries were selected as key 
business sectors because of their dominant land use position within the Lake Erie Region. The 
SPA’s selection of the general public representatives is guided by a background document that 
directs “individuals rather associations” should be chosen.327 While participation is diverse, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
323 Ibid.  O. Reg. 288/07. The appointment of members is set out in the following sections: s. 2 and s. 6(2).  
324 CWA, Ibid, s. 7(1)(2). Also see: Supra. note 309 MOE Fact Sheet at p 2 states: “Source Protection Committee: 
There will be strong municipal representation on the committee, as well as a range of stakeholders within the 
watershed. Municipalities across the watershed will work together through the source water protection committee, 
identifying, assessing, and addressing risks to drinking water within their municipal wellhead and intake protection 
areas.” Printed Copy only.  
325 CWA, Ibid. s.2(1). The Source Protection Authority “source protection authority” means a conservation authority 
or other person or body that, under subsection 4 (2) or section 5, is required to exercise and perform the powers and 
duties of a drinking water source protection authority under this Act.  
326 CWA, Ibid. s. 7(2)(3) The composition and membership of the SPC is to be prescribed by in the regulations. 
Refer to: O/Reg 288/07. s. 2 and s. 3 and s. 6. Also refer to Background Reports: Lake Erie Region Source 
Protection Committee Final Composition and Rationale online: LESPR 
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/index/document.cfm?Sec=5&Sub1=0&sub2=0>. O.Reg. 288/07 ss. 1(3) sets out 22 
members and ss. 2 and 6 expands the number to 25. The Lake Erie Source Protection Region must have a Source 
Protection Committee of 22 members comprised of: 1 non-voting Chair; 7 municipal representatives; 7 sector 
representatives (including business, industry and agriculture); and 7 others’ representing interests other than 
municipal and sector interests (the public   interest). In addition to the Chair and the 21 municipal, economic sector, 
and other members referred to above, 3 seats must be offered to, and held for the two First Nations communities in 
the Lake Erie Region, the Six Nations of the Grand River and Mississaugas of the New Credit First Nation. There 
are also 3 non-voting liaison seats for representatives of the Source Protection Region, the Province of Ontario, and 
Public Health. 
327 CWA, Ibid. O. Reg. 288/07 s. 4(10)(b) – “interests of the general public.” Also see: Background Reports: Lake 
Erie Region Source Protection Committee Final Composition and Rationale, online: LESPR 
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administrative selection process is controlled by the SPA and results in of a select range of 
participants. While a diversity of participants can participate on the SPC, the selection process is 
tightly controlled by the province raising questions of public access and on what interests of the 
public are being raised in a meeting.  
 Administratively, each water-source protection committee328 in the Province is charged 
with overseeing a diverse array of tasks that result in the production of three documents: i) a 
terms of reference; 329  ii) a “science-based” 330  risk assessment report; 331  and iii) a source 
protection plan (SPP).332 Each of these documents is considered an essential component of the 
planning process. The final product of the planning process is the SPP. Under the CWA, the 
content of the SPP is informed by the risk assessment report, the terms of reference document, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/index/document.cfm?Sec=5&Sub1=0&sub2=0>. The Rationale document states: 
“Municipal Representatives: The Source Protection Authority consulted with municipalities in the Lake Erie Source 
Protection Region on the distribution of the 7 municipal representatives on the Source Protection Committee. Sector 
Representatives: Of the 7 seats for sectors, 3 have been allocated to industry and business; 3 to the agricultural 
community, and 1 to the aggregate industry. The majority of municipal supplies in the Lake Erie Region are located 
in urban areas. As such, the Clean Water Act may significantly impact a large number of businesses and industries, 
particularly in the cities. Of the three business and industry seats, at least one member on the Committee will be 
representative of commercial interests, and one of small business, while also taking into account geographic 
distribution within the Lake Erie Region. Additionally, it is recognized that agriculture is a dominant geographic and 
economic land use activity in all four watersheds, and plays a strong role in the protection of the quality and quantity 
of water sources. Geography and the diversity in agricultural operations will also be considered in the selection of 
representatives. The Lake Erie Region is a key source of aggregate resources in Ontario, and the aggregate industry 
is very active in all four watersheds. As such, one seat on the Source Protection Committee has been allocated to the 
aggregate industry. Other Representatives (of the Public Interest): Six seats in the “Other” category will be 
appointed as representatives of the public interest, that is, as individuals rather than associations. …Geography and, 
in particular, diversity of public interests in drinking water source protection will be considered in the selection of 
representatives of the public interest. Additionally, one seat will be allocated to the Elgin Area Primary Water 
Supply System Joint Board of Management, as it operates a major supply of drinking water serving a significant 
portion of the Southwestern Lake Erie Region. Being neither a municipality nor an economic interest, the Joint 
Board of Management will be represented in the “Other” category.” 
328 CWA, Ibid. O.Reg 284/07 The total number of source protection areas in Ontario is 36. O. Reg. 288/07 sets out 
the membership numbers for the 19 water source protection region/committees.  
329 CWA, Ibid. s. 8(1). For the content of terms of reference, see General O.Reg 287/07. And, O.Reg 288/07 
Preparation, Approval, and Amendment of Terms of Reference – s. 2 to s. 10. 
330 Environmental Registry, Ministry of Environment, “Source Protection Plans Under the Clean Water Act, 2006: A 
Discussion Paper on Requirements for the Content and Preparation of Source Protection Plans” (June 2009) at 5, 
EBR Registry #010-6726., online: EBR 
<http://www.downloads.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/env_reg/er/documents/2009/010%2D6726.pdf>. 
331 CWA, Supra note 2. s. 15(1). Also see O.Reg 287/07. Preparation, Approval and Updating of Assessment Reports 
– s. 11 to s. 18.  
332 CWA, Ibid. s. 22(1). Also see General, O. Reg 287/07. Preparation, Approval and Amendment of Source 
Protection Plans – s. 19 to s. 39.  
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policy directives and consultation with the committee members. The legislation, thus, promotes a 
diversity of interrelated tasks and outcomes.  
 The administration of the planning process is a coordinated and shared activity between 
the MOE, the CA and the committee members based on a partnership. The CWA places an 
obligatory duty upon the SPA (i.e., CA) to provide the committee with scientific, technical and 
administrative support.333 The CA co-ordinates and facilitates the activities of each committee 
and manages the development of the final plans (SPP).334 The MOE sets the strategic policy 
framework for the planning process, provides legislatively required policy directives,335 makes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 CWA, Ibid. s. 7(5)(b) 
334 CWA, Ibid. s. 2(1) Definitions – “source protection authority” means a conservation authority or other person or 
body, that under subsection 4(2) or section 5, is required to exercise and perform the powers and duties of a drinking 
water source protection authority under this Act. And, s. 4(2) The conservation authority shall exercise and perform 
the powers and duties of a drinking water source protection authority under this Act for the source protection area 
established under subsection (1).  
335 CWA, Ibid. Under s. 22(2), the content of a SPP must also include a number of mandatory policies that achieve 
particular objectives. Specifically, the legislative requirement for these mandatory policies is as follows:  
Section 22. (2) A source protection plan shall, in accordance with the regulations, set out the 
following: 
2. Policies intended to achieve the following objectives for every area identified in the assessment 
report as an area where an activity is or would be a significant drinking water threat: 
i. Ensuring that the activity never becomes a significant drinking water threat. 
ii. Ensuring that, if the activity is being engaged in, the activity ceases to be a significant 
drinking water threat. 
3. Policies intended to assist in achieving every target established under section 85 for the source 
protection area, if the Minister has directed under subsection 85 (6) that a report be prepared that 
recommends policies that should be set out in the source protection plan to assist in achieving the 
target. 
4. Policies governing, 
i. the monitoring, in every area that is identified in the assessment report as an area where 
an activity is or would be a significant drinking water threat, of the activity, and 
ii. the monitoring, in every area that is identified in the assessment report as an area 
where a condition is a significant drinking water threat, of the condition. 
5. Policies governing, 
i. the monitoring of an activity in an area, if the area is identified in the assessment report 
as a vulnerable area, the activity is listed in the assessment report as an activity that is or 
would be a drinking water threat, subparagraph 4 i does not apply and the monitoring of 
the activity is advisable to assist in preventing the activity from becoming a significant 
drinking water threat, and 
ii. the monitoring of a condition in an area, if the area is identified in the assessment 
report as a vulnerable area, the condition is listed in the assessment report as a condition 
that is a drinking water threat, subparagraph 4 ii does not apply and the monitoring of the 
condition is advisable to assist in preventing the condition from becoming a significant 
drinking water threat. 
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available a liaison representative at the committee meetings 336 and the Minister approves the 
final water plan.337 The individual SPC members offer information on local watershed conditions 
to the overall committee with a particular focus on how the prescribed drinking water threats 
affect their interests.338 Effectively, this partnership creates a diversity of tasks and may build a 
capacity to co-ordinate activities. In addition, through the exchange of information a diverse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6. Policies governing monitoring to assist in implementing and in determining the effectiveness of 
every policy set out in the source protection plan under paragraph 3. 
7. Policies governing the monitoring of a drinking water issue identified in the assessment report, 
if the monitoring of the drinking water issue is advisable. 
Also, significant, moderate and low and strategic action policies are discussed O.Reg 
287/07. In particular, refer to:  
s.31. Significant threat policies. A source protection plan shall identify the area to which 
a significant threat policy applies. O. Reg. 246/10, s. 12. 
s. 32 Moderate or low drinking water threat policies (1) Any policy set out in a source 
protection plan that addresses moderate drinking water threats shall be identified in the 
plan as a moderate drinking water threat policy and shall identify the area to which the 
policy applies. O. Reg. 246/10, s. 12. 
(2) Any policy set out in a source protection plan that addresses low drinking water threats shall be 
identified in the plan as a low drinking water threat policy and shall identify the area to which the 
policy applies. O. Reg. 246/10, s. 12. 
(3) If a policy set out in a source protection plan addresses an activity that is a moderate or low 
drinking water threat, the policy shall not prohibit or have the effect of preventing a person from 
engaging in the activity. O. Reg. 246/10, s. 12. 
s. 33 Strategic action policies Any policy set out in a source protection plan that is not one of the 
following policies shall be identified in the plan as a strategic action policy: 
1. A significant threat policy. 
2. A designated Great Lakes policy. 
3. A policy to which section 45 of the Act applies. 
4. A policy to which clause 39(1) (b) of the Act applies. 
5. A policy to which clause 39(7) (b) of the Act applies. O. Reg. 246/10, s. 12. [Emphasis 
Added]. 
336 CWA, Ibid. O.Reg 288/07. s.19.2. MOE Representative s. 19(2) see: Liaison – s. 19 The following persons may 
attend and participate in discussions at meetings of a source protection committee, including any meeting or part of a 
meeting that is closed to the public: 1. A person designated by the source protection authority as a representative of 
the [SPA] authority.; 2. A person designated by the Minister as a representative of the Ministry.; 3. A person 
designated by the Minister as a representative of the medical officers of health for the health units in which any part 
of the source protection area or source protection region is located. [Emphasis Added]. 
337CWA, Ibid., s. 29(1)(a)(b). The Minister of the Environment may approve the SPP or request amendments or 
resubmission of the plan prior to final approval of the SPP is granted. 
338 The selection process for participants combined with the focus on drinking water threats and land use activities 
suggests that the role of the participants is to provide local knowledge of water use, impacts and activities. For 
example, refer to O. Reg. 288/07, Supra note 174. Under s.4.(9)(a), the appointment of persons who “are engaged in 
agricultural, commercial or industrial activities that have or will have an impact on existing or future drinking 
sources of drinking water or that are significantly dependent on existing or future sources of drinking water; and” 
are selected.  
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networked knowledge base may develop. Soft skills such as fostering trust and social capital may 
arise to ensure the completion of the administrative tasks.  
 In sum, diversity is constructed under the CWA through the diverse composition of the 
source protection committee (SPC); thus, establishing a heterogeneous decision-making body 
that is inclusive of state and non-state actors and is based upon a partnership orientation. The 
diversity of tasks and functions assigned to a range of institutional actors fosters the potential for 
a diverse range of issues to be brought forward in the SPC setting. Given a committee member is 
handpicked by the SPA (i.e., CA), one might wonder if a selection bias exists concerning the 
membership. In a local watershed planning exercise with a focus on identifying municipal and 
dominant business interests and the identity of First Nation communities within the Lake Erie 
region is well-known, the SPA’s selection process leaves open the question: Who is the general 
public? What issues does the general public representative bring forth?  
5.3  Flexibility 
5.3.1 What is the decision-making rule: Consensus, Voting or Consultation? 
A legal regulatory framework is flexible when a collaborative decision-making process relies 
upon the principle of consensus and is inclusive of a range of regulatory tools.339 However, the 
legislative and policy direction on the decision-making principle to be employed in the SPC’s 
collaborative setting is unclear and inconsistent.340  
 The CWA’s regulations direct the committee to rely upon consensus.341 This regulatory 
push to adopt the decision-making principle of consensus is also supported by the committee’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 Supra. note 2. For example, the CWA, 2006 provides for incentive programs, education and outreach programs 
under s. 22(7) and prohibition of activities under s. 22(8); O. Reg. 287/07 outlines a range of regulatory tools: 
s.27(2) stewardship programs, best management practices, pilot programs, govern research.  
340 An Internet search, directed at the Provincial conservation and environmental authorities including the 
Environmental Registry website, did not uncover a Provincial policy document or bulletin. Rather, the form and 
content of decision-making appears to reside at the local SPC level, with Provincial approval. See CWA. O. Reg. 
288/07, ss. 14 and 15. 
341 O.Reg. 288/07. s.14(1)2. The committee shall attempt to make decisions by consensus among the members.  
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rules of procedure. While the procedural rules promote consensus, the principle is moderated by 
a voting mechanism.342 Moreover, the Ministry of the Environment views the planning process 
as a collaborative undertaking but leaves open the decision-making principle to be relied upon — 
consensus or not.343 In end, the SPC’s decision-making process is informed by the principles of 
consensus and voting through procedural rules that privilege the voting mechanism.  
 Contrary to consensus, consultation is presented as the key decision-making principle. 
Justice O’Connor, in the Walkerton Commission Inquiry Reports, stressed how the “consultation 
should err on the side of inclusion.” 344 These Reports are viewed by the MOE as a seminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
342 Lake Erie Source Protection Committee Rules of Procedure, Code of Conduct and Conflict of Interest Policy – 
Amended – January 10, 2011, Background Reports, The Source Protection Committee, online: LESPR Rules of 
Debate – Speakers: <http://www.sourcewater.ca/index/document.cfm?Sec=5&Sub1=0&sub2=0>. Every member 
wishing to speak to a question or motion shall, upon recognition by the Chair, address the Chair. And, Decision-
making: The Committee shall attempt to make decisions by consensus among the Members. If the Chair determines 
that reasonable efforts have been made to achieve consensus but the committee has been unable to make a decision 
by consensus, the decision may be made by a vote of two-thirds of the Members present, excluding the Chair. And, 
see: Procedure at Meetings – Rule of Procedure: In all matters of procedure not specifically dealt with herein, the 
current edition of Bourinot’s Rules of Order shall be binding. [Underlining Added]. Meeting Procedures – R. 29. 
Committee meetings shall conform to the following procedure insofar as the procedures are applicable to the 
meeting:  
29.1. Call to order by Chair  
29.2. Certification by Recording Secretary (or designate) that there   is a quorum of members present  
29.3. Chair’s Remarks  
29.4. Review of Agenda  
29.5. Declaration of Pecuniary Interest  
29.6. Adoption of Minutes of previous meeting  
 9.7. Hearing of delegations  
29.8. Presentations  
29.9. Correspondence  
29.10. Presentation of reports  
29.11. Other business  
29.11.1. Question and Answer Period  
29.12. Closed Meeting   
29.13. Adjournment 
343 Ontario Ministry of Environment, Source Protection Plans Description, Source Water Protection, online: MOE 
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/environment/en/subject/protection/STDPROD_080598.html>. The description of the 
plans states: “Collaborative, locally-driven, watershed-based drinking water source protection plans founded on 
sound science will enable Ontario communities to effectively protect their drinking water sources.”  
344 O’Connor, Walkerton Report Two, Supra note 59. Report Two – Ch 4. 4.3.6. Participation of Affected Groups 
and the Public at 109. He stated: “Although the form of consultation may vary to accommodate local circumstances, 
the need for it is clear. As a general rule, consultation should err on the side of inclusion, both regarding which 
parties are consulted and regarding the level of involvement in the process. Consultation should never be pro forma; 
it should be meaningful and substantial. Interested parties must be given adequate time and information to ensure 
that their views are fully canvassed and considered.”; also see the MOE Bulletin on Pre-Consultation with 
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reference inferring that inclusive consultation is decision-making principle to be upheld by the 
legislation. Throughout the Act, the language of consultation is used. 345  The legislative 
perspective of consultation takes into account a notice, comment, and publication process that is 
grounded in administrative law.346 Furthermore, two key provincial documents also discuss the 
importance of consultation. The first is a provincial Ministry of the Environment discussion 
paper (2009) on the preparation of a source protection plan; 347  the second document is a 
regulatory decision notice.348  Read together, these documents position the SPC deliberative 
process with the principle of consultation suggesting the committee members are acting in an 
information and advisory capacity in servitude to the province.    
 In short, the legal framing of the source protection committee’s (SPC) decision-making 
criteria is ambiguous. The regulatory framework privileges consensus; yet, the language of 
consultation is embedded in the legislation and policy documents. At the local governance level, 
the SPC procedural rules promote both consensus and a voting mechanism. Given the inclusion 
of a MOE liaison representative at the committee, it is also reasonable to expect that the 
Ministry’s position that the water planning process should be a collaborative endeavour might be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Stakeholders – MOE, “Source Protection Planning Bulletin – Overview of Requirements for Pre-Consultation with 
Stakeholders” (March 25, 2011);  online: MOE 
<http://www.sourcewaterprotection.on.ca/downloads/notices_minutes/notices/2011_Apr_8/8a_Pre-
Consultation%20Bulletin%202011%20Mar%2025%20FINAL%20_2_.pdf>.; Also see: EBR #010-8766.  
345 CWA, Supra note 2. For example, consultation with municipalities is required when drafting the terms of 
reference and water source protection plan. See Terms of Reference s.8(2) Consultation In preparing the terms of 
reference, the source protection committee shall consult with all of the municipalities in which any part of the source 
protection area is located. 2006, c. 22, s. 8 (2); Consultation s. (15) In preparing the source protection plan, the 
source protection committee shall consult with all of the municipalities in which any part of the source protection 
area is located. 2006, c. 22, s. 22 (15). Regulations – L.G. in C.s 109. (1) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may 
make regulations, …(ii) governing consultation during the preparation of terms of reference, assessment reports and 
source protection plans,… 
346 C.M. Flood and L. Sossin, Administrative Law in Context (Toronto: Edmond, 2008).  
347 MOE’s SPP Discussion Paper. Supra. note 330.  
348 Ministry of the Environment Environmental Registry, “Regulatory components to support the development and 
implementation of source protection plans under the Clean Water Act, 2006” (August 11, 2010) EBR Registry No: 
010-8766. online: EBR<http://www.ebr.gov.on.ca/ERS-WEB-
External/displaynoticecontent.do?noticeId=MTA4NjQ1&statusId=MTY0NDk2&language=en>. 
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an influencing factor. In the end, it is unclear what decision-making principle will prevail in 
practice at the local SPC level — consultation or consensus, with voting as a backstop.  
 Nevertheless, the committee’s decision-making power is limited by the Minister’s final 
approval of the source protection plan (SPP). Under the CWA, the direct decision-making power 
remains with the State – the Minister of the Environment. 349 For the Lake Erie Source Protection 
Region, all SPPs must be completed by December 31st, 2012. 350 This legislatively imposed 
deadline further suggests the factor of time might hamper the flexibility of the Committee to 
investigate issues of concern that arise late in the planning process.  
5.3.2 Flexibility – A Mix of Regulatory Tools  
The Act does promote flexibility through a mix of regulatory tools. For example, the committee 
can apply to the Director to add a drinking water threat beyond the 21 prescribed drinking water 
threats. 351  The committee can also consider a range of policy tools: prohibition; 352  risk 
management plan; 353  restrict land uses, education, outreach, incentive and stewardship 
programs;354  and, agreements such as Great Lakes agreements,355  the Environmental Bill of 
Rights.356  
 Flexibility is also pushed upon the institutional actors implementing the water plan 
because the legal test requires consideration of related legislation357 (for example, the Planning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349 CWA, Supra note 2.  s. 29(1)(a).  
350 CWA, Ibid. s. 94. Also see Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee Report No. SPC 12-06-01 (June 7, 
2012) online: MOE <http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/SPC_120601.pdf>. As documented in the Report: 
“On May 10, 2012 the Minister of the Environment granted the Lake Erie Region an extension on the submission 
date of all four Source Protection Plans to December 31, 2012. As a result of the extension, Source Protection Plan 
timelines have been revised to accommodate the needs of various municipalities as they continue to develop their 
Source Protection Plan policies.”  
351 Ibid, s. (Technical Regulations.)  
352 Ibid, s. 22(2)(8); s 57.  
353 Ibid, ss. 56 or 58 or 61.  
354 Ibid, ss 22(2)(7) and s. 97(1)(2).  
355 Ibid, ss. 14(1) and s.83.  
356 Ibid, s. 85(8). 
357 Ibid, s. 39(5).  
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Act, the Green Belt Act, 2005, Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001). This legislatively 
constituted duty places an obligation on a municipality to cooperate with the source protection 
authority and the source protection committee.358 Under Part III of the Act entitled: the “Effect of 
[the] Source Protection Plans,” the hierarchy conflict test created ensures the water protection 
plan will prevail over a zoning by-law, official plan or provincial policy statement. 359 
In sum, the CWA constructs a flexible space of engagement where decision-makers come 
together to govern a watershed in an open, fluid and deliberative decision-making process. These 
decision-makers have access to range of legislative instruments. However, the flexibility in the 
committee’s decision-making is countered by the legislative requirement for Ministerial approval 
of the final water plan.  
Furthermore, a conflict exists between the regulatory principle of consensus and 
procedural rule of voting and the legislative language of consultation. The Act is silent with 
respect to whether the decision-making should be premised upon either a collaborative, 
consensus or consultative basis. The regulations emphasize the principle of consensus. The 
Ministry of Environment’s documentation supports collaboration. The committee’s procedural 
rules privilege voting rather than achieving consensus. In the end, the ambiguous nature of the 
decision-making principle to be relied upon by the committee and the difficulty in determining if 
the committee members reached a consensus-based decision hints at a process that produces 
arbitrary decisions. In effect, a limited form of flexiblity exists under the legal regime.  
5.4  Broad Perspective 
A governance regime is broad when it takes into account a multi-jurisdictional framework (e.g., 
local, regional, national or transnational) and is polycentric and includes coordinating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Ibid, s. 86(1). & 105. 
359 Ibid, s. 39(2). 
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mechanisms.  The Lake Erie SPC offers a broad perspective aligned with the existing 
jurisdictional watershed boundaries established for the Provincial conservation authorities 
(CA).360  
 Under the legislation, the broad watershed perspective is countered by the consideration 
of only 21 prescribed drinking water threats within the watershed.361 These threats address a 
range of activities and can be broken down into pathogen and chemical sources. The water 
planning process relies upon a desktop-engineered approach to determining expected risk of 
these prescribed drinking water threats. Risk is assigned to known land uses that may potentially 
produce chemicals or pathogens and could contaminate a municipal drinking water source. In 
short, the prescribed threat list is underpinned by a risk orientation that is classified by known 
land uses and activity. 
The Ministry’s risk-management information process includes the identification of the 
water sources, prescribed threats and the establishment of a vulnerability analysis. Within a 
watershed, the 21 prescribed risks (or in the a case of Lake Erie Lake Source Protection Region 
the 22 threats362) are first identified as being present in the watershed. The threats are assigned a 
hazard rating based upon the movement of water and transport pathways within the vicinity of 
the municipal well-head intake. The threats are mapped onto four vulnerable areas363 of both 
surface and groundwater: i) highly vulnerable aquifers, ii) significant groundwater recharge 
areas, iii) wellhead protection areas (WHPA) and iv) intake protection zones (IPZ).364 These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Ibid, s. 4(1) and s. 108(1)(c) and O. Reg. 284/07 Source Protection Areas and Regions.  
361 Ibid, The 21 threats ---- note aggregate is not on the list.  
362 The SPC received Ministerial approval to add pipelines on July 13, 2011. See: Lake Erie Region Source 
Protection Committee (LERSPC) “LERSPC Discussion Paper – Final Draft (August 2011), online: LESPR< 
http://www.sourcewater.ca/plandevelopment/Oil_Pipelines_DiscussionPaper_Final.pdf>.  
363 CWA, Supra note 2. s. 1 Definition Section: “vulnerable area” means, (a) a significant groundwater recharge area, 
(b) a highly vulnerable aquifer, (c) a surface water intake protection zone, or (d) a wellhead protection area; 
364 Ministry of Environment, The Clean Water Act: Promoting Municipal Awareness and Understanding (Toronto: 
Queens Park Printer, Date not recorded). online: MOE 
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identified vulnerable areas are established municipal intake drinking water sources and are not 
ecologically defined water sources. The vulnerable areas and the land uses are translated into 
significant, moderate and low threats as determined by a desktop calculation and are set out in 
the risk assessment report. Specifically, the characterization of the drinking water threat is 
equated to a risk score calculated by multiplying a hazard rating to the vulnerability score based 
upon the location and potential contaminate pathway (measured by time of travel) of either a 
municipal wellhead or intake protection site.365 In short, within the committee’s jurisdiction of 
the watershed, these threats are mapped out and assigned a hazard rating based upon the 
movement of water and transport pathways within the vicinity of the municipal well-head intake. 
A narrow, technocratic engineering planning approach to risk management informs the 
planning process rather than a precautionary approach. Risk is presented as a calculated formula, 
which is set out as follows: Risk = vulnerability analysis + prescribed threat + water source 
(wellhead - groundwater or intake - surface) + travel time pathway zone (red zone – 100 metre 
from the water source or yellow zone – two year time travel from the water source or blue zone – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/Assessment/Assessment_tables.cfm?printer=true> 
At page 46 of the Report, a plain language groundwater and surface water vulnerability analysis explanation is 
offered: “Groundwater Vulnerability Analysis would identify and map vulnerable areas for each existing and 
planned drinking water system that is required to be considered in the assessment report and that obtains its water 
from a raw water supply that is groundwater. Vulnerability scores would be assigned for each vulnerable area 
according to its susceptibility to becoming contaminated. A level of uncertainty would also be assigned.” “Surface 
Water Vulnerability Analysis would identify and map the surface water intake protection zones (IPZs) around each 
existing and planned drinking water system that is required to be considered in an assessment report and that obtains 
its water from a raw water supply that is surface water. A vulnerability score and level of uncertainty would be 
assigned.” The vulnerable area and the time of travel zones are explained in the table: The areas where the activity is 
taking place i.e., Wellhead Protection Areas (WHPA) or Intake Protection Zones (IPZ) shown in Column 3. 
◦   WHPA-A is a 100-metre circle around the well [Red circle on map] 
◦   WHPA-B is the 2-year Time of Travel Zone [Yellow circle on map] 
◦   WHPA-C is the 5-year Time of Travel Zone (10 years in some communities) [Blue circle on map] 
◦   WHPA-D is the 25-year Time of Travel Zone [The area beyond the blue circle] 
◦   IPZ-1 is a 200 meter semi-circle around a river intake or a 1 kilometer circle around a lake intake 
◦   IPZ-2 is the water and land areas where hazardous materials could reach the intake in a specified time, 
usually two to six hours 
◦   IPZ-3 are areas where activities further away from the intake could have an impact on water quality. 
365 MOE, Technical Bulletin: Threats Assessment and Issues Evaluation, March 2010 at 5. online: MOE 
<http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/stdprodconsume/groups/lr/@ene/@resources/documents/resource/std01_079532.pdf>.  
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five year time travel from the water source). This formula then guides the source protection 
committee’s deliberative process to allow the decision makers to assess the potential risk to 
existing and future sources of drinking water and to identify those drinking water sources in the 
red zone – WHPA-A: 100 meters from the drinking water source.  
The Ministry’s reliance upon a risk management approach was first presented in the 
MOE’s discussion paper supporting the statutory amendments.366 In the discussion paper, the 
Ministry’s risk management direction is presented as falling along “a continuum – moving from 
non-binding and/or informal approaches that are least invasive to approaches that are both formal 
and legally binding.”367 The document’s supporting explanation indicates the Ministry intends to 
“reduce risks and manage threats”368 to drinking water sources by implementing a range of 
policies and a shared model of governance. In the Ministry’s view this course of action, requires 
integration and adaption to other institutional systems, implementation of the plan by 
municipalities and relies upon voluntary participation of the public and negotiated agreements 
between risk management officers and the affected property owners.  
 In sum, the committee’s broad jurisdictional boundary of the Lake Erie Region’s 
watershed contrasts with the consideration of only the 22 drinking water threats with the 
watershed. Compounding this narrow view of the presence of drinking water threats is the 
technocratic engineering planning approach to risk management. Effectively, the SPC’s decision-
making process is limited to a discussion of the prescribed drinking water threats, the Ministry 
discussion papers and the technical language of WHPAs.  
5.5  Emergent Change 
The goverance regime exhibits emergent change if the decision-makers operate in an open 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 Supra. note 330. Policy Proposal: SPP Discussion Paper at 8-9. 
367 Ibid. at 8. 
368 Ibid.  
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information system where the participants are able to be open to uncertainty and surprise that 
may emerge in the diverse decision-making process. While it is expected the SPC members will 
bring forward local knowledge of activities within the watershed and watershed conditions, the 
ability of the source protection committee to respond to ecological change within the watershed 
is limited. Under the legal framework, a managed form of change exists; as any proposed 
amendment to the source protection plan must be submitted to the Minister for approval.  
 The legal framework, however, does provide for the situation where an immediate health 
concern might arise. In this urgent situation, the Ministry must be informed immediately of “an 
imminent drinking water health hazard.”369 In effect, the local source protection committee is 
directed to respond to pressing drinking water threats, such as experienced in the Walkerton 
drinking water incident. The ability of the SPC to respond to a change in the quality and quantity 
of watershed is limited to an emergency or accident situation where human health may be at risk.  
 In short, the legal framework reflects a state-centric information management approach. 
Under the legislation, the ability of the committee to be responsive to emergent change is limited 
to human health and is framed by a risk management approach that is directed at the end product 
— that is, the provision of safe drinking water.  
6.0  The Eco-Resiliency Framework In Practice: The Water Source Protection 
Committees & Localized Watershed Management Planning Process & Aggregate 
Extraction 
6.1  Flexibility – Consensus Building 
In practice, the local source protection committee’s (SPC) decision-making is structured by 
voting. The legislative framework envisions a regulatory space where decision-makers come 
together to govern a watershed in an open, fluid and deliberative decision-making process. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 CWA, Supra. note 2. s. 89(1).  
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However, as I observed, a polite form of conversation is the preferred style of dialogue. This 
manner of exchange is constructed by the Lake Erie Source Protection Committee Rules of 
Procedure.370 According to the rules, the committee members direct all statements to the Chair. 
These rules create a meeting decorum where the members’ statements and submissions from 
citizen groups are presented and received in a similar manner as in an administrative tribunal. 
For example, at the November 1, 2012 SPC meeting, in reaction to the Concerned 
Citizens of Brantford presentation, the committee members deliberated whether their mandate 
included the consideration of a local aggregate license. The aggregate industry respresentative 
directed his strong statements of disagreement directly to the Chair. Specifically, he stated that it 
was “not within the Committee’s jurisdiction to comment on site-specific development 
activities.”371 The Chair calmly listened and then, opened the floor for additional comments to be 
received. Then, the Chair called for a vote on the matter. A committee member demonstrated 
agreement with the industry representative by voting in the affirmative. The committee also 
passed a resolution to accept four questions from the citizens group and to request that CA staff 
respond to the questions at the next meeting in December. In effect, a flexible open dialogue 
encouraged by a collaborative governance literature is diminished by the Procedural Rules that 
require a committee member to direct all questions and responses to the Chair. In the end, the act 
of voting is privileged over building consensus-based decisions. As observed, this adversarial 
type of dialogue may lead to barriers to participation as the process discourages robust debate 
and diminishes dissent.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 LEWSPC, Rules of Procedure, Supra, note 342. 
371 Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee Meeting Minutes Thursday, November 1, 2012, online: LESPR-
SPC<http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/110112_spc_minutes.pdf>. R. Haggart felt that the issues being 
put forward by the CCOB are a County-wide concern and requested that these questions be reviewed and discussed 
at an upcoming SPC meeting. T. Schmidt felt that it is not the mandate of the SPC to comment or make decisions 
regarding site-specific development or operations (i.e., the proposed gravel pit in Paris). W. Wright-Cascaden agreed 
and added that although CCOB is particularly concern about events in Paris, the questions being brought forth to the 
SPC can be answered in a general manner. [Emphasis Added].  
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6.1.1  Flexibility – A Mix of Regulatory Tools 
While the Act promotes flexibility through a mix of regulatory tools, such as Ministerial 
bulletins; the source protection committee decision-makers did not reference these bulletins in 
their discussions. For example, an MOE information bulletin entitled: “Source Protection 
Planning Bulletin – Aggregate Resources Act Instrument (March, 2011)” outlines the 
requirements of the Aggregate Resources Act and Clean Water Act, 2006. 372  Even though this 
bulletin was produced a year earlier than the 2012 SPC meeting, the committee did not consider 
this directive nor did the MOE liaison representative or CA official raise the bulletin.  
 Under the bulletin’s subheading of “Prescribed Drinking Water Threats”, a rationale is 
offered for the exclusion of aggregate extraction from the statutorily imposed drinking water 
threat list. The rationale states: “[s]ince the activity of aggregate extraction at pits and quarries 
itself does not contribute chemicals or pathogens, this activity is not listed as a prescribed 
threat.”373 As explained in the bulletin, a threat is included in the regulation when an “activity” is 
“associated with the release of chemicals or pathogens, or have the ability to impact the quantity 
of water in aquifers or surface water bodies.”374 In short, the bulletin stresses how an activity 
results in the release of chemicals or pathogens and may affect quantity (but not the quality) of 
the water source.  
 The bulletin further restricts the source protection committee’s (SPC) duties and law-
making. The bulletin states: a SPC “cannot write policies that treat the activity or aggregate 
extraction itself as significant (or moderate or low) drinking water threat.” Rather, the drafting of 
a policy falls within the ambit of the regulator: the Source Protection Authority or the MOE. The 
bulletin, however, does point the SPC decision-makers to consider a range of prescribed threats 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 MOE Aggregate Bulletin, Supra. note 289.  
373 Ibid.  
374 Ibid. at 3. 
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that could be connected to the operations of a pit or quarry.375 Specifically, the threat of handling 
and storage of fuel is considered the most common threat associated with an aggregate extraction 
operation.376  
 In observing the committee proceeding, I found it odd that during their deliberations, 
neither the Ministry officials nor MOE liaison representative discussed the 2011 bulletin nor 
informed the citizens’ group of the information bulletin. The Ministry representatives preferred 
to remain silent suggesting the Ministry’s position was decided; thus, no further debate would be 
entertained. However, this lack of discussion by Ministry official raises questions regarding the 
role of the MOE liaison officer and whether the SPA failed to fulfill its legislative constituted 
advice function.  
 A close reading of the MOE bulletin suggests the committee could consider a pit or 
quarry operation under a transport pathway policy and draft a transport pathway policy.377 
“Transport pathways are shortcuts to drinking water sources that increase the vulnerability”378 
the sources and land.  “[A]n aggregate operation may be considered a transport pathway, since it 
can remove protective layers of overburden above an aquifer potentially increasing the 
vulnerability of the water supply.” 379 As described in the bulletin, if one of the 21 prescribed 
drinking water threats is within the locale of a “transport pathway, such as an aggregate 
operation, the risk level (significant, moderate, low) of those [21 prescribed drinking water] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Ibid. “Other threat that could occur at ARA operations are [identified as]: application of road salt; handling and 
storage of road salt; handling and storage of dense non-aqueous phase liquids (DNAPLs); handling and storage of 
organic solvents; consumptive water taking activities; activities that reduce the recharge of an aquifer; application of 
commercial fertilizers to land (may be associated with rehabilitation); application of pesticides to land (may be 
associated with rehabilitation).  
376 Ibid. 
377 Ibid. at 4.  
378 Ibid.   
379 Ibid at 4-5. A transport pathway is described as “shortcuts to drinking water source that increase vulnerability of 
the drinking water supply, and may increase the vulnerability score of the land in and around the transport 
pathway..” 
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threats may have been influenced by the presence of the transport pathway”.380 In response to a 
transport pathway situation, the bulletin directs the committee members to consider the 
implementation of diverse mix of policy tools (for example, education, incentive programs, 
stewardship programs, research) but excludes the consideration of a prohibition policy.381 In 
effect, the information directive carefully distinguishes an aggregate operation from a drinking 
water threat and introduces the transport pathway but limits the ability of the SPC to prohibit the 
extraction operation itself.  
 Essentially, the rationale set out in the bulletin is a form of technocratic doublespeak that 
is contrary to the CWA’s legislative objective (i.e., “to protect existing and future sources of 
drinking water”). It is inconsistent to characterize the activity of extracting aggregate that has 
breached an aquitard as a transport pathway and not a local drinking water threat to an existing 
and future source of drinking water as directed by the CWA’s legislative purpose. In the Guelph 
situation, the activity of aggregate extraction breached the aquitard. The exposed aquitard (by 
way of a breach of the protective layer) may act as a pathway to allow chemicals or pathogens to 
enter the aquifer affecting the quality of the groundwater contained in the aquifer.382 The harm to 
the aquitard is related to the extraction of aggregate, which may harm an existing drinking water 
source. The SPC’s inability to request a prohibition policy is counter to the protective stance of 
the legislation.  
 While the legislation provides a range of policy responses, in the end, the exclusion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Ibid at 5. 
381 CWA, Supra. note 2. For example, the policy tools include: education, outreach, stewardship, best management, 
and pilot programs including research and/or specify particular actions to achieve the objectives set out in the source 
protection plan and the use of instruments set out in the Aggregate Resources Act licence, for example, wayside 
permit, aggregate permit and site permit. 
382 Supra note 257. City of Guelph, Planning & Building and Environment Committee Report (September 19, 2011) 
at 40 to 55. As documented in the Committee report, “this breach [of the aquitard] will allow surface water from the 
quarry pond, contaminated with bacteria and other pathogens, to leak into the groundwater and thereby 
contaminated the water supply aquifer” and potentially, harm the municipal drinking water sources.  
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aggregate extraction as a local drinking water threat directed the committee members to ignore 
the aggregate extraction operation and allowed the Ministry representatives to remain silent on 
the issue. After observing the committee members adopt a technocratic perspective of aggregate 
extraction and accede to the province’s justification, I was left wondering: how is the existing 
and future water source protected under this rationale?  
 As the public comment period for the proposed Grand River source protection plan ended 
on January 16, 2013, citizens continued to express their concerns. As reported: “the majority of 
the commenters from the general public expressed concerns relating to aggregate extraction.”383 
Thus, as the source protection planning process has come to an end, with the first version of the 
source protection plan in place, citizens from the cities of Guelph and Paris continue to express 
their concerns on aggregate extraction through the public comment mechanism. In effect, the 
public’s participation on the SPC is one of a privileged informant and the principle of 
consultation is confirmed through their continued participation via the public comment process 
raising questions on the effectiveness of planning process to address the public’s concerns.  
6.2  Broad Perspective 
A broad perspective of the water-source protection planning is promoted through an institutional 
design that is premised upon the jurisdiction of a watershed. However, as I observed at the 
meetings, the committee members adopted a particular technical language. Their discourse is 
characterized by the use of specialized acronyms, such as: WHPA-A’s (i.e., municipal wellhead 
protection areas) or IPZ-1’s (i.e. river or lake, intake protection zones). This technocratic 
discourse narrowed the discussion to the enumerated drinking water threat list and consideration 
whether a drinking water threat (for example, application of road salt) might affect the municipal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 Grand Source Protection Authority Minutes Meeting, “Submission of the Proposed Grand River Source 
Protection Plan: Report No. SPA-01-13-02, January 25, 2013” at 1; online: GRCA 
<http://www.grandriver.ca/Governance/012513_grspa_package.pdf>. 
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well or a lake or river drinking water intake.  
The committee’s deliberative process also included the consideration of discussion papers 
produced by the provincial government – MOE. As observed at the meeting, typically, the 
discussion paper was directed at the committee with the aim of guiding the member’s decision-
making on how to deal with a drinking threat in the water plan. The content of a discussion paper 
included a description of the drinking water threat, its vulnerability scoring, related legislation 
and the policy options under the CWA. Often, a Conservation Authority representative acted as 
the lead actor in explaining the discussion document to the committee and guiding the members 
through the detailed document. The committee members acted as informants as they were 
offered an opportunity to comment on the substantive aspects of the discussion paper. Their 
comments, as expected, reflected their local knowledge of the watershed, professional expertise 
and associational interests. Through out this presentation and comment process the provincial 
officials held tight control over the discussion transforming their role into a reporting function.  
 In the end, a narrow perspective of water source protection was carried out. The 
committee’s decision-making was shaped by a limited legislative purpose and the legislative 
structure of drinking water threats. Accordingly, the legislative structure and legislatively 
influenced mechanisms such as Ministry directives crafted a specialized language of acronyms 
within the decision-making process. The SPC’s technical discussion was reinforced by the 
presentation of Ministry directives and policy papers transformed the Ministry officials into the 
experts of the local watershed.  The focus on drinking water threat list promotes decisions 
oriented toward the protection of human health rather than toward the ecological health of the 
watershed.384 All other perspectives (such as, a social-ecological,385 First Nations, a gendered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 Ibid. This human health risk perspective is further reinforced in the Report by the emphasis that is placed upon 
land-use planning activities and the characterization of risk associated with each type of land use activity. For 
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view 386  or an eco-health) are ignored at the local level. Unfortunately, this narrow 
anthropocentric focus of water source protection restricts the enactment of a broad planning 
process, which then plays out at the local SPC level with potentially harmful consequences for 
the natural ecosystem not being explored further.387  
7.0  Conclusion 
Pressure from community groups on local source protection committees is expected to continue 
into the future as citizens seek and demand to participate in decision-making processes that affect 
their drinking water sources. Urban development projects will continue to expand into rural areas 
where aggregate deposits are being quarried and will likely prompt similar conflicts as seen in 
the municipalities of Guelph and Paris. While water source protection planning was envisioned 
by Justice O’Connor to be responsive to community interests, the SPC process as observed in 
practice at this research site offered limited access for citizens to participate fully as equals. In 
practice, the responsiveness of the legal regime’s governance mode is inward-oriented and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
example, the risk of water contamination from non-point source pollution, such as use of pesticides and herbicides 
by agricultural users. Risk of water source contamination was assessed in relation to land use and its vicinity to the 
water source and the pathways of potential pathogens.  
385 Ostrom, SES, Supra. note 161. M. Falkenmark & C. Folke, “Ecohydrosolidarity: A New Ethics for Stewardship 
of Value-Adding Rainfall” in P. Brown & J.J. Schmidt, Water Ethics: Foundational Reading for Students and 
Professionals (Washington: Island Press, 2010); G. Cornelis Van Kooten & E.H. Bulte, The Economics of Nature: 
Managing Biological Assets (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) at 249; J. Linton, What is Water? –The History of 
a Modern Abstraction (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010).  
386 National Network on Environments and Women’s Health, “The Gendered Health Effects of Chronic Low-Dose 
Exposures to Chemicals in Drinking Water” (Toronto, York University, August 2009).  
387 Lake Erie Source Protection Region SPC Meeting “Source Protection Meeting Minutes – Thursday, July 9, 2009. 
online: LESPR-SPC <http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/070909_spc_minutes.pdf>. For example, nitrate 
contamination and private wells has been identified as an issue. The source water protection planning process does 
not address the adverse environmental impact of private wells. In the Thornton well field, nitrate contamination is a 
well-known problem. As noted in the July 9, 2012 SPC minutes, the town of Thornton is “primarily [an] agricultural 
area where extensive nitrate research has been undertaken. The nitrates found in the Thornton Well Field will take a 
considerable amount of time to be reduced; researchers have investigated the best economic models for approaches 
to reducing nitrates, taking into consideration efficiency, effectiveness, and cost. To address nitrates in the long 
term, the County of Oxford has purchased and is leasing or taking land out of production. Well decommissioning 
will also be part of the process. A tenant farmer on county leased parcels of land has been working collaboratively 
with universities to assess the various approaches to nitrogen application in relation to groundwater protection.” Yet 
these private wells are outside the jurisdiction of the water source protection committee; and thus, the potential 
adverse impact(s) upon the natural ecosystem is also considered to be outside the jurisdiction of the SPC.  
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advances the administrative tasks of the state actors including provincial interests in economic 
development as carried out by the aggregate industry. In the end, legislatively constituted re-
organization of the governance function from the bottom up failed to be inclusive of community 
interests and First Nations issues. Rather, the governance function continued to exhibit 
centralized control features of a traditional environmental regulatory regime.  
In this case study, the province exhibited chameleon-like features. The province with its 
changing oversight, strong and weak forms of communication including its partnership 
relationship with other state and non-state actors controls the committee’s decision-making 
process. The province realizes this control directly and indirectly through policy bulletins, 
directives, discussion papers and reliance upon the non-appointed MOE liaison committee 
representative and through the CWA’s regulations. In effect, the communication style of province 
changes with each type of instrument and in order to communicate its position on the various 
issues. Similar to a chameleon that communicates to signal behavioural responses, the provincial 
government relies upon a range of instruments to steer the water planning process and direct the 
decision-making behaviour of the participants.  
On the aggregate extraction issue, we see the province through its representatives at the 
water-source protection committee recoiling from the debate. The Ministry officials allow the 
aggregate-extraction industry-committee member to dominant the policy discussion on whether 
aggregate extraction should be added as a local drinking water threat. In the committee meeting, 
the MOE’s liaison representative’s silence on the issue demonstrates a thin form of 
communication and allowed the province to march on with the task of completing the water plan.  
The province’s oversight, carried out by the Ministry officials, ensured a narrow 
interpretation of the legislative mandate prevailed throughout the planning process. The 
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committee decisions were directed by the legislative structure, which further limited its decision-
making to the statutorily imposed 21 drinking water threats. During a meeting, if the committee’s 
conversation steered off the legislatively mandated agenda then, the province through its 
Ministry representatives guided the committee back to the 21 drinking water threats. Thus, the 
province changed its form in response to committee’s progress on the planning process and in 
reaction to local community concerns.  
In this chapter, the eco-resiliency governance framework was applied to the legal 
framework to gain insight into the responsiveness of the legal regime – the CWA revealed the 
presence of the four features: diversity, flexibility, broad perspective and emergent change. In 
practice, the province was responsive to the dominance of the state actors and the reliance upon a 
narrow technocratic engineering risk based approach tied to the enumerated list of 21 drinking 
water threats. Thus, the planning process was narrowly focused upon human rather than 
ecosystem health and resulted in a limited flexible decision-making process. The SPC’s Rules of 
Procedure shaped the form and substance of the process and allowed the members to rely upon a 
procedure of voting rather than consensus. In effect, the governance mode constructed by the 
CWA is limited by the final decision-making power that resides with the Minister. Over all, the 
state-centric nature of this governance experiment raises doubt that environmental decision-
making has improved from the earlier command-and-control era.  
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Chapter Four:  
The Enigma State: The Changing Form and Function of Water 
Governance through Alberta’s Soft Law Approach 
1.0 Overview: What is consensus?  
This simple question sparked a contentious and heated debate amongst the participants 
attending a Bow River Basin Council (BRBC) meeting in June 2012.388 The BRBC 
Executive Director later described this debate as the most combative the Council had 
experienced to date. The debate centered on a proposed change to the definition of 
‘consensus’ as set out in the Council’s by-laws.389 The proposed wording change would 
have allowed a 75% majority vote to constitute consensus. In reaction, a BRBC member 
loudly disputed limiting consensus to a 75% majority. In his view, a 75% majority vote in 
favour of an outcome did not reflect consensus and would silence the minority views held 
in the group. He further argued a properly designed consensus-based decision-making 
process should include a dispute-resolution mechanism. As other participants joined the 
debate, some offered their understanding of the term consensus while others searched the 
Internet and offered definitions of the term consensus discovered online. As I observed 
the exchange, the tension in the room increased quickly as the debate intensified and 
then, a burst of laughter from a group of participants broke the tension. Suddenly, the 
debate ended. The issue of defining consensus through the BRBC’s by-laws was deferred 
to the next annual general meeting without any discussion. With this decision, a cheerful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
388 The Bow River Basin Council quarterly forum and annual general meeting held on June 13th, 2012 at 
the Ralph Klein Park facility, Calgary. Alberta.  
389 Bow River Basin Council, “BRBC Administration Manual Consolidated: Article 2: Definitions” at 21, , 
online: BRBC <http://brbc.ab.ca/index.php/about-us/about-the-brbc/mission-and-purpose>.  [Here in 
Known as the BRBC Manual]. See Article 2.0-2.06 “Consensus” means a decision is arrived at with a 
“high majority support” (between 70% to 80% support) with the following conditions. In the process, (a) 
everyone was satisfied that a sufficient range of options has been looked at; (b) everyone agreed that the 
preferred option is capable of achieving the intended outcomes; (c) all concerns about the preferred choice 
were noted along with the decision (as “subject to” statements); and (d) there is a clear mitigation process if 
these concerns turn out to be significant factors. 
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spirit re-entered the room. The decorum of the meeting returned to a calm collegiality 
described by others as characteristic of the BRBC. The passing of the resolution allowed 
the members to move forward to the next presentation. 
 However, as I observed the meeting, listened to the presentations and reflected 
upon the debate on consensus, I was mystified in how to describe the watershed planning 
and advisory council (WPAC). The WPAC membership consisted of over a hundred 
members. The meeting agenda included presentations by groups and individuals on a 
range of water issues. Except for the passing of the resolution on consensus, no voting or 
decision-making occurred. Both the size and agenda was reflective of a public 
consultation process. In contrast to the structure of the Lake Erie water source-protection 
planning committee and its decision-making process, the nature of the Alberta WPAC 
defied understanding and description. How do I describe the administrative function or 
structure of this WPAC? How does Alberta’s central policy “Water for Life Strategy” 
play out in this forum?390 Who is the decision-maker in the WPAC? 
 At this point in my research, Alberta’s water governance regime appeared porous 
and ambiquous without defined structural boundaries. How does this localized water 
committee contribute to province’s environmental governance function? At the end of the 
meeting, my impression of the WPAC’s function was one of an opaque form of 
governance obscured by the power relations brewing amongst the participants. At the end 
of this research, my first impression remained unchanged. I conclude Alberta’s soft-law 
water governance regime is an enigma exhibiting a puzzling, complex and fragmented 
policy-driven approach to governing water.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390 Alberta, Water For Life, Supra note 4.  
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2.0  Introduction  
In Alberta, watershed-management planning is comprised of a multilayered maze of 
policy documents. At a local level, the watershed planning and advisory council (WPAC) 
is structured as a collaborative watershed-planning process carried out by a “stakeholder” 
committee.391 First established in 1991 under the name the Basin Council, the Bow River 
Basin Council (BRBC) is the oldest “multi-stakeholder, registered non-profit charitable 
society” responsible for water-use management and environmental stewardship. 392  
 In 2004, the provincial government named the BRBC, the first WPAC in the 
province. The Council’s mandate is to consider and report on the water issues facing the 
Bow River.393 The Council’s State of the Watershed Report describes the Bow River as, 
“the most highly populated and regulated river in Alberta, and water has become the most 
significant resource issue for balancing environmental and management practices with 
regional economic development.”394 The BRBC governs a complex situation requiring a 
water management planning process responsive to the water challenges facing the water 
basin and its’ users.  
 The BRCA’s governance mode reflects a regulatory shift driven, in part, by 
Alberta’s water crises. In the 1990s, industry and residential demand for water was 
increasing, the effects of climate change, including glacier melting and extreme drought 
conditions impacted seasonal river and stream flow regimes leaving regulators in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Bow River Basin Council, Print Copy: Bow River Basin State of the Watershed Report Summary 
Booklet, 2010 (Calgary, Bow River Basin Council, 2010). Also see BRBC, State of Watershed Summary 
Booklet (2010), online: BRBC 
<http://wsow.brbc.ab.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=102&Itemid=182>. 
392 BRBC Administrative Manual, Supra at 389. The BRBC is registered under the Societies Act, Chapter 
S-14.   
393 Ibid. at 2. 
394 State of the Watershed Summary, Supra note 391.  
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conundrum.395 Together, these water stresses created the impetus for regulatory change. 
The Alberta government introduced the Water Act396 in 1996, which came into force in 
January 1, 1999, repealing the previous Water Resources Act. 397  The water licence 
scheme and the establishment of a senior water-management plan for the province are 
important aspects of the Water Act. 398 However, another key regulatory maneuver was 
the policy turn to a shared governance model that introduced WPACs, as part of a Water 
for Life Strategy.399 Accordingly, in 2003, through the Water for Life Strategy, Alberta’s 
Environment Minister (formerly, the Sustainable Resource Development Ministry400 and 
now Environment and Parks (2015)) established eleven WPACs throughout the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
395 D.W. Schindler & W.F. Donahue. 2006. "An impending water crisis in Canada's western prairie 
provinces." (2006) 103 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 7210., online: PNAS< 
http://www.pnas.org/content/103/19/7210.full >. 
396 Water Act, Supra note 3. 
397 R.S.A., 1980, c. W-5, was repealed and replaced by the Water Act, S.A. 1996, c. W-3.5 on January 1, 
1999. The Water Act, S.A. 1996, c. W-3.5 was replaced by the Water Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W-3 on January 
1, 2002.; Also see Environment and Parks (formerly, Alberta Environment and Sustainable Resource 
Development Department), “Legislative History of Water Management in Alberta”, online: AESRD 
<http://esrd.alberta.ca/water/education-guidelines/legislative-history-of-water-management-in-
alberta.aspx>. 
398 Water Act, Supra note 3. s. 1 and ss. 7 to 9. Section 1.(1)“water management plan” means a plan with 
respect to conservation and management of water developed under Part 2., (Herein known as SSRB Plan); 
Also see: Alberta, Environment-SSRB., Alberta, Environment “Approved Water Management Plan for 
South Saskatchewan River Basin (Alberta) August, 2006 (Pub no. 1/011), online: Alberta, Environment 
<http://environment.alberta.ca/documents/SSRB_Plan_Phase2.pdf>.  At page 18: The SSRB plan is the 
senior plan within the SSRB and all other water management plans in the SSRB are to be consistent with it. 
It is recognized that improvements to the SSRB plan may be made as research results and other data 
becomes available. “Future watershed planning will be led by the Watershed Planning and Advisory 
Councils. The Councils will work together to ensure their individual planning is aligned with the SSRB 
Plan. Together they will decide when sufficient new information has been obtained or situations have 
sufficiently changed to warrant review of any aspect of the SSRB plan.” 
399Water for Life (November, 2003). Supra note 4.   
400 Alberta Environment and Parks – Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils, online: Alberta 
Environment & Parks <http://www.waterforlife.alberta.ca/01261.html/>. also see Government of Alberta, 
News Release, (May 8, 2012) On May 8, 2012 Premier Redford announced a new provincial government 
structure that is premised upon three principles, with the third principle being: 3) Advancing World-leading 
Resource Stewardship – Developing our natural resources responsibly to protect our environment and grow 
our markets. This realigned principled driven structure resulted in the merging of the Ministry of 
Sustainable Resource Development with the Ministry of Environment resulting in the newly formed 
Environment and Sustainable Resource Development Ministry, which is now renamed Environment and 
Parks, under the NDP government. online: Alberta <http://alberta.ca/acn/201205/322862DD7B1D9-AA32-
9F78-02192F6786E99742.html>. 
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province. 401  Given the recent emergence of a WPAC as the institutional partner in 
managing the environment and specifically, the assigned role of river basin management 
planning in Alberta, several questions regarding governance remain open. Who are these 
decision makers? And, how do they make their environmental decisions? 
3.0  Background  
3.1  A Historical Context: Alberta’s Soft-Law Approach to Water Governance  
The Water for Life Strategy is the province’s central organizing water policy framework. 
Alberta’s Environment and Parks Ministry (formerly Environment and Sustainable 
Resource Development Ministry), the policy’s institutional home, describes the directive 
as instrumental in shaping water policy and management decisions while also facilitating 
public participation and establishing partnerships in water governance.  
 In March 2003, the Province released the first Water for Life Strategy 
document.402 The 2003 Strategy report explicitly discusses the WPAC as a partner in 
water governance and as holding the leadership role in “watershed assessment and 
planning.”403 In 2008, the Provincial government released the Water for Life: A Renewal 
Report, an update to the 2003 Report.404 The updated report affirmed the Water for Life 
Strategy as the key water-policy instrument setting the direction for managing water 
resources in Alberta. The 2008 Report also affirmed a continued commitment to the 
networked partnership between the Province, the Water Advisory Council, the WPACs, 
and the local stewardship groups. The four-way partnership established through this soft-
law policy approach is contingent upon two-way flows of communication, knowledge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 Ibid.  
402 Alberta, Water for Life, 2003, Supra note 4.  
403 Ibid. at 14.  
404 Alberta, Water for Life, (2008) Supra note 4. 
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exchanges, consensus-based deliberations between the partners and fosters a responsive 
form of governance raising questions regarding what information and what actors these 
partners are responsive to?  
 In January 2007, the Alberta Water Council (AWC), in its advisory-partnership 
role and in support of the Strategy’s principle of partnership, conducted a “review of the 
shared governance framework,” as carried out by the WPACs. 405 The goal of this internal 
review was to strengthen the four-way partnership relationship (the province, the AWC, 
WPAC and WSG). This review report set out thirteen recommendations and defined the 
terms “governance” and “shared governance.” The report defines “governance” as a 
“formal process under which an organization or group of organizations makes decisions, 
determines who they will involve in the process, an how they render accountability.”406 
This definition is distinct from “shared governance”:  
a governance structure where both government and other stakeholders 
share responsibility for the development and delivery of policy, planning, 
and programs or services, but where the government retains legislative 
accountability…. it is a collaborative goal-setting and problem-solving 
process built on trust and communication. Shared governance requires 
clear roles, responsibilities, accountabilities, and relationships.407 
 
The AWC’s review report presents governance as process oriented. In contrast, shared 
governance illuminates the heterogeneous nature of the institutional partnership 
arrangement. The governance function is a shared responsibility with other actors who 
also participate in the public law-making exercise. Read together, these two definitions 
reveal the coalescing of the four partners in a decision-making process where the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
405 Alberta Water Council, Strengthening Partnerships: A Shared Governance Framework for Water for 
Life Collaborative Partnerships Report (September 2008) at 1. online: Alberta Water Council 
<http://www.albertawatercouncil.ca/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=65kwLFVSSjY%3d&tabid=59>or< 
http://www.assembly.ab.ca/lao/library/egovdocs/2008/alawc/171085.pdf>. 
406 Ibid. at 3. 
407 Ibid.  
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province retains the final decision making power. These partners problem-solve together 
in a collaborative setting and are expected to contribute to policy goals, develop programs 
and deliver services. In effect, the privatization of the water governance function is 
endorsed.  
In sum, Alberta’s shift to a shared governance framework illuminates the state’s 
steering function and its changing multi-faceted role – as facilitator of water protection, 
orchestrator of policy domains and institutional actors, gatherer of information, and 
educator of both environmental and watershed management functions. On its face, with 
this major shift to a shared mode of governance, the State’s environmental function has 
devolved to a local community level or is at least now shared with the local community. 
Yet, the state retains the final decision-making authority. In the four-way partnership, 
these stakeholders are responsive to numerous issues including but not limited to learning 
about the water security issues facing the Bow River basin, water users’ needs and local 
community and Aboriginal concerns.  Thus, we can conceive this regulation re-tooling to 
a governance mode as a form of responsive governance.   
In this chapter, the examination of the principle of consensus, as applied in the 
governance mode, is viewed as a factor that shapes the decision-making process. A 
danger exists, of course, that the WPAC membership, while described as inclusive, is 
restricted to specific types of communities or alliances, potentially leaving other groups 
with their interests and water-related issues off the watershed-planning table. The 
hypothesis in this research is the WPAC’s inclusivity, combined with a consensus 
decision-making principle, results in the province being informed of specific water issues 
affecting the local watershed but not other issues (for example, the effects of climate 
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change, fracking, and First Nation perspectives on the Bow River). In this research, 
particular attention is given to a decision-maker’s responsiveness to the ecological 
resiliency.  
To gain an understanding of the responsiveness of Alberta’s shared governance 
mode to ecological resiliency the socio-legal context of the WPAC is examined in this 
chapter. The WPAC is a non-regulatory body embodied through a complex policy-driven 
governance framework. The roles, responsibilities, and functions of a WPAC are not set 
out in legislation but are captured by a form of soft law — provincial policy.408 The 
Water Act and other provincial documents, such as the South Saskatchewan River Basin 
plan (SSRB), 409  sanctioned by the Water Act, 410  offer a glimpse into the WPAC’s 
expected function. The discussion presented next, thus, begins with the WPAC’s genesis 
and growth as envisioned in the Province’s key policy document, namely the Enabling 
Partnerships – A Framework in Support of Water for Life: Alberta’s Strategy for 
Sustainability Report (2005) and The South Saskatchewan River Basin Plan (August 
2006). Lower level policy documents produced by the Alberta Water Council and the 
WPAC’s organizational administrative manual including the WPAC’s Reports will also 
be outlined with the aim of understanding the responsiveness of the WPAC’s decision-
makers to eco-resiliency. The province’s multifaceted soft-law policy approach blurs the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 Alberta Water Council, “Strengthening Partnerships, Supra note 405 at 17. The Water for Life Strategy 
is a Provincial Cabinet policy. Under Recommendation 10: Given the Water for Life Strategy is a Cabinet 
level policy, the AWC concluded that the a “Cabinet policy gives considerable force when considering the 
structures and processes to achieve Water for Life goals.” 
409 SSRB Plan, Supra. note 398. The South Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB) was approved in August 
2006. At page 1, the Report states: This is the Approved Water Management Plan for the South 
Saskatchewan River Basin (SSRB), which comprises the Red Deer, Bow, Oldman, and South 
Saskatchewan River Sub- basins within Alberta. The plan applies to all of the named rivers, their tributaries 
and all natural surface water with hydrological connection to the named rivers and tributaries. Groundwater 
that readily flows naturally under the ground to these surface water bodies is also considered surface water.  
410 Water Act, Supra note 3.  
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governance function and contributes to the difficulty in delineating a bright line structure 
and function for the WPAC. Hence, in this dissertation, Alberta’s environmental 
governance function at a local level is characterized as the Enigma State.  
The legal governance framework presented next is organized according to the 
four eco-resiliency principles: diversity, flexibility, broad perspective, and emergent 
change. Moreover, given the Water Act’s “integrated and comprehensive, flexible 
administration and management” legislative purpose, each eco-resiliency subsection 
presents the legislation and the policies, if applicable to the discussion. 411     
4.0  Appyling the Eco-Resiliency Framework to Alberta’s Soft-Law Policy 
Approach 
4.1  Diversity 
This eco-resiliency element considers the inclusivity of the decision-making process. For 
example, what is the composition of the local watershed committee? Does the decision-
making process consider a diverse array of perspectives?  
4.1.1  Under the Water Act 
In the Bow River Basin, the senior water plan — the South Saskatchewan River Basin, 
(2006)412 — is distinct from the water planning process carried out at the local WPAC 
level. Under s. 9 of the Water Act, at the discretion of the Director, the composition of the 
senior water-management planning body provides for a heterogeneous group.413  The 
Director holds wide discretion to engage with a range of individuals and governments to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Ibid. Legislative purpose s. 2 (c).  
412 SSRB, Supra note 398.  
413 Water Act, Supra note  3. s. 9: Water management plans 9(1) The Minister may require a water 
management plan to be developed by the Director or another person. (2) The Director or other person 
developing a water management plan (a) may adopt an integrated approach to planning with respect to 
water, land and other resources; (b) may co-operate with (i) any persons, (ii) local authorities, (iii) 
Government agencies and other Government departments, and (iv) the governments and government 
agencies of other jurisdictions. 
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develop a senior water plan. With Ministerial approval, the Director oversees the senior 
water plan committee. However, a designate can be assigned the task of developing the 
water-management plan with the assistance of “any person” and government officials (at 
a local, regional or federal level) and includes mandatory public consultation.414 The 
broad legislative language of “any person” also suggests the inclusion of such individuals 
such as interest groups, business associations, local citizen groups, and so forth. This idea 
of inclusivity of a diverse range of participants has also been adopted at the local WPAC 
level.  
 Instead of being explicitly referenced in the Act, the watershed planning and 
advisory council (WPAC) is established through provincial policy documents such as the 
Enabling Partnerships Report.415 This Report identifies a WPAC as the primary actor 
responsible for watershed planning at a local scale. The composition of this local 
watershed committee is described in the Report, as comprising of a range of stakeholders: 
citizens, municipalities, government agencies, and First Nations. 416  Interestingly, the 
policy document advances a similar notion of a diverse institutional arrangement as 
provided for a senior water plan under the Water Act. 
The Alberta Water Council (AWC) internal review report also reinforces the 
WPAC’s diverse stakeholder arrangement. 417  In that document, the key stakeholders are 
identified as representatives from the three levels of government (federal, provincial and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 Ibid. Water management plans at s.9(2)(f) states: The Director or other person developing a water 
management plan (f)    must engage in public consultation that the Minister considers appropriate during 
the development of the water management plan. [Emphasis Added] 
415 Alberta Government, Enabling Partnerships – A Framework in Support of Water for Life: Alberta’s 
Strategy for Sustainability Report (2005) (ISBN No. 0-7785-4242-4 Pub. No. 1/1005) at 2. online: Alberta, 
Environment <http://www.waterforlife.alberta.ca/documents/wfl-enabling_partnerships.pdf>. In support of 
the partnership concept set out in the Water for Life Strategy, the Alberta government published the 
Enabling Partnership document to provide guidance on “how these partners may operate.” 
416 Ibid at 8.  
417 Alberta Water Council, Strengthening Partnerships, Supra note 405.  
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municipal), First Nations and Metis parties, as well as industry and non-governmental 
organizations.418 The Report states: together these participants “shar[e] the responsibility 
for recommending water policy” and carry out “watershed assessment and planning, 
developing education and outreach, monitoring, stewardship and other programs, and 
delivering services” in support of the Water for Life Strategy provincial policy. 419 As an 
inclusive decision-making model, the document explicitly identifies four sectors 
(“provincial government, 420  industry 421  other governments, 422  and non-government 
organizations”423) as the key participants in a WPAC’s planning, policy, and community 
outreach activities. Even though these diverse group of individulas share responsibility 
for recommending water policy, the provincial government holds the legal authority and 
legislative responsibility for the province’s water policy, planning, and “land-use 
management decisions.”424 
In sum, while the WPAC is not legally constituted, it is established and 
reinforced, by several soft-law policy documents. Both policy documents — the Enabling 
Partnerships Report and the Alberta Water Council’s  (an internal review report of the 
shared governance model)  — provide for an inclusive and heterogeneous institutional 
arrangement.  
However, the water committee’s arrangement is complicated by a plethora of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418 Ibid. at 3.  
419 Ibid. 
420 Ibid. at 7-8. Alberta Agriculture & Rural Development, Alberta Economic Development Authority, 
Alberta Energy, Alberta Environment, Alberta Health & Wellness, Alberta Sustainable Resource 
Development, Alberta Water Research Institute.  
421 Ibid at 8. Industry – Chemical and petrochemical, forestry, agriculture (including livestock, irrigated 
crops, and other crops), mining, oil and gas, power generation.  
422 Ibid. Federal government, First Nations, Métis Settlements, large urban municipalities, rural 
municipalities, small urban municipalities.  
423 Ibid. Environmental, fishery habitat conservation, lake environment conservation, wetland conservation.  
424 Ibid. at 9.  
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policy documents. Together, the large number of provincial policies creates a puzzling 
water committee structure and contributes to the organic as well as opaque nature of 
governance at the WPAC scale. The size of the WPAC can balloon to over 200 
participants making it difficult to identify the decision-makers and define the composition 
of committee at any one time and who holds power and influences the planning process. 
This elastic design feature exposes the need for further research to understand the 
nuances and limits of the diversity in this collaborative governance arrangement.  
4.2  Flexibility 
The eco-resiliency factor of flexibility is oriented towards understanding the flexibility of 
the decision-maker’s thinking and regulatory mechanisms. For example, are the decision-
makers open to considering new information? Do these decision-makers have access to 
range of regulatory instruments?  
4.2.1  Under the Water Act 
The Water Act advances a flexible approach to decision-making. The multi-pronged 
legislative purpose characterizes water management as an “integrated and 
comprehensive, flexible administration and management.”425 This flexible management 
and integrated ideology, along with the obligation to incorporate a range of values, 
encourages a non-linear decision-making approach that requires balancing competing 
values of: “wise allocation,” water conservation, intra- and intergenerational 
sustainability, a “healthy environment,” as well as “economic growth.”426 Further, the 
legislative purpose directs the decision-maker to follow the “provincial planning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 Water Act, Supra. 3. Legislative purpose s. 2 (c).  
426 Ibid. s. 2(a) “the need to manage and conserve water resources to sustain our environment and to ensure 
a healthy environment and high quality of life in the present and the future.” 
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framework,”427 including a “strategy for the protection of the aquatic environment”428 and 
“biological diversity.”429 Effectively, the decision-makers are encouraged to be flexible 
by relying on the multi-purpose legislative goal that encourages an understanding of the 
key issues affecting the river basin and integrating these socio-ecological concerns into 
the planning process. However, this multi-legislative approach applies to the decision-
makers drafting the senior management planning process not the local watershed 
planning advisory council’s (WPAC) process.  
Flexibility is further encouraged through a mix of statutorily imposed regulatory 
tools. Under the Act, water governance is carried out through a diverse array of practice 
tools (e.g., strategies, guidelines, framework, and a Ministerial agreement430). However, 
access to these legislative tools is limited at a local level. The Act provides for water 
management planning at the senior plan level. In contrast, the watershed planning 
advisory council (WPAC) is non-regulatory body assigned a reporting function. Together 
these legislative objectives, establish a multi-faceted decision-making criterion, and 
reinforce the legal doctrine of prior allocation,431 expressed through the legal instrument 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 Ibid. Part 2 – Planning and Environmental Assessment Division 1 Planning. 
428 Ibid. Provincial Planning Framework s. 7(2).  
429 Ibid. s. 8. 
430 Ibid. s. 6(1)&(2)(f) “any other matter related to the administration of this Act.”; also see: Specifically, 
the legislative provisions outline the use of: “a strategy for the protection of aquatic environment” that may 
include “water management principles” (s. 7(2)(a)), “guidelines for establishing water conservation 
objectives” (s.8(2)(f) and 8(3)(b)), “matters relating to the protection of biological diversity”(s. 8.(3)(c)) 
and the direction from the Director as set out in “the framework for water management planning” (s9(2)(e)) 
and in the Director’s “water conservation objectives” (s. 15(1)) and in the Minister’s water guidelines (s. 
14(1) & (2)). The water plan may also include “any information, documents, or water and land 
management plans” (s.9(2)(d)) and the approved water plan must include relevant information concerning 
preliminary certificate, licence, registration and water allocations (s. 11(3)(a)(iv)(A)(B)). 
431 For a discussion of the prior allocation doctrine generally see: David R. Percy, “Water Rights Law and 
Water Shortages in Western Canada” (1986) 11(2) Canadian Water Resources Journal 14.; David R. Percy 
“Seventy-five Years of Alberta Water Law: Maturity, Demise & Rebirth” (1996) XXXV(1) Alberta Law 
Review 221.; David R. Percy “The Limits of Western Canadian Water Allocation Law” (2004) 14 J. Env. 
L. Prac. 315.  
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of a water licence and ‘the first in right and first in time’ water law doctrine.432  
In effect, the Act and the soft-law documents together encourage a regulatory 
mapping exercise.  An exercise where information gathering, from state and non-state 
actors as well as a vast range of policy documents, encourages flexible decision-making 
and integration of a range of issues and consideration of the senior water plan under s. 9 
of Water Act. The Water Act also provides a backstop by assigning the final decision-
making power for approving a water plan to the Minister.433 However, what remains a 
puzzle is: how the senior water-management planning process, as enunciated by the Act, 
shapes the water-management activities carried out by a WPAC, a non-regulatory entity?  
4.2.2  The Government of Alberta (GOA) Level - Water Act’s South Saskatchewan 
River Basin Plan Report (SSRB)  
Under the Act, the SSRB is considered the “senior”434 water-management plan; all other 
plans in the South Saskatchewan River Basin, such as Bow River Watershed Plan, must 
conform to the SSRB plan. 435  The approved South Saskatchewan River Basin Plan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 Ibid. 
433 Water Act, Supra. note 3. s. 11. Either the Lieutenant Governor in Council or Minister approves the 
water plan.  
434 SSRB Plan, Supra. note 398. at 18. Under Subsection 3.3 Review of the Plan. Also see: Water Act, 
Supra. note 3.  
435 Water Act, Supra note 3. s.s. 7(1), 9(1).; Also see: Ibid. SSRB plan at vi; Also see Alberta, Environment, 
Framework For Water Management Planning (1999) (ISBN No. 0-7785-1738-1 Online), online: 
Environment. <http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/6367.pdf>. A careful reading of Framework 
document indicates there is no reference to a WPAC. Thus, the Framework is not explicitly discussed in 
this section of the dissertation. The social impetus of the Framework is outlined at page. Under the 
Background Section, the report states: During the 1990s, guided by extensive public consultation, Alberta 
Environment reviewed water management policies and legislation. The goal was to establish a blueprint for 
the sustainable management of water in Alberta. By listening to Albertans, a vision and principles for 
sustainable water management were developed. New policies to guide water management were adopted by 
government. A comprehensive new statute, the Water Act, was created and is now in effect, providing 
legislative authority for the implementation of these policies. Throughout the review process, Albertans 
made it clear that government needed to ensure sustainable water management and a healthy aquatic 
environment. The government agreed that effective and efficient water management planning is essential 
and made a commitment through Part 2, Division 1 of the Water Act to develop a document to guide such 
planning called The Framework for Water Management Planning (Framework) document.  A water 
management plan can be developed by anyone. It can be a single issue such as a lake cleanup or involve 
multiple issues in a major river basin. However, any person developing a water management plan must 
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Report: The South Saskatchewan River Basin Plan (SSRB plan) affirms the flexibility of 
the watershed planning and advisory council’s (WPAC) organizational form, 
administrative tasks, and water-management responsibilities set out in the Strategy.436 
However, the SSBR plan does not address either the applicable decision-making principle 
or process that should occur at the WPAC scale. This gap suggests operationalizing the 
WPAC’s administrative procedures might be viewed as a lower-level activity to be 
assigned to the WPAC. In effect, the WPAC is afforded the flexibility to design an 
individual administrative response that can be responsive to local water issues and 
stakeholder interests.  
4.2.3  The GOA’s — Water for Life Strategy 
The Water for Life Strategy features flexibility as a coordinating mechanism bringing 
together multi-level institutional partnership arrangement. The Strategy is silent on the 
procedural aspects (for example, such as relying upon consensus as a decision-making 
principle). In the Strategy, flexibility is enabled through the interrelationship of the four 
institutional partners: the provincial government, the Alberta Water Council (AWC), 
WPACs, and Watershed Stewardship Group (WSG). Through then Environment and 
Sustainable Resource Development Ministry and now Alberta’s Ministry of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
follow the Framework for Water Management Planning. The Framework for Water Management Planning 
will be reviewed every five years to make sure it remains current and continues to support sustainable water 
management. 
436 SSRB. Supra. note 398. Under the Executive Summary Section of the Plan report, the plan is described 
as a guidance document for the WPAC and WPAC is referenced as the lead planning unit for future 
updates. Specifically, the report states: The plan will provide guidance to decision makers and act as a 
foundation for future watershed management planning of sub-basins in the SSRB by Watershed Planning 
and Advisory Councils, as well as stewardship groups. In the plan, at page v: “The plan provides guidance 
to decision makers and acts as a foundation for future watershed management planning of sub-basins in the 
SSRB by Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils, as well as stewardship groups. Strong linkages 
between water quality, land use and water quantity may now be further pursued. Improved cooperation 
between all stakeholders is expected and encouraged to occur.” At page vi: “The Watershed Planning and 
Advisory Councils (WPACS) are encouraged  to consider the priorities in their watersheds and undertake 
future watershed management planning with this water management plan serving as a foundation. These 
Councils will work together to ensure their individual planning is aligned with the SSRB plan.” 
	  	   	  155	  
Environment and Parks, the provincial government assumes oversight and accountability 
for water governance. The remaining three partners (AWC, WPAC and WSG) assume 
responsibility for the operationalization of the Strategy and serve in support to the 
province.  
 
Alberta’s Multi-level Policy Model & Its Actors (source needed)  
 
 
Under the Strategy, the WPAC is viewed as one of the four institutional partners 
dedicated to achieving these goals. The Strategy reinforces flexibility through a mix of 
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regulatory mechanisms where the WPAC serves as the primary vehicle for “watershed 
planning,” charged to develop “best management practices, foster stewardship activities 
within the watershed, report on the state of the watershed, and educate” water users. 437 
While the Strategy identifies the provincial government as the primary party accountable 
for oversight of provincial water policy and “watershed management activities,”438 it 
treats the remaining three partners as important actors. While the WPACs do not report 
directly to the Provincial Water Advisory Council, the Water for Life 2003 Report 
envisions that the WPAC will seek guidance from the Advisory Water Council on water 
issues leaving open the question: what provincial authority or entity does the WPAC 
report to?  
The Alberta Water Council (AWC) holds the advisory function. The AWC is the 
primary actor assigned the task of implementing the Water for Life Strategies. This multi-
stakeholder council of twenty-five members439 is charged with providing policy advice to 
the Provincial government, investigating existing and emerging water issues, as well as 
setting research priorities, consulting with citizens, and offering a broad view of water 
issues and outcomes at a provincial level.440 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 Water for Life, 2003, Supra note 4 at 16. 
438 Ibid. at 15.  
439 Alberta Water Council, Alberta Water Council Members, Alberta Water Council, online: Alberta Water 
Council <http://www.albertawatercouncil.ca/AboutUs/Members/tabid/56/Default.aspx>. The Council is 
comprised of 24 members from the following sectors: Industry: Canadian Fuels Association; Chemistry 
Industry Association of Canada; Alberta Irrigation Projects Association; Crop Sector Working Group, 
Alberta Chamber of Resources, Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Alberta Forest Products 
Association, Intensive Livestock Working Group, TransAlta; ATCO Power; Non-Government 
Organizations: Alberta Wilderness Association, Environmental Law Centre, Ducks Unlimited Canada, Fish 
Habitat Conservation Collective, Alberta Lake Management Society, Alberta WPACs; Government: Cities 
of Edmonton and Calgary; Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, Alberta Association of Municipal 
Districts and Counties, Métis Settlements General Council. Government of Alberta & Provincial 
Authorities: Alberta Agriculture and Rural Development, Alberta Energy, Alberta Environment and 
Sustainable Resources Development, Alberta Health, Alberta Innovates Energy and Environment Solutions 
– Water Resources.  
440 Water for Life, 2003, Supra. note 4 at 15. 
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The community-based Watershed Stewardship Group (WSG) is comprised 
primarily of local citizens, who voluntarily provide stewardship on-the-ground activities 
to protect local water resources. To encourage the sharing of local knowledge, these 
stewardship groups are encouraged to participate in the activities of their WPAC. 441  
In sum, the Strategy’s partnership model is contingent upon a coordinating 
feedback mechanism where information flows horizontally and vertically amongst the 
institutional partners. Horizontally, information sharing crosses policy domains, driven 
by a range of government and non-governmental agencies and industry actors who 
participate as partners in the AWC, WPAC, and the WSG, and through community, 
organizational, and professional networks. Vertically, information flows down from the 
provincial government to AWC. The AWC then translates the information and directs the 
activities of the WPAC. The WPAC further translates the information and guides the 
WSG. In reverse, local water stewardship information flows up from the WSG to the 
WPAC, the AWC, and Province. As more parties participate in the information loops, a 
danger might arise where the provincial government’s accountability is diminished and 
the government’s role and environmental governance function becomes blurred and 
difficult to characterize. Moreover, this flexible policy-driven approach might also foster 
a closed-loop governance regime responsive to internal stakeholder interests while 
creating an institutional barrier to receiving new information from external and less 
influential stakeholders.   
4.2.4  The GOA’s – Enabling Partnership Report: A Policy to Operationalize the 
Water for Life Partnership Concept 
The Provincial government’s Enabling Partnerships Report is a guidance document to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 Ibid. at 16 
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implement the Water for Life’s four-way partnership.442  In this report, consensus is 
viewed as a key principle to be used in the watershed planning exercise. Consensus is 
defined as “when all individuals in a decision-making process reach agreement.”443 In the 
report, consensus is presented as an indicator of success for the WPAC and it’s capacity 
to be “inclusive and strive for consensus.” 444  The policy document does not define 
“inclusivity” leaving open to question the parameters of inclusivity. However, this 
ambiguity may be intentional. The meaning of this term might be left open to 
interpretation by each individual WPAC, thus, granting flexibility to each WPAC to 
“define its own relationships”445 with its partners. 
 Nevertheless, a closer reading of the Report reveals the provincial government’s 
strategic use of consensus and control over the WPAC. The provincial government’s 
support of the local governance function is contingent upon the WPAC committing upon 
entering the partnership with the province “to a watershed approach and the principles of 
inclusiveness and consensus-based decision-making.” The water committee must commit 
to use an “adaptive management cycle” to update the water management plans as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
442 Alberta Government, Enabling Partnerships, Supra. note 415. In support of the partnership concept set 
out in the Water for Life Strategy, the Alberta government published the Enabling Partnership document to 
provide guidance on “how these partners may operate.” 
443 Ibid. at 4. 
444 Ibid. at 12. Councils Will Be Successful If They 
» Are inclusive and strive for consensus. 
» Provide a constructive platfor m for meaningful dialogue, information exchange, and 
making recommendations to governments, stakeholders and the public that result in 
improved watershed management.  
» Prepare, implement, review, and adjust watershed management plans in an ongoing 
adaptive management cycle required for long-term sustainable management of 
Alberta’s watersheds.  
» Gain support from municipal, Aboriginal, provincial and federal governments, industry, 
non-government organizations and the public to address specific issues and to 
prepare and implement watershed management plans.  
» Have objectives that are measurable, lead to actions, and improve watershed 
management over time.  
» Operate under the requirements for success identified for the overall partnership 
framework (see page 4).  
445 Ibid. at 11.  
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described in the “Framework for Water Management Planning” document.446  
 In essence, consensus is presented as decision-making principle, which the 
WPAC is required to employ, in return for establishing a partnership with the Province. If 
another decision-making process is adopted, the partnership arrangement could be 
considered breached and the province could withdraw administrative and financial 
support to the WPAC. The WPAC’s flexibility in designing individual processes is, thus, 
limited to consensus.  
4.2.5  The AWC Level – Alberta Water Council’s Shared Governance Model and 
Watershed Management Planning Framework Report  
As a guidance document for the WPAC, this Alberta Water Council’s Report defines 
“consensus” as “a decision-making process that not only seeks the agreement of 
participants but also works to resolve or mitigate the objections of the minority to achieve 
the most agreeable decision.”447 Consensus is further defined by the following three 
questions: i) What does consensus means to the WPAC? 2) How do WPAC members 
know they have a consensus? 3) How will they resolve a dispute?448 The Report and 
these questions encourage a robust form of consensus and recommends WPACs “have a 
thorough understanding of consensus before undertaking a watershed assessment or 
planning initiative.”449  In effect, flexibility is afforded to the WPAC to define their 
procedural process independently and without a direct outsight mechanism and perhaps, 
leading to arbitrary decisions. Moreover, the WPAC’s partnership with the province is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Framework, Supra. note 435. 
447  Alberta Water Council, Recommendations for a Watershed Management Planning Framework for 
Alberta (December, 2008) at 35. Alberta Water Council, online: 
<http://www.albertawatercouncil.ca/Portals/0/pdfs/SharedGov%20-
%20Watershed%20Management%20Plan%20FINAL.pdf >. [Here in Known as the AWC’s Framework 
Document] 
448 Ibid.  
449 Ibid. at 11.  
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premised upon consensus-based decisions, which reinforces the AWC’s guidance on 
consensus and places the WPAC in a position to adopt consensus as a procedural 
mechanism. However, the definition of consensus at the WPAC level still remains open.    
4.2.6 The AWC’s – Alberta Water Council (AWC): Strengthening Partnership: A 
Shared Governance Framework for Life Collaborative Partnerships Report  
The AWC’s Strengtening Partnership Report reinforces the Water for Life Strategy’s 
four-way partnership concept and consensus but adds a dispute resolution mechanism. 450 
Specifically, the Report recommends that “Water for Life partnerships should use a 
consensus-based process and a clear approach for dispute resolution.”451 Thus, if the 
group has reached a stalemate and cannot reach an agreement, the Provincial government 
“or other appropriate authority” can intervene and act as the final arbitrator. 452   
 The Council (AWC), however, cautions against seeking consensus on all 
decisions. The report presents “administrative or operational procedure” decisions as 
routine not requiring consensus. This rationale recognizes some WPACs may have a 
membership of over “100” people and achieving consensus on routine administrative 
decisions is inefficient.453 In effect, everyday and repetitive decisions should be bounded 
by time. At the “partnership table,” 454  non-repetitive administrative decisions are 
expected to be decided through a robust democratic decision-making process 
Overall, the AWC’s shared governance framework advances a form of 
“collective” power through the achievement of consensus.455 While three members of the 
four-way form of the partnership – the AWC, the WPAC, and, the WSG – do not hold 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 AWC, Strengthening Partnership, Supra. note 405. See Section 3.2 Consensus Decision-Making at 11-
13. [Here in Known as the AWC’s Patnership Document] 
451 Ibid. at 12. 
 
453 Ibid at 12.  
454 Ibid at 13. Refer to the Sub-Section – Sticking With the Process. 
455 Ibid at 16.  
	  	   	  161	  
legislative power, these parties and the other stakeholders at the table are empowered by 
the process of achieving consensus-based decisions and hold power within their sectors to 
implement the WPACs’ decisions. If the participants agree to a shared decision then they 
essentially hold a reciprocal duty to implement the decision. In effect, this governance 
model is premised upon the group’s social norms and expectations that develop in the 
consensus building process. Together, the social capital developed within the Committee 
can further lead to the implementation and, perhaps, the enforcement of a water 
committee’s decisions in the wider community (i.e., through the development of social 
capital). 
4.2.7 At The WPAC Local Level: The Bow River Basin Council’s (BRBC) 
Administrative Manual 
Finally, the BRBC’s Administrative Consolidated (2012) Manual is the primary lower-
level document directing the WPAC to establish consensus as the decision-making 
principle.456  The organization’s values, as highlighted in the document, point to “an 
inclusive, cooperative and collaborative organization”457 that promotes flexible decision-
making. The BRBC’s organizational values present a guiding principle articulating a 
consensus decision-making approach and defining “consensus”:  
“Consensus” means a decision is arrived at with a "high majority support" 
(between 70% to 80% support) with the following conditions,  
(a) everyone is satisfied that a sufficient range of options has been looked 
at, and  
(b) everyone agrees that the preferred option is capable of achieving the 
intended outcomes, and 
(c) all concerns about the preferred choice have been noted along with the 
decision (as "subject to" statements), and  
(d) there is a clear mitigation response if these concerns turn out to be 
significant factors.458  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 BRBC Manual, Supra, note 389.  
457 Ibid. at 6. Refer to: A.4 BRBC Values. 
458 Ibid. 
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This definition suggests that at the BRBC level consensus will be achieved in the group 
when the 70 to 80% of the members agree with the decision. Consensus is conditioned by 
four elements: i) alternatives being considered, ii) agreement is reached on the preferred 
alternative, iii) consultation on dissenting has occurred, and iv) a mitigation strategy 
response has been developed. If a dispute or stalemate arises within the BRBC 
proceedings, the WPAC is directed to adopt the dispute procedure set out in it 
administrative procedural manual.459 In effect, the BRBC’s administrative manual crafts a 
prescriptive approach to guide decision makers to adopt a flexible consensus–based 
decision-making protocol.   
 Overall, on the issue of consensus, it is difficult to ascertain whether the meaning 
of consensus set out in the BRBC administrative manual aligns with that of the Water for 
Life Strategy, as the meaning of the term was left open in this higher-level policy 
document. The BRBC Manual definition supports the AWC’s vision of consensus, except 
for the need to determine if 70 to 80% agreement has been reached. Achieving a high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
459 Ibid. at 37. Refer to: C.5.2 Conflict and Complaint Resolution Procedure states: Concerns with the 
BRBC, its Board and members should be communicated and acted upon in a timely manner, in accordance 
with the following guidelines: The concerned party should communicate directly with the person or persons 
(subject party) whose decisions or actions are the cause of concern to allow them to review the concern, 
clear up any misunderstandings, and make any appropriate adjustments to resolve the concern. If the 
circumstances are such that the person with a concern is unable or unwilling to communicate directly with 
the subject party, then the concern should be communicated, verbally or in writing, to the BRBC 
Governance Sub-Committee for assessment and follow-up. If the concern is not readily resolved and 
warrants Board attention, the sub-committee will request appropriate details in writing and present the 
concern to the Board. The Executive Director or the Board may seek outside or independent assistance in 
resolving concerns that reach the Board. Persons involved in helping resolve the concern can play a 
facilitation or mediation role to help the parties restore a positive working relationship, or pursue necessary 
information to allow the Board to assess the concern and undertake any necessary follow-up. Complaints 
and conflicts shall be dealt with in a confidential manner. In order to limit unreasonable damage to the 
reputation of the BRBC, all parties will refrain from drawing others into the process as a way of garnering 
support or gaining attention. Meetings to resolve a complaint shall be open only to the parties and those 
attempting to resolve the complaint. The parties may have an advocate or supporter present. Meetings may 
be with the parties individually or together. In the interest of openness, no minutes or written record of 
what is said in these meetings shall be recorded. The outcome of the meetings or a resulting agreement will 
be documented.  
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majority support of 70 to 80% on an issue heard at WPAC more than likely would be 
achieved through a vote.  
In sum, the Water Act legislative purpose sets the stage for a flexible water-
management planning process at the senior management planning level. This perspective 
of flexibility permeates to the lower-level policy documents. These documents articulate 
a flexible shared governance model. Effectively, the flexible multi-level institutional 
architecture allows for channeling of information, creating informational flows that are 
multi-directional and support the higher-level legally constituted senior water-
management planning approval processes.  
The reliance upon consensus as the dominant decision-making principle promotes 
flexibility in decision-making process. In the view of the AWC, consensus means a 
decision all parties can live with after having debated dissenting opinions. If a dispute 
arises, WPAC process is expected to provide for a dispute-resolution procedure. While 
the WPAC does not hold legislative power, a collective form of power that can be carried 
into societal sectors ensures implementation of a WPAC’s decisions set out in 
Committee’s reports.  
However, the reliance on voting mechanism is beyond the AWC’s Strengthening 
Partnership document and raises questions whether the WPAC is in breach of its 
partnership relationship with the province. Moreover, the use of voting illustrates the 
WPAC’s ability to design a localized decision-making element. This practice of voting, 
however, introduces the danger of diminishing the spirit of a shared governance model 
advanced by the Strategy and envisioned by the AWC. Moreover, in an inclusive and 
consensus-based process minority views might be ignored as argued by the WPAC 
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member at the June 2012 meeting, which further raises the question: What stakeholder 
group is the WPAC responsive to?  
4.3  Broad Perspective 
A broad perspective considers the scale and polycentric nature of the governance regime.  
Consideration is given to the centers of power and presence of co-ordinating mechanisms 
that can accommodate multi-level governance scales. This broad perspective is examined 
through the province’s policy documents.  
 
The South Saskatchewan River Basin Planning Area – need to reference 
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4.3.1  At  GOA Level – The Enabling Partnership Report 
A broad approach is featured in Alberta’s “Enabling Partnerships – A Framework in 
Support of the Water for Life: Alberta’s Strategy for Sustainability Report (2008).”460 
This report advances a form of polycentric governance carried out through multi-level 
scales that includes the WPAC. The WPAC’s mandate is described in this policy 
document as engaging “governments, stakeholders, other partnerships, and the public in 
watershed assessment and watershed management planning, considering existing land 
and resource management planning processes and decision-making authorities.”461  In 
effect, the WPAC’s role in the planning process includes a range of activities that 
requires interacting with a range of stakeholders in order produce the “State of the 
Watershed Report.”462 This report outlines the health of the watershed and documents the 
issues facing the watershed including gaps in research and data. 463  Collecting data 
needed to fulfill these tasks requires the WPAC to adopt a broad perspective of the 
watershed and interact with a broad range of stakeholders, establish relationships and 
develop knowledge networks concerning the environmental status of the river basin and 
predicting future research requirements. Together these tasks foster a broad 
understanding of the the Bow River basin.   
4.3.2  The GOA: South Saskatchewan River Basin Plan 
The SSRB plan reinforces a broad perspective of the watershed, while also taking into 
account a local perspective. 464  The 2006 SSRB Plan, describes the plan as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Partnership Report, Supra. note 405.  
461 Ibid. at 8.  
 
 
464 SSRB Plan, Supra note 398.  
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“foundation[al]”465 document, to be used by WPACs and WSGs to guide their planning 
processes. The SSRB plan directs WPAC decision makers to turn their minds primarily to 
the water quantity issues and other priorities identified in the watershed.466 A reading of 
the SSRB plan suggests water quantity is the priority issue of concern at a river basin 
level. In contrast, water quality appears to be an issue of local concern, directed at the 
WPAC level. 467 The SSRB plan can be updated, in response to water research data on 
water quantity and quality.468 This updating mechanism further reveals a multi-scale 
governance regime where the plan can be updated to take into account both features of 
water (i.e., quantity and quality) and at both scales, a basin level (quantity) and a local 
river-basin level (quality). Consideration of both features and scales points to the 
presence of a broad eco-resiliency feature.   
4.3.3  At AWC Level: Alberta Water Council’s (AWC) 2007 Report 
The AWC’s 2007 internal review report featuring the partnership concept supports a 
broad standpoint. 469  While the partnership concept is premised upon an informal 
reporting structure, communication is envisioned as the glue binding the “functional” 
relationships established by the four-way partnership relationship. 470  Effectively, the 
functional four-way partnership (between the Province, AWC, WPACs and WGS) is 
socially constructed and contingent upon the exchange of information and “shared 
outcomes and goals.”471 For example, a two-way flow of communication should exist 
between the localized WPAC and on-the-ground WSG. The WPAC is expected to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
466 Ibid. See Executive Summary. 
467 Ibid. at 2.  
468 Ibid. at 18. See Section: 3.3 Review of the Plan.  
469 AWC, Strengthening Partnership, Supra, note 405.  
470 Ibid. at 5. See Section: 2.3 The Relationship Among These Partnership Types. 
471 Ibid. at 1.  
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provide relevant watershed information, data, and outreach information to a WSG.472 The 
expectation is that a WSG will align its sub-watershed activities with the higher-level 
plans (in particular, the SSRB plan) and participate on the WPAC by providing 
information to the WPAC on the sub-watershed basin. Through these communication 
flows, a broad perspective of ecological state of the river basin could develop and multi-
level governance is reinforced.  
4.3.4  At WPAC Local Level: Bow River Basin Council (BRBC) Administrative 
Manual 
At a local WPAC level, The BRBC Manual promotes a broad social-ecological 
perspective of the river basin. The Manual directs decision-makers to take into account a 
broadly scoped vision statement: “a future where, The Bow River watershed will be 
conserved and protected as a fragile and unique resource and recognized as our lifeline. 
Multiple uses will be balanced, ensuring the needs of all stakeholders are met while 
recognizing that a healthy ecosystem is paramount.”473 Enactment of this vision will 
require engagement at a multi-level governance scale. This vision is future-oriented while 
taking into account intergenerational sustainability by considering a future that supports 
conservation and protection of the river basin, balanced against the needs of 
heterogeneous group of water users and leaves the WPAC addressing competing 
stakeholder interests.  
 In addition to conservation and preservation, the organization’s mission statement 
further directs the WPAC decision-makers to consider sustainability features (i.e., “all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 Ibid. at 6. The Report states: Effective two-way communication between the WPAC and WSGs is 
critical. Specifically, WPACs can support WSGs by: i) Providing them with relevant data and information 
ii) Indicating what resources are available to them and how to find them iii) regularly sharing 
communications.  
473 BRBC Manual, Supra, note 389 at 4.  
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social, cultural, economic and environmental aspects”) including the “quality and 
quantity of groundwater and surface water” and the impact of land use upon the river 
basin. 474  It is expected that the watershed plans will be crafted based upon “a 
collaborative stakeholder process,” and the BRBC’s recommendations will be directed to 
the “appropriate water and land-use decision-making authorities.” 475  As drafted, the 
mission statement suggests the BRBC should consider the ecological health of the 
watershed with specific regard to broad range of water features: the quality and quantity 
of ground and surface waters, including supporting ecological systems (riparian zones, 
aquatic ecosystems) and anthropocentric impacts.  
 In sum, while the provincial government is responsible for water management 
across the province, at a local level, the WPAC communicates both the ecological status 
of the river basin and the water issues facing the basin to higher-level Water for Life 
partners (i.e., AWC and the Province) and downward to the watershed groups. In effect, 
the local WPAC is responsive to its three partners as illustrated by the channeling of 
information upward and downward with the goal of creating a broad perspective of the 
ecological state of the South Saskatchewan River Basin. This model is premised upon a 
polycentric governance structure that implicates decision-makers at multiple scales, 
encourages two-way flows of communication within the four-way partnership (i.e., 
Province, AWC, WPACs and WGS) and creates a legal regime responsive to internal 
stakeholders.  
4.4  Emergent Change 
Often, uncertain and unpredictable events result in a water governance crisis. The eco-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Ibid. at 5. See A.3 BRBC Mission. 
475 Ibid.  
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resilient feature of emergent change encourages preemptive thinking where decision-
makers are directed to consider how surprises or uncertain and unpredictable events 
shape decision-making and the end-product – in this case, the water plan.  
4.4.1  Integration of the Water Act  & The Framework for Water Management 
Planning Policy Document  
Through a combination of policy documents and legislation, the idea of emergent change 
is exemplified by the concept of adaptive management. This concept is discussed in the 
policy document entitled The Framework for Water Management Planning,476 which is 
statutorily sanctioned under s. 7(1) of the Water Act. In this Framework document, an 
adaptive perspective is upheld by the “responsive and flexible” principle and is further 
supported by the integrated resource management approach advanced in this 
framework.477 An “integrated approach” is also referenced in s.2 (c) (Legislative Purpose 
Section) of the Water Act. Furthermore, under s.7(2)(d) of the Water Act, senior water-
management plans can be reviewed and revised based upon the participation of local and 
regional participants. This adaptive management information cycle mirrors the horizontal 
and vertical flows of information created by the Water for Life’s Strategy partnership 
principle. The partnership principle establishes unique informational networking 
activities to facilitate the sharing of local knowledge with the WPAC’s remaining two 
partners --- the Alberta Water Council and Watershed Stewardship Groups. Conceptually, 
the WPAC is responsive to conditions of emergent change stemming from the horizontal 
and vertical two-way information flows and knowledge networks created through the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 Alberta, Framework for Water Management Planning, Supra. note 435.  
477 Enabling Partnerships, Supra. note 415 at 9. An adaptive approach to watershed management is 
described in five fluid steps: i) Trigger – identify and assess watershed issues in a ‘state of’ report ii) Plan – 
examine alternatives and make recommendations for the best course of action in a plan. iii) Review and 
Evaluate – Determine if conditions in the watershed are getting better or if the plan needs to be revised. iv) 
Monitor and Report – Gather and analyze monitoring data in successive ‘state of” reports. V) Implement – 
Work with appropriate individuals, organizations and jurisdictions to implement plan.  
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four-way partnership model.   
4.4.2  At GOA: The Water Act’s South Saskatchewan River Basin Plan (SSRB) 
The SSRB Plan also takes into account emergent change.478 This legislatively constituted 
senior plan establishes a water-monitoring role for the WPACs and directs the WPACs to 
be responsive the water-management planning priorities set out in the Basin Advisory 
Committee, the Water for Life: Alberta’s Strategy for Sustainability Reports, and 
directives from Alberta Environment.479 These water-monitoring activities could include: 
flow monitoring, confirming water-modeling results; water diversions and consumption 
rates; and water quality and biological elements (such as, “fish populations and riparian 
forests.”). 480  This collect of data could then lead to changing water conservation 
objectives 481  and the plan itself. In effect, the SSRB plan views the WPAC as 
operationalizing the Province’s water priorities set out in Water Act and the Strategy 
document, which further creates both monitoring and reporting activities at the local river 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 SSRB, Supra. note 398 at 17. See Additional Provisions 3.1 Future Watershed Management Planning 
Priorities. 
479 Ibid. at 17. See 3. Additional Provisions 3.1 Future Watershed Management Planning Priorities 
Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils (WPACs) are encouraged to consider the priorities in their 
watersheds and undertake future watershed management planning with this water management plan serving 
as a foundation. The Recommendations Report of the Basin Advisory Committees and Water for Life: 
Alberta’s Strategy for Sustainability recommend a number of priorities, including holistic watershed 
management, performance indicators, land uses, economic planning, water conservation, water quality, 
groundwater, objectives for aquatic environments and evaluation of infrastructure needs (e.g. storage). 
Alberta Environment will assist the Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils in evaluations of the 
potential for on-stream and off-stream storage. It is also recommended that adjustments to this plan be 
made, as research results on the potential water management implications of climate change are better 
understood. 3.2 Performance Monitoring Requirements: In partnership with the WPACs, it is recommended 
that performance monitoring of the aquatic environment be conducted, to support any refinements to the 
WCO and allocation recommendations, including the following: i) Flow monitoring to confirm water 
modelling results and adherence to designated WCOs. ii) Tracking and reporting of actual water diversions 
and consumption. iii) Water quality monitoring, particularly for dissolved oxygen and temperature, to 
confirm modelling results, and to help ensure protection of the aquatic environment. Additional parameters 
such as nutrients and pesticides could be monitored using the Long-term River Network program and 
targeted water quality initiatives. iv) Assessment of biological communities, particularly fish populations 
and riparian forests.  
480 Ibid. at 18. See: 3.2 Performance Monitoring Requirements. 
481 Ibid. 
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basin level for the WPAC. In effect, these activities establish an adaptive management 
approach for the local water committee.  
4.4.3  At a Local WPAC Level: The BRBC’s Watershed Reports 
However, at a local level, the BRBC’s The State of Watershed Reports – the Bow River 
Basin (2005 & 2010) exhibit a limited ability to respond to emergent change. 482 These 
Reports are primarily directed at three issues: First, creating an understanding of the 
quantity and quality water challenges facing the watershed. Second, achieving an 
“adaptive management framework that enables research, actions and best practices 
needed to improve the health of the watershed.”483 Third, “ensur[ing] information and 
knowledge of our water resources is the foundation for sustainable development, 
enhanced conservation and, effective decision-making.”484  
 Together, these two lower-level informational Reports outline the ecological state 
and challenges facing the four rivers within the watershed: the Red Deer, Bow, South 
Saskatchewan, and Oldman rivers. A review of the 2005 and 2010 Report finds no 
discussion of emerging water issues. Emerging water issues, such as the pharmaceuticals 
in water sources, nutrient run-off, impact of climate change (e.g., flooding) and fracking 
are overlooked in the Reports.  
 The Watershed Reports direct the WPAC members to consider “communication 
and collaboration.”485 However, the report’s discussion of collaboration is limited to a 
closing section and offers one statement. This strategic placement of consensus at the end 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
482 Bow River Basin Council, “BRBC State of Watershed Report: Nuture, Renew, Protect”, (2005), BRBC, 
online: <http://wsow.brbc.ab.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=93&Itemid=179>. 
483 State of Watershed 2010 Report, Supra note 391 at 43.  
484 Ibid.  
485 Ibid at 187. Refer to Chapter 12: What needs to change? 12.4 Closing Statement: …Communication and 
collaboration among those involved in watershed management are essential to ensure the responsible use 
and conservation of water resources in the basin. 
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of document reinforces the function of these Reports as environmental reporting 
documents.  
In summary, the SSRP plan and the Water Act place a strong emphasis upon 
water quantity issues, which may narrow the water-planning exercise and limit the 
WPAC’s ability to be responsive to a change in water quality. While the plan envisions a 
localized management function and duties, the question remains open: Is the WPAC 
decision-making directed at water quantity, the legislatively dominant water feature, or 
water quality? The WPAC’s water-management activities, such as collecting and 
reporting of local information such as river flows and biological and chemical aspects of 
the river basin, foster an emergent-change perspective. However, this ecological 
perspective of a river is offset by the legislation’s strong emphasis on water allocation 
through licences. In the end, the BRBC’s reporting function — The State of Watershed 
Reports – the Bow River Basin (2005 & 2010) can be viewed as a key communication 
mechanism to inform the other three Water for Life partners and the public of the water 
quantity and quality water challenges facing the local watershed. As these science-based 
reports link policy changes with scientific information, they can be considered an 
informational tool for public education and, when read together, perhaps signal an 
ecological change to state of the watershed. However, these Reports offer a snapshot of 
static moment in time of a breathing river raising doubt the local water committee’s 
information function is responsive to ecological change as envisioned by an adaptive 
management approach. 
5.0  The Eco-Resiliency Framework in Practice – The WPAC & Consensus-
Building  
On June 13th 2012, I arrived at Calgary’s Ralph Klein Park to attend a WPAC meeting 
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during a heavy rainfall. The torrent of rain outside the meeting facility turned my mind to 
the wetland feature of the Ralph Klein Park. A key ecological design of the Park is the 
“man-made wetland that uses natural vegetation to treat storm water before it is 
discharged into the Bow River,” perhaps reminding some attendees of the subject matter 
of the WPAC meeting – the breathing river. 486 The meeting room was filled to capacity. 
Throughout the daylong meeting, several individuals presented reports and findings 
relating to the ecological state of river basin. The only contentious issue that arose that 
day was the meaning of consensus. On what basis should the consensus definition 
provided in the BRBC Administrative Manual’s be amended?   
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Province’s Enabling Partnership Report 
and the Alberta Water Council’s Watershed Management Planning Report and Shared 
Governance Partnership Report and the WPAC’s administrative manual discuss the 
importance of a consensus-based decision-making process. In particular, the “consensus” 
is defined as “a decision-making process that not only seeks the agreement of participants 
but also works to resolve or mitigate the objections of the minority to achieve the most 
agreeable decision.”487 In this view, consensus is achieved when the majority of the 
participants “can live with”488  with the decision. A robust form of consensus arises 
through exploring dissenting opinions while also attempting to take account of the 
participants’ diverse views. The BRBC’s Administrative Consolidated (2012) Manual 
also directs the WPAC to make flexible consensus-based decisions and provides a 
specific definition of “consensus” that is tied to gaining support of 70% to 80% of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 Ralph Klein Park, City of Calgary, online: <http://www.calgary.ca/CSPS/Parks/Pages/Locations/SE-
parks/Ralph-Klein-Park.aspx>. 
487 AWC’s Watershed Planning Framework, Supra. note 415. 
488 Ibid. 
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participants and is contingent on four pre-conditions.489  
As an observer of the heated debate amongst the meeting participants over the 
meaning of consensus, I noticed none of the participants referenced the aforementioned 
WPAC documents (for example, BRBC Administrative Manual: C.5.2 Conflict and 
Complaint Resolution Procedure and Alberta Water Council’s-Strengthening 
Partnerships: A Shared Governance Framework for Water for Life Collaborative 
Partnerships Report (September 2008). Rather, in the midst of the debate, these 
individuals either relied upon their own knowledge of the term or Internet definitions of 
the term. As the dispute gained strength and the tension rose in the meeting room, it was 
suggested that the amendment (to the definition of consensus) under debate be deferred to 
the next meeting. Throughout the heated discussion the facilitator did not guide the group 
to invoke the procedural consensus-voting mechanism set out in the BRBC’s 
administrative manual. As an observer, I perceived the meeting’s goal to be the creation 
of a collegial environment, while diminishing dissent and conflict, and need to consult 
with stakeholder groups in order to gather information required to update the state of the 
watershed reports. Based on my observations and the Executive Director’s comment that 
I witnessed the most contentious debate (over the meaning of consensus) during his 
tenure at the WPAC, this local governance function is one of process management rather 
than responsiveness to emergent change in the riverbasin or watershed.   
6.0  Conclusion: The Puzzling State of Water Governance 
In this chapter, the mapping of the eco-resiliency to the local watershed-planning and 
advisory council (WPAC) reveals a governance regime carried out by the non-regulatory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 BRBC Manual, Supra note 389. Refer to: A.4 BRBC Values. 
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entity. The WPAC is supported by a flexible legislative and policy structure that hinges 
upon the decision-making principle of consensus. However, articulating a defined 
institutional form and function for the WPAC is difficult.  
 Alberta’s multi-level water governance arrangement is created by a plethora of 
reports, policies and directives. This soft-law approach to governing water through 
numerous high level provincial policies and the introduction of a four-way partnership 
model blurs the administrative state’s role in governing water. This complex and puzzling 
arrangement leaves uncertain the province’s accountability for water governance and the 
boundaries of the WPAC’s function. This unclear policy hierarchy structure leaves open 
numerous questions. For example, How has the province’s environmental decision-
making powers been altered?  
 This empirical research affirms water governance in Alberta is primarily 
structured by a policy-driven soft-law approach resulting in a maze of documents with 
the dominant policy being Alberta’s Water for Life Strategy. These policies establish a 
localized mode of water governance bringing together a diverse range of state and non-
state actors to make decisions concerning the Bow River. Their decisions act as a filter to 
ensure certain issues and information are reported upon and prioritized – with the issue of 
water quantity being the dominant concern. This collaborative decision-making 
arrangement further implicates the power relations within the group and beyond the 
planning table. The effect of the power dimension means certain issues are reported on 
while other important issues are excluded for example, fracking, climate change effects, 
culture concerns, and Aboriginal peoples’ perspectives.  
 The localized WPAC allows the provincial government to gather information on 
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the river basin from various stakeholder groups. This information is brought forward to a 
higher, broader provincial level. But, it is unclear how the provincial government uses 
this information. The Alberta Water Council (AWC) appears to be the authority that 
responds to provincial state interests. The AWC is also responsive to the WPACs’ need 
for guidance on particular decision-making issues, as demonstrated by the need for the 
internal review process and the introduction of the idea of shared governance and 
consensus building amongst actors.  
 Consequently, the administrative state’s role in water governance remains vague. 
In this soft-law governance experiment, the province through a partnership model moves 
into a new role of overseer of water governance and the conditions for an uncertain legal 
regime arise. At the local WPAC level, the regulator’s presence and administrative 
environmental regulatory role remain open to debate. It is difficult to identify the 
provincial government’s environmental governance function, accountability for 
environmental protection and its role in the local decision-making process. Alberta’s 
water governance regime is a puzzling, complex, and fragmented policy-driven approach 
to governing water. Thus, I describe Alberta as an enigma state.  
 At the end of this research, several questions remain open: What is the provincial 
government’s role in water governance? And, how do the watershed planning and 
advisory council’s decisions shape the water governance in the province of Alberta? In 
the Chapter Six, the analysis chapter, the interview data is examined to understand if the 
WPAC decision-makers can shed light on the role of the provincial government and 
whether or not they view the decision-making process as exhibiting the features of the 
eco-resiliency framework.  
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Chapter Five:  
The Yukon: The Mechanized State: The State’s Stable and  
Routine Form of Water Governance Mediated through the  
Yukon’s Waters Act490 
1.0 Overview  
“In the Yukon, mining is in the culture.”491 This expression captures the mentality of 
miners in the Yukon  -- or at least, this belief was what the miners thought to be true 
before the Yukon Water Board (Board) heard the Western Copper–Carmacks (Carmacks) 
decision in May 2010.492 In that decision, the Board denied Western Copper Ltd. a water 
license. This unexpected decision created a ripple effect within the extractive industry. In 
the past, predictability had been a hallmark of the Board’s decision-making process, 
especially true in situations where the mining proponent had already secured the 
environmental approvals for the project. 493  In the Yukon’s mining sector, all notions of 
predictability seem to have disappeared with the Carmacks decision.  
 As I sat observing the July 4-6, 2012 public hearing held in the informal setting of 
a cross-country ski lodge with majestic mountains and the Yukon River as a backdrop, I 
was struck by the formality and the air of certainty that hung over the Board’s 
administrative process. 494 In considering the Capstone Mining Corporation’s application, 
the Board’s machine-like operation delivered its administrative function “in a routinized, 
efficient, reliable, and predictable way.”495 During this hearing, the Board’s streamlined 
procedural process ensured an orderly production of evidence and presentation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 SY 2003, c. 19, amended by SY 2007, c.6. (WA, 2003)  
491 Fraser Report, Infra. note 512 at 39.  
492 Carmacks, Infra note 568. 
493 Yukon Water Board, “YESAA and the Yukon Water Board: How do they link?”, Yukon Water Board, 
online: < http://www.yukonwaterboard.ca/policy/Info%20Sheets/YESAA%20and%20YWB.pdf>. 
494 On July 4-6, 2012, the Board held a public meeting to hear the Capstone Mining Corporation’s 
application to amend the company’s existing Type A water license for its Minto mine. 
495 Gareth Morgan Images of Organization (Newbury Park: Sage, 1986) at 22. 
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submissions by an array of participants that exposed the Minto Explorations Ltd.’s (a 
subsidiary of Capstone Mining Corporation) breach of its existing water use licence 
(#QZ96-006) and provided for the management of the illegal activities.      
 In this mechanized adjudicative function, the “Water Board is the sole decision-
maker under the Act regarding applications for water use and waste deposit.”496 Justice 
Veale, in Western Copper and Carmacks Copper Ltd (2011) decision affirmed “[t]he 
Water Board’s jurisdiction to regulate the use of water and discharge of waste into water 
must be respected.” 497  The Court’s strong affirmation of the Board’s administrative 
licensing function is distinct from an enforcement and compliance function. In the 
Board’s view, the Yukon Government “is the sole authority responsible for enforcement 
of Water Licences issued by the Board.” 498  But, what happens when the Yukon 
Government has withdrawn as an intervenor at a public hearing and instead, has chosen 
to participate as an observer? Does this mean the Board is charged with upholding the 
public’s interest in the protection of water in addition to the conservation, development 
and utilization of waters in the Yukon?  
2.0  Introduction 
In the Yukon, the Board is the regulatory body responsible for administering water 
permits. Mining proponents seeking regulatory approval from the Board expect 
predictable administrative processes. For Western Copper, the Board’s denial of its 
application for a 25-year Type-A water license was an unexpected result. At this 
regulatory stage with environmental approvals in place, Western Copper expected its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 Yukon Water Board, “Reasons For Decision: Water Use Application QZ11-031 (Amend 8 of QZ96-
006), Minto Explorations Ltd”. at 3. Reasons for Decision, online: 
<http://www.yukonwaterboard.ca/registers/quartz/QZ11-031/10.4.pdf>. 
497 Western Copper Corporation v. Yukon Water Board 2011 YKSC 16. at para. 140. 
498 YWB, QZ11-031, Supra note 496 at 3.  
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“open pit” quartz-mining project and “heap leach” technology would pass easily through 
the Board’s approval process.499 The evidence indicated the heap leach facility would 
impact both the “groundwater wells within the Upper William Creek and make-up water 
(i.e., sediment ponds) affecting a tributary of the Yukon River.” 500 Despite the evidence, 
the project proponent, with the environmental approvals in place, appeared confident in 
the public hearing that the Board would grant the water permit.501 For Western Copper in 
particular and the mining industry in general, the denial of the license marked an 
unexpected administrative turn in the Board’s water-licensing process.  
 In the aftermath of the Carmacks (2010) decision, some observers questioned 
whether the Board’s decision-making process held back the wave of burgeoning 
economic opportunities washing over the Yukon. In July 2012, the Board held a public 
meeting to hear the Capstone Mining Corporation’s application to amend the company’s 
existing Type-A water license for its Minto mine. The public gallery was filled to 
capacity. “So goes mining so goes the Yukon” and with the Minto project, Premier 
Pasloski’s public statement points to the socio-economic rewards of the project. 502 The 
rewards were expected to be high for the company, for the First Nations communities and 
the Yukon government. Given the stakes were high, a large number of mining executives 
(representing future Yukon mining projects - Western Cooper’s proposed Casino mine) 
and government officials attended the hearing as observers. As a participant-observer of 
the Board’s hearing process, I attended the hearing, sharing space and conversation with 
these gallery observers. Like me, these bystanders wondered if the licensing process had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
499 Ibid. 
500 Ibid.  
501 I am thankful to Arthur Pape for his insight on the turning points at the Yukon Water Board’s public 
hearing for the Carmacks water use license application.  
502 Premier’s Darrell Pasloski Budget Speech, Infra note 516.  
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changed as result of the 2010 Carmacks decision.  
 In his opening remarks at the Capstone July 2012 public hearing, Board Chair Mr. 
Bruce Willis expressed his disappointment in the Yukon government’s lack of 
involvement in the Minto application. The absence of the Yukon Government at the 
hearing was also recorded by the Board in the Introduction section of the decision 
document #QZ11-031. While the Yukon government, acted as an intervenor in the earlier 
Western Copper 2010 hearing, the government declined to participate in this proceeding 
for the Capstone’s Minto mine water use licence amendment #8. Rather, the Yukon 
government officials attended the hearing as observers, like me. One might view the 
Yukon government’s lack of input into the Board’s decision-making process as signaling 
the alignment of a government line department with Premier’s public support of the 
extractive industry.  
 After three days of the public hearing, the Board held that Capstone was in 
violation of the Water Act, 2003. This holding related to six illegal activities at the Minto 
mine. The Board found Capstone had “initiated prior to the [July 2012 public] hearing 
and prior to the “issuance of an amended water licence.”503 The six activites cited by the 
Board are as follows:  
1.   “The Licensee began mining of the Area 2 pit on April 15, 2011 and has produced 
waste (overburden, rock and ore) as part of the that process. Mining of waste rock 
and ore has been on-going since the Licensee’s operational decision to proceed. 
 
2.   The Licensee made an operational decision on or around April 19th, 2012 to mill 
area 2 ore.  
 
3.   Milling of area 2 ore and the subsequent placement of tailings..on the existing dry 
stack tailings storage facility (DSTSF) have been on-going since the Licensee’s 
operational decision to proceed was made.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 Minto, QZ11-031, Supra note 496 at 5.  
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4.   Water affected by the operational decisions to min and mill Area 2 has been and 
continues to be stored in the Mine Pit. 
 
5.   Temporary realignment of the South Diversition Ditch was completed by the 
Licensee at some unknown date in advance of the hearing. 
 
6.   Construction of the Mill Valley Fill was initiatied by the Licensee in May 
2011.”504 
 
For example, the Board in its decision-making considered on the issue of mining and 
milling of Area 2 ore that Capstone (Licensee) in its YESAA submission identified these 
as new actitivties. However, Capstone’s submission to the Water Board differed. 
Capstone’s submission to the Board suggested the activites at Area 2 were not “new 
activities” but in fact were included in an earlier amendment document (i.e., number 7 
not the current amendment number 8). While the Board considered Capstone’s 
persepective that “the initiation of the Water Use Licence amendment review process as 
sufficient regulatory grounds to begin milling area 2 ore,” 505  the Board disagreed. 
Through its questioning procedure, the Board found that “Licensee did in fact know that 
mining and milling of Area 2 ores were not authorized by Amendment 7.”506 Thus, on 
this issue, the mining company was found to have breached the licence.  
 Given the Yukon government’s supportive political climate for the mining sector 
combined with the self-regulatory nature of a water licence and the mining proponent’s 
infractions of the Waters Act, concerns are raised as to who the government is responsive 
to – the public’s interest in environmental protection, the mining industry’s need for 
water and its’ regulatory enforcement and compliance function? The change in the 
government’s participation in the Water Board’s public hearing process – where it had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 Ibid. at 4-5. 
505 Ibid. at 5. 
506 Ibid. at 6.  
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been a key contributor to the Board’s process in past hearings  — highlights the need to 
explore the multiple influences affecting these administrative decision-makers and their 
decisions. 
3.0  Background 
3.1 The Federal Level 
In Canada’s natural resources sector, the tagline “Responsible Resource Development”507 
brands Canada’s Economic Action Plan (Action Plan) and is featured in the 2012 Federal 
Budget.508 The Action Plan’s obscure approach to water governance and the details of 
how water is governed lie buried under the rhetoric of an economic development 
platform. The Action Plan locates the extractive industry as one of the country’s strategic 
economic pillars. Yet, the Action Plan omits the contribution of water resources to 
economic activities.  
 Prime Minister Harper, in his 2011 Throne Speech, reinforced the importance of 
the development of the natural resources sector.509 In the federal government’s view, the 
Action Plan encourages economic prosperity at local, national, and global levels, engages 
a flourishing natural resources sector, and strategically harnesses the resource-rich 
Territories. Select regions in northern Canada, including the Yukon, have been 
encouraged “to capitalize on the resource development potential” in order “to stimulate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 Government of Canada, “Responsible Resource Development Overview”, Canada’s Economic Action 
Plan, online: Gov’t of Canada <http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/page/r2d-dr2/overview>. 
508 Government of Canada, “Budget 2012: Backgrounder – Responsible Resource Development,” online: 
Gov’t Canada, <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2012/home-accueil-eng.html> and 
<http://www.budget.gc.ca/2012/rd-dc/bdc3-eng.html>. 
509 Government of Canada, Speech From the Throne, 3 June 2011, Ottawa, Canada, online: Gov’t Canada 
<http://www.speech.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1390>. In the 2011 Throne Speech, the development of the 
natural resources sector and streamlining regulatory supportive systems was emphasized, as exhibited by 
the following statements: “Our Government is committed to developing Canada’s extraordinary resource 
wealth in a way that protects the environment… It will engage the provinces, territories and industry on 
ways to improve the regulatory and environmental assessment process for resource projects, while ensuring 
meaningful consultation with affected communities, including Aboriginal communities.” 
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jobs and growth in a period of global economic uncertainty.” 510  Natural resource 
development in the Yukon was viewed as a strategic advantage in the global economic 
crisis. However, missing from the Federal government’s economic development 
discourse is water governance. Who gets to decide the fate of the Yukon’s water 
resources?  
Numerous factors have contributed to the success of Canada’s mining industry to 
extract and to export commodities. As a strategic plan, the Responsible Resource 
Development program is a response to the post-2008 global economic downturn, 511 
increasing worldwide demand for commodities, and positive commodity price projections 
(see, in particular, copper512). These events, combined with the vast mineral deposits 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510 Government of Canada, Canada’s Economic Action Plan, “Frequently Asked Questions: Responsible 
Resource Development, online: Gov’t Canada <http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/page/r2d-dr2/frequently-asked-
questions-responsible-resource-development#q1>. Q1. What is the purpose of Responsible Resource 
Development? There is a tremendous new global opportunity for Canada to capitalize on its resource 
development potential to stimulate jobs and growth in a period of global economic uncertainty. In today’s 
global economy, we simply cannot afford a cumbersome regulatory system full of delays, unnecessary 
duplication and unpredictable timelines that could jeopardize billions of dollars in investment in our energy 
and mining sectors. Therefore, building on the commitment in Canada’s Economic Action Plan 2012, the 
Government intends to introduce new legislation to implement its Responsible Resource Development 
initiative to bring Canada’s regulatory review system into the 21st century. Its goal is simple and 
straightforward: to make Canada the most attractive country in the world for resource investment and 
development, while protecting our environment today for future generations of Canadians. That is what 
Responsible Resource Development is all about: greater efficiency, more effective environmental protection 
and enhancing consultations with Aboriginal Canadians. [Emphasis Added]. Q2. Why is regulatory reform 
necessary? Our abundant natural resources form the backbone of Canada’s economy… In fact, it has been 
estimated that there could be more than 500 projects worth some $500 billion over the next 10 years in our 
energy and mining sectors. But, our outdated system of rules could put that investment at risk. That is why 
we need to eliminate duplication and delays in our regulatory system and focus our efforts to ensure 
efficient and effective reviews for major projects.”  
511 Government of Canada, “Budget Plan-Chapter 1: Introduction”, Federal Government of Canada, online: 
Gov’t Canada <http://www.budget.gc.ca/2012/plan/chap1-eng.html>. In Chapter One, it states: “Canada is 
emerging from the global economic recession. The economy’s strengths provide an opportunity for the 
Government to take significant actions today that will fuel the next wave of job creation and position 
Canada for a secure and prosperous future. Economic Action Plan 2012 sets out a comprehensive agenda to 
bolster Canada’s fundamental strengths and address the important challenges confronting the economy over 
the long term.” 
512 S. Absolom and T. Goldsmith, “Mine: The Growing Disconnect Report – Review of global trends in the 
mining industry – 2012”, online: PriceWaterhouseCooper <http://download.pwc.com/gx/mining/pwc-mine-
2012.pdf>. A theme in the Report is increasing prices of commodities, including copper, which is tied to 
the profitability of the industry sector. At page 29 of the report, the price of copper was reported increasing 
as: “Copper: On an annual average basis, copper prices were up over 2010. Also see F. McMahon & M. 
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located in northern Canada, including Nunavut and the Yukon, have intensified the 
pressure to develop these resources. The Federal government set the stage, through 
various federal tax initiatives, for the extractive industry to prosper in the Yukon and 
across northern Canada. 513 In the Yukon, with this economic development push, the 
conditions for the classic economic development versus environment protection debate 
are present, as international, federal, and local governments work in partnership514 to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Cervantes, “Fraser Institute Annual: Survey of Mining Companies 2011/2012: What miners are saying” at 
39. online: Fraser Institute <http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-
news/research/publications/mining-survey-2011-2012.pdf>. At page 5, in Fraser Institute’s Report, the 
authors indicate that mining executives expect…copper prices to increase by up to 50%” pointing to an 
industry interest in extracting natural resources in the Yukon. Thus, we should expect robust mining sector 
over the next decade, if commodity prices continue to rise.  
513 Government of Canada, “Phasing Out the Corporate Mineral Exploration and Development Tax Credit”, 
Canada’s Economic Action Plan, Online: Gov’t Canada <http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/initiative/phasing-out-
corporate-mineral-exploration-and-development-tax-credit>. The Federal Government’s website highlights 
the tax reductions directed at the mining sector: “ Actions taken by the Government since 2006, including 
corporate income tax rate reductions and the elimination of the federal capital tax, have increased the 
competitiveness of Canada’s mining sector.” Also see: PricewaterhouseCoopers “2012 Federal Budget 
Highlights” Newsletter. The online newsletter states: 1) 15% Mineral Exploration Tax Credit for flow-
through share investors extended until March 2013. The Federal Government plans to extend the temporary 
15% Mineral Exploration Tax Credit for flow-through share investors for an additional year. This credit 
helps junior exploration companies raise capital by providing an incentive to individuals who invest in 
flow-through shares issued to finance mineral exploration. 2) Phased out: 10% Mineral Exploration and 
Development Tax Credit & Atlantic Investment Tax Credit for oil & gas mining assets acquired after 2015, 
online: PriceWaterhouseCooper <http://www.pwc.com/ca/en/tax/budgets/2012/index.jhtml>. Also see B. 
Carr and S. Jeffery, “KPMG: Cutting Through Complexity – KPMG Canada: A Guide to Canadian Mining 
Taxation” (September 2011), online: KPMG 
<http://www.kpmg.com/Ca/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/5539_KPMG_A%20Gu
ide%20to%20Canadian%20Mining%20Taxation_web.pdf>. At page 3 of the Report, the authors state: “In 
many respects, Canada’s tax environment is favourable to business and in particular to mining activities.” 
Also see R.F. Ralbovsky, Corporate Income Taxes, Mining Royalties and Other Mining Taxes: A Summary 
of Rates and Rules in Selected Countries – Global Mining Industry Update (June 2012), online: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers <http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/energy-utilities-mining/publications/pdf/pwc-
gx-miining-taxes-and-royalties.pdf>. In the Tax Incentive for Mining Industry Section of the Report, the 
authors describe Canada as: “a flexible and generous tax regime for exploration expenditures, only for base 
metals, precious metals and diamonds. Provincial tax incentives are also available to mining companies in 
Canada.” At page 19 of the Report, a detailed summary of the tax structure for Canada is set out. At page 1, 
the Report states that the validity of the information is considered “correct as at January 2012, unless 
otherwise specified.” Note: The tax changes set out in 2012 Federal Budget might not be set out in the 
summary chart.  
514 S. Alfonzo, LL.B., Mining @ Gowlings Newsletter “How the 2012 Federal Budget Impacts the 
Canadian Mining Industry”. (April 17, 2012 – Volume 1, Number 2), online: Gowlings 
<http://www.gowlings.com/KnowledgeCentre/enewsletters/mining/HtmFiles/V1N02_20120416.en.html>. 
In the Newsletter under the heading, Measures to Expand Trade and Open New Markets, Alfonzo outlines 
2012 Budget implications for encouraging trade and investment opportunities in emerging markets: For 
example, she states: Alfonzo expects that “These initiatives will likely assist in encouraging and promoting 
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develop “Canada’s extraordinary resource wealth in a way that protects the 
environment.”515 With this strong support from the Federal government for the extractive 
sector, just how responsive are those decision makers charged with regulating water 
resources in the Yukon to ecological change and environmental protection concerns. 
3.2 The Provincial Level 
In 2012, at a Territorial government level, Premier Darrell Pasloski identified the mining 
sector as a key industry driver of economic development in the Yukon.516 According to 
Pasloski, the Yukon’s robust mining sector relies on strong commodity prices, the 
Federal government’s support, and a streamlined regulatory regime.517 In a speech, the 
Premier noted the growth in the sector, “[m]ineral exploration in the territory increased 
from less than $10 million to more than $300 million in 2011. There are 107 active 
mining companies in the territory today who staked a record 114,587 claims in 2011.”518 
This expansion in mining activity explains, in part, the Yukon’s healthy GDP. In 
Pasloski’s view, the extractive industry has driven the Yukon’s emerging reputation as an 
economic leader in Canada and “one the brightest lights on Canada’s economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
foreign investment in Canadian mining companies.”; Also see PricewaterhouseCoopers, “2012 Federal and 
Provincial Budgets’ Analysis and Commentary”, online: PricewaterhouseCoopers 
<http://www.pwc.com/ca/en/tax/budgets/2012/index.jhtm>. In PWC’s online newsletter, it states “Gov’t 
looks to foreign trade opportunities with China, EU, India, Asia-Pac, Trans-Pacific Partnership, “Mercosur” 
and Africa”.  
515 Government of Canada, Speech From the Throne, Supra note 509.  
516 Yukon Government, “Premier Darrell Pasloski, Budget Address 2012-2013 to First session of the 
Thirty-Third Yukon Legislative Assembly, Whitehorse, Yukon (March 15, 2012)”, Finance Department, 
online: <http://www.finance.gov.yk.ca/pdf/budget/2012_2013_speech_e.pdf>. At page 4 of the speech, the 
Premier attributes the positive economic status of the Yukon to the mining sector, “ Yukon’s mining sector 
is primarily responsible for this growth and 90% of exploration in Yukon is conducted by junior 
exploration companies which contribute significantly to the Yukon’s economic development. Between 
2004 and 2006 total exploration expenditures increased from $22 million in 2004 to just over $100 million 
in 2006. Expenditures in 2007 were $140 million, $110 million in 2008 and a $100 million in 2009. 
Exploration expenditures for 2011 are estimated to be over $300 million, almost twice the previous record 
of $157 million set in 2010.” 
517 Ibid.  
518 Ibid.  
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horizon.”519  In the speech, Premier Pasloski also cited the Capstone’s Minto Mine’s 
contribution to the region’s economic prosperity, low employment rate, strong demand 
for housing, and healthy retail sector. The Premier’s strong support of the Minto mining 
project points to the high economic stakes underpinning Capstone’s upcoming water 
license amendment hearing.520 Over the next decade, several new mines will come into 
production.521 In Pasloski’s view, a supportive Federal government can encourage the 
growth of the mining industry and promote partnerships with First Nations through 
numerous tax and royalty measures and a streamlined regulatory regime.522All of these 
political, tax and economic development factors point to a positive investment climate 
and a continued strong performance of the extractive industry in the Yukon.523  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
519 Ibid. 
520 Ibid.. The Premier highlighted three active mines in his budget speech: at p 7 he mentioned that the 
Yukon has three operating mines: 1) Capstone’s Minto Mine 2) Alexco’s Keno Hill Mine properties; and 3) 
Yukon Zinc’s Wolverine Mine.  
521 Ibid. In several pages of his budget speech, the Premier highlighted the importance of the mining 
industry to the Yukon. For example, at page 5 of the speech, he stated: “There are 107 active mining 
companies in the territory who staked 83,161 quartz claims in 2010 and a record 114,587 claims in 2011. 
With three operating mines, the current mineral production value is estimated to be approximately $420 
million…” He continues at page 6, where he further explains: that “Massive sulphide zinc/lead/silver 
mineralization was first discovered near Vangorda Creek in the Anvil Range in 1953. The huge Faro ore 
body was discovered in 1965 and mine production commenced in 1970 and continued intermittently until it 
finally closed in 1997…” And, finally, at page 9 he references, in addition to 12 expected mining proposals, 
he also points to opening of old mines and potential mining activities: “…Western Copper and Gold’s 
Casino property due west of Pelly Crossing is another massive deposit containing gold, copper, 
molybdenum and silver having a twenty three to fifty year mine life. Should it proceed to construction, it 
would create 17,691 jobs in Canada with 3,340 jobs being in Yukon during the four year construction 
phase, and 1,610 jobs in Canada with 1,054 being in Yukon for the operations phase.”; also see E. 
Schiman, “More Mining in the Yukon: What it Means for Yukoners”, (2007-05-01), online: Canadian 
Mining Journal, <http://www.canadianminingjournal.com/news/more-mining-in-yukon/1000212937/>; 
also see Highlights from The Conference Board of Canada’s , Territorail Outlook Report, online: The 
Conference Board of Canada <http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/abstract.aspx?did=4715>. The 
online highlights state: “Canada’s North is benefiting greatly from the strength in commodity prices. Real 
GDP growth in the territories will far outpace the national average over the next two years.” 
522 Energy and Mining Ministers Regulatory Performance Improvement Working Group, “Regulatory 
Improvements Across Canada” (June 2008), see The Yukon Government tab, online: Gov’t of Canada 
<http://mpmo.gc.ca/reports-publications/82#i16>. Gov’t of Canada 
523 K. Bromley, O. Cushing, J. Cook and C. Dusser, “Canada’s Territories: The Emerging North” 
(November, 2012). Engineering and Mining Journal, online: Global Business Reports 
<http://www.gbreports.com/admin/reports/Canada-Territories_Mining2012.pdf>. 
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 Notably, neither the Territorial government’s economic development policies nor 
the Federal government’s “responsible resource development” rhetoric considers water 
governance. Premier Pasloski has publicly acknowledged the advocacy efforts of several 
Yukon environmental and conservation groups that promote the protection the Peel 
watershed. Specifically, on the issue of the Peel Watershed plan, the Premier argues the 
Yukon Party’s historic third-term win clearly signaled the public’s affirmation of a 
balanced water-governance approach. In his view, the Peel Watershed plan should 
incorporate both environmental and economic interests. 524  The Premier’s economic 
growth narrative, combined with his government’s strong economic prosperity sentiment, 
reinforced by national and global political interests points to an unyielding preference for 
economic development. In light of the federal government’s advance of the natural 
resource sector and the Territories’ economic development orientation, further scrutiny is 
placed on the Yukon’s multi-leveled water regulatory regime to understand whether 
economic objectives are privileged and the Federal government’s economic recovery 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 Premier Darrell Pasloski, Budget Address 2012-2013, Supra. note 516. In the Yukon Party’s view, it 
appears the party’s third term win demonstrates a social license to support mining in the Yukon. The 
Premier stated: At p 22…despite the controversy over the Peel Watershed Regional Land Use Plan, Yukon 
Party governments have done more to protect and preserve Yukon’s environment and wildlife than any 
previous Yukon government…at p 23 The Peel Watershed Regional Land Use Plan was an issue in the 
2011 territorial election campaign. The Yukon Conservation Society, the Canadian Parks and Wilderness 
Society, the Opposition political parties and the four affected First Nations all indicated they were 
supporting positions of either 100% to 80% protection for the Peel Watershed. During the election 
campaign, the Yukon Party did not indicate its support for this high level of protection, but called instead 
for a final Peel plan that protects the environment and respects all sectors of the economy. We were 
severely criticized for taking this position by those supporting 100% to 80% protection. Mr Speaker, there 
were cars driving around with the bumper stickers reading “Protect the Peel. Let’s vote on it”. On October 
11, 2011, Yukoners did exercise their vote and elected a majority Yukon Party government for a historic 
third term. [Emphasis Added].; Also see: In The First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v. Yukon (Government 
of), 2014 YKSC 69 at paragraphs [186] to [187], Justice R.S. Veale refers to the Yukon government’s 
desire for a “more balance” [Peel Watershed] plan,” a balanced approach allowing for “increased options 
for access” for commerical interests in the watershed. In this land-use planning decision, the Court relied 
upon UFA to consider the Yukon Government’s refurishment of the Peel Watershed Plan. In the end, 
Justice Veale quashed the Yukon government’s  approved Peel Watershed Plan of January 2014.  
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strategy is indirectly promoted. The next section outlines the legal framework for water 
governance in the Yukon.  
4.0  The Yukon’s Fragmented Legal Structure 
4.1  Introduction 
In the Yukon, water governance is a multi-level governance arrangement. Governance 
responsibilities are shared between the Federal and Yukon government and First Nations 
resulting in a fragmented regime. Three key legal instruments frame the shared legal 
water-governance arrangement:  
1. The Waters Act, SY 2003, c 19., amended by SY 2007, c.6., 
2. The Umbrella Final Agreement, May 29, 1993, between The Government of 
Canada, The Council For Yukon Indians and The Government of the Yukon; 525  
and,  
3. The Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation Final Agreement, July 21, 1997 
between The Government of Canada and The Little Salmon/Carmacks First 
Nation and The Government of the Yukon.526  
All three legal governance regimes feature the Yukon Water Board.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 Council for Yukon Indians and The Government of Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development) and Government Leader of the Yukon, “Umbrella Final Agreement Between The 
Government Of Canada, The Council For Yukon Indians And The Government Of The Yukon 
Government” signed May 29, 1993, Whitehorse, Yukon. [Herein after known as the UFA]; also see: Supra 
note 516. Premier Darrell Pasloski comments on the economic influence of the UFA. At page 9, the 
Premier stated: “The Yukon Chamber of Mines attributes the success of the mining industry in Yukon 
today to three key factors: 1. The devolution of land and resource management to the Government of 
Yukon by the Government of Canada in 2003. 2. comprehensive Land Claims Agreements being reached 
with 11 of 14 Yukon First Nations; and 3. the establishment of a single assessment authority on behalf of 
all responsible authorities (Yukon, Canada and First Nations) that has greatly simplified the assessment 
process and provides for more certainty and transparency in the permitting process.” [Emphasis Added].  
526 The Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation and The Government of Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development) and the Government of the Yukon, “Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation 
Final Agreement”, signed near Carmacks, Yukon July 21, 1997.; Supra. note 524; also see In The First 
Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v. Yukon, Justice Veale at paragraph 20 interprets these final agreements as 
“new constitutional arrangements for the Yukon, Canada and Yukon First Nations including provisions” 
for water management planning.  
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 Under the Waters Act, the Yukon Water Board (Board) is the institutional actor 
responsible for approving, assigning conditions, and amending water licences within the 
Territory’s inland waters. 527 The Board’s administrative licensing system authorizes the 
release of contaminants into a water body, indirectly granting permission to pollute. Yet, 
some Canadian industry sectors balk at the Board’s time requirements and approval 
process. Mining executives have expressed frustration with the regulatory regime and 
what they view as an institutional barrier to advancing the industry’s development 
activities.528 In effect, a tension exists between achieving efficiency in the regulatory 
process and fulfilling the Board’s environmental protective role.  
In order to understand how this efficiency versus environmental protection 
tension plays out through Yukon’s fragmented water-governance framework, this chapter 
outlines the legal framework to place the two decisions featured as the Yukon case study, 
the Carmacks (Western Copper)529 and Capstone (Minto Mine)530 decisions, in a social-
legal context. The chapter’s purpose is threefold. Firstly, this chapter will describe the 
legal water-governance framework and clarify the role and function of the Board with 
respect to its water permit function and environmental protection of waters. Secondly, 
this chapter will determine if and in what ways the eco-resiliency framework and its 
elements operate within the legal governance arrangement of the Board and the Carmacks 
Copper May 10, 2010 Decision and its appeal. Finally, this chapter will identify the 
features of the eco-resiliency framework within the Board’s decision-making function as 
I observed at the Yukon Water Board’s July 4-6, 2012 public hearing of the Capstone’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
527 Waters Act, Supra note 490.  
528 McMahon and Cervantes, Supra note 512.  
529 Carmacks decision, Infra note 568. 
530 Minto, YWB, QZ11-031, Supra. note 496. 
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Minto Mine license amendment. 
5.0  The Legislative Context 
5.1  Introduction – The Big Picture: Environmental Protection in the Yukon 
In the Yukon, environmental protection is provided for under the Environment Act.531 
Under the Act, water is considered an aspect of the environment, and water governance is 
achieved, in part, through the development of “water management plans” and policies.532 
In effect, the Yukon government is responsible for environmental protection, integrated 
water-resource management planning process, development approvals, waste 
management, reduction and recycling, as well as the management of hazardous 
substances in those geographic areas not under the jurisdiction of First Nations. The 
public’s interest in water resources is strengthen through the legislation, which sets out 
the right to “healthful, natural environment,” and declares it to be in the public interest to 
provide each resident a remedy to protect the environment, including the right to 
commence an action in Supreme Court, provided for under s. 8.533  Similar to other 
jurisdictions in Canada, the safety of drinking water quality is considered a public health 
issue, falling under the jurisdiction of The Yukon Department of Health and Social 
Services’ Environmental Health Branch.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
531 R.S.Y., 2002, c. 76.  
532 Ibid. The definition section of the Act sets out an exhaustive meaning of the term “environment” that 
includes water: “environment means (a) air, land and water.” R. Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation. 
(Toronto: Irwin, 1997) at 72. According to Sullivan, an exhaustive definition is the sole meaning of the 
word and its meaning may not vary throughout the legislation. Section 64 provides for a “water 
management plan” which is in effect a resource management plan relating specifically to water.  
533 Environmental Rights: Section 6 reads: The people of the Yukon have the right to a healthful natural 
environment; and, the Declaration is set out in s. 7, which reads: It is hereby declared that it is in the public 
interest to provide every person resident in the Yukon with a remedy adequate to protect the natural 
environment and the public trust.; Generally see: David Boyd on environmental rights.  
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5.2 The Yukon Water Board (Board) & Its Water Governance Role  
The Waters Act, 2003 assigns jurisdiction over the allocation of water from, or the deposit 
of waste into, Yukon waters to the Board.534 The Board’s primary responsibility is the 
granting of licences for either non-domestic water use or the deposit of waste into water. 
The Board’s responsibilities were upheld in the 2003 devolution of federal powers to the 
Yukon government and First Nations. The Board’s governance function and 
administrative structure is set out in the Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA), specifically in 
Chapter 2: General Provisions and Chapter 14: Water Management of the Agreement. 
The UFA and the negotiation of self-government agreements between First Nations and 
the federal and Yukon governments has resulted in not only a distinctive multi-level 
governance arrangement between the parties over the management of water and the 
enactment of water laws, but also a legally endorsed co-management mode of 
governance.  
5.3 What is the connection between The Yukon Waters Act and the Umbrella 
Final Agreement and Little Salmon/Carmacks First National Final 
Agreement? 
In 2001, the signing of the Yukon Northern Affairs Program Devolution Transfer 
Agreement ensured the continuous transition and enactment of the provisions of the 
existing statutory water regime – the Yukon Waters Act, 1993, which informed the 
legislative basis of the Waters Act, 2003. 535  The enactment of the 2003 legislation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534 Waters Act, Supra 490. Also see, Western Copper, Supra. note 497 at para 74. Justice R.S. Veale states: 
“The Waters Act is binding on Yukon which, generally speaking, has the administration and control of all 
wat in Yukon.  
535 Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, Yukon Northern Affairs Program Devolution 
Transfer Agreement. The Devolution Transfer Agreement”, online: INAC <http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/eng/1297283624739>. In particular, under Chapter 2: Transfer of Responsibilities of the Yukon 
Northern Affairs Program Devolution Transfer Agreement between The Yukon Government (YTG) and 
Government of Canada, as represented by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, dated 
October 29, 2001, the YTG was required to enact legislation and supporting regulations that “mirror” 
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reflects the transfer of powers from the Federal to the Yukon government, as result of the 
negotiation and completion of the tri-party Umbrella Final Agreement (signed May 29, 
1993).536  
 The Waters Act, 2003 (Yukon) sets out the role and functions of the Board. 
Section 10, the legislative purpose states: “The objects of the Board are to provide for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
existing water legislation. Specifically, under Section 2.3(a) the YTG was required to “introduce the 
Legislation and support, as a government measure, legislation that: (a) mirrors, to extent practicable , the 
Yukon Placer Mining Act (Canada), the Yukon Quartz Mining Act (Canada), the Yukon Waters Act 
(Canada)…; and”. Under section 2.4, “The YTG shall make regulation that mirror, to the extent 
practicable, the regulations made pursuant to…The Yukon Waters Act (Canada)…, which are in force and 
applicable in the Yukon immediately prior to the Effective Date. 
Furthermore, under Yukon Act S.C. 2002, c. 7, the YTG has the authority under Section 18(1)(n) 
to enact legislation in relation to waters in Yukon. Section 18(1)(n) reads as follows: “18(1) The 
Legislature may make laws in relation to the following classes of subjects in respect of Yukon: (n) waters, 
other than waters in a federal conservation area, including the deposit of waste in those waters, the 
definition of what constitutes waste and the disposition of any right in respect of those waters under 
subsection 48(2);”. The preamble of the Yukon Act states: “An Act to replace the Yukon Act in order to 
modernize it and to implement certain provisions of the Yukon Northern Affairs Program Devolution 
Transfer Agreement, and to repeal and make amendments to other Acts”; thus, providing for and 
implementing the Transfer Agreement.”  
An in-depth explanation of the Yukon Northern Affairs Program Devolution Transfer Agreement 
is provided in the Legislative History of Bill C-39, a Parliamentary Bill to enact the Yukon Act, S.C. 2002, 
c.7. <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/LS/371/371c39-e.htm>. LS-422E; Mary C. Hurley, 
Law and Government Division 3 April 2002, Bill C-39, The Yukon Action Government of Canada, 
Parliamentary Research Branch See Section D. Yukon Northern Affairs Program Devolution Transfer 
Agreement, which states: “Canada and Yukon have long been discussing the transfer of responsibilities 
over natural resources in the Territory. Developments related to the present devolution initiative include the 
following: In 1996, the then Minister issued a consultation paper entitled Devolution of the Northern 
Affairs Program to the Yukon Government; In 1997, Yukon and the CYFN signed an Accord on the 
Devolution of Federal Programs, which outlined principles for a comprehensive devolution process. The 
same year, Canada tabled a Formal Proposal for the transfer of authority over lands and resources, 
including mines and minerals, forestry and inland waters, to the Yukon Government; In 1998, Canada, 
Yukon, the CYFN Grand Chief, on behalf of 11 of 14 YFN, and representatives of the 3 other YFN, signed 
the Yukon Devolution Protocol Accord (Accord), which provided a framework to both guide devolution 
negotiations and permit simultaneous negotiation of unresolved land claims; On 29 October 2001, 
discussions based on principles set out in the Accord culminated in the signing of the Yukon Northern 
Affairs Program Devolution Transfer Agreement (DTA) by Canada and Yukon. In it, Canada undertook to 
introduce legislation, i.e., Bill C-39, to repeal and replace the Yukon Act “to ensure that the [new] 
Legislature has the power to make laws with respect to Public Land, Waters, and the disposition of any 
right or interest in Public Land or of any right in Waters.” Canada is also to rescind the Yukon Placer 
Mining Act, the Yukon Quartz Mining Act and the Yukon Waters Act and related regulations; the Yukon 
Surface Rights Board Act will be repealed effective on a day to be fixed by the Governor in Council 
(Chapter 2: Transfer of Responsibilities). In return, Yukon has undertaken to introduce legislation prior to 
the effective transfer date that mirrors federal legislation to be repealed, and to make regulations mirroring 
related regulations. Should the anticipated Development Assessment legislation not yet be fully in effect, 
Yukon will also introduce legislation to mirror the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, and to have 
regulations prepared that mirror related regulations (Chapter 2).  
The Yukon Water Board: A Brief History, online: YWB, <http://www.yukonwaterboard.ca/role.htm>. 
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conservation, development, and utilization of waters in a manner that will provide the 
optimum benefit from them for all Canadians and for the residents of the Yukon in 
particular.” A similarly worded object was set out in the previously enacted legislation, 
namely the Federal government’s Yukon Waters Act537 and the earlier Northern Inland 
Waters Act.538 Thus, no substantive changes were made to the Waters Act, 2003 from its 
mirror legislation, the Yukon Waters Act, 1993.  
In this multi-level legal framework, The Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA - May 
29, 1993) and the Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation Final Agreement (LSCFNA 
Treaty - July 21, 1997) outline similar water governance regimes and reinforce the 
Board’s water governance function.  The institutional water governance arrangement, 
including the administration and management of water, is set out in Chapter Two and 
Chapter 14 of both the UFA and the LSCFNFA.539 Considering the evolution of the UFA 
and the subsequent LSCFNFA within the legal parlance of “statutory interpretation,” one 
could describe the LSCFNFA as a re-enactment of the UFA or a mirror agreement. 540  
The substantive construction of the UFA is unchanged in the LSCFNFA, except for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
537 S.C. 1992, c. 40. Under s. 12, the Act stated: The objects of the Board are to provide for the 
conservation, development and utilization of waters in a manner that will provide the optimum benefit 
therefrom for all Canadians and for the residents of the Yukon Territory in particular For a description of 
the evolution of water law in the Yukon see: Water Resources Branch, Department of the Environment, 
Government of the Yukon “Water for Nature, Water for People: Yukon Water Fact Sheet” (June 2014) 
online: Government of the Yukon < http://www.env.gov.yk.ca/publications-
maps/documents/FS_history_water_mgmt.pdf>.  
538Northern Inland Waters Act, to revoke the Northern Inland Waters Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1234 , online: 
YWB <http://www.yukonwaterboard.ca/role.htm> “The objects of the boards were: to provide for the 
conservation, development and utilization of the water resources of the Yukon Territory and the Northwest 
Territories in a manner that will provide the optimum benefit there from all Canadians and for the residents 
of the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories in particular” (NIWAs. 10). 
539 The provisions of the UFA are subsumed into the LSCFNFA resulting in a treaty that is premised upon 
the UFA. In essence, the UFA serves as the overarching standard agreement, which is then revised to 
include specific provisions applicable to the Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation. Specifically, under s. 
2.1.3 of the LSCFNFA, the provisions of the UFA are subsumed into the LSCFNFA. Refer to the following: 
[LSCFNFA] – CHAPTER 2 – GENERAL PROVISIONS.  
540 Sullivan, Supra. note 532 at 22.  
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specific provisions referencing the Little Salmon Carmacks First Nation. In the end, the 
Umbrella Final Agreement, as set out in its title, serves as an “umbrella” agreement for 
the LSCFNFA and the role of Yukon Water Board in administrating water licences is 
upheld.  
The Umbrella Final Agreement is considered a “comprehensive land claim 
agreement.”541In Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation542  [Beckman], the 
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) described the signing of the UFA after “20 years of 
negotiation,” as “a monumental achievement.”543 Writing for the majority, Justice Binnie 
describes the form and intent of the “modern comprehensive land claim agreements…[as] 
intend[ing] to create some precision around property and governance rights and 
obligations.” 544  For the Little Salmon Carmacks First Nation (LSCFN), the UFA 545 
together with the subsequent signing of the Little Salmon Carmacks First Nation Final 
Agreement Treaty546 (LSCFNFA, a “modern comprehensive treaty”547) resulted in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
541 M.C. Hurley, “Settling Comprehensive Land Claims,” Parliamentary Brief # PRB 09-16E, Social 
Affairs Division, September 21, 2009.  
542 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103. 
543 Ibid. at para. 2. 
544 Ibid. at para. 12. 
545 Ibid. Justice Deschamps, while agreeing with the Justice Binnie’s conclusion, offers different reasons 
for the conclusion. In several paragraphs, Justice Deschamps provides a detailed description of the UFA. In 
paragraph he states: “In Yukon, the parties sat down to negotiate. An umbrella agreement and 11 specific 
agreements were reached between certain First Nations, the Yukon government and the Government of 
Canada. Through these agreements, the First Nations concerned have taken control of their destiny. The 
agreements, which deal in particular with land and resources, are of course not exhaustive, but they are 
binding on the parties with respect to the matters they cover.” He further states at paragraph 130 that “It 
was after 20 years of negotiations that the Umbrella Final Agreement between the Government of Canada, 
the Council for Yukon Indians and the Government of the Yukon (“Umbrella Agreement”) was signed on 
May 29, 1993. At that time, the Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation was a member of the Council for 
Yukon Indians, and it still is today, along with nine other First Nations. The Umbrella Agreement provided 
for the conclusion, in accordance with its terms, of specific agreements with the various Yukon First 
Nations (s. 2.1.1).” At paragraph 131, Justice Deschamps references “the implementing legislation” 
namely, “the Yukon First Nations Land Claims Settlement Act, S.C. 1994, c. 34,” which should also include 
the Act entitled “An Act Approving Yukon Land Claim Final Agreements, RSY 2002, c. 240 that 
references the Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nations explicitly under s. 1 – the Definition provision.  
546 Ibid. at para. 131, Justice Deschamps explains the connection between the UFA and the LSCFN Treaty: 
“Although the Umbrella Agreement “does not create or affect any legal rights” (s. 2.1.2), it provides that 
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“the Yukon First Nations surrender[ing] their Aboriginal rights…., in exchange for 
defined treaty rights.”548 In the SCC’s majority view, the LSCFNFA Treaty “reflects a 
balance of interests,” where “the LSCFN surrendered all undefined Aboriginal rights, 
title, and interests in its traditional territory in return for which it received among other 
rights the “rights to representation and involvement in land use planning [Chapter 11] and 
resource management [Chapters 14, 16-18].”549 Within this the multi-level governance 
arrangement, the Board is upheld as the primary actor responsible for administering water 
use through a licensing process.  
6.0  Applying the Eco-Resiliency Framework to the Legal Framework 
6.1  Introduction 
Together, the Yukon’s multi-level governance framework supports the Yukon Water 
Board’s co-management approach. In the view of an interview participant, the Board’s 
practice is expected to be responsive to changing license conditions. The Board’s 
decision-makers rely upon the expertise and the best available science brought to the 
Board by the proponent, the interveners, and the government agencies. Yet, as legal 
scholar Barbara Cosens asks, “does the legal framework reveal the necessarily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Settlement Agreements shall be land claims agreements within the meaning of section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982” (s. 2.2.1). Moreover, according to the Umbrella Agreement, “[a] Yukon First 
Nation Final Agreement shall include the provisions of the Umbrella Final Agreement and the specific 
provisions applicable to that Yukon First Nation” (s. 2.1.3). It can be seen from the final agreements in 
question that the parties have given effect to this undertaking. Even the numbering of the Umbrella 
Agreement’s provisions has been reproduced in the 11 final agreements that have been concluded under it 
so far. These 11 final agreements represent over half of all the “comprehensive” land claims agreements 
(that is, agreements resulting from claims that Aboriginal rights exist) signed across the country. The Final 
Agreement in issue here was signed near Carmacks on July 21, 1997 and was subsequently ratified and 
implemented by enacting legislation; this last step was a condition of validity (ss. 2.2.11 and 2.2.12).” 
547 Ibid. at para 9. 
548 Ibid. 
549 Ibid. at para 36. 
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preconditions [elements] to be transformed into an adaptive governance framework?”550 
This section applies the eco-resiliency framework to the UFA Agreement (in particular, 
The Water Board (Chapter 2) and Water Management (Chapter 14)) and the legislation 
(Waters Act, 2003) and is organized by the four eco-resiliency features.  
6.2 Diversity - The Legal Framework: The UFA Agreement and the Waters Act, 
2003 
Diversity – Who decides? Who are the decision makers? These questions are key 
governance aspects pointing to an inclusive and diverse decision-making process, where 
decisionmaking is shared and learning is encouraged.  
6.2.1  Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA) 
Under the Chapter 2, the Board and its membership composition are explicitly 
referenced. The membership comprises one-third of the board members nominated from 
the Yukon First Nations or Council of Yukon Indians, with the remaining members 
nominated from within the government and all members must be residents of the Yukon. 
This residency membership requirement creates a diverse co-management board and 
ensures local Yukon knowledge, including traditional First Nation knowledge, and 
government expertise can be brought into the decision-making process.551  
Capacity building of the decision makers, with respect to their technical and 
socio-cultural knowledge, is also endorsed by the mandatory budgetary requirement to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550 Cosens, Supra. note 204. 
551 UFA, Supra note 525. See Chapter 2 – General Provisions: In addition to setting out the institutional 
participatory co-management governance structure. The Yukon Water Board is explicitly referenced under 
s. 2.12.0 of the UFA. Membership of the Board ensures that the majority of members nominated by Yukon 
First Nations or Council of Yukon Indians or the Government are residents of Yukon (s. 2.12.2.1). The 
Minister appoints the Board members (s. 2.12.2.3 & 4). The appointment to the Board shall be for a three-
year term (s. 2.12.2.11). The Board members’ role is expressly limited, in that each Board member “shall 
not” be a “delegate” for their nominating body (s. 2.12.2.12) In other words, in carrying out their duties, a 
member will act as representative for the Board, only.  
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direct funding annually to education and training.552 Specifically, the Board’s annual 
budget should include funding for “cross cultural orientation and education and other 
training” to build the members’ capacity to carry out their duties and to allow for the 
inclusion of traditional languages (s.2.12.2.9). The Board is required to enact bylaws and 
rules that are consistent with the UFA and the Board’s enabling legislation (s.2.12.2.10). 
In effect, the UFA directs the Board to place a priority on the cultural awareness 
education and training of its board members. This mandatory budget assignment 
highlights the opportunity for Board members to learn, share knowledge, embed 
ecological memory, and allow indigenous knowledge to be considered by the Board.  
Under Chapter 14, the diverse composition of the Board is set out. This water 
management chapter explicitly states: “The Council for Yukon Indians shall nominate 
one-third of the members of the Board.” (s.14.4.1). The Board’s Chair and vice-
chairperson is selected from the Board’s membership and through a process of 
consultation that includes Ministerial appointment (s. 14.4.1 & s.14.4.2).  
6.2.2 Waters Act, 2003 
As an administrative body, the Board functions in a co-management mode. The Board 
membership can range from four to nine members.553 The membership must include a 
government of Canada nominee, whose line department is “directly concerned with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
552 Ibid. Chapter 2 also prescribes the allocation of budgetary funds. The Board’s annual budget will 
include funding for “cross cultural orientation and education and other training” to build the member’s 
capacity to carrying out their duties and to allow for the inclusion of traditional languages (s. 2.12.2.9). The 
Board is required to enact bylaws and rules that are consistent with the UFA and the Board’s enabling 
legislation (s. 2.12.2.10). In short, Chapter 2 provides for a participatory co-management governance 
structure. In particular, the UFA directs the YWB to place a priority on the cultural awareness education 
and training of its board members and to ensure that their respective roles are carried out in both a 
culturally sensitive and a well-informed manner.  
553 Waters Act, Supra note 490. Under s. 8(1), the Yukon Water Board membership comprises of “four to 
nine members appointed by the Commissioner in Executive Council.” 
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management of waters.” A minimum of three Board members should also hold a 
“recognized position of Government Leader of the Yukon” (s.8(2) (b)).   
6.2.3  Summary of the UFA & the Waters Act, 2003 
Both the UFA and the legislation, establish a co-management arrangement inclusive of 
First Nation representatives and government actors (Federal, Territorial). Similar to the 
provisions of the UFA, the legislation provides for the Minister to appoint the Board’s 
Chairperson and vice-chairperson but without consultation with the Board. Contrary to 
the UFA, the Act does not explicitly reference either the inclusion of First Nation 
nominees or a residency requirement. However, if the wording of legislative phrase  
“recognized position of Government Leader of the Yukon” is read broadly, then the 
phrase could include a recognized Yukon First Nations leader. In the end, membership is 
inclusive of federal, territorial, and First Nation interests.  
 Overall, this participatory process is constructed to include a range of perspectives 
and fosters diversity in ways of knowing water, as expressed by ecological memory and 
indigenous knowledge. Learning is encouraged by the requirement, under chapter 2 of 
UFA, to designate funds for cultural and educational purposes. The discourse of rights 
may also enter the decision-making process via the legal instrument of the UFA, which 
places a priority on waters flowing on or flowing through First Nations (Settlement) 
lands.  
6.3  Flexibility  
Flexibility is present in the governance function when two-way communication is 
encouraged and where the Board members can rely upon a consensus-based decision-
making principle and a mix of regulatory tools.  
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6.3.1  The Waters Act, 2003 
Flexibility in the decision-making is featured in the legislation not the UFA. The Waters 
Act authorizes the Board to make rules regarding its hearings, complainant and 
representation procedures, and internal management protocols. For example, the Yukon 
Water Board Meeting Rules features consensus. Under rule 23, consensus is defined as 
“mean[ing] a general meeting of minds.” 554  “Consensus does not always mean that 
everyone is in complete agreement, but rather that a solution is found that all members 
can accept and that no members strongly oppose.”555  Under this rule, the Board is 
directed to adopt the principle of consensus decision-making for meetings not a public 
hearing. 556 As constructed by the rule, consensus appears to support flexibility through a 
dialogic model of open two-way communication between the Board members. Yet, this 
consensus decision-making rule also recognizes the limitations of consensus and allows 
the Board to invoke a vote if consensus cannot be reached. (R24).557  
 In sum, the Board’s primary decision-making principle is based upon consensus. 
A default option of a vote exists in the situation of a meeting but not necessarily 
applicable in the “in chamber” decisions of a public hearing. However, a danger of the 
reliance upon a vote as a dispute-resolution mechanism is that the consensus process, in 
practice, is vulnerable to power disparities and hegemonic majority rule behaviour.  
 Yet, the legislation limits the flexibility of the Board’s discretionary power to the 
issuing two types of licenses: either a Type-A or a Type-B water licence. The maximum 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 Yukon Water Board, Yukon Water Board Meeting Rules, (Decemeber 10, 2008), online: YWB < 
http://www.yukonwaterboard.ca/policy/YWB_Meeting_Rules.pdf >.  
555 Ibid. 
556 Ibid.  
557 Ibid. Rule 24 states: “Board members recognize that, in order to meet their obligations under the Waters 
Act (“the Act”), and to comply with the rules of procedural fairness, there will be occasions when 
consensus cannot be reached. In that case, the Board members will have to vote on the issue. Abstention is 
not an option.” 
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period for a licence is 25 years, requiring the payment of fees for the “use of waters or 
deposit of waste, or both” (s. 12(1)) based upon the criteria set out Regulation O.I.C. 
2003/58.558 The Act requires the project proponent to satisfy the legislatively defined 
legal test set out in s. 12, before the Board can grant a licence.  
 Flexibility in the licensing process is further reinforced through a range of 
legislative options particularized to the licence. If a licence is granted based upon the 
legal test, then the licensee or applicant can also be subject to a compensation agreement 
(s.12(4)(ii)).  
 The Act further directs the Board to consider Ministerial policy directives 
(s.11(1)) and the legislative requirements to issue (s.12), renew, amend, and cancel (s.16) 
as well as assign a licence (s.17) and to recommend to the Minister the expropriation of 
land (s.29).  
 A water licence can also be subject to numerous conditions (s.13(1)-(7)). 559 
Effectively, these conditions are primarily engineering or works-oriented requirements 
that must be balanced against the interests of other users and may require monitoring of 
“who would be adversely affected by the use of the waters or deposit of the waste.” In 
short, this narrow focus supports an anthropocentric (“who”) rather than an ecological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
558 Waters Act, Supra note 490. Under s. 7(1), the licensing criteria for “water use and deposit of waste” 
requiring either a Type A or Type B licence is set out in following Schedules based upon different uses: 
Schedule 5: Industrial Undertakings; Schedule 6: Placer Mining Undertakings; Schedule 7: Quartz Mining 
Undertakings; Schedule 8: Municipal Undertakings; Schedule 9: Power Undertakings; and, Schedule 10: 
Agricultural, Conservation, Recreational and Miscellaneous Undertakings.  
559 Ibid. For example, a Yukon Water Board decision maker can consider setting conditions relating to:  
1.   the “manner of use of water” (s.13(1)(a)),  
2.   the “quantity, concentration and type” of waste (s.13(1)(b)),  
3.   the circumstances of a waste deposit (s.13(1)(c)),  
4.   the studies to be conducted, plans to be submitted, “works to be constructed” and “monitoring 
programs” to be completed (s.13(1)(d)) or “future closing or abandonment” a project” (s.13(1)(e)),  
5.   the decision maker must also take into account other licence holders and domestic, instream and 
authorized water users, authorized waste depositors, property owners, “occupiers of property,” 
individuals holding an “outfitting concessions, registered trapline” and other similar rights(s.13(2)(a) -
(h)). 
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orientation.    
 Finally, as the final arbitrator, the Minister holds the final approval of a specific 
licence, with or without conditions. Ministerial approval is required for a Type-A and 
Type-B licences, if a public Board hearing is held. If no public Board hearing is held, 
then “the chairperson of the Board” can approve a Type-B licence.560 Thus, the final 
decision-making of the Board is limited, reinforcing a limited form of flexibility in 
decision making for certain license decisions. 
 In summary, the Board’s function includes a range of actions that fosters adaptive 
and context-driven decision making but limits the Board’s primary regulatory function to 
administering the water licence process in a bureaucratic manner that takes into account 
the type of license (A or B), the legal test, compensation, conditions, and Ministerial 
policy directives and approval.  
6.3.2  Summary of the Waters Act, 2003 
Flexibility in the legal framework is exhibited by the decision makers’ reliance on a 
consensus based decision-making principle and range of legislative tools including 
compensation, licence conditions and Ministerial directives. The Board’s decision-
making arrangement is heavily focused upon process where flexibility is limited to the 
type of licence and is subject to a legal test and the Minister’s approval, for a Type-A and 
Type-B, if a public hearing is held.  
6.4  Broad Perspective  
A broad perspective considers the geographic scale and polycentric nature of the 
governance regime and considers whether mechanisms of co-ordination exist to allow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
560 Ibid. s.12(6)(a)(b)(i)(ii).  
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decision-makers to mutually engage in a problem-solving process and to seek solutions.   
6.4.1  The Umbrella Final Agreement  
In a typical legal drafting style, the UFA Chapter 14 Water Management opens with an 
objective directing the decision makers to be responsive to both water quality and 
quantity. Specifically, the Agreement’s objective states, “to maintain the Water of the 
Yukon in a natural condition while providing for its sustainable use.”561 A broad reading 
of this objective suggests water-management decisions is premised upon a principled 
approach that directs decision-makers to strike a balance between protection of water 
quality, as found in its natural state (“natural condition”), and the principle of 
sustainability through maintaining the “sustainable use” of water. In essence, both water 
quality and quantity issues could be taken into account by decision-makers, resulting in a 
balanced approach to the Agreement’s vague terms of “natural condition” and 
“sustainable use.”562  Arguably, the UFA fosters flexible decision-making and directs 
decision makers to consider both water quality and quantity issues. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
561 UFA, Supra. note 525. Section 14.1.1 reads: “The objective of this chapter is to maintain the Water of 
the Yukon in a natural condition while providing for its sustainable use.” Under the Definition section, 
““use” includes the deposit of Waste into Water” (s. 14.2.0). Note: Under s.14.2.0, the definition of 
““water” has the same meaning as “waters” in the Northern Inland Waters Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-25.” Pat 
get the NIWA definition.  
562 Ibid. The Definitions Chapter (c.1) of the UFA sets out a definition for “sustainable development" it 
does not explicitly provide a definition of “sustainable use.” In other words, the term “sustainable use” as 
set out in the objective is vague. Yet, under c.1 (definition section) of the UFA, sustainable development 
(SD) is defined as: “beneficial socio-economic change that does not undermine the ecological and social 
systems upon which communities and societies are dependent.” Extrapolating from the UFA’s SD 
definition it seems reasonable to characterize a “sustainable use” as a use that is balanced against economic 
development and results in both social and economic benefits. Applying this line of reasoning to a reading 
of the UFA it seems reasonable to suggest that UFA directs decision-makers to consider water quality 
issues, perhaps in terms of water quality standards. A broad interpretation of the term “sustainable use” 
may also allow decision-makers to adopt a social-ecological systems view of water. Perhaps, for YWB 
water managers, this social-ecological perspective of economic development might direct their decision-
making to consider benefits that support ecosystems and social systems of the local communities. It is 
essential that local communities dependence upon a sustainable water use remains connected to a 
communities’ need to flourish socially and economically.  
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6.4.2 The Waters Act, 2003 
The Board’s wide geographic jurisdiction encompasses the six water-management areas 
noted in the legislation, including the “Yukon River, its tributaries and all river basins of 
the Yukon River and its tributaries, including the Tanana River.”563  
 Under the Act, the Board is required to take into account the legislative object 
(s.10): “to provide for the conservation, development, and utilization of waters in a 
manner that will provide the optimum benefit from them for all Canadians and for the 
residents of the Yukon in particular.” 564  Water is characterized with competing values of 
of “conservation” and “utilization of water” and an economic orientation, as exhibited by 
“development” and “optimum benefit.” Taken together, these terms imply decision 
makers strike a balanced water-governance approach, where conservation, economic 
development and water utilization should be considered together. This construction of the 
legislative object creates a water narrative where water is an active productive economic 
resource to be conserved for the benefit of Yukon residents and all Canadians. Moreover, 
the “optimum benefit” of water for the people of Canada and of the Yukon further 
implies an economic orientation where a cost/benefit analysis could be premised upon 
costs and benefits quantified at a national, regional, and/or local scale. In the end, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 Water Regulation, YOIC 2003/58 Schedule 1 – Water Management Areas  
1. The Liard River, its tributaries and all river basins of the Liard River and its tributaries. 
2. The Yukon River, its tributaries and all river basins of the Yukon River and its 
tributaries, including the Tanana River.  
3. The Alsek River, its tributaries and all river basins of the Alsek River and its 
tributaries. 
4. The Peel River, its tributaries and all river basins of the Peel River and its tributaries. 
5. The Porcupine River, its tributaries and all river basins of the Porcupine River and its 
tributaries. 
6. All other waters and river basins of the mainland draining into the Beaufort Sea or into 
the Mackenzie River, and Herschel Island. 
564 Waters Act, Supra note 490. In the Northern Inland Waters Act, the legislative object of both the NWT 
Water Board and the Yukon Territory Water Board was “to provide for the conservation, development and 
utilization of the water resources of the Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories in a manner that will 
provide the optimum benefit there for all Canadians and the residents of the Yukon territory and the 
Northwest Territories in particular.” 
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legislative objective appears to direct decision makers to consider the competing issues of 
water conservation and economic development and use, as balanced against the benefits 
of the water use as defined for both Canadians and Yukon residents.  
 In sum, the Act presents decision makers with a broad objective. The legislation 
directs the Board to take into account both water quantity and public interest issues, 
suggesting a broad definition of the Board’s function. The Board holds the power to 
renew, amend, and cancel a licence.565 A licence can be amended in response either to a 
water shortage or an issue of public interest.566  But, as the Act does not define the 
meaning of public interest, the definition of this concept remains within the discretionary 
powers of the Board.  
 While designed to allow the Board members to consider administrative tasks 
such as amending, renewing, and cancelling a license, the legal framework also includes 
a coordinating mechanism, which includes the Yukon Environmental and Socio-
economic Assessment Board’s (YESAB) decisions. The Water Board’s consideration of 
a YESAB decision document suggests and integrated water governance process 
structured by a multi-level organizational design.   
6.4.3  Summary of the UFA & the Waters Act, 2003 
The governance regime’s broad perspective is exhibited in the coordinating jurisdictional 
mechanism with the Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Board 
(YESAB). This mechanism ensures environmental impacts of a project are presented to 
the Water Board and reinforces a multi-level form of governance where the YESAB’s 
process and decision documents are intergrated with the Yukon Water Board’s decision-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
565 Waters Act, Supra note 490. s.16. 
566 Ibid. s.16(b)(ii)(iii). The consideration of the public interest is bounded by a time limit of three years (in 
particular, the licensee’s failure to exercise their rights “for three successive years” (s.16(c)(ii)(iii)).  
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making process. However, this multi-level governance framework opens the process to 
the influence of power brokers and power plays operating in the shadows of the 
administrative process, as the legislation is directed at “who” is impacted. The social 
norms that encircle the Board’s function and play out in the shadows of the in chambers 
decision-making process are difficult to account for in this administrative function.  
6.5  The Accommodation of Emergent Change  
A governance regime exhibits the feature of emergent change if decision-makers operate 
in an open information system where the participants are able to be open to 
uncertainty and surprise.  
6.5.1  The Umbrella Final Agreement 
Under Section 14.8.1., a Yukon First Nation holds a right to receive “Water which is on 
or flowing through or adjacent to its Settlement Land remain substantially unaltered as to 
the quantity, quality and rate of flow, including seasonal rate of flow.” The Yukon Water 
Board is required to uphold these water rights and the water licence terms of other water 
users. In the licensing process, the Board is also required to consider the impact of the 
water use upon fish and wildlife, mitigation measures or compensation, to name a few 
issues named under this section of the Agreement. In sum, this protection of the quantity, 
quality, and water flows including seasonal flow requires the Board to be responsive to 
ecological change. However, it is questionable the Board’s administrative function 
structured for periodic reviews of a licence could be relied upon to be responsive to 
sudden ecological events.  
6.5.2 The Waters Act, 2003 
The legislation directs the Board to amend a license to take into account water quantity, 
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implying the Board’s function could be structured to respond to ecological change. In 
particular, the Board holds the power to amend a licence “to deal with a water shortage in 
any water management area,” 567  suggesting the Board’s decision-making regarding 
amendments is structured to be responsive to water shortages.  
 The Board is also conferred the power to amend a licence if the amendment is 
considered in the public interest. However, a definition of “public interest” is not 
provided for in the Act. Even though, a definition is set out in the legislation it seems 
plausible a sudden water pollution incident -- for example, an extreme rain event causing 
tailings to spill over the containment walls --  could initiate the cancellation of licence, if 
environmental degradation is interpreted as a public interest issue. Thus, on its face, the 
legal framework appears to provide for the accommodation of specific incidents of 
emergent change that could result in an amendment to licence in the case of water 
shortage and cancelation if this administrative act is perceived as in the public interest.  
 Yet, the Board’s final decision-making power in the situation of granting a Type-
A licence is limited. This lack of final decision-making power, illustrated by Ministerial 
approval for Type-A licence, suggests the Board is responsive to internal administrative 
change and, perhaps, political will, which points to a politicized driver of change and a 
centralized decision-making orientation. A danger exists this politicized decision-making 
process could marginalize and silence alternative ways of knowing water in the decision-
making process. In the end, the legal framework directs the Board and its decision-
making processes to be open to the changes to its primary administrative instrument (the 
licence) and directives imposed by the Minister.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
567 Ibid. s.16(1)(b)(ii). 
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6.5.3 Summary of the UFA & the Waters Act, 2003 
In sum, the legal framework offers the Board the opportunity to entertain the element of 
surprise by way of taking account of the new information and impact upon public interest 
in water. The new information may present during the term of the license or during an 
amendment process. Under the legislation, the Board appears to hold the power to 
respond to sudden or unexpected water security events or social developments as they 
affect water users and are considered in the public interest. Under the UFA, the Board is 
required to consider the water rights of both Yukon First Nations and other licence 
holders. The Board is required to give particular attention to the quality, quantity and rate 
of flow for the affected First Nation.  
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7.0  The Eco-Resiliency Framework in Practice — The Yukon Water Board  
7.1 Introduction: The Board’s Carmacks Decision 
In May 2010, after seven days of a public hearing, including “nine volumes of material 
and the evidence of a number of witnesses, including experts’ testimony,”568 the Board 
denied Carmacks Copper Ltd’s (Carmacks) application for a 25-year Type-A water 
license for a quartz-mining project. The project proposed in Carmacks’ license 
application related to “a heap-leach project, which include[d] groundwater wells within 
the Upper William Creek and make-up water (i.e., sediment ponds) affecting a tributary 
of the Yukon River.”569 The proposed location of the quartz project was a site “northwest 
of the Village of Carmacks.”570 The mining company’s project included, but was not 
limited to, “an open pit [with the intent] to mine copper oxide ore and to leach the ore 
with dilute sulphuric acid to extract the metal.”571 In denying the licence, the Board 
considered nine issues:  
1.   use of unproven technology, 
2.   likelihood of successful leaching, 
3.   likelihood of successful detoxification, 
4.   adequacy of the proposed discharge management plan, 
5.   adequacy of water quality standards for W12, 
6.   adequacy of proposed effluent discharge standards, 
7.   adequacy of heap facility preliminary design and liner system, 
8.   adequacy of water quality model; and, 
9.   adequacy of sludge management proposal. 
 
The Board, in examining the nine issues, placed the greatest weight on issue three: the 
“likelihood of successful detoxification.” The Board examined the heap leach technology 
and took into account the environmental effects of the technology as presented by an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
568Reasons for the Decision, Water Use Application QZ08-084; Carmacks Copper Ltd – Executive 
Summary, online: YWB <http://www.yukonwaterboard.ca/registers/quartz/qz08-084/QZ08-
084%20Reasons%20May%2010%20final.pdf>. [herein known as Carmacks Decision]. 
569 Ibid.  
570 Ibid. at page 2: Purpose of the Water Use Application. 
571 Ibid. at 2 – Heading: Purpose of the Water Use Application. 
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expert witness and the Yukon’s Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment Board’s 
(YESAB) decision document. As revealed in the record, it was through the questioning 
and consideration of expert evidence that the Board adopted a different position than 
YESAB and characterized the proposed rinsing and neutralization technology as 
“unproven.” A close reading of the Board’s decision reveals the committee’s 
deliberations concentrated on the new evidence that raised doubt that the heap leach 
technology could be deemed successful.572 In the end, the Board considered the expert 
evidence and applicant’s arguments concerning the physical and chemical aspects of the 
commercial scale heap, and found the evidence inconclusive, a finding that differed from 
the YESAB. The Board concluded the “[a]pplication includes the use of unproven 
technologies to leach, detoxify, and manage discharges from the site.”573 
8.0 Applying the Eco-Resiliency Framework to the Yukon Water Board’s 
Carmacks Copper Ltd Water Use Licence #QZ08-084 Decision of May 10 
2010.  
8.1 A Broad Perspective 
The Board’s licencing process supports a broad perspective where a coordinating 
mechanism takes into account a decision document from the Yukon Social 
Environmental Assessment Board (YSEAB). However, the Yukon Water Board found 
the findings of the YESAB’s decision-document deficient on several issues including the 
slope ratio of the heap and the issue of evenly spreading the rinsing fluids from the 70m 
heap onto a heap that will be sloped not level. The Board was concerned with the slope 
ratio of the heap where 75% of the heap surface would be sloped at 2:5:1 ratio.574 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
572 Ibid. at 13 – Likelihood of Successful Detoxification. 
573 Ibid. at 35. – Conclusion 
574 Ibid. 17.  
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Board interpreted this sloping ratio as indicating the final heap would not be level but in 
fact would be sloped. In the Board’s view, the sloped heap might result in the rinsing 
fluids being dispersed primarily on the steep slope of the completed heap resulting in a 
run-off situation. While the Board’s coordinating mechanism with the YESAB 
demonstrates a broad perspective, the Board demonstrated independence by further 
considering additional factors such as the sloping ratio and the environmental impact.  
8.2 Emergent Change  
In the decision-making process, the Board demonstrated openness and an ability to 
response quickly to new environmental concerns, information and experts. The Board 
found both Mr. James Kuipers’ (expert for Little Salmon Carmacks First Nation) and Dr. 
Lionel Catalan’s (Primary researcher for Noranda’s Mines Gaspe, Quebec trial in 1996 
and 1998 and cited in the YESAB assessment) testimony on the nature of the 
detoxification process to be persuasive. On the likelihood of the successful detoxification 
of the heap, the Board adopted a cautious stance and found that the evidence indicated the 
“proposed rinsing and neutralization of the spent heap”575 technology was “uncertain.”576  
 The Board, unlike the YESAB, received and reviewed 2008 testing data that 
demonstrated differences in the physical and chemical parameters. In particular, the 
evidence indicated the testing in the one-meter tall columns found insufficient proof of 
the technology’s certainty. The Board found the testing of the rinsing and neutralization 
processing at a smaller testing scale to be problematic. The evidence revealed physical 
differences between the leaching process at an 8-meter thick lift (lab trial) and 70-meter 
thick heap pile (i.e., the proposed project). The small-scale testing pointed to “potential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
575 Ibid. at 7 
576 Ibid. at 15. 
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chemical problems” associated with the neutralization of the ore process that resulted in 
column plugging (in Columns #3 & #6, as per the 2008 data) that included the application 
of a soda-ash solution.577 For the Board, that the plugging occurred in carefully managed 
trials was a significant concern.578  
 In the end, the Board characterized the technology as unproven and found the 
YESAB had not received or reviewed the new 2008 data. The Board also found Mr. 
Kuipers’ testimony reliable. He testified: “in the twelve years since the work of the 
Catalan was completed there is still no example of a successfully rinsed copper oxide 
heap.” 579  The Board found the applicant had not provided sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate the detoxification process could be deemed a certain technology for 
commercial use. Through this process of receiving new evidence, the Board’s decision-
making process demonstrated an openness to adopt a different opinion from the YESAB, 
based upon new evidence presented and the experts questioned at the Board hearing.  
Overall, this review of the Board’s decision record on the Carmacks Copper Ltd 
application exposes the workings of an administrative law tribunal-like process. The 
Board’s mechanized process in which expert decision makers receive witnesses, hear 
evidence, review documents and apply a “balance of probabilities standard” and where 
decisions are made privately “in chambers.” The board’s decision-making process 
illustrates responsiveness to new information, new experts and a new perspective on the 
technology. The decision document, the access point for discovering the presence of 
resiliency factors, suggests the Board’s water governance decisions arise from a co-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
577 Ibid. at 15.  
578 Ibid. at 14-17.  
579 Ibid. at 17. With respect to the issue of “Use of Unproven Technology” the “Board heard from Mr. 
James Kuipers, an expert witness of LSCFN, that there are not existing commercially successful copper 
oxide heap leach mines in North America.”  
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management arrangement of governance and reveal that the features of a broad 
perspective, and emergent change, which all play out at a Board level.  
9.0 The Legal Sequel 
Following the Water Board’s decision, Carmacks Copper Ltd. initiated two separate 
claims with respect to the denial of the water license. In the first claim, Western Copper 
Corporation and its subsidiary, Carmacks Copper Ltd., sought an order, under the Yukon 
Rules of the Court, declaring that the First Nations and the Yukon Conservation Society 
(Society) be granted intervener status, instead of respondent status, respecting the appeal 
of the Yukon Water Board’s May 10, 2010 decision.580 Western Copper sought to limit 
the parties to an intervener status so they could not proceed with an appeal. The court 
heard two issues:  
1.   Are the First Nations and the Society respondents under the Rules of Court 
without application?  
2.   Should the First Nations and the Society be limited to intervener status?  
In the end, Judge Veale held that both the First Nations and the Society should be 
assigned respondent status.  
In the second claim, Western Copper Corporation essentially rebuffed the Water 
Board’s finding concerning the rejection of the Yukon Environmental Social Assessment 
Board’s (YESAB) decision document (i.e., that the heap-leach technology had been 
proven feasible).581 The issues heard primarily related to the jurisdiction of the Water 
Board with respect to:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580 Western Copper Corporation v. Yukon Water Board, 2010, YKSC 61 CanLii. 
581 The Western Copper Corporation and Carmacks Copper Ltd v. Yukon Water Board, Yukon 
Government, Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, Selkirk First Nation and Yukon Conservation Society 
(Respondents) and Yukon Chamber of Mines (Intervener), 2011 YKSC 16 CanLii.  
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1.   a) Does the Water Board have the discretion to refuse an application for a 
water licence pursuant to s. 83(2) of YESAA,  
b) or is it obligated to implement the decision document in the Western 
Copper application for a water licence?  
2.   Has the Water Board’s decision exceeded its powers under the Waters Act 
by purporting to regulate the mining facilities contrary to the 
authorization issued by the MEMR in the Quartz Mining Licence which 
incorporates the terms and conditions of the decision document?  
Justice Veale held that:  
1.   a) Yes: the Water Board does hold the discretion to refuse an application.  
 b) No: the Water Board is not obligated to implement the YESAA’s decision 
 document.  
2.   No: The Board did not exceed its powers under the Waters Act.  
In the end, Justice Veale held that the Water Board had acted within its statutory 
jurisdiction under the Waters Act. 
10.0  The Water Board’s July 4-6th 2012 Public Hearing - Minto Explorations 
Ltd’s Water Use Licence #QZ11-031 Amendment #8 for the Minto Mine 
Yukon Project 
10.1 Introduction 
Having received affirmation from Justice Veale regarding its jurisdiction over water use, 
the Water Board entered the next public hearing with a strong sense of its’ statutory 
mandate with respect to the amendment (amendment # 8) of Minto Exploration Ltd’s 
existing Water Use Licence #QZ11-031. The Minto mine site is located “41 km 
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southwest of the community of Pelling Crossing, Yukon.”582 In Board’s deliberations, the 
oral and written submissions from the Yukon Conservation Society (YCS), the Selkirk 
First Nation (SFN) and Minto, the Licensee were considered and demonstrated certain 
features of resiliency.  
10.2 Diversity  
While confined to an administrative law public hearing setting, the Board’s proceeding 
does provide an opportunity to hear a diverse range of perspectives, which ultimately 
shape the final decision.583 For example, both First Nation and Board members were 
given an opportunity to present their concerns on the issue of the “adequacy of the 
mining company’s proposed tailings management plans.” At the hearing, the Selkirk First 
Nation argued a potential groundwater contamination scenario existed as result of 
“subaqueous deposit of tailings” into the Pits (Main and Area 2 Pits). 584 The Board 
requested “[t]he Licensee…provide clarification on what level of responsibility they 
would take for impacts to groundwater from the Project. In response, the proponent 
limited their responsibility to the operational period.585 In the end, the Board found the 
tailings should be subject to restrictions with respect to the volume in the Main Pit and 
“must include a reserve for the storage of excess water.”586 
The Selkirk First Nation (SFN) representative also expressed concerns regarding 
the stability of one of the dumps and the wall of the Main Pit, which would receive the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 Minto, YWB, QZ11-031, Supra. note 496. at ii.  
583 Minto, Ibid at ii. Decision document – Introduction: “In making this decision the Board considered the 
application of the Licensee, interventions from three parties, the separate decision documents issued by the 
Yukon Government, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources and by the Selkirk First Nation and oral 
testimony and arguments from the Licensee and two parties [Yukon Conservation Society] during a public 
hearing held from July 4 to 6, 2012.”  
584 Minto, Ibid at 8.  
 
586 Minto, Ibid. at 10.  
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majority of the waste rock. In the view of the SFN, the “stability of foundations for the 
waste structures at the site” required further review by the Board. The SFN argued a 
“criteria for identification of stable foundation conditions should be developed and 
implemented for [the] site” and should also include the “monitoring and analysis of the 
stability issue.”587  Based upon the evidence, the Board agreed with the SFN that the 
“conditions of the licence should be included to better monitor” the on-site dumps.588  
At the hearing, the Board also illustrated its ability to take into account the 
concerns of its own Board members. For example, Board members raised two water-
management plan issues: 1) the water storage capacity in the main pit and 2) the dry stack 
tailing storage facility. The Board members were concerned about the adequacy of the 
water storage capacity in the main pit. In the view of the Board members, the “historical 
water management issues at the site” and in particular, the issue of the “minimum surge 
capacity on average climatic conditions,” 589  required a conservative approach. This 
conservative approach included consideration of the “minimum storage capacity in the 
Main Pit.”590 The storage capacity issue at the Main Pit was resolved by relying upon 
several storage facilities as disposal sites (in particular, the dry-stack tailings storage 
facility’s storage capacity, the Main Pit, and the Area 2 pit).  
Moreover, through a Board member’s questions the adequacy of the proponent’s 
geotechnical analysis of the movement of the dry-stack tailings storage facility (DSTSF) 
was found to be inadequate. The Board held that the “continued loading” “of tailings on 
the DSTSF should be discontinued as soon as “transition to slurry tailings can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 Minto, Ibid. at 11. 
588 Minto, Ibid. at 12. 
589 Minto, Ibid at 13. 
590 Minto, Ibid. 
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completed.”591 Even though the proponent presented its consultant’s analysis on the last 
day of the hearing in response to the Board’s request for the proponent’s analysis of 
DSTSF, the Board did “not find any explicit statement that the analysis assumes that the 
full capacity of the DSTSF was assumed by the consultants responsible for the analysis.” 
The evidence suggested to the Board “the proof of the mitigation of documented 
movements of the DSTSF remain[ed] outstanding.”592 At the end of the hearing, the 
movement of the dry stack remained an outstanding issue requiring further clarification.  
In response to the outstanding dry stack issue, the Board advocated for a 
precautionary approach by requesting further monitoring of the dry-stack facility.  
10.3 Flexibility  
In the public hearing process, flexibility was exhibited through the Board’s two-way 
communication and the fluid participation of state and non-state actors (in particular, the 
three Selkirk First Nation representatives, the Yukon Conservation Society (YCS) 
representative and the mining company’s contingent of employees and a legal team). In 
contrast to a court’s stifled questioning procedure, the Board’s active dialogue between 
the parties resulted in exposing the deficiencies in Capstone’s application during the 
hearing. For example, the YSC raised the issue of the inadequacy of the “regulatory 
management, and compliance by the Licensee.”593 The YCS submitted that the mining 
operator had commenced its mining expansion operating activities without proper 
regulatory approval. The YCS requested “that the Proponent provide ‘comfort’ to the 
[YCS] that procedures will be developed by the Proponent to ensure future amendment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591 Minto, Ibid at 10.  
592 Minto, Ibid. 
593 Minto, Ibid at iii. 
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applications will be done in a timely manner.”594 The Board demonstrated flexibility in 
its decision-making by taking into account the evidence presented by the YSC and the 
submissions made by the company. The Board held the “Licensee has violated the 
existing water licence, [and] the Board agrees with YCS that the Licensee should develop 
procedures to ensure that such violations do occur in the future.”595  
Flexibility in the Board’s process is further demonstrated in the exchange of 
information on three issues either omitted or erroneously described in the water 
amendment application. First, for the SFN, the channel modifications to water 
conveyance structures on site were found to be questionable. These modifications 
appeared to suggest the flood flows from the “south diversion ditch” would be diverted 
away from the DSTSF and into Area 2 pit. The SFN submitted the application includes 
an insufficient “conceptual design for the Tailings Diversion ditch” that requires further 
details and review to ensure the modification would achieve the projected goals. 596 
Second, the Licensee had also modified several water-sampling locations not included in 
the amendment application. Third, the SFN also identified the Mill Valley Fill Extension 
structure that the Licensee had reconstructed but had not included in the existing licence 
amendment application. The structure’s design details were omitted in the application. 
During the Board’s cross-examination, the Licensee agreed these unauthorized 
modifications had occurred and agreed to provide the Board with the “as-built plans”597 
for the structures.  
In response to the SFN’s submissions, the Board rebuked the Licensee’s actions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 Minto, Ibid at 3. 
595 Minto, Ibid at 13. 
596 Minto, Ibid. 
597 Minto, Ibid at 14.  
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of proceeding with Mill Valley Fill structure before the commencement of July licence 
amendment hearing. The Board also requested additional information on the South 
Diversion Ditch modification, which was submitted post hearing, and the parties were 
provided an opportunity to comment. In their comments, the SFN continued to express 
concerns regarding the protection of the dry-stack tailings storage facility and overall 
flow capacity of the ditch. In the end, the Board found the channel modifications were 
appropriate to ensure the present Phase IV activities. The Board also recommended the 
inspection process should be directed by the SFN’s additional concerns (i.e., “when 
inspectors review further detailed submissions related to those structures”598). 
Relying upon a flexible decision-making approach responsive to the legal 
framework and institutional constraints places the proponent in a self-regulatory mode of 
compliance with the water use licence. In the end, the Board held on the issue of 
regulatory management and compliance by Licensee that regulatory administration 
clauses must be added in the license to ensure Capstone improves its regulatory 
obligations at the Minto mine site.   
In the Minto decision, and after considering the testimony of the proponent, the 
Board found the company was aware certain activities (for example, “the mining and 
milling of Area 2 ores”599) fell beyond the scope of the licence. The Board chided the 
proponent and found the mining company officials “either did not understand the Act and 
the limitations that the Act places on its use of water and deposit of waste or ignored 
those limitations in its decisions regarding Phase IV activities.”600  
In sum, flexibility in a legislative regime invokes the idea of law as adaptive to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598 Minto, Ibid.  
599 Minto, Ibid at 6. 
600 Minto, Ibid. 
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societal, ecological, or economic changes. The challenge facing the Board is the 
complexity of issues it must address during the licensing process. This complexity creates 
a need to contain information within a simplified and mechanized procedural system. The 
structured legal framework is designed to receive the information regarding the water 
resource in a particular manner. The decision-makers must consider how the water will 
be utilized and the effects of industrialized mining processes upon the quality and 
quantity elements of water, while being bounded by the regulatory objective to conserve 
water for the “optimum benefit” of all Canadians. Yet, the flexibility in the tribunal’s 
administrative law forum allowed the Board, through new information and questions 
from intervenors, to amend a license during the hearing process. In the end, while the 
Board’s function is defined by a rigid legal structure bounded by administrative law 
principles and creates a mechanized form of water governance; the Board’s decision-
making is deemed flexible and responsive to environmental protection values.   
10.4 The Accommodation of Emergent Change 
Prior to the commencement of the public hearing, the Board member interviewed 
anticipated two issues would prevail at the hearing: 1) the financial amount of the 
security bond to cover the decommissioning and reclamation plan (DRP) and 2) the issue 
of liability. However, at the hearing, the Board discovered a lack of up-to-date 
information on the DRP because the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR) 
approval process was still outstanding (the process was scheduled to be heard later in 
September 2012 and again, in June 2013). Thus, during the hearing, this preconceived 
conflict of the security bond dissipated quickly and the Board illustrated its ability to 
respond to change or changing scenarios. In response, the Board incorporated a condition 
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into the existing licence requiring the proponent to submit an updated version of the DRP 
in June 2013, when the information would become available. The Board also considered 
the SFN’s submission that DRP process should be reviewed in a public forum and added 
that all stakeholders should be provided an opportunity to review and comment on the 
DRP.601 Finally, the Board prescribed specific issues to be included in the updated June 
2013 DRP. 602  
In sum, the eco-resiliency element of surprise considers how decision-makers in 
an administrative process respond to new and changing information. Before the 
commencement of the Minto license amendment hearing, the Board expected the primary 
issue would be the amount of the security bond. During the public hearing, the focus of 
the administrative process quickly shifted away from the security deposit and towards the 
consideration of technical aspects of the mining operation, non-compliance problems and 
the need to update the licence. In effect, this element of surprise603 created the space for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
601 Minto, Ibid. at 18. 
602 Minto, Ibid. at 18-19. The decision document states: The Board expects the requested future DRP to 
focus specifically on the following issues: Evidence related to cover designs and performance; Evidence 
related to passive treatment approaches and performance; Consideration of the effect of potential 
instabilities affecting the closure of waste management structures; Consideration of the long term effect of 
runoff and surface drainage from soils cover systems on waste management structures; Greater detail in 
relation to water management planning and infrastructure designs; Greater attention to contingency 
planning, particularly in relation to activity water treatment; Greater clarity to reclamation research 
requirements and plans; and Greater detail in regard to costing of security associated with the proposed 
DRP.” In addition, the Board directed the Licensee to consider the Board’s February 2012 newsletter 
entitled: “Licensee to review the Type A and Type B Quartz Mining Undertaking Information Package” 
and “The Licensee shall also refer to and comply with the conditions listed in the two decision documents 
related to the development of the DRP.” Finally, “the Licensee agreed to undertake a Failure Modes and 
Effects Assessment of its proposed DRP.” The Board expects the assessment to be incorporated into the 
DRP and to allow input from all stakeholders and the SFN in the assessment.  
603 Numerous newspaper accounts exist discussing the positions of the parties, the uncertain nature of the 
technology, the Board’s jurisdiction and the mining proponents desire to continue with the project. For 
example, CBC Online News “Water board’s Carmacks copper ruling upheld” CBC News Feb. 25, 2011. 
Online: CBC <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/water-board-s-carmacks-copper-ruling-upheld-
1.1119258>. Also see CBC online News “Yukon Water Board to consider Carmacks mine bid” March 3, 
2010, online: CBC <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/yukon-water-board-to-consider-carmacks-mine-
bid-1.893876>. Also see The online version of Yukon News reported on February 6, 2013 that “Copper 
North Mining Corp. is preparing to purchase power from the Yukon Energy Corp. for its proposed 
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the Board to be nimble in its decision-making and offer immediate remedies to new 
information. However, the Board was limited in responding effectively to the discovery 
of several non-compliance issues. The Yukon government is deemed responsible for the 
enforcement and compliance measures such as termination of the licence.   
11.0 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the application of the eco-resiliency governance to the Board’s 
governance arrangement reveals some of the features of eco-resiliency. The Board’s 
water committee arrangement promotes diversity in decision-making through the 
inclusion of a range of state and non-state actors. The substance of the decision 
documents and legal decisions display a rational and technocratic presentation of 
information privileging engineering science and the operational needs of the mining 
sector.  
 Within the Board, a bureaucratized and mechanized administrative state organ 
controls the decision-makers working within a co-management institutional framework. 
In this forum, the interpretation of the law is shaped by the social context and the 
participation of non-state actors, but is also constrained by tenets of administrative law 
that organizes the processing of information in an orderly format. Understanding how this 
heterogeneous group informs the final decision is difficult, as decisions are made in a 
closed-door meeting. The transparency of the decision-making process is limited to a 
review of the final decision documents. Thus, an insight into how these diverse decision-
makers shape the outcome in practice remains unattained. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Carmacks Copper mine. The mining company and Yukon Energy have signed a letter of intent to negotiate 
a power-purchase agreement.” online: Yukon News <http://yukon-news.com/news/yukon-energy-prepares-
to-power-carmacks-copper>. 
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 Essentially, the Board’s governance arrangement and decision-making exhibits 
the features of eco-resiliency. This co-management model is entrenched within an 
administrative law framework that creates the space for the decision-makers to receive 
information, evidence, amend a water licence, and ask questions. The regulatory space 
exists for the regulatee and the interveners to present evidence and to raise questions, but 
they must wait patiently for the Board to collectively reach a decision, which is made 
within the sanctuary of the Board’s meeting room. This empirical research of 
administrative tribunal raises challenges to the governance model. The first challenge is 
to understand how to develop a flexible environmental governance mode that can respond 
quickly and test new information, as demonstrated by the Board; and, the second issue, 
what process design mechanism (e.g., intervenor status) can be introduced to take into 
account the participants’ views.  
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Chapter Six:  
The Voices of the Committee Members on Eco-Resiliency 
1.0  Introduction 
Taking into account the participants’ perspectives on governing water, this comparative 
case-study examination of water committees is focused on questions of who decides and, 
how decisions are made in these committees. When governance is conceptualized as a 
decision-making process and the public policy sector under consideration is water, one 
wonders how decision makers take into account the substantive content of the subject 
matter — aquatic systems. In these governance experiments, is it reasonable to expect a 
committee member to incorporate ecological change in her decision-making?  
 The next four sections present highlights from the interviews with the water 
committee members, offered as way of exploring the interplay between the theory of 
environmental governance and its practice. Does theory inform governance practice? If 
not, can it or should it? The presentation and organization of participants’ responses to 
eco-resiliency framework begins with a discussion of water committee’s ability to be 
responsive to ecological change then moves to the four features of eco-resiliency. These 
voices represent the dominant patterns that emerged from the eco-resiliency framework 
analysis. The committee member’s responses were analyzed to examine the presence of 
the four features of eco-resiliency in the governance mode and to consider the role of the 
state in environmental water protection. Part Six offers a synthesis of the research, 
discussing the problems plaguing these localized governance models.  
2.0  The Committee’s Responsiveness to Ecological Change  
In the natural resources management literature, an adaptive governance regime exists if 
decision makers are responsive to changing environmental conditions. This research 
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demonstrates a limited form of adaptive governance. The findings in Ontario and Alberta 
reveal how the provincial government and industry interests (including legislatively 
defined tasks and deadlines) constrained the comittee’s ability to be responsive to 
ecological change.  
 Contrary to Ontario and Alberta, the Yukon Water Board participant responded 
“Yes! Yes! Yes!” — the decision-making reflects local environmental conditions:  
depending on the evidence or traditional knowledge [presented], we have 
our textbooks, we have our statutes, we have our regulations that are broad 
and basic but, at the end of day it’s going to be specific problems and 
specific solutions. So, all the reports are bringing us the best new science 
that’s out there but we’re evidence based with what’s in front of us.604 
 
In this Board member’s view, the water license is localized by the characteristics of the 
water use, water problem, solutions, and scientific evidence presented to the tribunal. 
Together these factors support how the licensee can be responsive to the local watershed 
conditions.  
 In Alberta and Ontario, the research findings raise doubt on the ability of a water 
committee to be responsive to local watershed security issues. In Alberta, an interviewee, 
well versed in provincial water issues, questioned the model of water-management 
planning applied by the watershed planning and advisory council (WPAC) and its 
oversight of several water security issues:  
[H]ow do I put this politely? I’ve always wondered why we don’t have a risk 
management approach in the watershed planning advisory councils. In the water 
basin, “we have had an oil spill, we have climate change, we have population 
pressures, we have droughts and floods, and all of these other issues happening 
around us. As a Bow Basin council, we’re not necessarily creating a risk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
604 Interview of #15 (July 15, 2012) Interview notes at page 7.  
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management approach with our partners. 
These comments raise doubt whether the WPAC is responsive to changing environmental 
conditions and prompts the question, “What is the purpose of locally based committees if 
the local watershed security issues are not addressed in the planning process?”  
 In the Ontario interviews, and without prompting, the majority of the Lake Erie 
Region water source protection committee (SPC) participants raised the MOE’s lack of 
responsiveness to local community concerns, with aggregate extraction emerging as the 
dominant issue. As explained by one of the three agricultural SPC committee members, 
“the two sectors that more questions have been raised in the SPC are: one, the 
agriculture and second, the aggregate sector.”605 The participant, when asked about the 
responsiveness of the SPC’s decision making to a changing environmental watershed 
condition, he responded hesitantly and revealed that he felt “manipulated.” He felt his 
decision-making was steered by the province to fulfill the provincial goal of conformity 
in the water plans rather than being directed to realize Justice O’Connor’s vision of the 
local planning process that is responsive to local citizen concerns.606 The participant 
stated:  
Good question again. I really don’t know. I don’t know how you’d answer 
that one …. no, I don’t know…. I don’t how to answer that one. Things 
have been … the decision-making … how do I put this diplomatically? 
We’re being manipulated so that decision-making isn’t what Justice 
O’Connor hoped for. He wanted basically [water planning] “by the 
people for the people” to sum it up, in simple terms. When we are done, 
most of the source protection programs across the province will have the 
same wording for all sectors.607 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
605 Interview of #23 (Dec. 12, 2012) Interview notes at page 15.  
606 O’Connor, Supra. note 59. Walkerton Report Two. Ch. 1: An Overview at 9. 
607 Interview of #23 (Nov. 13, 2012) Interview notes at page 15. 
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When one of the three aboriginal SPC committee members was asked the same 
question on responsiveness, he emphatically responded “No – not the least!” He went on 
to explain how the committee’s limited mandate was responsive to the local concern over 
pipelines but not the aggregate extraction conflict:  
Our mandate is to study the impact and report via the water plan. [The 
local committee] pushed the [staff] to come up with a pipeline crossing 
[as a local drinking water threat] with respect to the “leaks” [spills], 
which was a positive result [because a pipeline was added to drinking 
water threat list]; but, the aggregate undertaking was not [added to the 
list]. I voted with the [public representative] in favour of [adding] 
aggregate extraction as a drinking water threat but, we got pushed back to 
narrowing the problem to protecting [municipal] wellheads – the water 
source.608 
 
Taken together, these SPC committee members’ responses point to the rigidity and 
political nature of the planning exercise. Effectively, the planning exercise narrowed the 
deliberative process to the issue of protection of the municipal wellhead. The 
committee’s response to the local citizens’ concerns with aggregate extraction activities 
(in contrast to its ability to persuade the MOE to include pipelines as the twenty-second 
drinking water threat for the Lake Erie Region) suggests the theory’s endorsement of an 
adaptive governance regime is complex and nuanced. The complicated story of aggregate 
extraction arising in the Ontario case study and presented below, as recounted in the 
comments of several SPC interviewees, is a broader conflict that appears to be mired in 
the wider economic development and political background briefly discussed in Chapter 
Three. The voices of the SPC participants involved in the aggregate extraction conflict 
appear next, over the next few pages.  
 Collectively, the participants’ comments reveal how a legally constituted water 
committee became politicalized, responsive to economic interests, and transformed into a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
608 Interview of #22 (Nov. 27, 2012) Interview notes at page 1. 
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strategic instrument of the state. This story of an efficient water planning exercise begins 
with one of the seven public interest representatives who recounted how a local city 
official – Dave Belanger, the water supply manager for the City of Guelph – informed the 
committee of a breach of aquitard at the Dolime quarry in Guelph. His story, and others 
on the committee, exposes a state-centric approach to water governance. This centralized 
approach by provincial authorities begins with the controlling of the committee’s 
decision-making, the downplaying of local citizen’s concerns over the drinking water, 
and results in the state’s quashing of the SPC’s recommendation to add aggregate 
extraction to the local drinking water threat list. Belanger’s cautionary tale of the danger 
of the government’s policy drift to the governance mode is told by one of the public 
interest representatives who attended the SPC meeting and observed Belanger’s 
presentation:  
“[A] n Ontario geological survey identified the fact that the [extraction 
activities at the Dolime mine had breached the aquitard.]. Thus, “one of 
the [drinking water] threats that we identified, as a committee, after 
hearing [Belanger’s presentation was aggregate extraction – that is,] the 
quarrying that’s going on at the Dolime Quarry.”  
 
The “Ontario geological survey identified that fact that the [company’s 
extraction activities] are removing the aquitard. [In the meeting, Belanger 
opined] that this should not be taking place because the aquitard is 
protecting our [City of Guelph] aquifer, which is our prime source of 
drinking water. [The threat is the possibility of contamination of the water 
in the aquifer] because as soon as the quarry closes, if the aquitard has 
been removed, then the surface water that has accumulated in the quarry 
pit [commonly called the quarry pond] will be in contact with the ground 
water [in the aquifer], which can contaminate the aquifer; so, [its 
important] to prevent contamination of the aquifer waters.”  
 
“But, the MOE did not see this as a [significant drinking water] threat. 
So, [even though] the source protection committee identified this a threat 
and passed a resolution saying it [aggregate extraction] should be 
included in the list of [local drinking – like the pipeline issue] threats. The 
committee was responsive to the changing environment but the MOE 
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wasn’t.”  
 
In fact, “the [manager] came back to the source protection committee and 
presented the information again and I believe it was in December 2010 
meeting. It was clear that the quarry [management] had not changed their 
behaviour at all. They were still mining the aquitard and there was lots 
talk about it where the MOE had asked them to present a management 
plan to either the City or the MOE which the MOE would approve and 
share with the City. The management plan still has not been approved. So, 
nothing has been done about this situation and it continues to get worse. 
You can tell they're mining the aquitard because its different part of the 
rock...you can over there and see that there’s some darker rock piling 
up...that’s the aquitard.”609 
  
The foregoing commentary, when read with the next interview passage, reveals a 
perception of the CWA, 2006 as a restrictive legal instrument imposing limitations upon 
the committee.  
One of the SPA staff members, whose role on the committee was to facilitate the 
planning process and report back to the SPC with policy documents, hinted at not only 
the political nature of water planning but also how the protective drinking water function 
combined with limitations of the Act shaped their decisions. He explained in his 
interview how the committee felt constrained by the CWA:  
“[I]t’s kinda tricky because a lot of what we do with respect to the Clean 
Water Act [CWA] is to provide additional protection for municipal 
drinking water. A lot of the work we do is framed through the Act so 
there’s not a lot of leeway in terms of what we could include or not. There 
was obviously decisions around in the beginning that we put forward to a 
committee ... there are mandatory items but there’s also optional content. 
We make recommendations to include some of the options. It’s mandatory 
to address significant drinking water threats. It’s optional to address 
moderate and low drinking water threats. So, at this first round, we look at 
significant threats and we basically just put those moderate and low 
threats addressing those to a later round of planning...but, we essentially 
stayed on track because of timing and resources.”610 
 
Feeling restricted by the legislation and specifically, the legislatively prescribed twenty-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
609 Interview of #30 (Dec. 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 6. 
610 Interview of #24 (Nov. 19, 2012) Interview notes at page X.   
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one drinking water threats, was a theme raised by another public interest representative, 
who had extensive professional experience with municipal planning issues:  
“The committee did ask the Ministry to add aggregate extraction as a 
significant drinking water threat...We did identify the areas, it was the 
region of Waterloo, Guelph and the County of Brant where we felt that it 
could be appropriate… what we have tried to do is to insure that the 
activities are dealt with as best we can such as fuel storage and other on-
site activities. Under the Clean Water Act, they identified, I think it’s 21, 
specific things that can be considered as significant drinking water 
threats. Aggregate extraction was not one of those. So, only activities that 
would fall under those [21] items identified under the Clean Water Act 
can actually be addressed and those are the more limited activities in 
terms of the policies that we can develop. I think it is fair to say, we tried 
to work around it.”611 
 
These limitations of committee were viewed as a governance problem.  
One of the SPC public interest members not only commented on the limitations of 
the committee’s decision-making but also inferred that the committee was impotent, 
controlled by the MOE, and sadly, had failed to achieve a localized planning process, as 
envisioned by Justice O’Connor. In his view, the aggregate extraction problem is:  
“a governance issue. The committee really can pass whatever it wants to, 
and the MOE can disregard it. So that it [MOE] is not controlling or 
managing water at the local watershed level the way Justice O’Connor 
envisioned it. We identified the threat that was not on the [legislatively 
prescribed] threat list and tried to get the MOE to recognize it and change 
their list of twenty-one prescribed threats.”612 
 
In his interview, he further explained, the two-fold root problem (i.e., administratively 
and philosophically). The MOE had designed a process where the 21 drinking water 
threats had been identified prior to bringing the water-source protection committee (SPC) 
together. However, the province had raised the expectation in the minds of the committee 
members that local concerns would be addressed when raised in the committee. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611 Interview of #20 (Nov. 1, 2012) Interview notes at pages1-2.  
612 Interview of #30 (Dec. 14,  2012) Interview notes at pages 2-3.  
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practice, the manner in which the planning process was steered by MOE meant local 
concerns appeared to be arbitrarily decided. In effect, Justice O’Connor’s mandate in the 
Walkerton Inquiry to set out a local planning exercise directed at soliciting local citizens’ 
concerns became an aspirational notion rather than operational result, leaving the 
committee member feeling frustrated:  
So, “I think [the problem] is an administrative issue” – “it’s partly the 
process and partly the administration of the source protection program. 
The process problem is that MOE held workshops to identify threats long 
before the SPC started their work. So, they came up with this list of threats 
and, at the time, they said ‘they may not be inclusive… there may be other 
threats that we haven’t identified and there may be other threats down the 
road, and if so, if a source protection committee identifies some we will 
include them’ … is what they [MOE] said. However, when our source 
protection [committee] identified this particular threat, they refused to 
recognize it … and,  
 
I see their logic… it is not a threat right now… it’s a potential threat. It is 
only going to be a threat when the quarry unplugs their pumps and stops 
dewatering.  
 
However, that’s not what the source protection committee is about – it 
about prevention. So, I found the whole process very, very frustrating.”  
 
“I think, philosophically, the MOE did not understand the intention of 
Justice O’Connor’s report. The government passed the Clean Water Act, 
which asked the MOE to set up these source protection committees. It’s 
very clear that water should be managed on a local basis by local 
expertise with local input, So, here you have Dave Belanger, the City’s 
hydrogeologist saying we have a problem… that’s local expertise...you 
have the local source protection committee saying we’ve identified a 
threat… that’s local management but at the provincial level, it was 
overturned and that’s how you run into problems when you don’t have 
local control of the watershed... To be clear, we’re [SPC] trying to 
manage the watershed on a watershed basis, the province is managing it 
on a provincial basis saying aggregate extraction is not on our list of 
threats province wide.”613 
 
This commentary reveals a state-centric approach to governing where the MOE’s control 
of the process and, specifically, the Ministry’s administrative steering of the drinking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
613 Interview of #30 (Dec. 14, 2012) Interview notes at pages 3-4.  
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water threat issue from afar diminished localized participation in the planning exercise. 
The training workshop held prior to the commencement of the SPC’s work was also 
referenced in both comments. For one of the participants, the workshop offered an 
opportunity to understand the thinking of others – in effect, an early warning (risk) 
mechanism:  
Prior to starting my work at the SPC, “the first information/learning/ 
training session I went to, a member of another SPC, I think the person 
was from Halden or Hamilton area asked for clarification with respect to 
the restriction of quarry activities. The person said: ‘you mean that we 
can’t prohibit a quarry by sitting on this committee? Well, that’s no good, 
we have to able to prohibit them.’ So, in the early going they had gotten 
on the committee, it appeared to me, just because they had one purpose, 
which was to prohibit a quarry in a certain area.”614 
 
This passage and the interview statements below suggest early on the process, during the 
identification of the twenty-one drinking water threats in the Region and, importantly, 
prior to the commencement of the SPC’s work, the MOE had solidified its’ perspective 
on aggregate extraction. A position seemingly in line with the industry perspective, 
recognizing the industry’s importance to the province’s interests of economic 
development. This committee member responded “Yes,” as an industry representative, he 
was concerned with adding aggregate extraction as a threat:  
“[it] would directly impact our industry and if there’s an understanding 
what the industry is and understanding of what it does, there may be areas 
where you don’t want some activity in it. There are some activities that are 
loosely associated with pits and quarries, like an asphalt plant for 
example, that should be set aside and looked at completely on its own. But, 
for a quarry on its own, there has been a lot of studies showing that other 
than storage of fuel...(we checked obviously to be very careful) that there 
isn’t anything else going on in the operation that is going to affect the 
ground water or drinking [water sources] or other waters.  
 
But, it [aggregate extraction] wouldn’t be popular local opinion in some 
areas so that [in] those cases the MOE would have to take a provincial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
614 Interview of #31 (Dec. 19, 2012) Interview notes at page 4.  
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line.”...In my view, the provincial line is concerned with pathways. The 
MOEs characterization of pathways would be different in clay [soil 
conditions] as opposed gravel conditions and it [comes down to] the time 
and the movement of a chemical to a water source. The MOE set out the 
framework and there was little, if any, local involvement in that so they set 
up the framework so they steered the local involvement if you will, which 
isn’t bad.”615 
 
“It’s good because the committee and conservation authorities are highly 
influenced or composed of local politicians and sometimes local pressure 
may cause them to put forward a decision or take a position without even, 
frankly without knowing the fact. So, the MOE had to set guidelines and 
sometimes take the hard line to make sure that the provincial interest was 
maintained and you didn’t have a local committee over-riding a local 
interest.”616 
 
 In the end, these interviews reveal a reluctant provincial government. A 
government agency, backed by industry support, was reluctant to take into account local 
citizens’ concerns on the issue of aggregate extraction. Taken together, the foregoing 
comments indicate the committee’s hotly debated resolution to add aggregate extraction 
to the SPC’s local drinking water threat list was dead in the water before the committee 
even rendered its vote on the resolution.617 This interview data suggests that, as this 
aggregate conflict was unfolding at the SPC, the provincial government was in 
conversation with the quarry owners – thus, demonstrating the relational features of the 
responsive regulation’s compliance/enforcement pyramid. These interviews reveal the 
MOE had solidified its position before the commencement of the SPC’s process: it did 
not view aggregate extraction as a local threat. The MOE failed to formally share this 
position with the committee until the last SPC meeting (December 2012) several years 
later, leaving community members with a sense of frustration with the water management 
planning process.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615 Ibid. Interview notes at page 3. 
616 Ibid. at page 4.  
617 See Appendix “B”– The SPC minutes where the final resolution is set out.  
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 As described by one of public interest representatives, the Clean Water Act is a 
rigid document. In his view, the legislation was a good starting point for the first water 
plan. He also commented on the nature of the legislation, its rolling (update) rule and 
legislatively imposed timeline that would together allow the plan to be updated and 
completed:  
“The Clean Water Act, in itself, is not a flexible document. But, I think it 
was probably a good place to start because what it did was, it gave a 
framework within which you could achieve certain objectives within a 
specific timeline. The Act also provides for a review of the plans after a 
maximum of five years and one of the opportunities that I think the 
committee has and will take advantage of, is to identify things that are still 
not yet done and other things that need to be addressed in the future.”618 
 
To conclude, in practice and as managed by government officials, the water governance 
mode in Ontario and Alberta is not responsive to ecological change. In Ontario, the CWA 
is not an ecologically responsive instrument. In Alberta, a participant expressed a similar 
sentiment of a lack of responsiveness. The WPAC respondent raised concerns whether 
the local water committee could be responsive to an oil spill, climate change, droughts, 
and floods. The participant called for “creating a risk management approach with our 
partners.” In constrast, in the Yukon, the Water Board member perceived the 
administrative tribunal proceeding as responsive because the process provided for the 
presentation and questioning of experts, leading-edge science and results that were 
localized to the environmental conditions in the watershed.   
3.0  Eco-Resiliency Framework – The Flexibility Factor 
3.1  Introduction: Flexible Governance Regimes 
Governance scholars contend collaboration based upon consensus creates a fluid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
618 Interview of #20 (Nov. 1, 2012) Interview notes at pages 1-2. 
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procedure and opens the process to new ideas and, possibly, new solutions, as well as 
exposes the “limits” of the existing regulatory. 619  A governance mode moves the 
decision-making process away from the rigid, and prescriptive nature of the command- 
and-control regulatory style towards a “softer” process. 620  This softer, supple 
collaborative process “loosens [rigid regulatory] requirements to allow for 
communication, fluid participation, and consensus-based deliberation,” which may foster 
“a more flexible attitude toward reaching decisions.”621Generally, these “collaborative 
arrangements are…described as consensus processes.”622  
 Structurally, in the governance mode, the design of the problem-solving process is 
premised upon collaboration, and the group’s decisions are developed through, and 
decided upon, by relying upon the principle of consensus. Procedurally, the meaning of 
consensus can be open for the group to define before commencing the collaborative 
process — often, varying from group to group — and can, be set out in both legal 
regulations and administrative procedures. Thus, when a diverse group of individuals 
come together to collaborate on a problem and rely upon the decision-making principle of 
consensus, it should be expected that their understanding of the meaning of consensus 
could differ.  
 In arranging regulatory spaces based on collaborative arrangements, legal scholars 
should take heed of Karkkainen’s contention — lawyers need to pay attention to the 
procedural justice issues that arise in these processes. In his view, lawyers must 
understand the nuances of consensus. He holds, as a procedural justice mechanism, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619 Freeman, Collaborative Governance, Supra note 80 at 69. 
620 Lobel, Renew Deal, Supra note 92. at 310. 
621 Ibid at 311. 
622 B.C. Karkkainen, “Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism” (2001-
2002) 21 Va. Envtl. L.J. 190 at 239. 
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consensus might offset the effects of regulatory capture. In his view, lawyers should be 
encouraged to present critical questions on the nature of consensus based decision-
making rules and processes.  
 Karkkainen’s caution is timely given the recent policy drift to a regulatory 
governance model and the potential for particular regulatory interests to prevail in the 
process and the need to examine the power relations amongst the participants. His call to 
examine more deeply collaborative decision-making arrangements frames this analysis of 
the participant’s interview data. In all three cases, under examination in this dissertation, 
even though policy documents, provincial directives and regulatory instruments existed 
to guide the participants and decision-makers on the meaning of consensus, these 
research findings revealed the participants’ lack of awareness of the regulatory or soft-
law instruments setting out the definition of consensus. The participants’ lack of 
awareness of the legally constituted meaning of consensus points to an implementation 
problem. Karkkainen’s argument that the nuances of meaningful consensus in the context 
of a collaborative mode of governance require further study – and, holds in this research. 
 In the next few sub-sections, flexibility in the decision-making process is 
presented as revealed by the patterns that emerged from the interview data. In particular, 
the participants’ notions on the meaning of consensus, a flexible legislative toolbox, and 
the state’s role in water protection. The participants’ comments also offer insight into the 
practice, the problems and possibilities of these legislative governance experiments.  
 
3.1.1  Flexible Legal Frameworks: The Participants’ Comments on the Meaning of 
Consensus 
On the issue of an overarching rule to direct the decision-making process, environmental 
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governance scholar Karkkainen asks, “If local decision-making is no longer hierarchical 
but collaborative, what decision rule should govern the [collaborative] process?”623 All 
three local collaborative water-governance committees examined in this dissertation 
relied upon consensus as the primary decision rule. However, how does a committee 
member understand the meaning of consensus?  
These research findings demonstrate an implementation problem regarding the 
execution of the consensus decision-making principle as set out in provincial policy 
directives and regulatory instruments. As the heated debate at the Alberta WPAC meeting 
demonstrated, the meaning of consensus is elusive, as the meeting participants’ presented 
definitions derived from an Internet search rather than the definition set out in the 
administrative manual. During the interviews in Alberta, the interviewees’ were unable to 
offer a definition of consensus. This inability to define consensus was surprising because 
the debate over the meaning of consensus had just occurred at the previous day’s WPAC 
meeting. One would presume the debate was still fresh in the interviewee’s mind. At the 
end of these BRBC interviews and similar to the interview results in Ontario and Yukon, 
the meaning of consensus remained undefined by the participants.  
Defining and achieving consensus was also an issue of inquiry for the Alberta 
Water Council (AWC). The AWC’s Report entitled: “Shared Governance – What We 
Heard Workshop Summary Report (2008)”, presents survey results of participants, asked 
about the implementation of consensus under the shared (partnership) governance model 
at the WPAC level. 624 These survey findings revealed support for consensus. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
623 Karkkainen, Supra note 622 at 240. 
624 Alberta Water Council, “What We Heard Report: Summary of Findings of the Shared Governance-
Watershed Management Planning Workshops, Shared Governance and Watershed Management Planning 
Project Team (February 2008), online: AWC 
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the Report raised a concern with the committee’s ability to achieve consensus, 
considering the size of a WPAC. The AWC survey participants expressed the view that 
achieving consensus in a WPAC of “300 members” is “unwieldy.”625 The workshop 
results left open the participant’s interpretation of consensus. The current membership of 
the BRBC - WPAC is over 200 members, and it is reasonable to expect that the 
perception of achieving consensus might continue to be viewed as unwieldy; given the 
large number of participants who may hold different and, perhaps, competing views with 
respect to water use in the river basin.  
Perhaps, in this research, the interviewees’ inability to define consensus exhibits a 
policy/information overload. One of the Ontario SPC industry participants raised 
information overload as a concern. He responded to the question regarding information 
needed to make informed decisions during the planning process: “I think, if anything, 
[the SPC] had information overload.”626 His response points to the possibility committee 
members have too many documents to review and too little time to read the stacks of 
paper, leaving them unprepared to discuss the issues in the committee. After all, these 
committee members are volunteers. A danger of this information overload is committee 
members may acquiesce to others’ opinions and align their views to the dominant 
perspective without striving to achieve consensus in the committee. Establishing the 
decision-making criterion and its principles, for example, consensus, is a critical step in a 
multi-party negotiation process and is considered a hallmark of a principled approach to 
negotiation theory.627  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
<http://www.albertawatercouncil.ca/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=kQ1a4ehGplI%3D&tabid=133>. 
625 Ibid at 11.  
626 Interview of #31 (Dec. 19, 2012) Interview notes at page 5.  
627 R. Fischer, W. Ury & B. Patton, Getting to Yes (New York: Penguin Group, 1991).  
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The participants’ inability to define consensus or describe the decision-making 
principle is problematic as it signals a form of “policy without law” playing out in these 
collaborative governance arrangements. Political Science scholars Sousa and McGrory-
Klyza contend these “new collaborative approaches present us with this problem of 
policy without law: ad hoc choices made by administrative agencies in the absence of 
clear [legislative] guidance.” 628  For legal scholars, a public policy question is 
underpinned by a common presumption the policy or in this case, the water plan or 
licence, is bounded by law set out in the legislation and its regulation. In this research, we 
see a policy document (water plan) developed without the backing of law. A danger 
exists these decisions, which are subsequently embedded into a water plan, might be 
subject to a criticism of arbitrariness.629  
 To conclude on consensus, in theory, collaborative governance fosters a robust 
dialogue and a fluid problem-solving process premised upon a consensus decision-
making rule. In practice, in all three cases studies, a definition of consensus had been 
provided for in either a soft-law document or explicitly in the regulations. However, 
implementation of the consensus principle as crafted by legal instruments eluded the 
committee members. These findings reveal that decision-making based on consensus, 
while crafted in a collaborative setting of the water committee in the case of Ontario and 
Alberta, is not representative of the meaning of consensus as set out in the law. This 
finding points to a procedural implementation problem in these collaborative 
arrangements. In the Yukon case study, the committee members conducted their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628 D.J. Sousa & C. McGrory Klyza, “New Directions in Environmental Policy Making: An Emerging 
Regime or Reinventing Interest Group Liberalism” (2007) 47 Nat. Resources J. 377 at 408.  
629 My thinking is informed by: Sousa, Ibid. and G. Schubert, “Policy without Law: An Extension of the 
Certiorari Game” Stanford Law Review (March 1962) Vol. 14 No. 2 284; G.C. Harzard, Jr., “Justice 
Marshall in the Medium of Civil Procedure: Portrait of a Master” (1991-92) 80 Geo. L.J. 2063.  
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decision-making “in chambers” -- a closed-door proceeding – making it difficult to 
discern or describe the practice of consensus. 
3.1.2  The Flexible Governance Toolbox 
In this research, all three case studies illustrate an implementation problem with the 
responsive regulatory theory’s premise of applying a range of regulatory instruments. In 
Smart Regulation, Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair’s compliance/enforcement 
model recommends the use of a mix of regulatory tools to foster a flexible response to 
noncompliant regulatory behaviour. Regulators pursue compliance by escalating up the 
three-sided punitive enforcement pyramid, choosing from a toolbox of regulatory 
strategies and instruments. With the regulatory shift to management-based regulation, 
firms gain flexibility in achieving regulatory goals by way of developing internal 
standards and self-regulating management plans.630  
Contrary to Gunningham et al.,’s promotion of a mix of regulatory tools, the 
majority of respondents when questioned on the use of a range of regulatory tools, the 
interviewees referenced the legislation as a whole and could not name any tools 
prescribed by the legislation. For example, the Yukon Water Board participant responded 
by quickly naming the Water Act and briefly referenced “compensation” as regulatory 
tool. He tempered his words by adding few individuals “come to the Board to file the 
evidence”631 for compensation to be considered. While a Board member may consider a 
range of available legislative tools, the respondent’s first thought turned to compensation, 
without further consideration of other tools.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
630 N. Gunningham, “Environmental Law, Regulation and Governance: Shifting Architectures” (2009) 21:2 
Journal of Environmental Law 179 at 189-92; S. Wood, “Environmental Management Systems and Public 
Authority in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance (2003) 10 Buffalo Environmental Law 
Journal 129.  
631 Interview of #15 (July 5, 2012) Interview notes at page 3. 
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In the practice of developing a water plan in Alberta and Ontario, none of the 
participants interviewed referenced any specific tools offered in their governing 
legislation. Rather, the participants named the legislation as a whole. For example, in 
Alberta, a typical response referenced the name of the legislation but not necessarily an 
understanding of the range of legislative tools: “Environmental Protection and 
Enhancement Act and the Water Act [both] deal a lot with water management activities 
and the Municipal Government Act.”632 Similarly, in Ontario, when asked to name any 
regulatory tools or techniques that could be relied upon to address the dilemma 
(aggregate extraction) raised by the participant, the SPA interviewee responded, “Not as 
it relates to the Clean Water Act, no … there are other existing planning and approval 
tools.”633 
Taken together, the foregoing commentary from all three case studies suggests an 
implementation problem with the responsive regulatory theory’s premise of using a range 
of regulatory instruments. This empirical data indicates the participants were aware of the 
legislation, but their responses suggest they were unaware of the range of regulatory tools 
available under the legislative framework, which points to both implementation and 
capacity-building problems. In short, in their view, their regulatory toolbox is empty. 
Conceivably, this empty toolbox highlights a danger where a committee member may 
resort to narrow-minded decision-making focused upon the administrative tasks – rowing 
activities rather than acting as a steering decision-maker, who considers wider 
environmental impacts.634  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
632 Interview of #11 (June 14, 2012) Interview notes at pages 6-7.  
633 Ibid.  
634 Freeman, Supra note 80 at 12. Consideration was given to Jody Freeman definition of “meaningful 
participation” in a collaborative governance arrangement, which is defined as: “enables the contributions of 
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3.1.3 The State’s Role 
The inflexible practice of participatory governance revealed in this research turns the 
inquiry to the state’s role in fostering “a flexible, engaged agency.” 635  Governance 
scholar Freeman identifies a flexible agency as one of five characteristics of collaborative 
governance. In her view, a flexible agency takes on the role of facilitator of the 
collaborative process and, through incentives, encourages “participation, information 
sharing and deliberation.”636 The state regulator also contributes by building the capacity 
of participants through the provision of “technical resources, funding and organizational 
support.” 637  In all the case studies, the regulatory body encouraged some form of 
participation, sharing of information, discussion, and organizational support. This 
engagement, however, was limited to the information the agency sought to gather, 
resulting in a closed-loop system of engagement. Thus, flexibility in the decision-making 
was restricted because the organizational support was directed at collecting input from 
the committee members on predetermined water management issues the provincial 
authorities deemed important.  
In these governance experiments under examination, the regulators exhibited a 
weak form of flexibility in responding to changing information. In all three case studies, 
the state through a legislative framework provided for a legally defined institutional 
setting, including the procedural means to organize and to gather information, as 
suggested by Freeman. In Ontario and Alberta, the collaborative water committee was 
limited by the policies imposed by the government. In contrast, the Yukon Water Board, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the most affected parties to be institutionalized and gives them some responsibility for the regulatory 
regime. By “institutionalized,” I mean that participation should be an ongoing feature of the decision-
making process.”  
635 Ibid.   
636 Ibid. at 11.  
637 Ibid.  
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an administrative tribunal, demonstrated a stronger form of flexibility, through the 
presentation and testing of the evidence, and in particular, in responding to the evidence 
that the heap leach was untested technology. In the end, it is difficult to describe the 
Alberta and Ontario water committees as flexible and engaged agencies.  
Consequently, this research illustrates the organizational behavioural problems 
underpinning the shift to a governance mode from a command-and-control 
implementation style. For example, the Ontario case study reveals the difficulty of 
moving away from a state-centric mentality limits the ability to be transformed into a 
flexible agency. For legal scholars, the challenge is to understand whether regulatory 
regimes can be designed to take into account organizational behaviour theory and the 
challenges of organizational change.  
3.2  Eco-Resiliency Framework: The Diversity Factor  
3.2.1  Introduction 
Diversity concerns the composition and inclusiveness of the water committee. Devolution 
of water governance to a local watershed and river basin increases the participation of 
citizens, business and associational groups, and other non-state actors that often represent 
local community interests. Regulatory pluralism describes this increased participation by 
non-state actors (civil society, business) and the decline of the state in the regulatory 
process. 638  Presented below, the interviews expose the nuanced practice of water 
governance, presenting a complex picture of water governance, beginning with a 
discussion the legal composition a water committee then, who is a water committee 
participant?, Who has influence in a committee? Who’s voice is missing? And, finally, 
how the diversity of thought fosters learning in a committee?   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
638 Grabosky, Supra note 5.   
	  	   	  243	  
3.2.2  Diversity: What is the composition of a water committee?  
All three legal frameworks under study in this dissertation construct a pluralistic 
regulatory space. As examined in the Ontario case study chapter, O. Reg. 288/07 
identifies a diverse range of stakeholders, setting out the requirement a 1/3 split between 
four identified stakeholder groups: 1) municipal; 2) agricultural, commercial or industrial 
including small business; 3) environmental, health, and other interests of the public; and 
4) First Nations. Through this legal instrument, the composition of source protection 
committee (SPC) establishes a heterogeneous decision-making body inclusive of state 
and non-state actors.  
 The literature presents a pragmatic perspective of who participates based on 
leadership and execution. Larson and Lach contend the implementation of the 
committee’s product requires the inclusion of “opinion leaders and other influential 
parties should be engaged in the planning and related activities,”639 which may or may 
not hold true in practice.  
 In practice, at the SPC in Ontario, the decision-makers at the planning table 
represented key interests in the watershed and professionally, had been or continued to be 
affiliated with an association that informed their perspective at the policy table. Even the 
public interest representatives’ backgrounds (i.e., Municipal Councilors, Commissioner 
of Planning, Water Manager) related to municipal, land-use planning and water-
management expertise, suggesting expertise and knowledge of municipal water concerns 
were the criteria for selection rather than a demonstrated personal interest in local 
watershed issues. The heavy concentration on a municipal background for the public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
639 K.L. Larson & D. Lach, “Equity in Urban Water Governance Through Participatory, Place-Based 
Approaches” (2010) 50 Nat. Resources J. 407 at 410. 
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representatives further suggests, perhaps, their involvement might create alliances and 
inroads with the affected municipalities in order to “increase support for outcomes and 
facilitate implementation”640 of the water plan, as suggested by Larson and Lach. This 
research leaves open whether a local resident without a professional background 
affiliated with water management or a municipality would have been considered an 
appropriate candidate for the public interest representative category.  
 In contrast, as discussed in the Alberta case study chapter, a soft-law approach 
directs the composition of the watershed-planning advisory council (WPAC). In this case, 
the Enabling Partnership Report does not define the BRBC’s (Bow River Basin Council) 
composition. The Report’s vague identification of stakeholders (“several individuals, 
groups, agencies, Aboriginal and municipal governments” 641 ) creates a conundrum 
regarding the composition of the water committee and frames the question: “What 
constitutes a WPAC?”642 The WPAC is a fluid, collaborative committee that has grown 
over the years to the present capacity of over 200 members. The difficulty of bounding 
and characterizing the WPAC by stakeholder identification and the Water for Life’s 
partnership concept leaves the water committee’s organizational identity and functional 
boundaries ambiguous.  
 In the Alberta Water Council’s “Shared Governance – What We Heard Workshop 
Summary Report”, the WPAC’s “operative body” is portrayed as open-ended. 643 In this 
report, the workshop respondents raised a concern regarding the organizational 
architecture of the WPAC: “What is the operative body of a WPAC? Is it the Board of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
640 Ibid.  
641 Alberta’s Enabling Partnership Report, Supra note 415 at 8.  
642 Alberta Water Council, “What we heard Report?, Supra note 624 at 8.  
643 Ibid. Specifically, the workshop participants asked the question: what is the operative body of the 
WPAC?  
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Directors, committee or the entire membership?”644 This dissertation continues to ask the 
question: What constitutes a WPAC? The answer remains undefined and a mystery.  
3.2.3  Diversity: Who is a Water Committee Participant? 
Notionally, localized governance is premised upon the participation of those individuals 
who work, live, or spend their leisure time within the community.645 These individuals 
are often referred to as stakeholders – they have stake in the issue or problem under 
consideration. In Ontario, one of the seven public interest representatives described his 
participation, as an observer:  
“As a public interest representative… I think I watched more …. I think 
decision-making varied considerably [on the committee]. Like industry 
representatives, they were there to present [the industry’s] point of view. 
The municipal representatives are presenting what their councils want 
them [to say]. And, public interest representatives, like me… are more 
broadly based in our perspectives and trying to present and represent 
what is good for the general public and future generations.”646 
 
This statement reflects a role of observation combined with an expectation each 
individual will present an expected narrative aligned with his or her interest group.  
 Research suggests stakeholder groups often show “strikingly similar demographic 
and attitudinal characteristics” that may create political alliances and power imbalances at 
the water committee table.647 In her California-based urban water-management research, 
Wessells’ research demonstrates how “being placed” in a water community is a key to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
644 Ibid.  
645 Larson & Lach, Supra note 639. These scholars “examined the ability of a watershed council, in 
Portland Oregon, to engage a wide variety of residents in environmental protection and decision-making.” 
Their research findings reveal that the “council overrepresented urban residents” “those who live new water 
in flood-prone areas” “new comers to Oregon” “residents with relatively high educational levels” “classic 
pro-environmental (biocentric) worldviews and liberal political interests. Overall, watershed council 
participants appear to bring a bureaucratic capacity and liberal ideology to the council that does not reflect 
the full array of residents in the watershed.” 
646 Interview of #30 (Dec. 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 16.  
647 A.T. Wessells, “Place-Based Conservation and Urban Waterways: Watershed Activism in the Bottom of 
the Basin” (2010) 50 Nat. Resources J. 539 at 540. Also see Larson & Lach, Supra note 738.  
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achieving equity.648 Wessells contends citizen participation and in particular, bottom-up 
activism can create political capital that coalesces to influence the decision-making 
process and outcomes of a decentralized water governance regime. In her view, 
“procedural reforms” — “who gets included in decision-making processes” — requires a 
consideration of how to foster “political” and “economic equity” to create not only fair 
access but also “ways of building capacity, solidarity and evaluative force among those 
with fewer material and organizational resources.”649 In this research, while the identity 
markers (e.g., associational group affiliation or social and economic characteristics) of 
the water committee participants were not collected, Wessells’ research findings should 
remind legal scholars that water governance is more than the placement of name cards at 
the policy table, as has been done in Ontario.    
 Nevertheless, it is notable that, the Ontario participants displayed absolute 
acceptance of the identity of their fellow participants. All the participants interviewed 
appeared to accept the limits of procedural access without question. Who “gets to decide” 
in the planning exercise was not in question. The participants interviewed did not raise 
concerns with equitable access, political capital, collective-alliances (coalitions) and did 
not offer a critical perspective of the selection process.  
 Similar to Ontario, none of the interviewees in the Alberta BRBC case study 
commented critically on the participants’ ability or recognized they might suffer from 
“group think.”650 Generally, the participants viewed the committee as being “inclusive – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
648 Ibid. at 554. Wessells described being placed as: “To be or to become “placed” entails collective, 
endeavor-oriented, spiritual dimensions. Being “placed” is key to greater equity.”  
649 Ibid. at 542-43. 
650 I.L. Janis, “Chapter 15: Groupthink: The Desperate Drive for Consensus at Any Cost” in J. Shafritz, J. 
Ott and Y. Jang Classics of Organizational Theory (Boston: Gale/Cengage Learning, 2015).  
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to allow people to be heard, to obtain the right information and get people engaged.”651 
Another BRBC participant viewed participation in the planning exercise as a “voluntary 
process, nobody is compelled to be members of the BRBC…. There must be a fairly held 
view that there is value added in participating with us … and getting into one of those 
seats at the table.” 652  In other words, as volunteers, this study participant viewed 
participation in WPAC as beneficial.  
 Perhaps the benefit offered to the participants is gaining an understanding of 
others’ perspectives. Similar to Hutter and Jones’ research findings where the governance 
mode was found to create an opportunity for business representatives to be exposed to the 
viewpoints of others, this research also offers a similar finding of the creation of an early 
warning system. In identifying the civil society and private sectors as two sources of 
regulation, regulation scholars Hutter and Jones argue the government to governance shift 
can be understood by commercial entities’ risk-management practices. Their research 
found firms are influenced by numerous external forces that affect their “risk 
management practices” and “shape the motives and preferences of internal workings,” 
thus, directing “what managers acted on.”653  
 In practice, a long-term administrative BRBC member expressed a similar 
sentiment of the industry sector’s gathering intelligence to understand its risk tolerance. 
This risk management approach allowed the business community to be exposed to the 
views of other stakeholder groups creating an early “warning system”:  
“like any other organization there’s voices that I wouldn’t call them 
dominant voices …. they’re loud voices and powerful voices and we have 
very good input from the big players (i.e., big licence holders: City of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
651 Interview of #09 (June 13, 2012) Interview notes at page 8.  
652 Interview of #11 (June 11, 2012) Interview notes at page 15. 
654 Interview of #13 (June 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 19.  
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Calgary, TransAlta, an electrical company and three irrigation districts) 
because they’re interested in what others are thinking. And, we have 
pretty good turn out of environmental groups and the environmentally 
interested general public. The big players...the big [water] licence holders 
like to hear what those people are say because we’re almost like an early 
warning system to what’s kinda of going on and what’s on people’s minds 
and so forth. So, I think, it's a pretty good spectrum. I would say really 
strong adversarial environmental groups kinda do their own thing. And, 
we are fine with that. There’s a big role out there for adversarial groups 
and there’s a big role for what we do in collaborative way – sorta, like 
let’s find a solution group.”654 And, as we expanded from a group of “49 
members in 2000” to the current WPAC membership of “over 200”655.... 
“more people come and tell you about things they know.”656 
 
In addition to industry’s intelligence gathering, this foregoing statement also points to a 
danger where group norms and similar perspectives bar outside perspectives, perhaps 
“more adversarial” or radical voices, from entering the planning forum. The prevailing 
cooperative sentiment of the group may explain the collegial environment (or symptoms 
of group think) and lack of dissent I observed at this research site (and, in the other two 
committees.)   
 Taken together, the participants’ perspectives on who is a stakeholder or 
participant on the Ontario and Alberta committees paint a picture of a volunteer whose 
place at the table is either prescribed by the regulation (Ontario) or is unrestricted 
(Alberta). These individuals see their position as voluntary. As volunteers, they come to 
the table to offer information on the river basin or watershed that aligns with either their 
personal, professional, or associational views and, through the committee, are governed 
by the group norms established within the process and by the group. Their ascribed role 
and identity as committee member represents a particular policy position to the larger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
654 Interview of #13 (June 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 19.  
655 Interview of #11 (June 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 15. 
656 Interview of #13 (June 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 22. 
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committee that is anticipated and respected within the group and constructs a particular 
identity (municipal advocate) on the committee. After all, their role as a water committee 
member is to offer their expertise and provide information. This information giving-and -
gathering informs policy development, and the gathered information can be taken back to 
their constituency or associational alliance acting as an early warning system that a risk to 
their existing water use may be percolating beyond the water committee. 
3.2.4  Diversity – Who is the decision-maker?  
Theoretically, participatory governance is premised upon gathering the insights of a 
diverse range of actors. Often, the engagement of these affected communities is 
structured upon establishing a partnership relationship. 657  Gutrich et al. view a 
partnership “as a dynamic relationship among actors, based upon mutually agreed upon 
objectives, pursued through an understanding of division of labor based on respective 
comparative advantage of each member.” 658  The literature now regards developing 
“partnerships and co-operative” forms of environmental governance as a worldwide 
trend.659 Gutrich et al. insist this participatory partnership trend reflects an upward push 
from interests groups, citizens, and other decision-makers demanding access to policy 
decisions.660 Partnerships are specifically referenced in the Alberta case study and, in 
particular, as a key organizing principle of the Water for Life Strategy. In this empirical 
research, Alberta’s partnership trend presented as a division of labour where the 
decentralized water committee is charged with developing the water plan that in effect is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
657 P. Ryan, “Sustainability partnerships: eco-strategy theory in practice? (2003) 14(2) Management of 
Environmental Quality 256.  
658 Ibid.  
659 J. Gutrich, et al., “Science in the public process of ecosystem management: lessons from Hawaii, 
Southeast Asia, Africa and the US Mainland” (2005) 76 Journal of Environmental Management 197 at 197. 
660 Ibid. at 198.  
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“a decision support tool” for the province.661  
 Another BRBC member described the division of labour or partnership 
relationship between province and the WPAC in the planning function, as difficult to 
characterize. This BRBC member viewed the province’s operationalization of the 
partnership principle as offering a mixed message; yes, the province supports the freedom 
to draft a water plan but then it also asserts control when a WPAC policy is out of line 
with provincial interests. This WPAC member acknowledged ordinary individuals at a 
“grassroots” level as a key feature of the partnership model but also expressed frustration 
with the state’s lack of direction and engagement:  
“The whole purpose for building a water partnership approach to river 
basin management is to be able to engage the grassroots. [But], it would 
be helpful to have a little bit more participation from the provincial 
government or direction from the provincial government in terms of area 
of focus.”662 
 
The province “should be inviting a process of back and forth” 
communication; listening, understanding and discussing what are the 
issues facing each basin and what are the priorities of government. We 
are not quite there yet.” The province has designed the process 
backwards. The province “spawned the WPAC community in Alberta, now 
the province really needs to understand [the tension between] what to do 
to let loose [at a WPAC scale] and how can it can control the [WPAC] by 
giving the [committees] the right protocols, planning frameworks and 
levels of authority. Unfortunately, I think they got it a little bit backwards 
because we’ve already finished establishing the committees and most of us 
have planning underway and now they’re coming out with guiding 
documents to reign us in.”663 
 
Generally, while the state encourages participation in decentralized planning, as set out in 
the theory, this research demonstrates, in practice, a provincial authority disinterested in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
661 Interview of #11 (June 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 3. 
662 Interview of #09 (June 13, 2012) Interview notes at page 4-6.  
663 Ibid. 
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the details of the local planning process (i.e., committee’s rowing activities). 664 Yet, 
when the water plan initiative contradicts provincial interests, the provincial authority 
steps in and curtails the proposed action plan. For this committee member, increased two-
way communication between the partners (i.e., the province and WPAC) could rectify 
this problem. While this policy exercise seems to promote an exchange of information at 
a local level and to higher-level partners, in essence, the partnership principle facilitates 
provincial oversight and control, as the decision-maker.  
 Overall, as discussed in the literature, a democratic process that ensures equitable 
participation of citizens is a concern in a collaborative process.665 In these legislative 
governance experiments, ensuring procedural justice mechanisms in the process did not 
present as an issue for the participants. In the interviews, none of the interviewees 
expressed doubt with respect to the efficacy of their perspective or the lack of 
representation of the public interest. In addition, as professionals and experts in their 
fields, these participants happily brought their expertise to the policy exercise and 
appreciated the opportunity to question the substantive content of the policy documents 
produced by the environmental ministries. As participants, they viewed their roles as 
offering assistance and fulfilling a substantive informational role for the state. The 
democratic deficit critique offered by the literature was irrelevant to these committee 
members. This research exposes the lack of awareness of procedural justice issues and 
the need for further research to fashion an appropriate mechanism(s) to measure and 
achieve procedural justice in these water committee, an inquiry beyond this research.666  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
664 R. Eversole, “Community Agency and Community Engagement: Re-theorising Participation in 
Governance” (2011) 31(1) Jnl. Publi. Pol 51.  
665 Larson & Lach, Supra. note 639. 
666 For example, J. Caddy, “Evaluating Public Participation in Policy Making” (2005) online: OCED 
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3.2.5  Diversity: The Voices of Influence 
This research confirmed the dominance of the provincial government and the industry 
sectors in the Alberta and Ontario water committees. In contrast, all the parties to the 
administrative tribunal under study – The Yukon Water Board – their voices were heard 
and their concerns taken into account in the decision document.  
 In the Yukon case study, it seemed clear to one Water Board participant all voices 
were heard:  
“We hear them”. In the Keno decision, for instance, “we heard their 
submission. They had their written submission. We took it into account but 
at the end of day many of their issues were beyond our jurisdiction. 
Really, it’s just noise…. Now, having said this, we understand their 
concerns…and we suggest that they limit operating heavy equipment if it 
near a suburban area…let’s say 11:00 at night to 7:00 am. So, [w]e 
understand the problem, your sympathetic, but at the end of the day you 
have to work within the authority that you’re given under your statute.”667 
 
In other words, individuals receive the opportunity to present their arguments and 
evidence. However, further research is required to understand whose voices are 
privileged in the process and enabled by the legislation?  
 In the Ontario case study, the Ministry of Environment (MOE), the Conservation 
Authority and the Industry representative — aggregate extraction — not the local 
citizens, were the voices of influence. One of the SPC agricultural representatives 
suggested that for a citizen to influence the committee, the presenter would have to 
present a rational, science-based presentation. The interviewee described the committee’s 
expectation of a presentation to the committee as:  
“...a science-based form from an accredited source.” We had one member 
of the public who has repeatedly made submissions to the committee 
regarding the aggregate issue. “She’s been on her high horses all along. 	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667 Interview of #15 (July 5, 2012) Interview notes at page 11. 
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She has… hmmm… an axe to grind… her own agenda. We receive her 
[submission] and we file it. So, if somebody wants to put something 
forward, it has to be from a reputable company.” It must be “science-
based and put forward in a proper format and it will be looked at. It 
hasn’t happened too many times.”668 
 
This commentary suggests a citizen needs to present as an expert, with a science-based 
presentation.   
 Even with a expert persona projected onto a layperson, the SPC Chair seemed 
perplexed by the lack of public participation suggesting the presence of a selection bias or 
issue myopia occurring:  
“Originally, the [water source protection authority (SPA)] thought we 
probably going to have quite a few delegations but I’d say that we had five 
delegations and most of them who were coming, were on issues like the 
quarries that are really not part of our [legislative] mandate. I mean some 
people think they should be but they’re not. The 21 issues are described 
and so the people who were coming were the wrong people.  
 
They were coming talking about quarries. Quarry issues seem to be the 
big things that were bothering people. We were polite and accommodating 
enough to let them speak at the end of the meeting and assured them that 
we would record their concerns but explained to them that we didn’t have 
the ability to do anything about that because we had letters. It’s in the 
back of the great big book...the letter that Lori and I signed and wrote 
when the SPC had concerns about breaching the aquitard [in Guelph] and 
the response from the Ministry was that it was not one of the SPC items. 
Now the general public has difficulty perceiving that and I can agree… 
share their concerns but when it’s not part of our mandate, there’s 
nothing the SPC can do about it...but, pass on their concerns.  
 
Most of the issues were quarry related and water taking regarding water 
bottling but we didn’t have more than half a dozen of those. One or two 
year maximum… we didn’t get a lot of public participation coming to the 
meetings. I mean the public had opportunities to come and we held open 
houses and we had all kinds of things but at the actual [SPC] meetings 
themselves we had very few delegations.”669 
 
While the dominant issue of concern for local citizens was aggregate extraction, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
668 Interview of #23 (Nov. 13, 2012) Interview notes at page 25-26. 
669 Interview of #26 (Dec. 20, 2012) Interview notes at page 23. 
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foregoing statements illustrate this issue was legislatively barred from being considered 
at a SPC. The legally constituted drinking water threat list narrowed the water 
management planning process into an enumerated classification system of drinking water 
threats, which further narrowed the thinking of water committee members. This 
narrowing effect created a frame for the provincial authority and committee members to 
receive, to process and to deny concerns of local citizens.   
 Though citizen participation was anticipated in the design of Ontario’s SPC water 
committee, the public stayed away. Freeman contends, unlike industry groups, the 
public’s lack of participation should be expected. In her view, the public may lack the 
resources or technical, scientific, and legal knowledge to participate. Moreover, a citzen 
or citizen group’s ability for a sustained commitment may be hampered by their ability to 
continue in the process. Also, a role conflict may present as result of thei need to 
establish “the public-private divide.”670 
 Although the theoretical premise of collaborative governance is based upon 
citizen participation, these research findings demonstrate citizen involvement is 
complicated by the legislation and the persona of presenter. In Ontario, a citizen’s 
presentation must be presented in science-based expert format and fall squarely within 
one of the twenty-one prescribed drinking water threats. Otherwise, as I observed, the 
committee members would respond by smiling politely, noting the citizen’s concern, and 
then, promptly dismissing the issue, as the committee quickly moved forward to draft the 
water plan.  
These research findings point to an apathetic attitude towards citizen or public 
interest participation. The Conservation Authority (i.e., the source protection authority 	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(SPA) or the MOE) did not step back and investigate why citizens were not engaging in 
the overall process. Rather, the SPA stayed focused upon its administrative tasks – locate 
the twenty-one drinking water threats in the watershed, complete the water plan, and 
meet the legislatively imposed deadline.  
 Unlike the public, the MOE and the SPA were the dominant voices influencing 
the public law-making exercise. Some of the SPC members described the MOE liaison 
representative, not an official member of the committee, as being too influential while 
other committee members found the MOE representative to be helpful. For example, one 
of the public interest representatives described “working with our liaison from the 
Ministry of the Environment [has been good]. She has an understanding of where we are 
coming from. She’s been a very good resource for us.”671 In contrast, another committee 
member emphatically stated that he “didn’t agree that [MOE representative] should be 
there [at the SPC meetings] at all.” In his opinion, she had “too damn much” influence: 
“To be frank, I’ve thought all along that how can you have a decision-making process 
when your decisions are in Toronto before you are home [from the SPC meeting]?” This 
member’s view characterizes the MOE liaison representative’s role as gathering real-time 
intelligence on the SPC process, delivering the information to the Ministry headquarters 
in Toronto for it to be processed and re-packaged into a Ministry policy or directive to be 
delivered to the SPC at the next meeting by the SPA. 
 Committee members also viewed the SPA staff as a strong influence in the 
decision-making process. The original aggregate extraction committee member stated, “I 
don’t think you can underestimate the effect and influence that the staff had on things that 
are presented to the committee because on the overwhelming majority of cases, the 	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committee went along with the staff’s point of view.” This statement exposes the SPA’s 
steering of SPC process with the MOE’s influence in the background. Perhaps, this 
insight also explains how a strong MOE presence and SPA direction at the meeting 
ensured the planning process stayed on course.  
 In sum, while the diversity of participants, their interests, and knowledge was 
envisioned as vital aspect of the process, the MOE liaison representative, who effectively 
operated as an information mechanism at service to the province, was a dominant voice. 
These findings indicate the acceptance of the MOE’s liaison representative on the 
committee was mixed. The notion of diversity, as an incentive to encourage the public’s 
participation, is aspirational. In the end, the SPA, MOE and industry players exhibited the 
strongest voices in the committee. Together, these state actors controlled and narrowed 
the administrative planning tasks to align with the enumerated drinking water threat list 
rather than fostering a local planning process, where the public could participate, as 
envisioned by Justice O’Connor in the Walkerton Inquiry Report. 
3.2.6  Diversity - The Missing Voices 
In all three case studies, First Nations voices were missing. Specifically, the Yukon 
Water Board member indicated indigenous knowledge had not been taken into account 
“because they don’t come forward. If they did, we would give a strong weight” to their 
knowledge. He further explained:  
“by and large, they don’t come forward, by and large, they got a side with 
the company and so… they don’t want...there are copyright issues here. 
They don’t want people to know where those berries are [located]… you 
know where they’re getting their medicine from… they want that 
protected. So, they’ll make a deal with the company that we will never 
know. Once it’s out there, [as result of a public hearing] it’s on our web 
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page and everyone knows about it. So, as a result we don’t get indigenous 
knowledge.”672 
 
In this participant’s view, intellectual and cultural property issues, including concerns 
with the lack of confidentiality in a public process, limits indigenous knowledge being 
brought to the committee.  
 An Alberta BRBC administrative member expressed concern at the lack of 
Aboriginal peoples’ participation on water committee. He explained, First Nation 
participation:   
“has not been very successfully addressed [in our WPAC]. This is an extremely 
complicated issue. There’s all kinds of legal requirements that I’m not very 
familiar with … duty to consult sorta of issues. And, it’s very difficult for us to 
comprehend exactly how we fit into that. The provincial government has, at 
various times, claimed what they believe is their right to consider any discussions 
that to on between a WPAC and First Nation as being potentially mandated 
consultation. We indicated that we don’t like that idea...we don’t think it is fair. It 
has been an impediment in us having those discussions with First Nations. For 
good or bad, they’re reluctant to come to our table and have even informal 
discussions around planning and watershed issues in the presence of fear that 
whatever they say may be considered binding by the provincial government…. We 
understand their reluctance and we’re frankly pretty helpless at being able to do 
anything.”673 
 
As did another committee member who also viewed First Nation participation as 
complicated by “legal interventions” and the “duty to consult.”674 Together these two 
responses, point to how a legal rights perspective and the provincial position (i.e., on 
consultation) are barriers to aboriginal participation on the WPAC.  
 In contrast, in Ontario, three First Nation representatives held seats on the SPC. 
Together, the legislatively constituted place cards at the policy table — including their 
presence at a meeting — was deemed by other SPC members to be active participation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
672 Interview of #15 (July 5, 2012) Interview notes at page 12.  
673 Interview of #11 (June, 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 10-11. 
674 Interview of #13 (June 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 25. 
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One non-aboriginal member succinctly stated: “[M]embers of the First Nations are part of 
the committee, [they] do participate regularly at the committee meetings and have been 
supportive of the development of the source protection plan.”675 Another non-aboriginal 
committee member expressed disappointment in the attendance of the First Nations 
representatives. His statement reflects a lack of understanding how governance issues at 
an Indian Band level might affect their attendance record. Moreover, his statements also 
hint at an underlying attitude of assimilation where the interviewee expressed a desire to 
see aboriginal interests align with dominant societal views. The SPC member stated, 
“that he was disappointed in their attendance” on the SPC. He continued to explain that 
he understood “they were included from the very start; with three seats at the table and 
there has only been one that has, in my view, that has made a consistent attempt to 
attend. We’ve had two or three different ones and they’re seldom there. And, that’s too 
bad.” When asked why he thought they did not attend the meeting on a regular basis he 
cautiously stated:  
“Boy I better be careful here … I sense that, as many, many other things, 
First Nations communities don’t really value and respect, if you like, what 
mainstream society is trying to do around various matters whether its land 
claims or whether its protecting water supply.”676 
 
 Offering insight into an aboriginal perspective of water source protection, one of 
the First Nations representatives interviewed presented a holistic perspective of water 
source protection. His perspective, as he explained, is informed by the teachings from 
elders often told through stories, stories that are sacred and kept within the community, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 Interview of #20 (Nov. 1, 2012) Interview notes at page 1.  
676 Interview of #19 (Sept. 27, 2012) Interview notes at page 14. 
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stories that, I, as the researcher, did not push him to share.677 Rather, in the interview, he 
offered the following explanation of his holistic perspective:  
“Like the typical native person… elders, traditional people … whatever 
…. on reserve. They never thought of it as ok … there’s a well here, a zone 
around [it that] should be protected. They never thought of things like 
that. They didn’t set up these protection zones or Whoppas or IPZs [like 
the SPC planning process has created]. When we did our [process] … it 
was like we need to protect all water … surface water, ground water 
whatever it is because somebody’s gotta use it … an animal, a bird, a 
person… they should all be treated the same…. We have some ideas how 
they were going to do it back then and I say well… we can still keep ours 
the same way, it’s separate so that’s the we left ours. We “dropped the 
word ‘source’ off our plan. It’s not source protection it’s just water 
protection. I think this is a pretty good example of how [we] think 
differently.”  
 
“When I do a scientific project … like a water study or putting in a water 
well … I would go to the Elder and say this what I am working on, what 
do you think? Any advice? Are there sources of Indigenous knowledge or 
ceremonies to be considered? If the Elder provides advice then I 
incorporate it into the whole strategy. But, I need to be careful how I 
present the Elder’s advice in public so I don’t go into details. I just say 
[that] I consulted with an Elder.” Typically, I am asked the name of the 
Elder. [The Elder’s advice given through stories] “they they’re gifts and 
that you don’t talk about it publically… We are not supposed to talk about 
our [stories] publically or to write them down so it’s...the oral part...that 
is supposed to be respected.”678 
 
Over the two-year observation period of the SPC, I did not observe this committee 
member raise this holistic perspective of water source protection. Rather, he revealed his 
perspective in the private setting of our one-to-one interview.  
 Overall, non-aboriginal committee members expressed frustration with the 
inability to engage with First Nation communities, as was the case in Alberta. In Ontario, 
the participants revealed an expectation that a legislatively prescribed place card at the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677 Leanne Betasamosake Simpson “Theorizing Resurgence from with Nishnaabeg Thought” in J. Doerfler 
et.al., Centering Anishinaabeg Stories: Understanding the World Through Stories (East Lansing: Michigan 
State U Press: 2013) at 287.  
678 Interview of #28 (Dec. 20, 2012) Interview notes at page 24-26. 
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policy table constructed the appropriate space for aboriginal participation. Even though 
the SPC committee had met for over several years, the participants’ comments exposed 
the collision of different worldviews.  
 In this planning process, time and space are compressed to ensure the completion 
of the administrative tasks. Over the lengthy planning period, the committee, as a whole, 
revealed an inability to nurture the time and space to uncover the epistemologies 
embedded in the decision-maker’s colonial ways of knowing. Instead, a form of 
“cognitive imperialism” emerged where aboriginal peoples are viewed as lacking 
knowledge. 679  The existing knowledge technologies embedded in the provincial 
government’s planning functions were privileged in the watershed-management planning 
exercise. In effect, First Nations’ identities were eroded by an embedded colonial 
knowledge perpetuated in the technocratic and risk-oriented water-planning process. In 
practice, the static, institutional watershed-planning structure preserved colonial 
knowledge. These findings illuminate the need to consider committee participants’ 
cultural competency and their ability to engage in a cross-cultural collaborative 
regulatory space.  
 These findings also reveal an adversarial legal rights perspective predominates 
and can act as a barrier to the participation of Aboriginal communities. As this rights 
perspective becomes entrenched in the natural resources sector, strained relations will 
continue to frame the engagement, distance parties and reinforce dominant perspectives 
in water-source planning. Collaboration purports to promote diversity of thought and the 
inclusion of range of viewpoints and, perhaps, leads to a disruption of institutionalized 
frameworks. However, the de-colonizing of regulatory methodologies, and the 	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introduction of new ways of negotiating a governance problem through indigenous 
knowledge and law remains an elusive goal in the governance mode.   
3.2.7  Diversity – How is Knowledge Production and Learning Experienced by the 
Participants?  
Information exchange is emphasized in the governance arrangements under study. 
Governance scholars, Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden contend participatory 
governance arrangements facilitate learning and knowledge production, at both an 
individual level and beyond the group.680 In their view, these “knowledge-based” policy 
exercises are information exchanges between experts operating within expert 
“governance networks.”681 These networks allow for information and knowledge to be 
expressed, relied upon, and re-considered. Kersbergen and Van Waarden contend expert 
knowledge “is fed into the policy making arenas, including public media… These new 
forms of technocracy … also serve as a mechanism of mutual learning.” 682  These 
scholars propose this idea of an information exchange where information is generated 
through continuous feedback loops of experimentation, monitoring, learning, and 
adjustments of knowledge.  
 Technocratic knowledge production prevailed at Ontario’s SPC planning process. 
Knowledge production and information feedback loops on the aggregate extraction issue 
was expressed by one of the public interest representatives as occurring: “[when] the 
issue [Guelph quarry] was identified, it was referred to [SPA – Conservation Authority] 
staff for further information and recommendations, staff came back with Ministry of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
680 K. Van Kersbergen & F. Van Waarden, “‘Governance’ as a bridge between disciplines: Cross-
disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems of governability, accountability and 
legitimacy.” (2004) 43 European Journal of Political Research 143 at 162; Wood, Supra note 630 at 131. 
Wood discusses “knowledge production” in the context of the design or value of the voluntary management 
systems as “generating and disseminating ideas, information and expertise.” 
681 Ibid. Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden. 
682 Ibid at 162. 
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Environment (MOE) recommendations saying its outside of our jurisdiction and it was 
the end of the issue.”683 In this statement, the SPA and MOE’s bureaucratic policy-
making process provides for the identification of an issue, the exchange of information 
between staff and the committee, followed by the province’s production of a final 
decision, which is then directed to the committee.  
 On the point of individual learning, the aggregate industry representative stated 
the diversity of interests around the planning table assisted him in understanding different 
perspectives on the Guelph quarry issue:  
“I didn’t understand the specific concerns on the Dolime [Guelph] 
quarry, they [municipality and the public representative] thought they 
were digging too deep and getting into the actual supply of the Guelph 
drinking water supply so … I didn’t know that was the concern and that 
was … ya … was news to me so I learned because that is a specific 
[problem]… that came out of a learning thing.” I think what the [MOE] is 
saying … if there’s a quarry and it’s not breaching the aquitard that is 
part of the drinking water …. [MOE] is not dealing with that one.” So, 
“understanding [occurred] and increased understanding of the other 
side.”684 
 
Similar to the theory, these findings demonstrate how the exchange of information led to 
the understanding of different viewpoints and allowed for individual learning of a 
specific concern at the Guelph quarry.  
 This research affirmed individual learning and the hope for group learning as 
benefits of participating in the committee decision-making process.  In Ontario, the 
public interest representative learned first-hand about water problems facing Aboriginal 
communities when he attended the SPC meeting held at the Six Nations First Nation and 
listened to the Chief. He also showed individual learning when he said he was reminded 
of the Aboriginal Seven Generations perspective, and, further expressed hope for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
683 Interview of #30 (Dec. 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 13.  
684 Interview of #31 (Dec. 19, 2012) Interview notes at page 17. 
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broader learning experience for the wider group:  
“[T]he Chief mentioned that they take a seven generation perspective and 
it was important not to think about what’s going to happen today but 
what’s going to happen to our grandchildren’s – grandchildren. It was not 
new to me but it was refreshing to hear… to be [reminded] and for the 
committee to hear that [perspective].”685 
 
 Taken together, these comments affirm the literature’s discussion of knowledge 
production and forms of learning through information exchange and dialogue occurring 
at the policy table.  
 Overall, these research findings on diversity point to the law’s contribution in 
creating a pluralistic regulatory space through a legally established committee. While 
learning and knowledge production occurred in these governance arrangements, the 
participatory aspect of these governance experiments revealed regulatory pluralism as an 
early warning system. Moreover, the role of the non-state actors as surrogate regulators, 
as argued by Gunningham et al., is limited in these committees. The participant’s 
volunteer role became one of a privileged government informant, privileged because the 
voluntary participants were selected and, as an informant these participants provided 
needed information to allow the province to understand and manage local watershed 
conditions and concerns. Within these committees, the government actors emerged as the 
dominant voices drowning out the voices of Aboriginal communities and the general 
public representatives. In end, the promise of diversity to enhance a public policy 
function through inclusion, the diversity of thought and learning was featured in each 
legal framework. However, the implementation of regulatory pluralism through the 
participation of non-state actors not only revealed the province’s need for information but 
also exposed its limitations.  	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3.3  Eco-Resiliency Framework: A Broad Perspective Factor 
3.3.1  Introduction 
A broad eco-resilient factor refers to the scale of governance (i.e., local, regional, national 
and transnational) regime with consideration given to the presence of polycentric 
governance and the presence of a coordinating mechanism that can take into account 
multiple jurisdictional scales. Farber and Freeman offered their “modular” environmental 
regulation model as a coordinating function addressing regulatory fragmentation.686 This 
modular model advances the “idea” of “provisional and functional rearrangement of 
units” with the advancement of a “flexible co-ordination” mechanism to overcome 
regulatory fragmentation.687 The aim of modularity is to construct ad hoc “institutional 
arrangements” aligned with the environmental problem and the potential solutions.688 
Their research highlights the inherent complexity of addressing regulatory fragmentation 
that is hampered by “different mandates, [organizational] cultures, management 
structures and budgetary priorities [that present] significant challenges for co-ordination.”  
689690 
 The preceding case study chapters examined the legal frameworks’ broad 
perspective. At the Yukon Water Board, the regulatory management of water licensing 
showed a broad perspective when the Board’s decision document revealed consideration 
of a coordinating approval process with the Yukon Environmental and Socio-Economic 
Board (YESEB) and Yukon Government’s Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources 
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687 Ibid. at 798.  
688 Ibid. at 799.  
689 Ibid. at 813.  
 
	  	   	  265	  
(EMR). However, a coordinating mechanism was not found in either the Alberta or the 
Ontario case study.  
 A member of the Alberta BRBC, with a membership of over 200 members, 
reveals a sophisticated understanding of the barriers to creating an inter-jurisdictional 
coordinating mechanism in a localized water-management planning exercise. One of the 
interviewee’s responded to the question, Can you tell me about your experience about 
how the [BRBC] council addresses overlapping jurisdictional issues?”:  
“Ya...we’ve certainly noted it as a challenge. … I suspect it is in almost 
every watershed that the topographical, geographical environmental 
boundaries that make up a watershed are not at all aligned with or poorly 
aligned to the geo-political boundaries of municipalities and provinces. 
So, there is without question, overlapping jurisdictions both vertically, if I 
could say it that way … referring to federal, provincial and municipal 
governments and also horizontally with any specific municipal or 
provincial government layer and the fact that there may be instances 
where different departments in the provincial government have different 
ideas on how things should be done. For example, wetland protection; the 
Alberta Environment department demands the recognition of the natural 
capital of wetlands and the protection of wetlands. But, the Energy or 
Agricultural departments promote the notion that siting a gas or oil well 
in a wetland is an option because the land and oil resource is not taken 
out of production as could be a possibility under a wetland protection 
policy. A contradiction exists.”691 
 
This foregoing commentary shows a tension between the economic development and the 
environmental protection mandates of the different departments. As discussed by Farber 
and Freeman, these different mandates are expected to present as a challenge of 
interagency co-ordination. Furthermore, this respondent commented on the conflict 
between the natural features and the imposed administrative boundaries of the watershed. 
Together these challenges, which presented at this local water management planning 
scale, illustrate how a WPAC is trapped within its jurisdictional silo.  	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 In this research, the study participants from the Yukon Water Board and Ontario’s 
SPC offered responses similar to the Alberta respondents’, highlighting the pervasiveness 
of the jurisdictional co-ordination mechanism challenge and the presence of a regulatory 
fragmentation barrier. Specifically, the short response from the Yukon Water Board 
member to the question on over-lapping jurisdiction reveals a hands-off perspective: “We 
haven’t” dealt with it. Upon reflection, he offered an example for clarification: With 
“First Nations with over-lapping claims and how we deal with it is we will hear from 
both First Nations…. It’s not our job to get into the politics or under legal interpretations 
as to who’s what. So, we have submissions from both First Nations.”692 
 In Ontario, several SPC participants also commented on the challenge of 
jurisdictional co-ordination. One member of the SPC explained his response to the 
jurisdictional barrier by offering three examples. In particular, the committee member 
discussed the Port Stanley (Lake Erie) intake pipe’s proximity to shipping lanes in the 
Great Lakes and the concern regarding the potential contamination from shipping 
activities; First Nation water issues; and, the Melancthon Mega Quarry conflict in the 
Credit Valley, Toronto and Region and Central Lake Source Protection (CTC) 
jurisdiction. On the shipping issue, the participant described the committee’s response: 
“We [SPC] very quickly came to the conclusion, well…shipping lanes and the Great 
Lakes is a federal jurisdiction issue, we don’t need to deal with that period.” On the 
interconnected ecological boundaries of the broader watershed with the CTC jurisdiction 
and the mega-quarry conflict, the SPC placed greater emphasis upon the administrative 
jurisdictional boundary of their Lake Erie SPC and isolated itself from the abutting CTC 
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SPC.693 With regard to First Nations, a participant’s stated: the “[Lake Erie SPC] “put 
blinkers on saying [First Nations] that’s not our jurisdiction; or in the other case, [the 
Mega quarry] it’s outside of our boundary.”694 Similar to the other SPC participants’ 
responses to this question of jurisdictional co-ordination, this participant’s comments 
highlight the SPC’s efficient response to jurisdictional issues: it’s not our jurisdiction so, 
let’s move on to the next administrative planning task.   
 Overall, in all three case studies, examining the element of a broad perspective 
exposed the immense challenge of jurisdictional co-ordination. This finding of 
jurisdictional fragmentation points to a weak version of Freeman and Farber’s modularity 
in these participatory governance arrangements. The administrative jurisdictional barrier 
exposes the constitutional constraints imposed upon these committees and reinforces the 
acceptance of the regulatory fragmentation as a constraint. Instead, these committees 
remain tethered to the traditional legal question of jurisdiction. This traditional approach 
is expected to impede a broad perspective of water issues and planning recommendations, 
which will further act as a barrier to the implementation of interagency co-ordination 
processes and innovative regulatory solutions.  
3.4  The Emergent Change Factor 
3.4.1  Introduction  
Emergent change directs decision-makers to consider the unpredictability embedded in 
the water governance problem and challenges the committee’s ability to respond quickly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
693 CTC Source Protection Region, “Amended Source Protection Plan: CTC Source Protection Region” 
(July-August 2014),” online: CTC <http://www.ctcswp.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/CTCAmendedProposedSPP_20140719.pdf>. The CTC Source Protection Region 
spans from the Oak Ridges Moraine in the north to Lake Ontario in the south. The region contains portions 
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region of Canada. 
694 Interview of #30 (Dec. 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 9.  
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to change. In this research, the strongest form of emergent change presented in the Yukon 
case study. Through the Water Board’s process, the tribunal entertained the element of 
surprise by way of taking account of new information. In the Carmacks Copper Ltd 
decision, the Board demonstrated an ability to receive new information and experts 
regarding the uncertainty and the unproven nature of the heap leaching technology. 695  In 
the Minto license-amendment hearing, the Board again demonstrated responsiveness to 
new information. Before the meeting, a Board member anticipated the primary issue 
would be financial amount of the security bond. However, during the public hearing, I 
observed through the presentation of submissions and the questioning process, the 
Board’s administrative focus shift away from the anticipated security deposit and towards 
the consideration of technical aspects of the mining operation that exposed numerous 
violations of the water use licence and the Waters Act. The Board’s record and public 
hearing function demonstrated openness to new information – that is, surprise.  
 In contrast, in the Ontario case study, the water committee’s ability to be 
responsive to emergent environmental change was limited by the legislation and the 
province’s control over the planning process. The committee’s law making was narrowed 
to established categories enumerated in the drinking water threat list, a perspective of 
public health – drinking water, and a risk-management approach to water governance.   
 The majority of Ontario SPC participants’ comments exhibited a managed view 
of the watershed-management planning:  
“I can’t think of an example of when the committee [was being responsive 
to changing environmental information.] … hmm…..so, when an issue was 
raised and the committee needed to determine a course of action…hmm..: 
I have seen the issue debated...it’s often debated whether the issue is too 
disruptive in the process – should the issue be parked to be dealt with at a 	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later date… some instances have arisen when late-breaking information 
has come to light and question is raised: how can we incorporate this new 
information into either existing policies or revisions to the source water 
protection plans? It always comes down to weighing the significance of 
the change and the need to continue on with the [planning] process in a 
timely manner. Right!...So, is this a show stopper that we have to halt the 
process and delay things or is this something that we can put into a 
parking lot and we can still get this thing [i.e., water plan] through in a 
timely manner and address this little detail at some future point.”696 
 
This comment illustrates a theme of a managed process responsive to internal 
institutional goals.  
 In Alberta, one of the BRBC participants offered a similar insight into the 
bureaucratic mechanics of how the committee responds to new environmental 
information. When information “comes to the board as new information” … we need to 
decide if it is “something that we need to take action on, we’ll then figure out if there is a 
way we can do something within our priorities and whether it is something we need to 
look at right away.”697 In other words, an inward organizational focus is adopted where 
fitting the problem into the existing administrative structure reveals an issue selection 
bias. The system is static rather than a fluid, changing, or responsive regime. In the end, 
new or emerging ecological information was not incorporated into the committee’s final 
regulatory product – the state of watershed report.  
 Taken together, these decision-makers may debate the issue, but the SPC’s 
decision-making protocol, like the BRBC’s approach, is to first ask the questions, “Does 
the problem fit into the existing policy regime? If not, can we park the issue for future 
consideration?” This efficient processing of information raises concerns whether the 
committee would respond to climate change research indicating both water quantity and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696 Interview of #17 (Sept. 20, 2012) Interview notes at page 13. 
697 Interview of #13 (June 14, 2012) Interview notes at pages 28-29. 
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quality are be affected. 698  Would the response to a climate change incident be the 
traditional management by crisis approach?  
 In the Ontario case study, some respondents exhibited issue myopia, a 
shortsightedness in seeing environmental problems in the watershed. In response to the 
question, “By way of an environmental example, how did the SPC respond to emerging 
issues in the watershed – the element of surprise?” one of the SPC participants offered 
this response:  
“There were no surprises. There really were no surprises because the 
conservation authority had a lot of data or a lot of the information was 
presented in some of the presentations that we had at the beginning [of the 
planning process.] There were no surprises in regards to any 
environmental issues. Now there may be some coming up now that the 
plan has been submitted that slipped through the cracks.”699 
 
Conversely, another SPC participant stated, “the biggest surprise to the committee has 
been the aggregate” extraction issue. Typically, in the committee,  
“problems are raised, we consider the information and then the matter is 
dealt with…. Personally, I’m supportive of what we are trying to achieve 
but timing has been difficult on several issues (for example, Port Stanley 
Harbour intake pipe issue) and the information wasn’t readily available. 
So, rather than sort of stop the whole plan production process, we 
proceeded with what we could and we will do the other part in the 
future.”700 
 
Again, these foregoing comments support a managed approach to water-management 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
698 Ontario, “Climate Ready: Ontario’s Adaption and Action Plan – 2011-2014,” Ontario’s Expert Panel on 
Climate Change, online,: ABCA 
<http://www.abca.on.ca/downloads/MOE_Climate_Ready_ENG.pdf?phpMyAdmin>. The Report states at 
page 12: “The Government of Ontario recognizes that the impacts of a changing climate need to be 
considered in all decision-making.” And, at page 16: “A changing climate will affect both water quantity 
and quality. Intense rain storms and changes in the annual snow melt may cause flooding to happen more 
often. A changing climate may lead to reduced winter ice cover on lakes, lower lake levels and more 
frequent water shortages due to higher temperatures and increased evaporation rates. In the Great Lakes, a 
changing climate is expected to cause lower water levels, exacerbate other stresses such as habitat loss and 
pollution, and increase problems with excess algae growth and invasive species infestations. Climate 
change may cause changes in water temperature in Lake Simcoe, affecting commercial fisheries and further 
accelerating the growth of aquatic plants caused by high phosphorus loading.” 
699 Interview of #29 (Dec. 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 16. 
700 Interview of #20 (Nov. 1, 2012) Interview notes at page 2. 
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planning by the committee where controversial issues were parked for future 
consideration reinforcing the MOE’s institutional goal of completing the water plan.   
 The Yukon participant offered a similar view of managed information but stated 
Board was open to receiving new scientific information by way of the public hearing 
procedure:  
“[W]e will work with the best science available [presented to the Board in 
a public hearing] and all those expert reports we take a look at the 
footnotes and the bibliography …. it’s quite extensive. The science keeps 
on evolving. [As I recall], I think on the Western Copper decision we got 
into studies from, I think, a university in Washington State, so we will get 
scientific research from a university thrown at us and...unless someone 
disagrees with it, then we will work with it. So, in the public hearing, you 
have this evidence, it stored on our secure website” for future reference.701 
 
 In sum, all three case studies illustrate a closed system focused on the completion 
of legislatively assigned administrative tasks. While the collaborative governance 
arrangement is premised upon diverse participation, where it is expected new information 
will be brought to the table, the Yukon Water Board, an administrative tribunal supports 
the element of surprise – that is, responsiveness to new information. Interestingly, in this 
research, the governance experiments – the BRBC and SPC – exhibited features of a 
closed system focused on an efficient completion of their administrative tasks. These 
decision-makers came to the planning table fitted with metaphorical blinkers that focused 
their attention on the administrative tasks, limited the scope of their vision, and directed 
their sight on the finish line: completing the end product – the water plan or watershed 
report.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
701 Interview of #15 (July 5, 2012) Interview notes at page 16. 
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4.0  Synthesis Of Findings: The Limitations Of These Legislative Experiments 
4.1  Regulatory Capture 
This research supports the dominant theme in the environmental regulatory literature of 
regulatory capture. Regulatory capture is “the effective control or domination of 
regulatory mechanisms by the interests who are the object of regulation.”702 As argued by 
Wood, Tanner, and Richardson, the permissive “consultative style” of regulation in 
Canada allowed regulatory capture by industry to prevail.703  
 In this research, the aggregate extraction conflict in the Ontario case study 
exemplifies a danger of regulatory capture. Unknowingly, the SPC small business 
representative hinted at the presence of regulatory capture when he described how the 
wording of the SPC’s assessment report policy was reviewed first by the industry and 
then revised by the MOE to support the industry’s position. For this business SPC 
member and his industry, it was important that the policy was “worded properly” to 
reflect the difference between “agricultural source materials” and “non-agricultural 
source materials.” He discussed the steps he took within and outside the committee to 
begin the dialogue with the ministry officials:  
“I spoke in the committee and it was decision of the committee” that I first 
“meet with the staff.” “I met separately outside the committee with some 
of the staff to have some of the wording reworked and changed to fall 
more into line where then I got support from the rest of the agricultural 
sector on the committee and support by the committee for approval” of the 
wording change.704 
 
The foregoing statement demonstrates a consultative style of regulation as discussed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
702 M. Minogue, “Governance-Based Analysis of Regulation” (2002) 73 Annals of Public and Cooperative 
Economics 649 at 655.  
703 Wood, Tanner & Richardson, Supra note 6. 
704 Interview of #29 (Dec. 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 2-4. 
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Wood, Tanner, and Richardson in Chapter One.705 This committee member describes his 
involvement in the development of a key SPC legislative document – an assessment 
report (s. 15 of CWA). The document was developed, revised, and finalized through an 
information exchange between the government and industry. In short, a business interest 
successfully pursued a form of regulatory capture through information pushing at the 
SPC policy-making table.  
 The earlier comments from the Yukon Water Board participant on the pulling 
back of the two levels of government and dominance of an industry perspective in a 
public administrative proceeding points to a danger of regulatory capture – the mining 
sector’s dominance of the administration of water permits. With regret, the Water Board 
respondent commented on the recent withdrawal of federal and provincial governments 
in the administrative proceeding, and he expressed concerns private interests will direct 
future proceedings and could shape a licensing outcome:  
“Unfortunately, the Government of Canada seems to have [been] pulling 
back on involvement and now we had this [recent] hearing (XXX) where 
the Government of Yukon is not there, and they’re a major resource, and 
for them not be available to add to the expert opinion is lamentable. It’s 
sad. And, if governments continue to pull back and leave it to the private 
sector, I think we’re not going to get the objective706 … we’re going to 
have either the hired gun for the company or the higher gun against the 
company and there’s not objectivity.”707 
 
This participant’s concern regarding the stepping back of both levels of government and 
the opening of the door for the private sector to dominate a public proceeding is 
disconcerting. He viewed state withdrawal as problematic on two fronts: 1) the Board’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
705 Wood, Tanner & Richardson, Supra note 6.  
706 Yukon, Waters Act, Supra note 490. To reiterate, Section 10 states: The objects of the Board are to 
provide for the conservation, development, and utilization of waters in a manner that will provide the 
optimum benefit from them for all Canadians and for the residents of the Yukon in particular. 
707 Interview of #15 (July 5, 2012) Interview notes at page 1. 
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inability to serve the public interest; and, 2) the Board’s ability to fulfill its legislative 
objective: “the conservation, development, and utilization of waters in a manner that will 
provide the optimum benefit from them for all Canadians and for the residents of the 
Yukon in particular.” (s.10). In short, in his view, the voices of the government are key to 
protecting the public interest and acting as a shield against the private interests. In effect, 
representation of the public interest is diminished by the lack of government participation 
and an insidious shift to the privatization of governance emerged.   
4.2  Agency Capture 
Complicating regulatory capture is the presence of a form of political or agency capture 
operating within the murky shadows of the Ontario SPC policy table. To reiterate, 
governance scholar Minoque characterizes regulation as weapon of political control that 
exposes the political factors shaping and controlling the regulatory process.708 Similarly, 
in this research, committee members described the planning process as captured by the 
political interests of the province where provincial economic development interests were 
placed before local interests – in other words, as a strategic weapon of political control.  
 Specifically, the aggregate extraction representative told the story of how, in early 
days of SPC planning process, the committee had passed a resolution to add aggregate 
extraction to the local drinking water threat list. He, and perhaps one other member, was 
the only “dissenting vote” with respect to the resolution. Even though he was the only 
dissenting vote at the local SPC level, the province – operating behind the scenes over 
many months and without updating the local SPC -- delayed a formal response, overrode 
the committee’s decision, and refused to add aggregate extraction to the local threat list. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
708 Minoque, Supra note 71 at 656. 
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The province’s actions point to back room meetings and the presence of agency capture 
where the broader political interests of the province captured the MOE and SPA. 
 Moreover, this aggregate representative’s commentary reveals Ministry officials 
(or agency capture) in pursuit of provincial economic goals. This member, who is no 
longer part of the SPC, described the memo the MOE finally offered – through the SPA – 
at the December 2012 meeting (a meeting, which this representative did not attend 
because he is no longer a SPC member) as factually correct. His statement reveals how 
the industry’s position remained unchanged since his departure from the SPC (18 months 
earlier) and the MOE’s protection of the provincial interest in the aggregate sector and 
the environmental ministry’s role as a backstop to local decisions:  
“I don’t think there are any factual errors in the summary (December 
2012) that I noticed. I guess to a certain extent …I’ve been away 18 
months from the committee and I was thinking they’re still flogging a dead 
horse in one sense … let it go but...so, I don’t … I don’t think the answer 
that came out is not bad… I think the MOE protected the provincial 
position and stopped local interests from doing something that I don’t 
think would’ve been right.”709 
 
The foregoing commentary reveals the practice of Minoque’s view of regulation as “a 
weapon of political control.” The MOE successfully controlled the SPC committee by 
delaying its formal response. The MOE announced its policy decision at the December 
2012 meeting, the concluding meeting, when the ink was drying on the final water plan. 
In effect, the local conflict in Guelph was contained through tactics of delay and back-
room political maneuvering amongst provincial ministries (MOE and Ministry of Natural 
Resources - MNR). On this aggregate issue, one of the public interest representatives 
succinctly summarized the situation: “to be clear…the province is managing it on a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
709 Interview of #31 (Dec. 19, 2012) Interview notes at page 13-14.  
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provincial basis saying it’s not on our list of threats province wide.”710 In short, agency 
capture prevailed, confirming a state-centric approach to water governance.  
 When read together these two statements show aggregate extraction as a 
provincial interest. In his statement, the aggregate industry SPC representative explicitly 
characterizes the province as protecting its position. That this industry representative 
described his position as a dissenting view, as he was the only representative on the SPC 
to oppose aggregate extraction being added as a significant drinking threat, suggests the 
industry’s interests were being protected by and aligned with the province’s interests.  
 The aggregate representative’s statement demonstrates he supports the factually 
correct MOE document, which he had not read because he was not present at the 
December 2012 (Brantford SPC meeting) meeting. This statement suggests political 
interests away from the policy table may have vetted the factually correct document 
through the association’s informational networks exposing the consultative regulatory 
style between the business sector and the regulatory state.  
 In sum, the literature details an evolving skepticism of collaborative governance 
arrangements where “critics, including many national environmental groups, have [now] 
focused on accountability, authority, expertise, and capture.”711  These research finding 
reinforced this sentiment of skepticism as illustrated through the aggregate extraction 
conflict. The SPC committee members’ comments expose the industry’s regulatory 
capture. Moreover, the MOE’s and the SPA’s agency capture of the decision-making 
process, as the MOE directed what could and could not be discussed and limited the 
addition of drinking water threats affecting provincial interests and key economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
710 Interview of #30 (Dec. 14, 2012) Interview notes at page 4. 
711 Sousa & McGrory Klyza, Supra note 628 at 427. 
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interests. In short, the implementation of the CWA, 2006 through the SPC is a complex 
and nuanced process. The MOE transformed the water governance regime into a weapon 
of political control, and where these local watershed participants felt like puppets 
controlled their puppeteer – MOE. The aggregate extraction example affirms the presence 
of both regulatory and agency capture within a localized water committee and raises 
further doubt on institutionalizing these collaborative governance arrangements.  
4.3  Accountability for Environmental Protection 
Overwhelmingly, the Ontario and Yukon respondents attributed accountability for 
environmental protection of the watershed to the State – their respective provincial 
environmental authorities. The Yukon interviewee stated, the province “is responsible 
under the Yukon Environmental… Act.” In Ontario, one of the aggregate industry 
representatives suggested “the three front runners . . . could be the Ontario government 
(MOE), the municipalities and the conservation authorities.”712 Another Ontario SPC 
member also viewed accountability as falling within the authority of the conservation 
authority.713 The small business SPC representative succinctly stated, “The ultimate buck 
always stops at the MOE but I think the conservation authority and the committee have 
had some significant input but the ultimate authority will always go back to the MOE.”714 
The foregoing commentary strongly locates the accountability for environmental 
protection of the watershed with the state. None of the respondents hesitated in the 
interview nor offered an alternative perspective on how regulatory pluralism disperses 
regulatory power and accountability. 715  These limited findings from the Yukon and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
712 Interview of #17 (Sept. 20, 2012) Interview notes at page 14. 
713 Interview of #26 (Dec. 20, 2012) Interview notes at page 23.  
714 Interview of #29 (Dec. 12, 2012) Interview notes at page 18. 
715 Grabosky, Supra note 5.  
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Ontario suggest these respondents continue to assign accountability for water protection 
to the state, thus, reinforcing the traditional role of state as guardian of the environment. 
 In contrast, the Alberta BRBC respondents viewed the accountability for 
environmental protection of the river basin as based on the shared responsibility 
stemming from the shared governance model. For example, a participant stated:  
“Under the current partnership model, the members that come around the 
table to write the recommendations in the plan are responsible for 
implementing them. These are the folks that should be picking up the 
responsibility for and accountability for those aspects.” This also 
“includes the provincial government, and also the federal government, 
given the water quality objectives. Because these are voluntary documents 
under a voluntary policy framework in Alberta.”716 
 
This commentary expresses a shared governance model.  
 Reinforcing this shared governance model, Alberta’s legislative language 
explicitly references “shared responsibility.” The legislative objective of Alberta’s Water 
Act sets out a “shared responsibility” for not only water “use” but also “water 
management planning and decision-making.” Section 2.(d) states “the shared 
responsibility of all residents of Alberta for the conservation and wise use of water and 
their role in providing advice with respect to water management planning and decision‑
making.”717 The origins of this legislative intent can be traced to the province’s water 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
716 Interview of #09 (June 13, 2012) Interview notes at page 19.  
717 The history of the Water for Life Strategy is set out by the government at: Alberta, Environment and 
Sustainable Resource Development Ministry, The Strategy: The History, online: Alberta Environment 
<http://www.waterforlife.alberta.ca/0918.html>; also see Equus Consulting Group Inc., “Minister’s Forum 
on Water: Summary Report on the Advice Received” (August, 2002), online: Alberta Government, 
<http://environment.gov.ab.ca/info/library/7507.pdf>. In the summary report, it offers a history of the 
public outreach that commenced in June 2002, a focused group of 108 invited Albertans and water experts 
met to review information gathered during the public outreach and consultation process. A clear set of 
principles 11 emerged [with one of the principles explicitly stating: “Citizens, communities, industry, and 
government must share responsibility for water management in Alberta, and work together to improve their 
local watersheds;”; also see Queens Bench decision: 979899 Alberta Ltd v Alberta 2008 ABQB 57 
(CanLii) at paragraph [14] Justice R.E. Nation, in hearing a water licence dispute and considering the sub-
issue: What is the appropriate standard of review? where Justice Nation interpreted the legislative purpose 
and “shared responsibility” as an enumerated factor embedded in the Water Act. At paragraph 14, she 
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legislation review, which began in the early 1990s and included extensive public 
consultation, culminating in the 1999 policy document entitled “The Framework for 
Water Management Planning.” This document explicitly states “the government has 
made it clear that all Albertan share a responsibility for water management” and, 
informed the legislative framework of the Water Act, 2003.718 
 Together, these foregoing policy and legislative instruments in Alberta reinforce a 
shared governance model; however, the scope of this “shared” paradigm is vague. This 
notion of shared responsibility appears to rest on the public engagement process 
informing the water-policy framework document as codified in the water legislation. 
Perhaps in Alberta, acceptance of a shared responsibility extends from both the 
government’s and the public’s penchant for self-reliance and partnership relationships. 
However, it remains unclear how this shared governance informs the WPAC participants’ 
perspective of a shared responsibility for the environment protection of the river basin. 
The government’s responsibility for environmental protection under the WPAC remains a 
policy riddle trapped in an enigma.  
 Within public domain of water or environmental protection, a change in attitude 
towards environmental protection appears to be occurring. In this research, the Yukon 
and Ontario respondents demonstrated a clear perspective of the state’s responsibility for 
environmental protection. The participants exhibited an endorsement of state’s role in 
environmental protection and, perhaps a state-centric approach. In contrast, in Alberta, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
stated: The purpose “[i]t is to support and promote the conservation and management of water, including 
the wise use and allocation of water, while recognizing six enumerated factors: environmental concerns, the 
need for economic growth and prosperity, the shared responsibility and role of residents, the need for 
cooperative work with other jurisdictions and the important role of comprehensive and responsive action in 
administering the Act.” 
718 Alberta, Framework, Supra. note 435 at 9.  
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the respondents adopted a broader perspective of environmental protection that took into 
account both state and non-state actors. The Alberta legislation clearly articulates a 
“shared responsibility” for water management and decision-making. 719  Possibly, a 
legislative nudge through “social engineering” has re-oriented social attitudes to accept 
both state and non-state actors as accountable for environmental protection. 720 
Nevertheless, a dark side of this legislative push is regulatory limbo where neither the 
public or private actor will accept responsibility for the environmental damage or 
degradation.721  
 
4.4  Volunteer Fatigue 
Gunningham and Holley’s identification of volunteer fatigue in collaborative governance 
is affirmed in this research and points to their concern whether these regulatory spaces 
can be sustained. The voluntary nature of the participation on these committees combined 
with lengthy time commitment and the heavy workload demanded of these committee 
members created work stress for the participants. Offering assistance and their advice 
came at a price. One Ontario interviewee described the “volumes” of documents that had 
to be reviewed for a meeting. 722 Another participant described the committee members as 
“weary. It has been a long, hard process of slogging through mountains and mountains 
and mountains of data and everyone was quite happy to have finish the report and send it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
719 Supra. note 2. Section 2.(d) states: “the shared responsibility of all residents of Alberta for the 
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720 A. Podgorecki, J. Alexander & R. Shields, “Social Engineering” (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
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off for approval.”723 Holley and Gunningham’s findings on water committees in New 
Zealand, under natural resources legislation, identified volunteer fatigue as a threat to 
“sustaining” these collaborative initiatives into the future.724 The two key representatives 
involved in the aggregate extraction conflict on the Lake Erie SPC demonstrated 
“fatigue” and expressed concerns over the workload, and now no longer sit on 
committee. Sustaining a robust participatory SPC process in the future is in doubt. While 
not raised by the participants in this research, participants in the Alberta Water Council’s 
2008 Shared Governance workshop expressed a similar concern over volunteer fatigue.725 
4.5  Coping With Change 
Regulatory scholars Baldwin and Black contend the challenge for the responsive 
regulatory theory, in particular, the enforcement pyramid, is capacity to cope with 
change.726 These research findings demonstrate the water committees were shortsighted 
on emerging water security issues and the risk to water resources. In line with Baldwin 
and Black’s contention, these committees exhibited regulatory methodologies that “tend 
to focus on existing high level risks rather than smaller, cumulative or newly emergent 
risks. It will tend to be blind to risk that are not picked up in the existing analysis and has 
no core method of identifying new regulatory challenges and adjusting to these.”727 
During the interviews, at the end of a group of questions on the element of emergent 
change, the participants were asked explicit questions on emerging water quality and 
quality issues such as hydraulic fracturing, nitrogen-loading, pharmaceuticals in drinking 
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725 Alberta Water Council, “What we heard Report?, Supra note 624 at 11.  
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water, and climate change. While the majority of the participants interviewed had little to 
say on these issues, one Ontario SPC member commented on climate change as it related 
to the short-term task of watershed planning, saying climate change  
“should be considered for water quantity analysis. Like, …is something 
going to change with a rainfall or heat that’s gonna make less water 
available in the watershed. But, in my mind, with limited understanding of 
hydrology these [concerns] are for wells that are gonna take decades … 
I’m not saying we should ignore it, I’m just saying that it...struck me as a 
little bit of wasted time to deal with it at this committee. So, for us to look 
at climate change now, in the initial [water] plan I thought it was not the 
best use of time. [So, how does the committee then respond to new 
information?] “[T]his committee has very specific goals under the Clean 
Water Act and it’s not [protection] of the environment.”728 
 
The foregoing comments illustrate that the Ontario SPC suffers from regulatory blindness 
– the committee members are blind to the changing state of the environment as well as 
the inability to cope with change or the element of surprise and implications of climate 
change on water source protection.729 This research reinforces Karkkainen’s view that 
natural resource management law continues to uphold the traditional view that natural 
systems can be controlled — a disconcerting finding given the Walkerton tragedy has 
been attributed to a heavy rainfall event.   
 Furthermore, as Baldwin and Black correctly pointed out, in order to move 
towards a “really responsive regulatory” regime, the regulator must “foste[r] the capacity 
of regimes to change regulatory direction so as to adapt to changes in circumstances, 
priorities and objectives, including the cultivation of changes in organizational cultures 
and intra-organizational dynamics that may be needed to respond to these changes.”730 
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“the capacity to achieve cultural change” occur still remains “a matter of conjecture.”731 
Retooling organizational culture is difficult, and in their view, success hinges on the 
support of those who will implement the new regime. Together these researchers point to 
the importance of cultural organizational attitudes in facilitating a paradigm change. This 
research exposes the limited institutional capacity of these provincial authorities to 
respond to change. The regulatory regime remains vested in the traditional “governance 
by crisis mode.” A command-and-control regulatory legacy characterizes the traditional 
environmental and natural resource regulatory regimes and in this research, acts as a 
barrier to its actors’ responsiveness to ecosystem problems or red flags – a breach of an 
aquitard. These regulatory regimes remain hampered by a traditional organizational 
culture and its regulatory behaviour of control.  
 The promise of a responsive regulatory regime seems optimistic at this point 
because, as suggested by Gunningham and Sinclair, this research points to a cultural 
organizational change problem, which requires further study. Nevertheless, this 
organizational behaviour problem rests at the senior levels of the bureaucracy, who may 
fear releasing the tight reins they traditionally held in the command-and control 
regulatory system.  
 Finally, in this research, the normative claim of these governance experiments 
that a localized stakeholder-driven water committee enhances environmental governance 
exposes an implementation problem that failed, for example, to bring to life Justice 
O’Connor’s vision of local planning exercise. For legal scholars, an interdisciplinary 
environmental policy approach, which incorporates organizational change and leadership 
theories should be studied further to understand the organizational challenges of giving 	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life to public law values of public participation and environmental protection framing 
regulatory regimes.   
5.0  Concluding Comments on the Eco-Resiliency Governance Framework 
Overall, the application of the eco-resiliency framework to the three case studies reveals a 
weak form of eco-resiliency. The factor of flexibility is encouraged in the three legal 
regimes through the support of a collaborative decision-making process. In turn, this 
collaborative process is supported by the flexible decision-making principle of consensus 
and the inclusion of a range of legislative tools. However, in practice, in the ungoverned 
shadows of the water committee strong social norms foster a practice of water 
governance allowing group norms to dominate and foster a weak form of flexibility. In 
these committees, the law and its legal instruments become irrelevant to the committee 
members and point to a regulatory implementation problem.   
All three legal frameworks construct a pluralistic regulatory space. While 
legislation or the partnership policy orientation of the legal framework encourages the 
diversity factor, in practice, unequal and inequitable participation and the inability to 
discuss different ways of knowing the watershed result in a weak form of diversity. Even 
though regulatory pluralism is encouraged and could fulfill a surrogate regulatory role, 
these participants are effectively privileged informants, offering the state information and 
perhaps, easing the regulatory burden of information gathering. The information offered 
is oriented towards the administrative tasks. Committee members expect rent-seeking 
behaviour from other members. Complementing the rent-seeking behaviour is the strong 
presence of competing interests operating in the ungoverned political space away from 
the planning table but within the polycentric regulatory context. The centers of power 
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lurking in the shadows of the ungoverned space shape the decision-making process. The 
state’s strong arm of control continues to limit the water committee’s decision-making by 
limiting who participates on the committee and, thus, in the decision-making process. 
The presence of a strong social norm of collaboration in the group either silenced 
particular views or created a “do not enter sign” for dissenting voices, often 
representatives of the public. Together, the rent-seeking behaviour combined with the 
politicization of the water committee and silencing of particular voices further reveals a 
power imbalance in these committees, which requires further study.  
 This research found a limited demonstration of a broad perspective of water 
governance directed at organizing different scales of governance through a coordinating 
mechanism. All the participants expressed frustration with the lack of a coordinating 
mechanism. This frustration further shaped their decision-making as they adopted a 
perspective that the issue was beyond their jurisdiction, enabling them to ignore the 
water-planning issue. Rather than challenging the legal status quo, the participants 
exhibited an attitude of administrative fatigue: it is beyond our jurisdiction, so let’s move 
on to the next administrative task.  
 Finally, the most interesting finding was on the feature of emergent change. 
Surprisingly, the Yukon Water Board, a mechanized administrative body, exhibited the 
ability to entertain the element of surprise by taking account of new information (for 
example, in the Carmacks Copper Ltd decision). The Board’s record and public hearing 
function demonstrated openness to receiving new information – that is, surprise. In 
contrast, the Ontario water committee’s ability to be responsive to emergent change was 
limited by the enumerated drinking water list and a risk-management approach to water 
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governance. Overall, the element of surprise was weak in both the Ontario SPC and 
Alberta BRBC but not the Yukon Water Board.  
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Chapter Seven:  
Conclusion – Lessons Learned  
As a Participant Observer in a Water Committee 
1.0  Introduction 
The inquiry undertaken in this dissertation began with an academic curiosity to 
understand and evoke change in legal frameworks governing water; in particular, to 
direct the regulator’s mind to the protection of the subject matter – water or namely, 
aquatic systems. Seeking a desire to understand the responsive regulatory theme in 
relation to ecological change or resiliency, this research was guided by the question: If a 
regulatory water law regime seriously adopted a “conservation, ecological integrity or 
biodiversity as a frame of reference, what would happen” to legal models of water 
governance? 732 Professor Benidickson’s provocative question is not unlike the search for 
change sought in the governance literature by other scholars.  
 As illustrated in this research, numerous scholars including legal experts have 
proposed change to environmental governance and regulatory theory. This dissertation 
examined the governance shift as set out in the responsive regulatory literature, in 
particular, Gunningham, Grabosky and Sinclair’s three-sided enforcement-compliance 
pyramid. These scholars expanded upon Braithwaite and Ayres’ relational idea of a state-
centric enforcement and compliance pyramid that engaged two actors — the regulator 
and the regulatee. Conceptually, Gunningham et.al.,’s Smart Regulation or regulatory 
pluralism approach presents a model premised upon multiple instruments and the 
inclusion of diverse range of state and non-state actors. Collectively these actors are 
transformed into policy makers focused on the context of the environmental problem. 
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This doctoral research takes a step back from Gunningham et.al.,’s result-based 
environmental policy prescription, underpinned by effectiveness and cost-efficiency 
normative frame, and examined the responsiveness of the decision-making to ecological 
change, a perspective informed by public law values of environmental protection.  
 The recent change in the environmental regulatory theory to a governance mode 
has informed the legal framework of water governance in Canada. This policy drift was 
examined in this dissertation in order to understand the decision-making process in these 
water committees. This new legal model combined with the social-ecological perspective 
and the regulatory theme of responsiveness, turned this research inquiry towards how and 
in what ways theory can inform the practice of water governance and how the practice 
can inform theory. The inquiry therefore concerns how, and under what conditions, can 
these legislatively constituted water committees take into account responsiveness from an 
ecological perspective.  
 My academic curiosity in advancing environmental regulatory theory considers 
how the ideas of adaptive governance and responsiveness can be taken together to re-
orient legal environmental governance scholarship to be responsive not only to the 
business sector (the regulatee: the firm, or corporation) but to the aquatic system — the 
subject matter of the regulation. This desire to shift awareness to the subject matter of the 
regulation (for example, Ontario’s Clean Water Act – s.1: “to protect existing and future 
sources of drinking water.”) further directed my attention to identifying and developing 
the eco-resiliency governance framework. This framework was used to not only organize 
my observations of the SPC and WPAC committee members and the Water Board at a 
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public hearing but also to understand and analyze the water committee participants views 
on the four features of eco-resiliency.  
 This research began with Bakker’s definition of governance “to how we make 
decisions and who gets to decide.”733 In this research, Bakker’s definition is expanded 
upon and governance is defined as a process of decision-making, a process influenced by 
the power dynamics in play and shaped by the political dimensions underpinning the 
decision-making process. This understanding of governance brings forward the political 
nature and procedural aspects of what the participants are charged to do under a legally 
and socially constructed water governance regime: that is, in simple terms, to make 
decisions. In this sense, water governance can be contrasted with water management, 
which addresses principally the “operational approaches” and includes “the models, 
principles and information we use to make those decisions.”734  
2.0  Lessons Learned From Applying the Eco-Resiliency Governance Framework 
In this research, the eco-resiliency governance framework was designed to explore the 
adoption of an adaptive water governance legal model and to explore the research 
question: What lessons can be taken from resiliency theory and applied to environmental 
regulation and governance theory?  
In particular, the lessons learned from the analysis conducted in chapter six and 
legal analysis set out in the three case study chapters aimed to advance Gunningham 
et.al.,’s Integrative Regulation: Principle 4. A participatory approach: the empowerment 
of third parties to become quasi-regulators. By way of this approach, these scholars 
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advance a participatory principle contextualized in the responsive enforcement theory. In 
their view, participation of third parties encourages information exchange, supports an 
educative function and shares the regulatory burden of compliance and enforcement. The 
state’s role is to construct a procedural regulatory space that offers the public an 
opportunity to participate, gather information and exchange knowledge.  
Presented next are the lessons learned from applying the features of the eco-
resiliency governance framework. These lessons take into account the collaborative, SES 
governance and responsive regulatory themes directed at a protective stance of water 
rather than the regulatory logics of enforcement and compliance. A law in action inquiry 
directed at the “bottom-up”735 — the decision-makers and the social norms guiding their 
decision-making in the water committee, was applied. In this research, the eco-resiliency 
governance framework is relied upon to identify the presence of Holling’s four resiliency 
factors and to gather lessons on how the theoretical premise of these governance 
experiments informed the practice of governing water at local level. In the following sub-
sections the lessons learned from observing the eco-resiliency framework in action in the 
water committees and the legal analysis of the respective case study regulatory regimes; 
thus, point to the possibilities for change and the recommendations are offered to 
strengthen these collaborative water governance committees.    
2.1 Eco-Resiliency Factor One: Flexibility   
Theoretically, the collaborative mode of governance is premised on consensus. In all 
three cases studies, a definition of consensus had been provided in either a soft-law 
document or explicitly in the legal regulations. However, in all three case studies, the 
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research participants did not refer to these legal instruments. Effectively, the legal 
instruments defining consensus are insignificant to the participants and point to an 
implementation problem. Rather, the social norms of the group controlled the decision-
making process instead of the legally defined decision-making principle. In the end, a 
legal instrument offered as a guidance document is irrelevant to a committee member. 
Moreover, the meaning of consensus remains an ambiguous concept resulting in the 
characterization of a water plan as a policy without the backing of law.   
Flexibility as exhibited through the application of range of instruments and 
strategies is unimportant to water committee members. All three case studies highlight 
the irrelevance of the responsive regulatory theory’s premise of applying a range of 
regulatory instruments. Rather, in the water management planning exercise, a committee 
member’s thinking is confined by the state’s control or the state’s lack of direction, as 
was highlighted by the Alberta case study. The committee is narrowly focused upon its 
administrative tasks rather than being responsive to ecological change or to the protection 
of the watershed/ river basin. Complicating this narrow-minded thinking is the political 
nature of water governance, as illustrated in the Ontario case study. The politicization of 
water governance is a barrier to bringing to life the flexibility embedded in the 
legislation.  
 In all three case studies, the participants exhibited strong support for the 
collaborative mode of governance. They displayed an eager acceptance of the 
collaborative process fostered trust, respect, good working relationships and goodwill 
within their communities. Within these localized sites of law-making, the relational 
aspect of governing was brought to the forefront in part through an emphasis on these 
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soft skills that fostered the development of social capital. As observed at the WPAC and 
SPC meetings, the emphasis upon creating a fun environment and the sharing of food at 
lunch provided for an exchange of dialogue and relationship building that was then 
carried over into the main committee forum. Unlike the water committee’s strong 
relational aspect, the adversarial environment fostered between the parties at the water 
board’s public hearing was pervasive. The mining officials including senior executives 
missed an opportunity to strengthen relationships and build their social license to operate 
within these communities by not recognizing the social norms of building relationships in 
the informal settings (i.e., shared lunch environment) that indirectly supported the public 
hearing. In the natural resource sector, the challenge remains for lawyers operating in a 
co-management or collaborative law forum to understand the importance of relationship 
building and the need to build their social license within the communities they operate in, 
especially in a cross-cultural community.   
2.2 Eco-Resiliency Factor Two: Diversity   
The literature promotes inclusiveness as a key feature in a participatory mode of 
governance as it establishes regulatory pluralism. The diverse group of actors is 
presumed to bring different perspectives and ways of knowing the watershed to the 
committee. While this research exhibited the features of regulatory pluralism, these 
volunteers viewed their participatory role as offering advice and collecting information to 
be taken back to their constituency or associational alliance where the information served 
as an early warning system. These findings demonstrated the respondents’ strong support 
of the rent-seeking behaviour of their fellow committee members.  
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 However, this research questions the participatory aspects of the new governance 
mode. The governance mode is promoted as responsive to the upward push from interests 
groups, citizens, and other decision-makers demanding access to policy decisions. The 
aggregate extraction conflicts in Ontario countered this participatory aspect and exposed 
a shortfall of this governance regulatory approach. 
 Theoretically, and in practice, the state encouraged participation in these 
decentralized water-planning exercises in the collaborative spirit of the shift from 
government to governance. In this devolution of the water governance function to a local 
committee, this research illustrated how the steering function remained strongly vested in 
the state. The state’s steering function diminished the spirit of the local planning exercise 
and the participation of local community groups (i.e., O. Reg. 288/07 s. 2. “in particular, 
environmental, health and other interests of the general public). The rowing function 
where the state is actively engaged in the details of the administrative process revealed 
mixed results: in Ontario, the province demonstrated a strong preference to retain the 
rowing and steering functions. In contrast, the Alberta case study, the province’s role at 
the lower river basin level was more difficult to define. In Alberta, the reach of the 
province into the local activities became active when the local committee planning 
exercise contravened the state’s position. Consequently, in both the Alberta and Ontario 
case studies, the state maintained a strong influence over the committee and local 
concerns.  
 In practice, these research findings expose the state-centric function of water 
management planning where these volunteers are transformed into privileged informants 
by their place at the table and their role in offering and collecting information. In all three 
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case studies, the Minister has final approval over the water plans and the water license. 
For these participants, the Minister’s final decision-making authority was unremarkable, 
as they exhibited support of Minister’s approval of the final plan or license.  
 Yet, voices were missing in these water committees. In the Yukon Water Board’s 
proceeding, both the provincial and federal governments appear to have pulled back from 
participating in the water licensing process, which pointed to a shift in political interests. 
The worry, as expressed by a long serving Board member, is in the absence of the state, 
the private sector’s economic development values could dominant the licensing process 
resulting in the privatization of governance. This re-orientation of a public law function 
could further result in the diminishment of the public interest in water resources and the 
state’s withdrawal of its’ environmental protection function. In effect, a re-alignment of 
the balanced approach to interpreting the Waters Act’s legislative object (s.10) is 
occurring. A modification where the public interest in the “conservation” of water is 
discounted and greater emphasis is placed on the economic “development” of the 
Yukon’s water resources for private interests rather than “for all Canadians and for the 
residents of the Yukon in particular” (s.10), as legislatively prescribed. In short, the role 
of state as guardian of the public interest in water has resulted in a turn towards 
privileging a neo-liberal economic development perspective and the privatization of a 
governance function.  
 In Ontario and Alberta, the active participation of First Nation communities was 
silenced in the planning exercise. While the participants in Alberta expressed frustration 
they could not bring First Nation communities to the policy table, it appears that 
provincial support for First Nation participation was lacking and may have created a 
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participatory barrier as result of legal doctrines concerning the duty to consult. In 
Ontario, while First Nation members hold a legally constituted place at the policy table, 
their participation was silenced. The silencing of First Nation communities is complicated 
by a lack of recognition of historically embedded mistrust and a misunderstanding of how 
an aboriginal perspective of knowing water differs from a mainstream view of water 
source protection.   
 Notably missing in all three committees is a SES (social-ecological systems) 
perspective, an eco-health standpoint and an environmental protective stance. 
Interestingly, this lack of an eco-health or environmental perspective is particularly 
problematic in Ontario given the composition of the committee as set out in s.2.3 of 
O.Reg 288/07, which explicitly references the participation from “environmental, health 
and other interests of the general public.” In the case of Ontario, perhaps the narrow 
legislative purpose focused on protecting drinking water of the Clean Water Act, 2006 — 
Section 1: to protecting existing and future sources of drinking — has created a mixed 
message. While the regulatory constituted committee is diverse, the limited legislative 
objective directed the SPC, and its supporting Source Protection Authority and the 
committee’s planning activities were narrowed to a public health perspective directed at a 
municipal water supply. All other perspectives are overlooked.  
 In all three case studies, the participants confirmed they experienced learning. In 
these localized committees, the literature’s discussion of knowledge production and 
forms of learning through information exchange and dialogue is affirmed. The regulatory 
space exhibited the formation of networks, community building and perhaps, an 
opportunity for broader public policy goals (i.e., reconciliation and conflict resolution).    
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 However, what remains outstanding in all three committee is the function of 
monitoring the aquatic system. None of the committees were structured to monitor the 
health of the ecosystem by way of physical, chemical or biological or other indicators of 
ecosystem health. Yet, learning with respect to the environmental state of water system 
occurred in the committee but this knowledge is contained and overlooked in the water 
plan and state of watershed report. The committees failed to support an adaptive 
management approach to watershed protection. In other words, the ability to understand 
and predict whether a disturbance has or might occur that could shift the aquatic system 
into a degraded state or create a water emergency disaster remained a missing element in 
this administrative process. In the Alberta case study, neither the issue of oil and gas 
fracking nor the risk of a flood, as experienced in Calgary in June 2013, were highlighted 
in the state of watershed planning documents. These planning documents informed the 
background of the interviews and the observation of the WPAC, a year earlier in June 
2012.   
2.3 Eco-Resiliency Factor Three: Broad Perspective   
Overall, in all three case studies, the challenge of jurisdictional co-ordination is immense. 
A broad perspective is present where the local scale of governance includes a polycentric 
perspective where the decision-maker’s nodes of power and the presence of a 
coordinating mechanism can take into account multiple jurisdictional scales and 
fragmentation. Rather, this research exposed the challenges of jurisdictional 
fragmentation and institutional co-ordination barriers. The administrative jurisdictional 
barrier is reinforced by constitutional constraints imposed upon these committees. The 
constitutional constraints influenced the behaviour of the committee members to accept 
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the regulatory fragmentation and remain tethered to the traditional legal question of 
jurisdiction. This traditional approach is expected to impede a broad perspective of water 
issues and will further act as a barrier to the potential implementation of integrated 
planning recommendations and interagency co-ordination processes.  
2.4 Eco-Resiliency Factor Four: Emergent Change Perspective   
While the collaborative governance arrangement is premised upon diverse participation 
where it is expected that new information will be brought to the table, it is the Water 
Board, through the legal mechanism of presenting evidence at a public hearing, that 
supported the element of surprise – that is, responsiveness to new information, new 
experts and new perspectives. In this research, it was the legislative experiments in 
collaborative governance – in Alberta: the BRBC and in Ontario: the SPC – that 
exhibited features of a closed system focused on an efficient completion of their 
administrative tasks, institutional goals and organizational mandates. These decision-
makers came to the planning table fitted with blinkers that channeled their vision on the 
administrative tasks, limited the scope of their sight line and directed their attention on 
the finish line: completing the end product – the water plan or state of the watershed 
report, in the case of the BRBC.  These committee members demonstrated a narrow 
perspective that hindered their ability to be responsive to emergent ecological change.  
3.0 The Possibilities for Improvement 
Collectively, the group of study participants including the analysis of their interviews and 
the legal regimes in the three study areas point to specific actions that can be taken to 
incorporate an environmental protection perspective into water source planning. Eight 
recommendations are summarized below. This summary is neither comprehensive nor 
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presents a hierarchy of recommendations, rather these suggestions are offered to 
encourage further debate and discussion on how to bolster an eco-resilient governance 
approach.  
 In all three case studies, the meeting process is open to the public. A member of 
the public at large can observe and if requested in an appropriate manner, make a 
presentation to the committee. The access to the meeting facilitates openness with respect 
to how decisions are made and the development of a water plan or license. Transparency 
in the process is encouraged and the committee’s decision-making is exposed for public 
consumption, review and critique. The observation of whether decisions take into account 
defined public policy principles can be ascertained. The general public can gain a better 
understanding of how the decision-makers have considered their submissions. The 
publication of information on the website offers access to minutes of the SPC meetings, 
reports and submissions made by the various delegations offers the public a better 
understanding of how decisions are made with respect to the local watershed. A citizen 
can gain insight into the administrative workings of administrative system that affects 
watershed and thus, their well-being.  
 Transparent processes in water governance regimes expose citizens to the diverse 
decision centers and the networked nature of the institutional system – its polycentric 
nature. Gaining this understanding of the polycentric nature of a governance system may 
open not only the public administration but also local communities to think about new 
ways to structure citizen engagement, regulatory pluralism and decision-making. In this 
way it has moved away from a conflict to a reconciliation spectrum of legal orderings. In 
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response, the state’s role becomes one of nurturer of local communities and their 
wellbeing, guided by an ethic of care principle.  
 However, understanding the nuances affecting an administrative decision is often 
hidden from the public in all three cases. In the Yukon case study, the final decision is 
made “in chambers” – the final decision-making process is hidden away from the public. 
The public learns of the final decision by way of a written decision that is posted on the 
water board’s website. In a similar manner, the WPAC Board or in the case of the SPC, 
by the government officials – (MOE & SPA’s Conservation Authority) the final decision 
document – the water plans – are drafted and finalized by the administration, hidden 
away from the public. The public is informed of the plan via a publication that is also 
reported on a website. In other words, both an administrative tribunal and participatory 
governance processes function in a similar “in chambers” manner with the decisions 
hidden from the public followed by an announcement to the public via a final document. 
Of course, in all three cases, the final decision making authority is assigned to the 
Minister.  
 With changes in technology in public forums combined with the governance shift 
to the inclusion of the civil society sector in public policy the possibility exists these 
decision-makers’ chambers can become visible. The option exists for the format of the 
decision-making forum to be transformed into an “in camera” proceeding with real time 
streaming via the Internet. For individuals living in remote communities and busy 
members of the public at large who cannot attend a mid day meeting these proceedings 
could be accessed via the Internet, which would support exposure to the decision-making 
process and the opportunity for greater citizen awareness and perhaps, engagement in 
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local water security issues.  
3.1 Foster Social Capital & Networking & Community Building  
Participatory processes are viewed in the literature as encouraging social capital. In the 
Alberta and Ontario case studies, a strong form of social capital and networking was 
exhibited. The committee members had established relationships that would allow them 
to connect beyond the work of the committee. For example, one SPC explained: “Yes, 
Wholeheartedly” I trust the committee members. “I have been contacted by people and I 
have contacted people regards to things … If I need clarification I just pick up the 
phone.”736 The possibility exists that with the formation of networks and community 
social capital perhaps individuals will come together in a supportive manner to pursue 
additional water challenges that the community will begin to face; as result of changing 
water conditions created by change climate, urban development challenges and changes 
in the provincial political landscape.  
 An opportunity exists for regulatory regimes and its supporting legal system to 
encourage rather than contain these communities of social capital. Water security issues 
exist at local, regional, national and global scales. Together these multi-level and 
interconnected governance scales, combined with the crisis mode of governance that 
prevails in environmental regulation regimes (as demonstrated by the Walkerton tragedy 
and the Alberta water security issues) illustrates not only the limits of traditional legal 
problem solving but also the possibility that transnational environmental challenges will 
create the momentum to re-conceptualize regulatory regimes and approaches to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
736 Interview of 29 (Dec. 14, 2012) Interview notes at p 13.  
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jurisprudence.737 
3.2 Changing to a Social-Ecological Perspective of Water  
In Alberta, the shared responsibility perspective of water protection suggests a conceptual 
change in the public’s view of environmental protection: water – is a shared resource to 
be protected in partnership with the state. Perhaps, this change in perspective also points 
to a SES (social-ecological systems) perspective of a regulatory regime where individuals 
will self-organize in pursuit of protection of a natural resource.738 Participating on a 
WPAC provides for individual and collective learning and gaining knowledge of the 
environmental issues facing a watershed. This ecological understanding gained from the 
participatory process combined with a legislative intent explicitly expressing “shared 
responsibility” points to a re-orientation of the traditional environmental regulatory 
paradigm of the state as the primary custodian of environmental protection. The 
possibility exists for a social-ecological perspective to become interpreted by the courts 
and embedded in legal doctrine.  
3.3 Encouraging Surrogate Regulators  
In order to be responsive to the ecological conditions in a watershed, a monitoring and 
enforcement function based upon the participation of non-state actors could be integrated 
into the regulatory regime. In the literature, non-state actors are viewed as a potential 
resource -- a “complement to, direct government regulation.”739 Participatory, pluralistic 
and localized modes of governance allow for the diverse participation of range of non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 D. A. Kysar, “What Climate Change can do for Tort Law? (2011) 40 Environmental Law (Yale Law 
School Working Paper no. 215) 1. 
738 Ostrom, Supra. note 161.  
739 N. Gunningham, M. Phillipson & P. Grabosky, “Harnessing Third Parties as Surrogate Regulators: 
Achieving Environmental Outcomes by Alternative Means” (1999) 8 Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 211 at 212.  
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state actors who gain local knowledge of watershed conditions. Through social 
mechanisms and norms these actors can act as surrogate regulators to modify behaviour 
in their community, and beyond. In other words, non-state actors are directly engaged to 
lend support to the state’s monitoring and enforcement roles. In recognition of 
decentralizing water governance to engage ordinary citizens, these individuals are 
effectively transformed into environmental police (partners in the compliance and 
enforcement activities). In support of new role for citizens, the state can provide “1-800” 
hotlines to report offences and with a follow-up posting detailing the state’s response to 
the individuals charged with an offence. Social media can be used to inform individuals 
of water security issues and responses by local commercial entities. In effect, the state is 
encouraging a form of social-environmental responsibility reporting on local watershed 
conditions.  
3.4 Thinking About Innovation & Knowledge Transfer Opportunities 
In this research, two modes of water governance were featured: a co-management water 
board and a participatory, pluralistic and localized water committee. Both of these modes 
of governance are now the dominant legal models in Canada; yet, operate as two distinct 
bodies with different purposes: 1) the water board’s function - to facilitate the licensing 
of water permits process primarily for economic development purposes; and, 2) water 
committees - water management planning to gain an understanding of the environmental 
state of the local water conditions and the risks to public health – drinking water. In the 
regulatory literature, both of these modes of governance are considered unique and 
innovative ways to bring local communities interests into an administratively structured 
waterscape. Legal governance scholars are challenged by the complexity embedded in 
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these models and as exposed in this research: how to craft legal models where theory 
informs the actual on ground practice? The opportunity exists for continued innovation 
and knowledge transfer between those who practice water governance and those who 
structure the legal modes of governance. Governance scholars should begin to ask deeper 
questions about: What lessons can be learned from comparing and contrasting the legal 
governance models created by environmental regulation? Consideration should be given 
to whether water security issues (flooding events, water scarcity) will continuously re-
structure these modes of governance without leading to protective water policies. This 
limited research demonstrates the possibilities of law as a flexible instrument to structure 
and meet the challenges created by decision-making processes and norms of law-making 
that operate outside a courtroom but within communities.  
4.0  Recommendations to Strengthen the Governance Mode 
Introduction: Regulatory regimes emerge and are uniquely situated within its 
sociopolitical and organizational fitness environment. 740  Similar to the management 
literature’s discussion of the organizational fitness or an administration structure’s 
responsiveness to change, the regulatory regimes under study in this research are 
responsive to distinct sociopolitical environments resulting in three different images of 
the state’s function in water governance: Alberta – The Enigma state; Ontario - The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740 S. C. Voelpel, M. Leibold & K. M. Mahmoud “The organizational Fitness Navigator: Enabling and 
Measuring Organizational Fitness for Rapid Change” (2004) 4(2) The Journal of Change Management 123 
at 128. These business management scholars define organization fitness as an “organization’s ability to 
adapt and survive in the ever-changing business environment. [It] is achieved through natural evolution, 
purposeful change and continuous learning. Moreover, it is an organizational ability to effect dynamic and 
spontaneous changes in its extended business network processes and to ensure systemic co-evolution of the 
socio-cultural system to create new and improved stakeholder value It also encompasses managers’ 
capability to effect meaning that is make sense of socio-cultural trends and provide context to internal and 
external stakeholders, to enable improved co-evolution and stakeholder success.” 	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Chameleon State and The Yukon: The Mechanized State. Each one of these metaphors is 
reflective of organizational fitness and the sociopolitical context of the administrative 
state. The policy-driven, partnership model that reinforces Alberta’s WPAC resulted in 
an ambiguous characterization of the role of the state. The role of province in localized 
water governance remained a riddle throughout this research endeavor. In contrast, in the 
Yukon, the mining sector’s strong economic development achievements have, in part, 
been enabled through the state’s efficient mechanized machine that ensures water 
licenses are administered in timely manner. In Ontario, water governance remained a 
state-centric function where the steering and rowing functions of the state oscillate 
depending on the degree of oversight the province wishes to extend over the committee’s 
decision-making process.  
 Nevertheless, in all three water governance case studies the mode of governance 
is reinforced by a state presence. An orientation that is responsive to the socio-political 
context, perhaps, reshapes the structure of the state and brings into question the 
contention of a fundamental shift towards a governance mode and the de-centering of the 
state. Given the state’s strong role in water governance and in order to strengthen water 
governance in the jurisdictions under study and to expand upon participatory principle set 
out by Gunningham et al., eight recommendations are offered. The following 
recommendations are directed at the Province and the Territories’ control over water 
governance and take into account the legal analysis, the participant’s interview responses 
and my observations of the water committees’ decision-making:  
4.1 Strengthen Transparency  
In order to create greater openness in the process and opportunities for citizen 
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participation in local water governance the format of the decision-making forum should 
be transformed into an “in camera” proceeding with real time streaming via the Internet.  
4.2 Test the Readiness of the Participants to Participate in a Collaborative 
Govenance Arrangement.  
Through an on-line forum, potential committee members could be provided access to the 
core procedural documents necessary to participate in the committee and then, their 
knowledge could be assessed via on line testing to ensure competency. For example, the 
decision-making rules outlining the meaning of consensus could be provided to 
participants. Moreover, to increase the participant’s understanding of the legislative 
framework, a plain language explanation of the legislation and the legislative tools should 
be offered as a on-line training document. 
4.3 Strengthen Diversity 
a)   Recognizing the challenge of fostering inclusiveness and diversity on a 
committee, as experienced in the Ontario case study, the intercultural competence 
of the committee members must be developed by introducing education tools that 
advance an attitude and openness towards cultural inclusion, different ways of 
knowing water and additional legal orders such as, Indigenous Laws.  
b)   To increase the diversity of thought within the water planning process, a targeted 
comment process that is inclusive of environmental groups, First Nations, the 
general-public, health and other non-governmental organizations should be 
designed. In order to offset the lack of participation from these groups, the draft 
water plans should be circulated for comment beyond the existing interministerial 
boundaries and public participation process. Additional outreach mechanisms 
should also be developed and should consider how the Internet and social media 
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can be used to target a broad range of citizens, non-governmental organizations 
and First Nation groups.  
4.4 Create A Regulatory Administrative Coordinating Mechanism 
In recognition of regulatory fragmentation and in the spirit of the Farber and Freeman’s 
modular regulation model including the blurring of private, public and non governmental 
organizational sectors’ role in contemporary water governance, a coordinating 
mechanism should be legislatively prescribed to allowed for greater cooperation, 
harmonization of authority and solutions to address the problem.  
4.5 Changing to a Social-Ecological Perspective of Water 
In Alberta, the shared responsibility perspective of water protection suggests a conceptual 
change in the public’s view of environmental protection: water – is a shared resource to 
be protected in partnership with the state. This change in perspective also points to a 
social-ecological perspective (SES) of a regulatory regime where individuals may self-
organize in pursuit of protection of a natural resource. In order to nudge a water 
committee’s behaviour to recognize the SES perspective, an explanatory note or a 
preamble could be added to the regulatory instrument to clarify the intent of the 
legislation.  
4.6 Implement Adaptive Governance Based on Adaptive Management Principles  
In order to be responsive to the learning experienced in the committee regarding the 
ecological conditions in a watershed and to assist in understanding the ecological changes 
occurring in the watershed, a monitoring and enforcement function based upon the 
adaptive management model should be integrated into the regulatory regime.  
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4.7 Encourage the Role of the Civil Society Sector as Surrogate Regulators and 
Foster Public Awareness of Water Security Issues 
The committee members and the public at large should be encouraged to participate as 
surrogate regulators to modify behaviour in their community, and beyond. In support, the 
province can provide “1-800” hotlines to report offences and with a follow-up posting of 
individuals charged with an offence. Social media and forms of communication can be 
used to inform individuals of water security issues and responses by local commercial 
entities; in other words, the state can encourage a form of social-environmental 
responsibility reporting on local watershed conditions.  
4.8 Conduct Further Research a)   In	  order	  to	  support	  the	  public	  law	  value	  of	  environmental	  protection	  and	  to	  counter	   the	   power	   imbalances	   within	   a	   shared	   governance	  model,	   explicit	  policies	   creating	   procedural	   mechanisms	   encouraging	   environmental	  protection	  values	  must	  be	  researched,	  developed	  and	  introduced	  into	  water	  source	  planning	  processes.	  	  b)   In	   light	   of	   the	   new	   constitutional	   arrangements	   created	   by	   the	   Final	  Agreements	  with	  First	  Nation	  groups	  and	  the	  explicit	  naming	  of	  First	  Nations	  and	   the	   general-­‐‑public	   on	   provincial	   water	   committees,	   research	   must	   be	  conducted	  to	  understand	  the	  barriers	  facing	  these	  groups	  from	  participating.	  	  c)   In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   shift	   in	   the	   public’s	   perspective	   on	  water — is a 
shared resource to be protected in partnership with the state — further research 
by legal scholars on this emerging trend is needed in order to be responsive to the 
privatization of governance effect upon this common pool resource. 	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Appendix “A” – The Interview Instrument 
 
Interviewee: Code # __________________ 
 
Part One: Interview Protocol 
 
At the beginning of the interview, I will:  
1. First, make a brief statement regarding my research – My research is focused on water 
governance regimes in Canada and the recent regulatory change towards a participatory 
mode of governance.  
2. Explain the purpose of the interview and the format and that they can stop the 
interview at any time;  
3. Address the terms of confidentiality;  
4. Indicate how long the interview will take – one hour max 
5. Tell them how to get in touch with you later if they want to;  
6. Explain the interview Terminology – when I use the term – participant – it means the 
same as stakeholder 
7. Ask them if they have any questions  
8. Obtain their signature on the consent form before you both get started with the 
interview.  
 
Part Two: Interview Questions 
 
A. Flexibility:  
1.   Please tell me how have your experiences as a water law expert/ Bow River Basin 
Council member influenced or not influenced you in the decisions that you have 
made with respect to protecting the watershed and its sub- basins? 
2.   Follow-up questions:  
a.   Could you say more about your decision-making role – using an example, 
from your experience could you describe how the Council’s decision-
making or your decision-making was responsive to changing 
environmental watershed conditions? 
b.   Was this example/problem outlined in a report – such as BRBC’s 
watershed report? 
c.   Probing question – with respect to your example, would you describe this 
decision-making as adaptive to changing environmental information? 
d.    Specifying question – could you describe a range of regulatory tools or 
techniques that were recommended by the Council to respond to this 
problem.  
e.   Direct question – did you feel you have enough information to make an 
informed decision? Or did you need an updated watershed report or 
additional information to make an informed decision? 
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B. Broad Perspective:  
3.   By way of an environmental problem in your watershed, could you Please tell me 
about your experience with how the Council addresses overlapping jurisdictional 
problems?  
4.   Follow-up questions:  
a.   Could you tell me more about how an overlapping jurisdictional or multi-
level participant problem was resolved by the Council?  
b.   Probing question: Did the Council’s overlook a perspective or an existing 
or an emerging watershed problem (e.g., pharmaceuticals in the watershed 
or fracking)  
c.   Probing question – following up [on the example given] would you 
describe the Council’s solution as 1) a local solution or 2) a solution that 
took into account regional or 3) national water perspective?  
d.   Direct question – by way of example, can you please describe how the 
Council’s decisions are communicated to external parties?  
e.   Direct question – by way of an example, can you please describe the 
Council’s protocol for informing a community of water source protection 
threat?  
f.   Specifying question – what did the Council do next to deal with the threat?  
g.   Specifying question – do you think the Council or the provincial 
government is accountable for the environmental state of the watershed? 
 
C. Diversity:  
5.   By way of an environmental problem in your watershed, could you Please 
describe whether the Council’s or your decision-making considers a range of 
participant perspectives (e.g., local citizens & quad-state parties: First Nations, 
municipal, provincial, federal)? 
6.   Follow-up questions:  
a.   Probing question – could you tell me more, by way of an example, how 
different perspectives are taken into account into the final product – the 
plan? 
b.   Specific question – did these different perspectives expand your 
understanding of the problem? 
c.   Probing question – can you tell me more about whether the group has 
created a trusting environment to allow for the development of network of 
local or regional watershed experts? 
d.   Direct question – by way of an example, was indigenous knowledge taken 
into account?  
e.   Indirect question – from your perspective, how would most Council 
members describe their decision-making role?  
f.   Probing question – can you tell me more about how conflicts are resolved 
within the group (i.e., through a formal process or informally)?  
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D. Emergent Change:  
7.   By way of an environmental problem in your watershed, could you Please 
describe how the Council responds to emerging issues (climate change, fracking) 
with respect to the watershed? – that is, the element of surprise. 
8.   Follow-up Questions:  
a.   Probing Question – can you tell me about whether the Council’s decision-
making process can respond to this new information, create feedback 
mechanisms and learn from the experience? 
b.   Indirect question – how would most of the council member’s describe the 
council’s culture – responsive to changing information? 
c.   Specify question – who would you describe as being accountable for the 
environmental protection of the watershed? (The Council or the Province 
or the Federal Government or the local community) 
d.   Specify question – what party is responsible for creating policy directives?  
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Appendix “B” – The Four Part-Motion 
The following detailed four-part motion is representative of a typical exchange between 
the committee members. L. Marshall and P. Eng, Source Protection Program Director, 
“Background on Quarry as a Drinking Water Threat – Report No. SPC-10-02-01, 
February 4, 2010”, online: Lake Erie Source Protection Committee 
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/SPC021001.pdf>.  
 
As result of the issue being brought forward by a public interest representative at the 
Source Protection Committee’s December 3, 2009 meeting, the following motion was 
deferred and a staff report was developed, which stated:  
 
“THAT the Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee recommend to the Ministry of 
the Environment that quarrying activities that involve mining the aquitard overlying an 
aquifer which is used as a source of drinking water be added to the list of drinking water 
threats.”  
 
Subsequent to the meeting, Ms. Minshall drafted Report SPC-10-02-01 and revised the 
December 3, 2009 motion by setting out the following four part recommendation, which 
was then sent onto the Ministry and requested the following:  
 
“THAT the Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee recommend to the Minister 
of the Environment that Regulation 287/07 section 1.1 subsection (1) be amended to add 
excavation that breaches the aquitard protecting a municipal drinking water supply 
aquifer to the list of activities that are prescribed drinking water threats; and  
 
THAT the Lake Erie Source Protection Committee identify excavation below the water 
table as an activity that may be a drinking water threat and request the Director to 
establish the hazard rating of the activity based on the release of pathogens to the aquifer 
that results from the breach of the confining layer protecting the aquifer; and  
 
THAT the Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee request that the upcoming 
source protection planning regulation provide for policies intended to deal with transport 
pathways that increase the vulnerability of a drinking water source such that significant 
threats are or can be created; and 
 
THAT the Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee request that pit and quarry 
licences issued under the Aggregate Resources Act be included in the list of instruments 
to be prescribed in the upcoming source protection planning regulation; also see Lake 
Erie Source Protection Committee Meeting Minutes, February 4, 2010, online: Lake Erie 
Source Protection Region  
 
<http://www.sourcewater.ca/swp_committee/020410_spc_minutes.pdf>.  
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The Background Report and the foregoing four recommendations were presented to the 
SPC at the February 4, 2010 Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee and were 
commented upon, the amendments made were noted and the four recommendations were 
voted upon and the following resolutions were passed:  
 
Res. No. 07-10 Moved by: M. Goldberg  (i.e., public representative) Seconded by: J. 
Laird Carried (1 opposed). THAT the Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee 
recommend to the Minister of the Environment that Regulation 287/07 section 1.1 
subsection (1) be amended to add excavation that breaches the aquitard protecting a 
municipal drinking water supply aquifer to the list of activities that are prescribed 
drinking water threats.  
 
M. Wales asked if the wording for the second motion was going to be amended. L. 
Minshall (Source Protection Director) proposed amending the wording to add “that 
breaches the confining layer protecting the aquifer”.  
 
M. Goldberg (public interest representative) and J. Laird accepted the friendly 
amendment. B. Ungar pointed out that there is more than just the risk of pathogens, and 
suggested changing the wording to acknowledge this. A. Henry suggested changing 
“pathogens” to “contaminants”.  
 
B. Ungar agreed this would address his concern. M. Goldberg and J. Laird accepted the 
friendly amendments. Res. No. 08-10 Moved by: M. Goldberg  Seconded by: J. Laird 
Carried (2 opposed)  
 
THAT the Lake Erie Source Protection Committee identify excavation below the water 
table that breaches the confining layer protecting the aquifer as an activity that may be a 
drinking water threat and request the Director to establish the hazard rating of the 
activity based on the release of contaminants to the aquifer that results from the breach 
of the confining layer protecting the aquifer.  
 
Res. No. 09-10 Moved by: M. Goldberg  Seconded by: J. Laird Carried (1 opposed) 
THAT the Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee request that the upcoming 
source protection planning regulation provide for policies intended to deal with transport 
pathways that increase the vulnerability of a drinking water source such that significant 
threats are or can be created.  
 
Res. No. 10-10 Moved by: M. Goldberg  Seconded by: J. Laird Carried (1 opposed) 
THAT the Lake Erie Region Source Protection Committee request that pit and quarry 
licences issued under the Aggregate Resources Act be included in the list of instruments 
to be prescribed in the upcoming source protection planning regulation. 
 
